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Preface 
This symposium on the Applications of Research on Human Decision- 
making was held at  the Ames Research Center and was sponsored by the 
Human Performance Branch of the Biotechnology Division. This sympo- 
sium and many of the studies reported are part of NASA's Human Factors 
Systems Program, directed by Walton L. Jones, M.D., and the Electronics 
and Controls Program, directed by Frank J. Sullivan. 
These proceedings reflect some of the efforts underway to close the 
gap between basic research and its applications. 

Foreword 
In recent years, there has been a general trend toward increased com- 
plexity in man-machine systems. Examples of particular interest to the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration include large and fast 
aircraft, manned spacecraft, and elaborate ground-based facilities for the 
control of space missions. Typically, such systems employ man primarily 
as a systems manager, with many requirements placed upon him for com- 
plex decisionmaking. Such emphasis makes it likely that any human error 
in the operation of such systems will be one involving decisionmaking. 
Laboratory workers in the behavioral sciences have become increasingly 
concerned with studying complex behavioral processes. Early laboratories 
stressed investigations of such relatively simple processes as sensory dis- 
criminations and reaction times. There has been an increasing interest 
over the past few years in complex information processing and decision- 
making, and a substantial body of information has been developed. This 
research has developed not only from concerns with hardware systems but 
also from problems of education, social interaction, and so forth. Thus 
there is a growing body of laboratory data available for application to 
NASA concerns. 
The Human Performance Branch of the NASA Ames Research Center 
has been deeply involved in this type of research for several years. This 
work has been supported by the Biotechnology Division and by the Elec- 
tronics and Control Division of the NASA Office of Advanced Research 
and Technology. As elements of a mission-oriented agency, we are particu- 
larly concerned with the application of this information to operational 
problems. 
Laboratory research in the behavioral sciences employs simplified 
analogs to the "real world." Such simplification involves a risk that essen- 
tial elements may be missing, making comparisons between the laboratory 
and the operational situation invalid. The development of valid methods 
permitting transitions between the two domains depends upon a person (or 
a team) having substantial familiarity with both. Such people, and such 
teams, are rare. 
I t  was the purpose of the conference on Applications of Research on 
Human Decisionmaking to bring together representatives of the two 
domains in order to make each group more aware of the concerns, require- 
ments, and capabilities of the other. 
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Introduction 
JOHN A. §WETS 
Bolt, Bernnek G Newman, Znc. 
This conference is concerned with the 
applications of psychological research to the 
operational problems that NASA faces. Al- 
though the theme of this conference is "hu- 
man decisionmaking," human information 
processing will also be discussed. Some of 
the speakers will emphasize the parts of their 
research that seem to them to be applied or 
to have potential applications. There will be 
variability, of course, within and across 
speakers. In fact, for some of the research 
that is going on, it is not entirely clear that 
there are immediate applications, Outside 
discussants have been invited partly to ease 
this confrontation of researchers and people 
who know about real problems and to facili- 
tate the conversation between them. The 
discussaiits know about the research and 
have some background with the kinds of 
problems to which we want to make applica- 
tions; they have also done some research 
themselves. 
Decisions are ubiquitous. If we sometimes 
have misgivings about how effectively psy- 
chological research is applied, a t  least we can 
feel confident here that we have a topic that 
is significant. We can hardly avoid decisions, 
and, understandably, the study of decision- 
making is very complex. We are going to 
consider decisions in several contexts : the 
pilot's task, sensory processes, motor proc- 
esses, probability judgments, and so forth. 
There are, however, a variety of kinds of 
research on human decisionmaking that we 
will not discuss, and it will be well to keep 
that in mind as we welcome the first speaker. 
Decisionmaking in the Manual Control of Aerospace Vehicles 
GEORGE A. RATHERT, Jw. 
NASA Ames Resewrch Ce~ter  
These remarks concern the role of decision- 
making in the operation and control of piloted 
aerospace vehicles. Specifically, we will re- 
view selected portions of the engineering 
research used to develop manual control sys- 
tems to point out areas where the decision- 
making process is a significant problem in 
establishing satisfactory dynamic behavior 
of the pilot-control system-vehicle combina- 
tion. The motive is to interest you in these 
problems and to describe them with sufficient 
clarity to permit you to evaluate the possible 
contribution of your own studies. Obviously, 
many different decisions occur a t  a formida- 
ble rate in any given flight; but I have lim- 
ited consideration to problems for which I 
feel there is a reasonable chance of fruitful 
interaction between our disciplines. 
With this in mind, we will primarily con- 
sider problems actively studied on piloted 
simulators, for a simple but very significant 
reason. Generally speaking, if engineers have 
a problem on a simulator, an attractive ex- 
perimental setup exists in which you can 
participate by asking. By definition, a suc- 
cessful simulation presents a specific problem 
or decision to be made. The presentation is 
often limited to the factors relevant to that 
decision; it has reliable presentation of cues, 
unlimited reproduction of the experiment, 
and uses sophisticated subjects, test pilots, 
and astronauts with established proficiencies 
of a caliber that very often are not accessible 
to experimenters in any other way. In other 
words, it is a running start on a pertinent 
experimental design that might satisfy even 
a human-performance expert. 
This sounds like we are trying "to estab- 
lish a more productive relationship between 
mission-oriented simulation and human-per- 
formance research," a phrase taken from a 
paper by Knowles (ref. 1). This paper fits 
the theme of our conference, and I would like 
to relate some of Knowles' ideas to the situa- 
tion, a t  least a t  Ames. 
There is a continuous spectrum between 
aerospace simulation and human-perform- 
ance research. At one extreme is the one- 
shot mission-oriented task simulator in which 
our chief pilot, George Cooper, makes a yes- 
no decision on the feasibility of a specific 
pilot task; at  the other extreme are the 
signal-recognition experiments in Trieve 
Tanner's laboratory. We are all aware of the 
friendly bickering that points out the defi- 
ciencies of either approach. The task simu- 
lator yields little data that is valid for a 
general case or directly applicable to pre- 
dicting the performance of a new and a 
different task; and Dr. Tanner's model situa- 
tions will not tell us if Mr. Cooper can 
actually land the airplane. 
There is, in the middle of this spectrum, 
what Dr. Obermayer (ref. 2) has called the 
forgotten man-the systems engineer who, 
on the basis of past findings a t  both ends of 
the spectrum, must predict future designs. 
His principal task is ultimately to develop 
and express a successful methodology for 
manned-systems design. The point is that 
there are times when experts should move in 
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from both ends and help him out, even if the 
urgent problem on the task simulator has an 
overbearing priority and if the theoretical 
model is not quite yet as tidy as one would 
like it. I am not naive enough to suggest a 
series of futile piggyback experiments, but 
I think we can manage our large, sophisti- 
cated simulation complexes so that sufficient 
work is accomplished to gain three objec- 
tives : in Knowles' terms, the feasibility 
demonstration, valid general empirical data, 
and adequate model or theory verification. 
However, we are not going to be able to 
accomplish these objectives without adequate 
participation by people who know how to 
design and conduct human experiments. The 
balance of this paper, then, is a review of 
those areas involving the decisionmaking 
process in which I would like to nudge the 
human-performance experts a little bit. 
The first problem to be faced is this: how 
to classify situations involving decisionmak- 
ing so as to present them in some orderly 
way. I am a devout coward about categoriz- 
ing decisions with behavioral vocabulary; 
therefore, the problems will be grouped on 
the basis of what the pilot is  trying to do. 
There are four major groups: 
Group I :  Immediate control of attitude 
about the flight path 
Group 11: Short-term (up to 1 minute) 
control of the flight path 
Group I11 : Long-term control of the flight 
path 
Group IV:  Overall mission or systems 
management 
In an actual mission, of course, these are all 
occurring nearly simultaneously in real time. 
As we discuss them, you will note a steady 
growth of the relative role of decisionmaking. 
Group I problems characteristically place 
the pilot in the role of an attitude sensor 
and dynamic neuromuscular controller who 
must stabilize unwanted motions created by 
the interactions of the control system, the 
vehicle, and the environment. Figure 1 rep- 
Man-machine system 
Operator I I 
I 
I I Input I 1 acquisition I system I I Display I and Central Muscle I dynamics I 
I lags and receptor process activation I lags and I I delay delay time delays I I 
I I I 
I I Afferent Efferent I I I 
I neural neural I I 
I transmission transmission Movement I I 
I delay delay time I 
I I I I I I I 
nervous 
system 
Proprioceptive feedback delay 
FIGURE 1.-Manual control process, developed by Wargo (ref. 3).  
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resents this control process in a form devel- 
oped by Wargo (ref. 3 ) .  I like it because it 
uses the word "delay" so many times. We 
can summarize figure 1 by saying that the 
pilot goes through four major processes- 
perception, decision, response, and feedback 
-in what typically must be a fast-respond- 
ing, stable closed loop with the delays reduced 
to the human minimums cited in the litera- 
ture. 
Roll 20 100 Stick 
angle. o travel. % O 
de9 -20 100 
Roll .4 20 
velocity, 0 Stick 
radlsec -.4 force, Ib 
-20 
Where decisionmaking is not a problem, 
I am going to follow through and very briefly 
illustrate the successful use of flying-qualities 
specifications and human pilot models. I t  is 
a digression in a sense, but I want to give 
you a feel for the procedure that we are 
groping for in the areas where the decision 
delay is vital. Figure 3 is a typical flying- 
qualities chart (ref. 4 ) ,  which shows two of 
the many dynamic parameters of the vehicle 
to be controlled : longitudinal short-period 
damping and stability. Figure 3 simply illus- 
trates that, given perception and response 
delays typical of a normal pilot, various com- 
binations of damping and stability match to 
give an acceptable overall response, whereas 
other combinations would be unsatisfactory, 
and would require the change of some dy- 
namic parameter. 
Time, sec Time, sec 
FIGURE 2.-Typical attitude control of pilot in 
V/STOL airplane. 
In many tasks in group I, the pilot is 
required to develop almost a reflex behavior. 
As figure 2 shows, hovering a V/STOL air- 
plane is an example. Here, decisionmaking 
is unimportant and, of our four processes, 
perception and response are the important 
dynamic parameters; they are the only sig- 
nificant delays. Notice on the time history 
the characteristic bang-bang response of full- 
control travel in response to a perceived dis- 
turbance. Within reasonable physical limits, 
this is the kind of set behavior that the pilot 
can perform while carrying on a conversa- 
tion or thinking about other problems. In 
this situation, the design engineer's task is 
to set numbers on the pilot's perception and 
neuromuscular response, and then select the 
control system and vehicle dynamic perform- 
ance (the flying qualities) so that the overall 
system is sufficiently fast and stable to cope 
with an adequate range of environmental 
conditions. He can check out his solution on 
a piloted simulator or variable-stability air- 
plane. 
(Minimum acceptable, 
emergency operation) 
10 
m 
-
Unsatisfactory 
4 
tj 
+ 4 0 
5 - m
D 
t;  - l o o  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Damping 
FIGURE 3.-Typical flying qualities analysis that  
emphasizes longitudinal short-period damping and 
stability, two dynamic parameters of the vehicle 
to be controlled. 
Figure 4 illustrates the use of mathe- 
matical pilot models. This is important to 
me because we are continually being chal- 
lenged as to why we fool with these models. 
Do we not know about the infinite varia- 
bility of the human operator, his marvelous 
adaptability to higher order control tech- 
niques, discrete control modes, and so forth? 
Of course we know about; these things, but 
even a greatly simplified model gives useful 
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Gain 
Good dvnamics 
FIGURE 4.-A typical use of mathematical pilot 
models. 
insight. Figure 4 shows a simple tracking 
task performed with two different control 
systems (ref. 5).  The real human pilot did 
quite well with one system, but his perform- 
ance with the other is obviously inferior. We 
applied a well-known, simple mathematical 
model with five dynamic parameters. By 
manipulating two of these, the model pilot 
gain (stick motion per error) and lead (or 
anticipation), we were able to derive the 
actual performance in both cases. With the 
superior system, the real pilot could have 
used a wide choice of response to error and 
did not have to worry about supplying antic- 
ipation a t  all to get the desired performance. 
With the inferior system, the choice of gain 
is quite critical and the pilot must supply 
lead. The point is that the model is not used 
for quantitative behavior prediction ; it is used 
to tell us before the systems are even built 
that the kind of system that would require 
this control behavior is inferior-particu- 
larly so in a situation where we are going 
to make other intellectual demands (e.g., 
decisions) on the pilot. 
To get back to our main theme, in group I, 
the reflex behavior is not adequate ; decision- 
making joins perception and response and 
takes enough time to impair seriously the 
dynamic performance of the system. Var- 
ious classes of these will be described by 
single examples. 
Group I consists of various aerodynamic 
instabilities of the basic airplane .and is illus- 
trated in figure 5 by a time history of the 
Normal acceleration, g 2 
Elevator angle, deg 0 
Pitch Pitch 
2 
radlsec radlsec 
-.4 -2 
4 
Horizontal 2 
tail load, 
1OOOIb 0 
Time, sec 
FIGURE 5.-A time history of a typical pitchup 
problem. 
pitchup problem (ref. 6). When some air- 
planes reach a certain angle of attack, their 
stability characteri~tics begin to change be- 
cause of wingstall or downwash phenomena. 
Instead of tending to straighten out by them- 
selves, they begin to diverge and, if left alone, 
will pitch on up to the stall. Figure 5 shows 
a pilot in a normal windup turn with the 
g-factor increasing steadily. At some point, 
the pilot perceives that the rate of increase is 
exceeding what he is calling for by the con- 
trols and he must execute a recovery and 
push forward on the stick to prevent exces- 
sive g-loads or a stall. What the pilot senses, 
incidentally, is an uncontrolled-for pitching 
acceleration developing past his perception 
threshold of about 0.15 rad/sec2. 
However, a simple reflex recovery action 
will not do. You can see on the tail-load trace 
that, depending on the abruptness of recov- 
ery, very large maneuvering tail loads can 
be developed. Whether these will exceed the 
design limits depends on speed, altitude, and 
rate of entry into the maneuver. The pilot's 
task is far from a simple reflex. He must 
perceive the motion, decide its true source 
among many possibilities, and weigh the 
hazards of delayed or excessive response in 
DECISIONMAKING IN THE MANUAL ( 2ONTROL OF AEROSPACE VEHICLES 5 
the circumstances of the moment. Quick- 
ening the perception or response is not the 
answer; the pilot needs aid in the decision 
process. Incidentally, in lieu of being able 
to aid or solve the decision problem, the 
alternative for this specific problem has been 
to install elaborate mechanical systems to 
sense the problem and push the stick forward 
at programed rates depending on the flight 
circumstances. To help the pilot in this way, 
a high penalty is paid in terms of weight, 
reliability, and maintainability. 
50 m s ,  20 
,G .z w 
-On o L o r n  
x -  " 0 %  0 4- - 
$ -50 s 7 d -20 
Damper failed Damper failed 
Time, sec Time, sec 
FIGURE 6.-Sudden failure of a pitch damper in the 
control system. 
The next problem area, with a different 
type of decision involved, is sudden control 
or structural failures that are not surely 
catastrophic. Figure 6 shows, as a typical 
example, the sudden failure of a pitch 
damper in the control system (ref. 7).  I 
deliberately chose an example in which the 
pilot is on the verge of adapting and main- 
taining control but finally loses it. Obvi- 
ously, depending on the circumstances and 
the particular failure, the pilot sometimes 
can maintain control and a t  other times faces 
a hopeless task. Figure 7 shows the predicted 
behavior of a fighter airplane when the pitch 
damper fails a t  low altitudes and the pilot 
cannot adapt. Note the divergent buildup in 
g-forces to 16 g in less than 2 seconds. Obvi- 
ously, the motion must be perceived, the 
source identified, and the correct decision 
made (eject) in less than 2 seconds to pre- 
serve a reasonable chance for a safe ejection. 
This is just one example of a situation with 
a very short time constant. There are many 
aerodynamicists and systems people devoted 
to eliminating these problems entirely, but 
there are still too many cases of "sticking 
with the ship" past the point where an aided 
or improved decision process would have 
triggered a safe ejection. 
As another example, consider a deep stall 
and spin recovery of, say, an F4H. Obviously, 
the airplane gets into an aerodynamic config- 
uration that it cannot get out of; yet the 
pilot thinks it can and stays with the plane 
too long. These kinds of decisions are made 
in an environment where I think the pilot 
needs help. 
A third example in which decision must 
be interjected between perception and re- 
sponse is termed turbulent-air upset. Figure 
8 is a time history of g-force and altitude 
Pitch damper failure 
, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I  
Stabilizer 
deflection, 0 
deg 
Pitch angle, 
deg 0 
Normat 
acceleration, 
9 
-8 
0 .4 .8 1.2 1.6 2.0 
Time, sec 
FIGURE 7.-Predicted effect o f  damper failure on the 
flight path. 
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3 
2 
Acceleration, 
g o  
- 1 
4 0  
30  
Altitude, 
lOOOft 20 
Time. sec 
FIGURE 8.-Time history of a typical upset in 
turbulent air. 
from a commercial airliner flight. In this 
case, the pilot perceives a departure from 
his desired flight attitude induced by turbu- 
lence and chooses to stabilize his attitude by 
paying attention to the wrong cue, in this 
case, airspeed. Without realizing the impli- 
cations of this decision, he persists and builds 
up a dynamic oscillation in angle of attack 
[not shown], altitude, and g-force. This 
oscillation persists until minutes later, when 
recovery can only be effected by a dive, re- 
sulting in a loss of thousands of feet of 
altitude, which he was fortunate enough to 
have. The various aerodynamic considera- 
tions forcing this choice of recovery are too 
lengthy to detail here, but the necessity for 
training and reinforcing the correct decision 
process in the pilot is obvious. 
A fourth example of an immediate atti- 
tude control problem in which the decision 
delay becomes critical is disorientation in 
flight. Figure 9 is a time history of altitude 
and acceleration in a real flight from take- 
off. We have all at  least read about labora- 
tory experiments on sensory deprivation in 
closed rooms, but this incident happened to 
the captain of a commercial airliner with 
nearly 100 passengers on board. He took 
off, climbed through heavy turbulence, and 
entered clouds. The turbulence built up to 
quite high oscillatory levels, including nega- 
tive 1 g, with all kinds of sensory cues and 
instrument readings. This particular air- 
plane has windows above the captain's head 
and, a t  this point, he perceived a pattern of 
lights through the overhead windows. He 
had no trouble interpreting that cue and, in 
a superb piece of flying, quickly got the ship 
in free fall on its side and recovered a t  about 
i200 feet. There are two probiem areas 
here : selecting and presenting unequivocal 
information to permit a quick decision that 
disorientation is occurring, and guidance in 
deciding on the recovery technique. 
One common factor that complicates many 
of these problems is false cues or uncertainty 
about the source of the motions that the pilot 
perceives. Pitching acceleration was the ini- 
tial cue detected in each of our example 
problems; however, without an orderly de- 
cision process, it would obviously be difficult 
to identify a t  the threshold level whether the 
pitching acceleration was due to aerodynamic 
instability, vehicle systems failure, turbu- 
lence, or inattention. With the newer gen- 
eration of long, slender, flexible aircraft, 
there is also an ambiguity of sign. Figure 
10 shows the situation of the pilot in the 
forward cockpit. A hard-over actuator fail- 
ure, causing the basic vehicle to pitch up, 
could actually give the pilot the sensation of 
pitching nose down; not a good start for his 
instinctive emergency recovery response. 
To summarize the group I problems 
briefly, we have examined several types of 
problems in the immediate control of attitude 
about the flight path where inserting a 
decision process must augment the reflex 
type of pilot behavior, perception, and re- 
3 
Vertical 2 
acceleration, 1 
9 0 
1 
Pressure 4 
altitude, 
1OOOft ; 
n 
1 2 3 4 5 
Ttrne, mln 
FIGURE 9.-Time history of altitude and acceleration, 
showing typical disorientation and recovery. 
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Initial g loading 
at pilot station 
'W 
Rigid body rotation 
\of body centerline due 
to first mode bending 
FIGURE 10.-Structural flexibility-the situation of 
the pilot in the forward cockpit during a hard-over 
actuator failure. 
sponse. The motion cue must be analyzed to 
decide its true source. In some cases, delayed 
response was hazardous; in other cases, ex- 
cessive response was hazardous. In all cases, 
much effort can be wasted on facilitating the 
pilot's perception process or assisting the 
speed of his control-motion response if what 
he needs is help in the decisionmaking 
process. 
Next I will consider group I1 problems: 
short-term control of the flight path. In 
group I, the pilot had to control his attitude 
but, within reasonable limits, really did not 
care about his flight path. In group 11, he 
will have all his group I problems, with the 
additional task requiring precision control 
of the flight path as well. In other words, the 
pilot is still an immediate attitude controller 
and, in addition, he is a fast-acting predictor 
of the immediate flight path. Here the de- 
cisionmaking process is nearly always as 
important as perception and response. 
The first example considered is low-alti- 
tude high-speed flight or terrain following 
(ref. 8). Figure 11 is a pictorial view of a 
typical flight path as  a function of elapsed 
time. Figure 12 shows typical displays that 
the pilot uses to perform this task on manual 
control. In the display a t  upper right, the 
pilot sees the relative height of the terrain, 
10 and 5 seconds ahead, the terrain below, 
and a heading indicator. There are other 
predictive display games, such as memory 
dots for terrain maxima and so forth, but 
the basic problem is clearly one of under- 
standing and properly aiding the decision- 
making process. Incidentally, the environ- 
ment can be quite rugged. Figure 13 shows 
a time history of the normal acceleration in 
a flexible airplane. Both actual and simu- 
lated missions with this task have been suc- 
cessfully flown for 1 to 3 hours. 
The next example problem in group I1 is 
weapon-systems operation. I will use older, 
hence unclassified, examples, but the prin- 
ciples are the same. Figure 14 illustrates the 
pilot task in tracking with an open disturbed- 
reticle sight (ref. 9), a task that is regaining 
its earlier prominence. The pilot controls the 
gun line or airplane axis with his usual group 
I attitude-control problems ; however, here 
he also must control the flight path to keep 
the line of sight on the target. The line of 
sight is not fixed to the airplane but moves 
with respect to it, by the dynamic equation 
shown in the box. Hence, the pilot must 
operate the gun line through the airplane 
control and environment dynamics so that, 
when moved by the gunsight dynamics, the 
line of sight stays steadily on the target. This 
is almost a classic example of divided atten- 
tion: simultaneously solving two sets of 
dynamic responses. 
The effects of this task on flight techniques 
and training are quite marked. When we 
first started to study the effects of airplane 
(Simulated bending mode) 
0 25 50 7 5 1 00 125 150 
Time, sec 
FIGURE 11.-Typical flight path as a function of elapsed time. 
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Heading indicator (off  course) 
Terrain 10 sec ahead 
Terrain, 5 sec ahead 
Terrain below 
Display C 
Angles to terrain ahead scaled G"1cm 
terrain below 333 ft lcm 
using horizon center as zero reference 
Display D 
Terrain ahead shown as 
relative heights, 333 ftlcm 
Height nieniory dot 
Display E 
Height memory dot (maxima of 
terrain 10 sec ahead) added 
Horizon 
(right bank, 
nose down) 
Display F 
Heights rescaled to  250 ftlcm 
oitch angle = 2.Z0/cm 
FIGURE 12.-Display nodes used to perform task 
(illustrated in fig. 11) on manual control. 
dynamics on tracking ability, even with fixed 
sights, we noticed that the Ames test pilots 
with Navy backgrounds handled the air- 
planes relatively harshly and used very quick 
and high-frequency control motions to keep 
- 1  . I (simulated bendinq mode) 1 
Simulator cockpit 
acceleration, g 
I 
0 5 10 15 20 
Time. sec 
FIGURE 13.-Time history of normal acceleration in 
a flexible airplane. 
L Flight path '~elat ive wind " 
Lead angle transfer fn: 
p = --- 
FIGURE 14.-The pilot task in tracking with an  open 
disturbed-reticle sight. 
on target. The ex-Air Force pilots, on the 
other hand, flew more gently and smoothly 
and made corrections relatively slowly. In- 
vestigation showed the cause was right in 
this box: the Navy had a very stiff, close- 
coupled disturbed-reticle sight that stayed 
close to the airplane axis a t  the expense of 
being slower to respond and show the correct 
lead. The standard Air Force sight had a 
very high dynamic response to show the 
correct lead more quickly, but was very 
easily disturbed and had to be handled gently 
to prevent oscillations. Both of these rep- 
resent reasonable compromise design solu- 
tions, but result in markedly different pilot- 
ing techniques due to the forcing effect on 
the pilot's decisionmaking process in short- 
term control of the flight path. 
Another problem that should be mentioned 
in group I1 is collision avoidance. Although 
perception is the mandatory first step, the 
pilot's decisionmaking process is also becom- 
ing critical. Increasing speeds, larger and 
less maneuverable airplanes, and increasing 
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traffic are all negative factors. Here we see 
considerable promise in automatic assist- 
ance ; however, a feasible and economic solu- 
tion must be based on an understanding of 
the human pilot's task and an analysis of the 
help he actually needs. 
To summarize the group 11 problems, the 
relative importance of decisionmaking has 
increased and there is obviously room for 
applying predictive displays, controls, and 
warning devices to augment the pilot and 
unload his decisionmaking capability. Con- 
siderable care and understanding of the 
pilot's actual behavior must be used, how- 
ever, to select the optimum form of assist- 
ance that the pilot really needs. 
Group I11 problems-long-term control of 
the flight path-differ from those of group 
I1 in that the speed of control response may 
become less critical, but the tasks become 
more complex. The relative role of decision- 
making (or, perhaps more properly at  this 
level, information processing) is much 
greater. 
The first problem to be considered is that 
of weapon-systems operation wherein the 
pilot's control task varies significantly with 
time. In the preceding (group 11) example 
of a disturbed-reticle sight, the pilot was 
required to keep the reticle on target for 
some length of time, but the behavior pat- 
tern required was constant and did not vary 
through his attack. He was firing a string 
of bullets, which takes time, and the sight 
needed time on target to have a chance to 
compute the correct lead angle, but the con- 
trol pattern did not change. 
There are other weapon systems that need 
to be aimed precisely only at  the instant of 
firing. To unload the pilot and free his atten- 
tion for some of our other problems, it would 
be desirable to let him track rather loosely 
for most of the time and then have him 
tighten up and give his undivided attention 
and best performance at the critical instant 
of missile launch. Figure 15 shows a director 
display designed to force this decision (ref, 
10).  The pilot's task is to fly so that the 
larger circle in the displays surrounds the 
target. I t  is a large circle and is displaced 
FIGURE 15. - Weapon-system operation - director 
display. 
from the target dot by a dynamic response 
that is fairly stiff and not easy to upset. As 
we approach 4 seconds to go, however, the 
large circle starts to collapse to the size of 
the smaller one and the dynamic response 
increases to pinpoint the lead angle, making 
it more difficult to cope with and making it 
mandatory for the pilot to divert his atten- 
tion and concentrate on this task. 
Obviously, there are a number of other 
weapon systems that require divided atten- 
tion, control of two sets of dynamics, and 
time-varying control precision, but it is inter- 
esting to observe how many new develop- 
ments can be rationalized on the basis of 
unloading the pilot's basic decisionmaking 
process in the disturbed-reticle-sight task. 
We concentrate the armament load to re- 
duce the performance firing time, we put one 
of the two sets of dynamics in an automatic 
missile, we signal the pilot-control-gain 
changes with director-display games, we in- 
crease the lethal radius of the missile to make 
the whole task performance less critical, and 
SO on. 
The next example of a manual-control task 
for long-term control of the flight path is 
navigation. At this point, we must comment 
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that in group 111 we have arrived a t  a level 
of task complexity in which the overall sys- 
tems designer has a real choice between 
either manual or automatic operation. 111 the 
problems I am now presenting, there are 
alternative and possibly better methods than 
manual control, but two points should be 
noted : the economic and feasible choice must 
be made in view of accurate knowledge of the 
manual-control capability; and, in most 
cases, a workable manual-control scheme will 
still be required for emergency backup. 
The manual navigation task used as an 
example is for an emergency return from a 
lunar mission. One scheme that has been 
developed is the manual use (by the pilot) of 
a hand-held sextant (ref. 11). A simulator 
was used to determine the feasibility of this 
approach. The pilot in the moving-base 
capsule read specified angles between colli- 
mated targets in his field of view. The accu- 
racy of the measurements was quite good- 
on the order of 10 seconds of arc standard 
deviation with adequate training and experi- 
ence. The important point to us is that 
critical delay in the system was the decision 
by the pilot that a particular sighting was a 
valid measurement. Again, from an overall 
system point of view, the pilot's chief need 
for help was not in the manual measurement 
technique but in the decisionmaking process. 
Probably the most prominent examples of 
problem areas in long-term control of the 
flight path are the takeoff and the landing. 
Particularly in a commercial jet transport 
where the takeoff seems to be one almost 
continuous decision tree, the decisionmaking 
process is almost more important than the 
manual-control performance, especially in 
emergencies. The takeoff decision tree is too 
lengthy to present here with clarity; I will 
recommend to those interested an excellent 
book by D. P. Davies, Handling the Big 
Jets. Davies is the chief pilot of the British 
Air Registration Board and he speaks vol- 
umes i n  the pilots' language. 
To summarize the group I11 problems, 
long-term control of the flight path, we can 
discern two trends that have been increasing 
through groups I and 11. The relative role 
of the decisionmaking process in comparison 
with perception and response has become 
much greater. Also, as we accumulate the 
previous problems and add them together, 
we have arrived a t  the stage where it has 
been found necessary and feasible to solve 
some of the more complex problems by in- 
stalling semiautomatic or completely auto- 
matic systems to unload the pilot's decision- 
making function by taking over part of his 
tasks. 
However, we greatly value the human 
pilot's decisionmaking capability and, in a 
sense, much prefer using him this way to 
using him as a superadaptive servocontroller. 
This brings us to the problem of properly 
allocating functions between pilot and ma- 
chine, which I want to stress as my final area 
for nudging the human performance experts. 
Figure 16, which is from a study by Seren- 
dipity Associates (ref. 12), shows a spectrum 
of possible approaches to a manned system. 
The upper solid line is a completely auto- 
matic approach; the lower broken line is a 
completely manual approach. Obviously, if 
there is to be a normal "ornery" human pilot 
in the system, and the task is on the level of 
the problems we have been considering, all 
the possible system-design alternatives are 
somewhere in between. In each of the prob- 
lems we have discussed, the possibility of 
assisting the pilot varies from trivial to an 
automatic takeover. Determining the opti- 
mum allocation of function, from the stand- 
points of both the human pilot and the overall 
system performance, is a serious problem. 
Its successful solution greatly depends on 
accurate knowledge of the human decision- 
making process and its quantitative perform- 
ance limits. 
We have next the group IV problems: 
overall systems or mission management. 
This group has been noted here primarily 
for completeness of outline. Although the 
decisionmaking process is, perhaps, of para- 
mount importance in this area, we a t  Ames 
have contributed little that I am competent 
to discuss, partly because in this group we 
tend to get away from the manual-control 
problems of a single pilot to those of man- 
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Allocation of function 
Command Execution of b 
FIGURE 16.-The spectrum of possible approaches to a manned system. 
aging more complex organizations. Harold 
Miller will describe some typical problems in 
this group in a succeeding paper. In a sense, 
group IV also needs less discussion from me 
because human-performance experts are al- 
ready involved and the importance of the 
decisionmaking process is so obvious. 
Figure 17 shows how all of the previous 
groups of problems coalesce into the struc- 
ture of a real mission. Figure 17 is a time 
history of a pilot adapting to an attitude- 
control failure while simulating a manually 
controlled reentry. The simulation was done 
more than 10 years ago and many such 
studies have contributed to the manual- 
control mode that was available for astro- 
naut Cooper's reentry. In what context, how- 
ever, did the problem actually occur on 
Cooper's mission? (Mercury Project Sum- 
mary, 1963). The failure occurred and was 
perceived and coped with immediately by 
manual control of attitude as shown here. 
A mission-control decision tree isolated the 
cause and extent of systems failure. The 
informed Cooper then looked for a substitute 
R O I I  angle 0 error, deg .go 
R O I L  angle, 18! 
deg -180 
P Dampers removed 
Yaw rate, 
deg/sec 1 
Acceleration, 5 
9 I l l ,  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Time, min 
FIGURE 17.-Time history of a pilot adapting to an  
attitude-control failure while simulating a manu- 
ally controlled reentry. 
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visual reference for manual flight-path con- flight path for a successful reentry. My final 
trol. He found one in the city lights of point is this: we can isolate these problems 
Shanghai and then continued immediate in our talks, our laboratory experiments, and 
control of attitude and programed it to exe- theoretical models, but they seem to occur 
cute the desired long-term control of the simultaneously in real-life situations. 
DISCUSSION 
JEROME I. ELKIND: YOU have said tha t  decision 
problems a re  involved i n  some of the examples of 
failure in group I tasks; in  other examples you said 
decision problems a r e  not involved. I do not really 
see the  distinction. It seems to me t h a t  one possible 
decision is, of course, ejecting; another is to  adopt a 
different kind of control action. 
GEORGE A. RATHERT, JR. : YOU must decide to adopt 
the different control mode. I f  you do adopt a different 
control mode, then you must evaluate whethw you 
a re  being successful or not. It would be very nice if 
sonleone who knew enough about the situation would 
be able to test  and evaluate very quickly whether or 
not the adaptation was successful. 
How do you decide quickly enough whether or not 
the adaptation is  successful? To do this requires pre- 
diction techniques of human behavior t h a t  I think 
would be pertinent to the  problem, but  the r ight  type 
of people have not studied it. In other words, when 
the damper fails, the pilot inlmediately begins track- 
ing. Something should be able to tell him r ight  away 
whether or not he is  beginning to cope with t h e  prob- 
lem. He is so busy in the reflex response motion t h a t  
I do not think tha t  h e  can make the decision properly. 
Perhaps something can measure what  the pilot is  
doing and then tell him. 
STEVEN E. BELSLEY: The basic problem is really 
to eliminate the occurrence of damper failure because 
the machine comes apar t  before the pilot has time to 
think about it. 
RATHERT: People a r e  trying to eliminate these 
problems entirely. The point is t h a t  they have not 
yet succeeded. Until they do I think t h a t  this is  a n  
area in which we can help the pilot. 
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Pilot Performance: Research on the Assessment of Complex 
Human Performance1 
If one had the responsibility of monitoring 
the performance and physiological condition 
of a vehicle operator such as  a pilot or an 
astronaut, what behavioral information 
would be necessary in order to represent his 
current, momentary level of performance? 
What biological or physiological information 
would be necessary? How would the two 
kinds of information be collated? Also, if 
part of the responsibility was the ordering 
of a return to base that could be accom- 
plished only in 1 or 2 hours after the order, 
how could the information be used to predict 
the operator's performance during that 
future hour or two? 
The fact that there is no set of correct 
answers to questions such as these demon- 
strates that little is known concerning the 
assessment of human performance in opera- 
tional systems. This problem of performance 
assessment is probably the most important, 
the most difficult, and the least-studied prob- 
lem in human-factors engineering today. I t  
is important because performance assess- 
ments must provide the ultimate criteria for 
the validation of other work. 
The final validation of selection and train- 
ing techniques should depend on the assess- 
ment of the performance of men who have 
been differently selected and trained. The 
final validation of an improved, human- 
1 Preparation of the paper was supported in part  
by the National Aeronautics and Space Administra- 
tion and by the U.S. Army Medical Research and 
Development Command. 
engineered, man-machine system should de- 
pend on such an assessment. The evaluation 
of the effects of various stresses, the meas- 
urement of performance decrements, and the 
establishment of operational limits and even 
of optimum operational conditions and pro- 
cedures all depend on the measurement and 
assessment of performance. 
The task of learning how to assess the per- 
formance of an operator in a real system- 
the pilot in an aircraft, an astronaut in a 
space vehicle, or even the driver of a truck- 
has been recognized as a difficult one, The 
basic problem is that we do not know how to 
assess an operator's performance on complex, 
meaningful (i.e., real-world) tasks. Thus, we 
have no criterion measure (s) around which 
to design our research, and because of this 
we are forced to do research on the criterion 
-to do research to discover how complex 
performance can be assessed. This may be 
considered direct research on performance 
assessment. 
Three techniques have been used in direct 
attempts to solve the problems of perform- 
ance assessment (ref. 1 ) .  They represent a 
dimension of possible approaches, with simu- 
lation techniques (ref. 2) a t  one end, specific- 
test techniques (refs. 3 and 4) at  the other, 
and a synthetic-work approach between the 
two (ref. 5). 
The major advantage of full-scale simula- 
tion lies in its providing a maximum of face 
validity; it involves the operator in situa- 
tions that closely resemble the operational 
14 APPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH ON HUMAN DECISIONMAICING 
situations to which generalization is desired. 
Apart from the questions of economic feas- 
ibility that arise from the relatively high cost 
of simulation studies, there are three impor- 
tant disadvantages: (i) There is the di%- 
culty of assessing the operator's performance 
in the simulated system. If we could assess 
this, then we probably would be able to assess 
it in the operational situation; if we cannot 
assess it in the operational system, there is 
little likelihood that we could do so in the 
simulated system. (2) There is the difficulty 
of generalization from the simulated system. 
The more faithful the simulation, the greater 
the generalization of results to the specific 
operational system that has been simulated, 
but the less the generalization to other sys- 
tems. That is to say, to the extent that the 
results of the simulation include variances 
based on specific factors, generalizations can 
be made to operational systems that also in- 
clude these specifics, but not to other systems. 
(3) Measures are taken of the performance 
of the total system; that is, system-perform- 
ance measures are used, and operator and 
hardware performances are confounded. 
Specific-test techniques use a test battery 
that consists of a number of appropriately 
selected or designed individual tasks. Their 
major advantage is that the operator's per- 
formance on each individual task can be 
assessed exactly. There are three important 
disadvantages : (1) These batteries have 
little or no face validity and, in the absence 
of criterion measures, this means there is 
little or no validating information at all. (2) 
Because there is little or no resemblance be- 
tween the test situation and the operational 
situation, there are some additional serious 
questions concerning the motivation of the 
subjects or operators. (3) The principal 
feature of "complex performance" may be 
its requirement for the time sharing of mul- 
tiple responsibilities and duties, but such 
time sharing is missing in the specific test 
technique. 
Between the simulation and specific-test 
techniques lies a synthetic-work technique 
that seeks to minimize the disadvantages of 
the other techniques with as little loss of the 
advantages as possible. The synthetic-work 
technique that will be discussed here is based 
on the measurement of multiple-task per- 
formance (MTP) in a synthetic (rather than 
simulated) work situation under controlled 
laboratory conditions. 
This approach uses a number of time- 
shared tests that are combined into an MTP 
battery. It  should be possible to generalize 
the tests or tasks to a wide variety of sys- 
tems, although their final generality may be 
dependent on the same sorts of taxonomy, 
task analysis, and weightings required for 
generalizing from the factors represented in 
the specific-test batteries. 
The essential requirements for the success- 
ful use of an MTP battery in synthetic-work 
techniques are related to the battery's having 
relatively high face validity, both in content 
and in acceptance by operational personnel. 
The content validity is required to insure the 
proper generality. The user acceptance is 
required because i t  is only on this basis that 
the inference can be made regarding the 
operator's viewing the test situation as being 
essentially like the operational situation, 
with his behavior in both situations validly 
placed within the domain of work behavior. 
The kinds of functions performed by man 
in operating the complex systems of today 
can be categorized into seven major areas as 
follows : 
(1) Watchkeeping, vigilance, and atten- 
tive functions, including the monitoring of 
both static (discrete) and dynamic (continu- 
ous) processes 
(2) Sensory-perceptual functions, includ- 
ing the discrimination and identification of 
signals 
(3) Memory functions, both short and 
long term 
(4) Communication functions, including 
the reception and transmission of informa- 
tion 
(5) Higher order functions, including in- 
formation processing, decisionmaking, prob- 
lem solving, and nonverbal mediation 
(6) Perceptual-motor functions 
(7) Procedural functions, including such 
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things as interpersonal coordination, cooper- treme right of the panel (fig. 1 )  are two 
ation, and organization. vertically arranged amber lights. Under nor- 
These, then, are the functions that must be 
measured with the tasks that constitute the 
MTP battery if the battery is to have some 
measure of content validity. 
There are several similar MTP batteries 
in use today. Figure 1 shows the front view 
of an operator panel used with the battery 
constructed a t  the University of Louisville 
under contractual support of the U.S. Army 
Medical Research and Development Com- 
mand. This will be called the BEID (Behav- 
ioral Effects of Infectious Diseases) battery. 
FIGURE 1.-Schematic diagram of the front view of 
an MTP operator panel. Letters in circles represent 
indicator lights : A-amber ; B-blue ; G--green ; 
R-r&. The smaller circles with crossed lines 
represent pushbuttons. 
With the BEID battery, behavioral meas- 
ures are obtained from the operator's per- 
formance of six tasks presented with the 
operator panel, The tasks are displayed on 
each of five identical panels, one for each 
member of a five-man crew. 
All of the tasks were selected to meet cri- 
teria of validity, sensitivity, engineering 
feasibility, reliability, flexibility, workload 
variability, trainability, and control-data 
availability as defined elsewhere (ref. 6). 
Because each task has been described fully 
in one or more previous reports (refs. 7-13), 
detailed descriptions are not repeated here. 
Three monitoring tasks are used to meas- 
ure the operator's performance of watch- 
keeping, vigilance, and attentive functions. 
Blinking lights monitoring.-On the ex- 
ma1 conditions, the two lights flash alter- 
nately a t  an overall rate of two flashes per 
second. The critical signal for which the 
operator is to be vigilant is an arrest of this 
alternation in which either the top or the 
bottom light flashes a t  twice its usual rate. 
His latency of response is recorded. 
Warning lights monitoring.-On the ex- 
treme left of the panel are two warning 
lights, one green and one red. The operator 
is required to turn the green light on should 
it go off, and the red light off should i t  come 
on, by depressing a pushbutton located im- 
mediately below the light in question. Laten- 
cies of these responses are recorded. 
ProbabiZ{tity monitoring.-Four meters are 
located along the upper edge of the panel. 
The pointer on each scale is driven by a 
random program generator. The pointer 
positions are normally distributed with a 
mean of zero (12 o'clock position on the scale) 
and a known standard deviation. Periodi- 
cally, the mean of the distribution on one of 
the four scales is shifted by a specified 
amount while the variability is unchanged. 
When the operator detects a shift in the 
mean, he indicates this by depressing a push- 
button under the meter in question: the left 
pushbutton if he has detected a bias to the 
left, or the right pushbutton for a bias to the 
right. Data recorded are the number of bias 
signals presented, the number detected cor- 
rectly, the number of false responses, and 
the time required to detect each bias cor- 
rectly. 
Three active tasks are used to monitor the 
operator's performance of memory functions, 
sensory-perceptual functions, and procedural 
functions. 
Arithmetic computations.-Three three- 
digit numbers are displayed along the lower 
central portion of the panel by means of nine 
one-digit numerical indicators. The operator 
is required to subtract the third three-digit 
number from the sum of the first two. He 
indicates his answer by use of four decade 
thumb switches immediately to the right of 
the indicators, and presses a pushbutton just 
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to the left and slightly above the switches to 
record his answer. If the answer is correct, 
a blue indicator light (immediately above the 
numerical indicators and just to the right of 
center) is lit for a 1/2-second interval as the 
problem is removed and just prior to the 
presentation of a new problem. Problems 
are presented a t  a rate of three per minute. 
The criterion used in earlier studies was the 
percentage of responses correctly made by 
each operator during the performance pe- 
riod. In the later BEID-series studies, two 
new criteria have been substituted for this: 
the percentage of problems attempted, and 
the percentage of problems correctly an- 
swered. The arithmetic-computation task 
measures both short- and long-term memory 
functions. Of course, i t  also involves infor- 
mation handling and, to a certain extent, 
higher order, mediational functions. Thus, it 
is not a pure measure of memory function- 
ing, but rather i t  is heavily involved with 
memory in a manner quite similar to real 
work. It is also an excellent user of channel 
capacity and permits realistic loadings of the 
operator. 
Target identification.-A 6 by 6 matrix 
of square lights is in the center of each 
operator panel. Contoured figures are gen- 
erated by lighting selected elements of the 
matrix. A stored target image is first pre- 
sented to the operator, followed by two 
sensed target images, presented in sequence. 
The stored target always appears as an up- 
right histogram. The sensed targets appear 
at  0°, 90°, 180°, or 270" from the upright 
(randomly determined) . The operator's task 
is to indicate, by pressing one of three but- 
tons located below and to the left of the 
display, whether the first, second, or neither 
sensed target image is the same as the stored 
image. Knowledge of res.ults is given to the 
operator by displaying his response (amber 
light) and the correct response (blue light) 
just above the response buttons. Records 
are made of the total number of responses, 
and the number of correct responses. 
Code-lock solving.-This is a group per- 
formance task. It employs three lights (red, 
amber, and blue) and two pushbuttons (one 
of which is a spare) located in the center- 
right section of the panel, just to the left of 
the blinking lights. The crew of five men must 
discover, by trial and error, the correct 
sequential order for depressing each mem- 
ber's pushbutton in order to complete a trial. 
Illumination of the red light is the signal 
that a problem is present and unsolved. The 
amber light is illuminated on all consoles 
when any operator depresses his pushbutton, 
but with no indication as to which operator 
it was or whether i t  was just one or more 
than one who did so. Verbal communication 
is necessary for this. The red light is ex- 
tinguished when the correct first operator in 
the sequence depresses his pushbutton, and it 
will remain extinguished until an incorrect 
response is made. When this occurs, the red 
light is reilluminated, the programing ap- 
paratus is reset automatically to the begin- 
ning of the sequence, and those group mem- 
bers whose position is known (i.e., those 
earlier in the sequence) must push their 
button in the proper sequence to get the 
group to the point where the error was made. 
When all five pushbuttons have been de- 
pressed in the correct order, the blue light is 
illuminated as a signal that the problem has 
been solved. 
Following a between-problem pause of 30 
seconds, the blue light goes off, the red light 
comes on, and the crew is presented with a 
replication of the problem previously solved. 
This requirement for a second solution has 
been included to increase the sensitivity of 
the task to performance decrements. Follow- 
ing the second solution and a between-prob- 
lem pause of 30 seconds, the blue light goes 
off, the red light comes on, and the crew is 
presented with a new sequence or code to 
solve. Records of the crew's performance are 
made in terms of the time required for code- 
lock solutions, the total number of responses 
made, and the number of errors (or resets of 
the programing apparatus). 
In operating the MTP battery, the concur- 
rent performances of several tasks are re- 
quired. The intent is to synthesize the several 
different tasks into a reasonably realistic 
worklike situation-a situation that requires 
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an operator to be respol~sible for more than 
merely a single function and that permits a 
variation in workload. 
The typical sort of multiple-task perform- 
ance employed in past studies is shown in 
table I. The work is divided over a 2-hour 
performance period so that the operator is 
responsible for the watchkeeping tasks all 
the time, but is responsible for the three 
active tasks only part of the time. Thus, 
periods of low, high, or intermediate per- 
formance demand can be created. 
A historical presentation will be used to 
summarize the results of the research com- 
pleted with the various versions of the MTP 
battery. This research was initially aimed 
at the development of a performance-assess- 
ment technique, at  the measurement of the 
effects of working in a volumetrically re- 
strictive environment, and at the determina- 
tion of optimum work-rest scheduling. More 
recent work has continued the emphasis on 
the development of performance-assessment 
techniques and has begun to measure the be- 
havioral effects of infectious diseases. As 
spinoff, the data collected have contributed 
to our knowledge of sustained performance 
and diurnal rhythms in man. 
A program of confinement research was 
started in 1956 a t  the Human Factors Re- 
search Laboratory of the Lockheed-Georgia 
Co. under the contractual support of the 
Aerospace Medical Research Laboratories, 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. The 
initial concern was with aircrew perform- 
ance as affected by confinement of the crew 
in the anticipated volumetrically restrictive 
work environment of a nuclear-powered air- 
craft, 
A mockup was designed and constructed to 
the scale of the nuclear aircraft. However, 
because of classification and because plans 
for the vehicle were shelved about the same 
time that support for the space program was 
increased, the mockup was changed to ac- 
commodate the panels that were then being 
developed. The total volume was approxi- 
mately 1100 cubic feet, divided about equally 
between working and living areas. 
The initial plan of study was to use the 
MTP battery to measure the effects of work- 
rest schedules on operator performance. The 
work situation to which generality was de- 
sired imposed ce~tain additional constraints 
on the experimentation; namely, crews rath- 
er than individuals would be needed, the 
work would have to be performed around 
the clock on a high-alert basis for 5 days or 
longer, and the work environment would re- 
main volumetrically restrictive (ref. 14). 
The initial battery was constructed, the crew 
compartment or mockup completed, and the 
first data were collected (ref. 15). 
The information sought in the first inves- 
tigation with the MTP battery was con- 
cerned with certain technical aspects of its 
use. For example, the questions asked were 
concerned with the rates at  which operators 
became proficient on the tasks, the test- 
retest reliabilities of the measures of per- 
TABLE I.-Basic 2-Hozcr Task Performance Schedule 
Performance task 
Blinking-lights monitoring ....... 
Warning-lights monitoring ....... 
Probability monitoring ........... 
Arithmetic coinputations ......... 
................ Code-lock solving 
Target identifications ............ 
Level of demand.. ......... 
15-minute interval in each 2-hour period 
1 
X 
X 
X 
Low 
2 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Medium 
6 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
High 
3 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
High 
7 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Medium 
8 
X 
X 
X 
Low 
4 
-------- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Medium 
5 
X 
X 
X 
X 
-------- 
Medium 
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formance obtained, the interactions among 
the tasks when performed in various multi- 
ple-task combinations, and the interest cor- 
relations. The operator panel employed in 
this first study is shown in figure 2. On the 
basis of the results obtained, the MTP oper- 
ator panel was modified, and the scale-posi- 
tion monitoring and tracking tasks were 
omitted. 
The MTP battery had demonstrated im- 
pressively high reliability, and it appeared 
to provide measures of essentially orthogonal 
functions. It imposed relatively minor train- 
ing requirements, and was capable of being 
programed in numerous ways to make possi- 
ble the study of a broad range of operator 
workloads (ref. 15). Five tasks were re- 
tained. There were three watchkeeping 
tasks : auditory vigilance, probability moni- 
toring, and warning-lights monitoring; and 
two active tasks : arithmetic computations 
and pattern discriminations. The presenta- 
tion of these tasks was integrated into a 
2-hour work period that is shown in figure 
3. Again, it should be noted that time-shared 
performances were required by the schedul- 
ing provided in each 2-hour performance 
period. 
The plan of research for a series of 4-day 
(96-hour) studies is shown in figure 4. The 
effects of the lengths of the duty and rest 
periods were investigated first, holding con- 
stant the duty-to-rest ratio. Next, the effects 
of the duty-to-rest ratio were studied, hold- 
ing the rest period constant. Subsequently, 
the most efficient work-rest schedule was 
selected and tested over a 15-day period of 
performance. 
In accordance with this plan, the second 
experiment sought to measure the effects of 
the durations of the work and rest periods 
over a 4-day (96-hour) interval. A unit 
work-to-rest ratio was used, with work-rest 
cycles of 2 hours on duty and 2 hours off, 4 
hours on and 4 hours off, 6 hours on and 
6 hours off, and 8 hours on and 8 hours off. 
Sixteen male college students served as sub- 
jects, with four subjects assigned to each of 
the four work-rest schedules. The principal 
data were obtained from the performance 
measures of the MTP battery, but additional 
data were obtained from an experimenter's 
record (logbook) and from a questionnaire 
administered to the subjects after the test. 
The results indicated that, throughout the 
96-hour period, the performance scores con- 
tinued to improve with each of the four 
work-rest schedules, and no significant dif- 
ference among the schedules was obtained. 
The data of the experimenter's log and the 
questionnaires suggested, however, that the 
2- and 4-hour cycles resulted in more favor- 
able adjustments by the subjects than did 
the 6- and $-hour schedules (ref. 7). 
FIGURE 2.-MTP operator panel used in first performance study. 
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Task 
Warning lights 
Auditory vigilance 
Probability monitoring 
Arithmetic Computation 
Pattern discrimination 
0 30 60 90 120 
Time. min 
FIGURE 3.-The 2-hour task-performance schedule 
used with the  modified MTP operator panel. 
studying the effects on performance of work- 
to-rest ratios of 2 :1 and 3 :l. 
Twenty male college students served as 
subjects. They were divided into four groups 
of five subjects each; two of the groups fol- 
lowed a work-rest schedule of 4 hours on 
duty and 2 hours off, around the clock for 
4 days, whereas the other two groups fol- 
lowed a schedule of 6 hours on and 2 hours 
off for the same length of time. 
The performance data gave clear evidence 
of diurnal (24-hour) cycling on all measures 
with both schedules. This is illustrated with 
the data of the arithmetic-computations task 
in figure 5; also illustrated is the fact that 
FIGURE 4.-Initial plan for  study of work-rest 
scheduling. 
From these data, i t  appeared that subjects 
could follow a work-rest schedule that per- 
mitted rest (or sleep) periods as brief as 2 
or 4 hours in duration. Indeed, the question- 
naire data suggested that the subjects pre- 
ferred the shorter work periods and that they 
were willing to trade off the length of the 
rest period to obtain briefer work periods. 
On the basis of this conclusion, it was de- 
cided to use the brief 2-hour rest period in 
Days 
FIGURE 5.-Comparison of the 4-2-s and 6-2-hour 
schedules in terms of number of correct arithmetic 
computations. 
the differences in the performances obtained 
with the two schedules did not permit any 
decision concerning which of the two was 
the better. 
However, there was a clear indication that 
the subjects preferred the 4-2-hour schedule 
over the 6-2-hour schedule. In addition, the 
experimenter's log indicated that the sub- 
jects who followed the 4-2-hour schedule 
averaged at least hours of sleep per 
24-hour period, whereas those who followed 
the 6-2-hour schedule averaged less than 
4 hours of sleep (ref. 8, pp. 29-34). 
All of the 4-day studies had one feature 
in common: they failed to produce differ- 
ences in performance that could be used to 
reach meaningful decisions concerning the 
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efficacy of the various work-rest schedules. 
This appears to be more a function of the 
total duration of the studies-that is, the 
4-day or 96-hour periods-rather than a 
function of any lack of effect of the work- 
rest schedules or lack of sensitivity of the 
performance measures (ref. 16). Man ap- 
parently has the necessary resiliency to meet 
the demands of quite stressful work-rest 
schedules, such as the 6-2-hour schedule, 
over relatively brief Cday intervals. Presum- 
ably, he has performance reserves that he 
can use to help him over such brief stressful 
periods. Studies of longer duration appear to 
be necessary to demonstrate work-rest sched- 
ule effects on performance. 
The results of the 4-day studies did sug- 
gest, however, that a work-rest cycle of 4 
hours on duty and 2 hours off might provide 
a highly efficient schedule for operators who 
had to perform the kinds of tasks included 
in the MTP battery. The results did not in- 
dicate whether the operators could maintain 
acceptable performance over prolonged peri- 
ods of, say, 15 days. This was measured in 
the first of several long-duration studies 
with the MTP battery (ref. 8 ) .  
Two crews of operational USAF personnel 
each followed a 4-2-hour work-rest schedule 
for 15 days. There were five subjects in one 
crew and six in the other. Both physiological 
and performance data indicated diurnal 
cycling (24-hour phase) throughout the 15 
days; this is illustrated in figure 6, again 
with the data of the arithmetic-computations 
task. 
In general, the performance cycles lagged 
about 2 hours behind the physiological cycles. 
Also, there appeared to be slight shifts in 
the cycles throughout the study-shifts that 
could be interpreted as slightly lengthened 
cycles of greater than 24-hour periodicity. 
These shifts, and the lag, are illustrated in 
figure 7. 
This apparent shift is tentatively inter- 
preted as an indication of fatigue, or a work- 
rest schedule stress; that is, as a result of 
the accumulated fatigue produced by the 
demands of the schedule, the subjects were 
reaching their physiological and perform- 
Days 
FIGURE 6.-Mean number of correct arithmetic 
computations on each of 15 days. 
ance peaks slightly later each day. This 
hypothesis may provide some interesting 
measures of fatigue and work-stress effects, 
if it is validated in other long-duration 
studies. 
In general, the data did support the hy- 
pothesis that the 4-2-hour work-rest sched- 
ule could be used. Specifically, it was con- 
cluded that, with some selection, highly 
motivated crews could maintain acceptable 
performance levels while following a 4-2- 
hour work-rest schedule for a period of 2 
weeks, and possibly for longer durations. The 
conclusion was based principally on the fact 
that 2 of the 11 subjects were able to main- 
tain high performance levels throughout the 
15 days. In addition, the majority of subjects 
indicated during posttest interviews that 
they could have continued the test for a t  
least an additional 15 days if i t  were neces- 
sary and important for them to have done so. 
The crew-performance code-lock task was 
subsequently developed, and the pattern-dis- 
crimination task was replaced with target 
identifications (refs. 9 and lo) .  The resultant 
panel is shown in figure 8 ;  the 2-hour per- 
formance periods employed with this panel 
were the same as those currently used with 
the BEID battery (as was shown in table I) ,  
with the exception, of course, that blinking- 
lights monitoring has replaced auditory vigi- 
lance in the final version. 
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FIGURE 8.-MTP operator panel a s  modified by addi- 
tion of crew-performance tasks (target identifica- 
tion and code-lock solving). 
Time of day 
(a) 
Time of day 
(b) 
FIGURE 7.--Shifts in performance cycle. (a) Within- 
day changes in heart-rate level. ( b )  Within-day 
changes in level of correct arithmetic computations. 
Besides the newly added crew-perform- 
ance code-lock task, the target-identification 
task was provided with a secondary display 
a t  the crew commander's position so that it 
also reflected certain aspects of crew, rather 
than simply individual performance. Then, 
with the addition of these crew-performance 
measures to the MTP battery, the 15-day 
study of the effects of the 4-2-hour work- 
rest schedule was replicated. The subjects 
were six highly motivated Air Force Acad- 
emy cadets-probably the most highly moti- 
vated subjects this experimenter has ever 
encountered! The subjects were asked to do 
whatever they could do to prevent the ex- 
pected diurnal cycling in performance by 
expending extra effort during those work 
periods that seem to be hard on you-usu- 
ally those in the early morning hours be- 
tween, say, 2 :00 and 6 :00 a.m. 
The physiological data (self-determined 
axillary temperatures and pulse rates) gave 
clear indications of a diurnal rhythm (24- 
hour period), whereas the performance data 
generally indicated no diurnal cycle. This is 
illustrated by the solid curve in figure 9, the 
axillary-temperature data of this group of 
subjects who were referred to with the code 
name "HOPE-11." The broken curve shows 
the skin-temperature data of the operational 
crews run in the previous 15-day study, re- 
ferred to as "OPN-360." 
The general absence of diurnal cycling in 
the performance data of HOPE-11, especially 
relative to that which was evidenced in the 
data of OPN-360, can be seen in figure 10 
with the data of arithmetic computations 
(percentage of correct responses, when the 
task was not time shared with the code-lock 
task). Also shown are the data of a group of 
10 subjects, HOPE-111, who followed a work- 
rest schedule of 4 hours on duty and 4 hours 
off for a 30-day period. I t  can be seen that 
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I ---- HOPE-I1 axillary temp.] 493.5 5 
Time of day, hr 
i? Day 6 
.- 
FIGURE 9.-Mean temperature data of OPN-360 
and HOPE-11. 
the subjects of HOPE-111, like those of 
HOPE-11, produced performance data that 
generally failed to indicate diurnal cycling. 
There was one important exception to this 
latter result in the data of both HOPE-I1 
and HOPE-111; this exception will be dis- 
cussed, but first certain conditions of the 
30-day HOPE-I11 study need to be explained 
further. 
The 10 subjects in the 30-day study were 
USAF pilots. They were divided into two 
five-man crews that followed the 4-4-hour 
work-rest schedule for the 30-day duration 
of the study. The subjects were led to believe, 
however, that the confinement for the study 
would extend for 40 days, and, because they 
did not learn otherwise until the study ended 
on the 30th day, these data safely can be as- 
sumed to show no end effects. 
The physiological data give clear evidence 
of diurnal cycling; this is illustrated in fig- 
ure 11, where the self-determined axillary 
temperatures are shown for the 30-day peri- 
od. Here, as in figures 9 and 10, rolling 
means were used to minimize the effects of 
variations attributable to differences among 
individuals and work activities. Thus, each 
2 96.5 1 I I I I I I I I 1 93.0 
, , \ \  85 --.,- 
80 D a y l l  12 13 ,,,': 15'-' 
Day 26 27 30 
75 
0800 0800 0800 0800 0800 0800 
7 
Time of day, h r  
10 
FIGURE 10.-Mean percentages of correct arithmetic 
computations without concurrent code-lock solving: 
OPN-360, HOPE-11, and HOPE-111. 
- .  
Y 8 
point has represented in i t  all 10 subjects and 
an equal number of subjects who have just 
arisen from sleep, who are in the midst of a 
4-hour work period, and who have just com- 
pleted a 4-hour work period. 
Several conclusions appear to be supported 
by the data of figure 11. First, the diurnal 
cycling with 24-hour periodicity in axillary 
temperature is clearly evident. Second, the 
drifting or lagging of the diurnal cycle- 
suggestive of a cycle that is slightly longer 
than 24 hours-is also evidenced; this is 
shown in the peaks of the broken line's being 
slightly displaced to the right of the peaks of 
the solid line. Third, it can be seen that the 
diurnal cycling in temperature apparently 
continued without much abatement for the 
first 20 or 25 days of the study. Only during 
the last 5 or 10 days does the diurnal varia- 
tion appear to be somewhat flattened. This 
suggests that physiological adaptation to 
atypical work-rest schedules will take a t  
least 20 days, and perhaps as long as 25 or 
9 
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Time of day, hr 
FIGURE 11.-Mean temperature data  of HOPE-111 : 
solid line indicates data  of days 1-15, and broken 
line days 16-30. 
30 days on the average-even where the 
environment is controlled and the variations 
due to activity are removed by means such 
as the rolling-mean techniques used here. 
There is additional support for this conclu- 
sion in the literature (ref. 16). 
The HOPE-I11 subjects, like those in the 
4-%hour HOPE-I1 study, had been shown 
the data of the first 15-day experiment 
(OPN-360) in which diurnal variations in 
performance had been noted. They, too, were 
instructed to expend extra effort when neces- 
sary to preclude such cycling effects. Al- 
though these subjects did exhibit significant 
performance cycling on some of the tasks, the 
magnitude of the effect was not great; and, 
as was previously shown in the arithmetic- 
computations data of figure 10, the lowest 
levels in the HOPE-I11 cycles still represent- 
ed substantially better performance than that 
generally exhibited by the OPN-360 subjects 
on the 4-2-hour schedule. 
As indicated earlier, there was one im- 
portant exception. This is shown in figure 12 
with the arithmetic-computations data that 
were collected while the operators were con- 
currently performing the code-lock task. The 
data given are those of the second, less-de- 
manding, 4-2-hour study (HOPE-11) and 
those of the even easier 4-4-hour study 
(HOPE-111) . The data indicate a condition 
of performance stress for both groups during 
the first several days of experimentation, 
apparently while they were still learning to 
time-share the tasks. 
Performance stress may be said to exist 
when, on the introduction of an additional 
task, performance on all tasks (including the 
newly introduced one) falls below the levels 
attained without the additional task. This 
was the case during the early days of per- 
formance when the code-lock task was added 
to the demands of the arithmetic-computa- 
tions and watchkeeping tasks. It is apparent, 
for example, from the bottom panel in figure 
12, where the data of the third and sixth 5- 
day periods of HOPE-111 are shown along 
HOPE I l l  (DAYS 16-30) 
0800 0800 0800 0800 0800 0800 
Time of dav. hr 
FIGURE 12.-Mean percentages of correct arithmetic 
computations with concurrent code-lock solving: 
HOPE-I1 and HOPE-111. 
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with the third period of HOPE-11, that the 
subjects did eventually learn to time-share 
these tasks. Also, because these levels of per- 
formance are essentially identical with those 
obtained without simultaneous presentation 
of the code-lock task (fig. l o ) ,  i t  can be con- 
cluded that the condition of performance 
stress no longer existed. 
Rather, it was during the first several days 
that the performance stress was evidenced. 
During those days, the diurnal cycling of 
performance was clearly indicated in the 
data. This is interpreted to mean that even 
when the subjects are generally able to over- 
come diurnal-cycling effects in their per- 
formances (the data of fig. 10, arithmetic 
computations without simultaneous presen- 
tation of the code-lock task, showed no di- 
urnal-cycling effects even during the early 
days of practice), they are able to dc so only 
within limits. A physiologically determined 
diurnal rhythm is present and underlies all 
performance; information and motivation 
can be used to overcome the tendency for 
performance to exhibit the same rhythm, but 
only to a point. If the subjects are overloaded 
-if they have more than they can do, as in 
the performance-stress condition-the diur- 
nal-cycling effects are likely to reappear in 
the performance data. 
The results of the 30-day study otherwise 
indicated that the 4-4-hour work-rest sched- 
ule was less demanding than the 4-2-hour 
schedule (ref. 10). It was concluded that, 
whereas with proper control of selection and 
motivational factors, crews can work effec- 
tively for a t  least 2 weeks (and probably 
longer) using a schedule of 4 hours on duty 
and 2 hours off, crews can work even more 
effectively for periods of at  least 1 month 
(and quite probably for 2 or 3 months) using 
a schedule of 4 hours on duty and 4 hours 
off. Also, the latter schedule would appar- 
ently require less-demanding controls of the 
selection and motivational factors. 
These conclusions were further supported 
by the results of four 12-day studies of the 
combined effects of sleep loss and the two 
work-rest schedules (ref. 11). This is illus- 
trated in figure 13 in terms of the percentage 
0800 0800 0800 0800 0800 
T ime of day,  hr 
FIGURE 13.-Mean percentages of correct arithmetic 
computations without concurrent code-lock solving : 
4-4- and 4-2-hour work-rest schedules with sleep 
loss. 
of correct responses in the arithmetic- 
computations task when it was presented 
without simultaneous presentation of the 
code-lock task. The solid curve represents 
the data of the two groups (20 subjects) 
who followed the 4-4-hour work-rest sched- 
ule, and the broken curve represents the 
two groups (12 subjects) who followed the 
4-2-hour schedule. 
Performance was generally inferior on 
the 4-2-hour schedule as compared with the 
4-4-hour schedule, and the stress of sleep 
loss (40 and 44 hours of wakefulness with 
the two schedules, respectively) resulted in 
greater performance decrements for sub- 
jects on the 4-2-hour schedule than for those 
on the 4-4-hour schedule. Diurnal cycling 
in the performance measures of the 4-4- 
hour subjects was generally not apparent 
except during the period of sleep-loss stress. 
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The performance of the 4-2-hour subjects 
also showed increased diurnal cycling dur- 
ing the sleep-loss period. Thus, it again 
appears that  the extent to which motivation 
can be used to overcome the physiological 
rhythm is limited ; operators, no matter how 
highly motivated, cannot achieve the impos- 
sible ! 
Several control studies have also been 
conducted, although direct reference has not 
been made to them. In one (ref. 8, pp. 35- 
39),  a group of six college students was 
tested 4 hours a day, 5 days a week, for 6 
weeks (120 hours of performance). When 
their performance was compared with that  
of the first 15-day 4-2-hour study (OPN- 
360), it was generally found that  the con- 
trols continued to improve and were superior 
to the experimentals on most tasks (spe- 
cifically, on arithmetic computations, warn- 
ing-lights, and auditory-vigilance tasks). 
A second control study (ref. 17) was con- 
cerned with an evaluation of performances 
on the three watchkeeping tasks (auditory 
vigilance, probability, and warning-lights 
monitoring) when they occurred with and 
without simultaneous presentation of the 
three active tasks (arithmetic computations, 
target identifications, and code-lock solving). 
After familiarization and preliminary train- 
ing given over a 4-day period, two groups 
of five college students were tested for 4 
hours per day on 6 successive days. I t  was 
concluded that  concurrent presentation of 
the active tasks has a detrimental effect on 
the operator's performance of his watch- 
keeping duties. The effects are similar to 
those of performance stresses, in that  re- 
moval of the concurrently presented active 
tasks invariably resulted in the recovery 
of the watchkeeping performances back to 
the previously attained levels. 
The most recent control study was con- 
ducted a t  the University of Louisville, with 
the UL-Army or BEID version of the MTP 
battery. In this study, 10 Air Force ROTC 
cadets followed a work-rest schedule of 4 
hours on duty, 4 hours off, 4 hours on, and 
12 hours off, for 11 consecutive days. These 
subjects were not restricted in their activi- 
ties except, of course, during the 8 hours of 
work per day; during the remaining 16 
hours, they were free to conduct their normal 
activities (school was not in session). 
The dotted curve in figure Id  presents the 
control group's percentage of correct re- 
sponses in the arithmetic-computations task, 
when this task was worked without con- 
current presentation of the code-lock task. 
The broken line presents the comparable data 
of the first 12 days of performance of the 
10 pilots in the 30-day study of the 4-4-hour 
work-rest schedule (HOPE-111) . 
I t  is apparent from the data in figure 14, 
as it was in the other data obtained, that 
the two groups performed a t  essentially iden- 
tical levels. From this, i t  can be concluded 
that  the 4-4-hour schedule under the condi- 
tions of the 30-day study (i.e., with con- 
trolled environmental conditions) produced 
performances that were as good as those ob- 
tained with a less demanding 4-4-4-12-hour 
100 
95 
$ 90 
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5 
.- 
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FIGURE 14.-Mean percentages of correct responses to  
arithmetic-computations problems without concur- 
rent  code-lock solving: BEID-1 and first 12 days 
of HOPE-111's performance. 
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schedule under the more nearly normal work- 104 , 103 
Day 1 I  I 2 l  I 3 l  ing conditions in which the operators were 102 101 
free during their off-duty hours to do what & 100 99 they wished (ref. 12).  - 
The men who operate our modern, com- 98 97 L, 
plex, man-machine systems are  subject to $ g6 
m 
95 2 
illnesses; they are subject to infection as 1 ~ 4  103 4 
LU 
long as they live. A large part  of the bio- : 1 ~ 2  101 9. 
medical literature is devoted to  infectious 2 ? 
diseases, and a great deal of medical practice loo 99 Q 
- 
is devoted to the prevention of infection and : 98 97 g 
the treatment and cure of infected individ- g6 t. 95 2 
a uals. - .- 104 
Relatively little of the psychological liter- ; lo2 
ature, however, has been concerned with the 
effects of infectious diseases on behavior. If 2 100 
only little is known of man's behavioral re- 
g8 
actions to  infection, essentially nothing is 
known regarding the quantitative effects of 96 0800 0800 0800 0800 0800 
infectious diseases on his performance or Time of dav. hr 
work (ref. 18).  There is little doubt that  this 
dearth of knowledge concerning the behav- 
ioral effects of infectious diseases is based in 
great par t  on the basic need for a suitable 
performance-assessment methodology. 
It is not unnatural, therefore, that  the 
present line of MTP research on the general 
question of performance assessment has 
turned specifically to the study of the effects 
of illness on performance. Hopefully, the 
research will lead us closer to both goals. 
The first experimental study was con- 
ducted a t  the U.S. Army Medical Unit, Wal- 
ter  Reed Army Medical Center, Fort  Detriclr, 
Md., in January 1966 with 10 volunteer sub- 
jects, 8 of whom were infected with respira- 
tory Pastezc~elln tula~ensis (commonly called 
tularemia or rabbit fever) and two of whom 
served as uninfected controls. The subjects 
worked on a schedule of 4 hours on duty, 4 
hours off, 4 hours on, and 12 hours off, dur- 
ing each of 12 successive clays. Exposure 
occurred on the morning of the fifth day of 
testing. As indicated by the rectal tempera- 
tures shown in figure 15, the experimental 
subjects were febrile by the 8th day, re- 
mained so during the 9th day when treat- 
ment was started, went through normal on 
the 10th day, and were slightly subnormal in 
temperature on the last 2 days of testing. 
FIGURE 15.-Mean temperature data  of BEID-1 and 
BEID-2. The axillary temperatures of BEID-1 a r e  
read from the ordinate on the r ight ;  rectal tem- 
peratures of BEID-2C (controls) and BEID-2E 
(experimentals) a r e  read from the ordinate on 
the left. 
The broken curve in figure 15 presents the 
rectal temperatures of the 2 control subjects; 
the dotted curve presents the axillary tem- 
peratures of 10 subjects in the University of 
Louisville control group that  was discussed 
previously. 
Respiratory tularemia is a febrile disease 
based on infection with the Pasteu~el la  tula- 
~ e n s i s  bacterium. It is characterized by 
severe headache, photophobia, nausea, my- 
algia, and depression. All eight of the exper- 
imental subjects became symptomatic on 
either the seventh or eighth day of testing, 
and chemotherapy was begun on each during 
either the eighth or  ninth day. Both of the 
double-blind controls remained asymptomatic 
throughout the period of testing. 
Decrements in the performances of the 
experimental subjects were measured during 
the period of illness with each of 13 scores 
that are based on the 6 tasks in the UL-Army 
MTP battery. In addition, a general index 
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of performance was derived in order to rep- 
resent in a composite score the general per- 
formance of the subjects on all tasks. This 
index of general performance is the mean 
percentage of baseline performance, where 
each subject's performance with each of the 
13 measures during the sixth day of testing 
was taken as the baseline and set at  100 
percent. The results obtained with this in- 
dex of general performance are shown in 
figure 16. 
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FIGURE 16.-Mean percentages of baseline (an index 
of general performance) : BEID-1 and BEID-2. 
As is indicated in figure 16, average effi- 
ciency fell about 25 percent during the period 
of illness. Recovery was incomplete 3 days 
after treatment had begun, with performance 
averaging 10 to 15 percent below that of 
control subjects (ref. 12). 
In terms of the individual tasks, illness- 
related decrements in performance were 
evidenced more clearly in the active tasks 
relative to the watchkeeping tasks, but the 
recovery to baseline performance following 
treatment was less nearly complete in the 
watchkeeping tasks than in the active tasks. 
During the period of illness, there was on 
the average a 6 percent drop in performance 
efficiency with each lo F rise in rectal tem- 
perature. However, individual differences 
among the subjects were very great; they 
varied from essentially no decrement in 
performance to a decrement of about 20 
percent per degree in the case of one subject. 
Additional research will be required to iden- 
tify the psychological and biomedical cor- 
relates of such performance decrements. It 
is hoped that such research will lead not only 
to an understanding of the differences among 
individuals in their behavioral reactions to 
illness but also to continued progress toward 
suitable solutions to the problems of perform- 
ance assessment. 
An attempt has been made here to sum- 
marize the philosophy, techniques, and data 
of a program of research on performance 
assessment, which began in 1956. The meth- 
odology developed has employed a synthetic- 
work situation in which i t  is possible to 
assess the performances of operators (sub- 
jects) who are required to work at the time- 
shared tasks presented with an MTP battery. 
The tasks themselves were selected to meas- 
ure certain behavioral functions that man is 
called upon to perform in a variety of today's 
complex man-machine systems. Specific re- 
search studies have dealt with confinement 
in a volumetrically restrictive environment, 
sustained performance, work-rest scheduling, 
the behavioral effects of infectious diseases, 
and diurnal rhythms in man. 
The general conclusions reached are the 
following : 
(1) Crews consisting of as many as 10 
men can be confined in a space as small as 
1100 cubic feet for as long as 30 days or 
more without observable detrimental effects. 
(2) Men apparently can follow a work- 
rest schedule of 4 hours on duty and 4 hours 
off for very long periods without detriment 
to their performances. 
(3)  For shorter periods of 2 or possibly 
4 weeks, selected men can follow a more de- 
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manding 4-2-hour work-rest schedule with 
reasonable maintenance of performance effi- 
ciency. 
(4) In following the more demanding 
schedule, man uses up his performance re- 
serve and so is less able to meet the demands 
of emergency conditions, such as those im- 
posed by sleep loss. 
(5) The diurnal rhythm, which is evi- 
denced in physiological measures, may also 
be evidenced in the performance, depending 
also on the total workload. 
(6) Even when motivation is sufficiently 
high, the diurnal cycling of performance 
may be demonstrated when the operator is 
overloaded or stressed. 
(7) The average performance efficiency 
of a crew of men will drop about 25 percent 
during a period of illness with a febrile dis- 
ease such as tularemia. 
(8) During such an illness, the average 
drop in performance efficiency is about 6 
percent per 1" F rise in rectal temperature, 
but individual differences will be very great 
and may be expected to range from no decre- 
ment to about 20 percent per degree. 
(9) The synthetic-work methodology and 
the MTP battery that were developed and 
employed in these studies yielded measures 
that are sensitive to the manipulation of both 
obvious and subtle experimental variables, 
and they provided results on the basis of 
which inferences could be drawn and con- 
clusions reached, such as those listed above. 
In short, some progress is being made on the 
assessment of complex human performance. 
DISCUSSION 
STANLEY DEUTSCH: Why did you switch from 
audio vigilance to visual vigilance? 
EARL A. ALLUISI: Specifically because of the 
environment in which I had to run the infectious 
disease studies; namely, the hospital environment 
where they wanted to keep the auditory channels free. 
RICHARD C. ATKINSON : YOU mentioned earlier 
that performanct? improved over days. . . . 
ALLUISI : I mentioned that  I could not distinguish 
between the two schedules with the performance data. 
They both dropped off, but they dropped off to the 
same degree and I could not say that the 4-2-hour 
schedule was better than the 6-2-hour schedule on the 
basis of the performance data obtained in 4 days. 
There were some differences, a s  I indicated. When 
the subjects came out of the 4-day studies, the 4-2- 
hour-schedule subjects came out essentially the same 
way they went in; that  is, they were relatively 
friendly toward each other and toward the experi- 
menters. We asked a t  the end of the study during the 
debriefing, sort of operationally, "HOW did YOU like 
the study?" We asked i t  this way (these were college 
students) : "We may need to replicate this study next 
month. If we do, i t  would be to our advantage to use 
people who have been trained. Would you like to serve 
again? If so, just check yes." All of the subjects in 
the 4-2-hour schedule said, "Well, sure, if you pay 
us." (We had paid them for 24 hours' work a day 
since on each day they worked and were confined for 
24 hours.) In 4 days they made nearly as  much 
money as  they would normally get in a quarter's 
part-time work. 
We asked the 6-2-hour-schedule people this. They 
informally answered, "Hell, no." When they came out, 
they were pretty stressed, and the clinical psychol- 
ogist who looked a t  their behavior described it a s  
stress behavior. They were easily angered, short 
tempered, not getking along with each other, and not 
getting along with the experimenters. One subject 
nearly destroyed a panel because he missed a prob- 
lem-just hit it, banged on it. The subjects were 
beginning to show the typical effects of a sleep-loss 
stress. 
We ran the study before we completed the literature 
review. If we had done the literature review first, I 
would have been able to predict that  we would not 
obtain definitive results in a 4-day study. The litera- 
ture indicates that  in order to demonstrate a work- 
rest scheduling effect, you must go a t  least 1 week, 
and preferably 2 weeks, before you can expect an 
effect. 
JOSEPH MARKOWITZ: HOW much training was 
there before they entered into the 4 days? 
ALLUISI: We used 2 days of what I would rather 
call familiarization training. We trained them to use 
the battery and then put them to work right away. 
They had one-half hour of training on each task by 
itself, and then another half hour on each in com- 
bination with other tasks before we began data col- 
lection. In this sense i t  was familiarization training. 
There is a reason for our having begun our studies 
immediately following the familiarization training: 
remember, these were work-rest scheduling studies 
and all the schedules were difficult. In order to make 
sure that  our subjects (adult human beings) would 
follow the assigned schedule, we did not leave them 
free to follow any other schedule. So we did not t ry  
to adapt them to the schedule before they went into 
the experiment. In the pretraining or familiarization 
period, the subjects worked during the day, but dur- 
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ing the evening they were free to go to Atlanta and 
do what people do when they go to Atlanta. That is 
not the way to break into a new work-rest schedule. 
So, in order to have the subjects follow the schedule, 
we put them in the mockup and started the study. In 
all these cases, however, the first 5 or 6 days of full 
data collection in the mockup are days of training in 
the usual sense: they are trained up to a baseline of 
performance, and in the cases of work-rest studies, 
these are days of adaptation to the new work-rest 
schedule. 
MARKOWITZ: W.ould you say they were well 
trained by the end of the first day? 
ALLUISI: NO; but let me explain. Each task was 
selected in part because i t  did not show much of a 
learning effect. As we told our subjects, "Believe or 
not, you can add now as well as you will be able to add 
a t  the end of this study. All the problems you are 
going to complete will not increase your skill a t  adding 
and subtracting. What you will learn is how to time- 
share mental arithmetic with other activities." Thus, 
the subjects learned the work; they learned the job; 
they learned to share the arithmetic with the other 
things demanded of them. They did learn to time- 
share the tasks, and in general they were on asymp- 
totic levels of performance by the end of the fifth day. 
Of course, the previous 4 days also represented to 
some extent an adaptation period to the work-rest 
schedule, so the learning of time sharing was con- 
founded with the adaptation to the schedule. 
ATKINSON: Those cycling functions are really 
quite impressive. If you had started them a t  12 noon 
a s  opposed to 8 a.m. in the beginning of the experi- 
ment, do you think the function would depend on the 
starting time or on the actual time of day; that is, i t  
increases from 8 o'clock up and then drops down 
again, and so forth. 
DEUTSCH: I have a corollary comment to that. 
You indicated that  a t  noon and late afternoon their 
performance would increase. I notice on your chart 
that  as the period of confinement increases, the in- 
creased performance occurs later and later in the day. 
JOHN W. SENDERS: The heart rate topped 88 
beatslmin. Why was i t  a t  such a high level? Eighty- 
eight is extraordinarily high for the small amount 
of physical activity. 
ALLUISI: I have a hypothesis! The next group of 
subjects that  we ran were Air Force Academy cadets 
who were flown directly from Denver to Atlanta. In 
their case, the heart-rate level changes in exactly the 
opposite direction: i t  starts low and ends up high. 
In their case, we suspect this change to have been an 
adaptation to the change in altitude. 
There is one report that  I have run across by a 
flight surgeon with SAC who indicates that  during 
the period in which this study was run (1959), SAC 
crews tended to go into a state of physiological alert 
about 2 hours before a mission and to remain that  way 
until about 4 hours after mission completion. By 
physiological alert, I mean elevated pulse rate, and 
SO on. 
The two SAC crews in our study had been flying 
average 4-day missions. We believe they went into 
our study with an elevated pulse rate in something 
like a physiological conditioning to flying a mission. 
Then, after the first 4 days, the pulse rate slowly 
returned to normal because this mission did not stop, 
i't just kept on going. 
SENDERS: I t  is really surprising, because I pre- 
sume their physical condition was first class, if they 
were regular SAC crews. And I would have imagined 
that a resting heart rate of something in the ordm 
of 66-68.. . . 
STEVEN E. B ~ S L E Y  : They are not resting. 
SENDERS: They are not doing physical labor of 
any great amount. They are sitting down while they 
are pushing the buttons. In your heart-rate monitor- 
ing, did you also get a measure of heart-rate varia- 
bility over the short term? I am thinking of the work 
of Carlsbeck a t  the Dutch Research Institution a t  
Amsterdam, on what he called sinus arrythmia and 
the claimed relationship between woi-kload and heart- 
rate variability as  opposed to a variation in mean 
rate itself. 
ALLUISI: Yes. As I recall, heart-rate fluctuations 
were obtained. I do not recall anything extraordinary 
about it. 
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Comments" 
DOUWE B. YNTEMA 
Li.ncoltz Laboratory 
D o u w ~  B. YNTEMA : I would like to com- 
ment on Professor Alluisi's talk first, then 
come back to Mr. Rathert's, and then go off 
on a tangent of my own. 
Mr. Rathert posed us a rather difficult 
question when he set forth a classification of 
decisions and then said he did not know 
whether that was the way psychologists 
would classify them. I feel that I must t ry  
to respond to that challenge. It is a fairly 
difficult task, so let me postpone it a little 
and come back to it. 
In a way, Professor Alluisi has left me 
with a much easier job : he has already sum- 
marized a long series of experiments and set 
them in their context. That means a discuss- 
ant does not have much work to do. There 
are just two points I might venture to add. 
In a sense they are related to each other. The 
first is the great difficulty there has been, 
historically, in doing research of this kind. 
The second is a comment on the way that 
results of this sort might feed into full-scale, 
realistic simulations of the sort he men- 
tioned. 
Historically, this has been a very tough 
field in which to work. I am not referring to 
the obvious difficulties-the almost heroic 
level of devotion demanded of the subject, 
or the almost equally heroic dedication of an 
experimenter who sets up such an operation, 
keeps it running for weeks, and then is faced 
' These comments concern the papers presented by 
Rathert and Alluisi and present related research on 
decisionmaking in air  traffic control. 
with a mountain of data when he is through. 
Rather, I am referring to the fact that as 
recently as World War 11, people did not 
know how to do experiments in this area. 
There were lots of people working manfully 
to show any kind of effect of stressful condi- 
tions on the human higher mental processes- 
an effect of excessive heat, or excessive noise, 
or sleep loss, on the learning of lists of non- 
sense syllables, or on mental arithmetic, or 
on anything else. They were not very suc- 
cessful. 
The breakthrough came a t  Cambridge 
when Mackworth introduced the vigilance 
tasks, which required a subject to pay unre- 
mitting attention to something or other for 
hours on end. These tasks did indeed show 
a decrement during the course of a long 
watch, and they have since shown decre- 
ments with other sorts of variables. More 
recently, time-sharing tasks that require the 
subject to divide his attention among two or 
more subtasks (thus presumably draining 
off some of his capacity to perform any one 
of the subtasks) have provided a much more 
sensitive weapon for investigating the effects 
of stressful conditions on human higher per- 
formance. I think it is not exaggerating to 
say that 25 years ago i t  would not have been 
possible to obtain the sort of results we have 
seen today. 
This is still a very rough area in which to 
do research. I think the rabbit-fever experi- 
ment points that out. Here is a man in a 
physiological state that would give a flight 
surgeon conniptions a t  the thought of his 
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even walking past an airplane : he has a split- 
ting headache, he cannot look at the light, 
he is nauseated, he aches all over, and he 
generally feels depressed. But we saw that 
even with the sensitive measuring tools now 
available, there was only a 25- or 30-percent 
decrement in performance. Clearly, the les- 
son is that further efforts on developing tasks 
that would prove even more sensitive to ad- 
verse conditions are going to be useful in 
making research more possible in this area. 
Professor Alluisi has indicated that he and 
people associated with him are in the process 
of developing further talks, and that is ob- 
viously a good thing. 
The second point, the relation of this sort 
of experiment to the more specific, more 
realistic, full-scale simulations, is this : I 
suspect that people who work on such simu- 
lations will look back on this work as telling 
them how to do decent experiments, espe- 
cially in simulating missions of long dura- 
tion. In setting up such a simulation, they 
will know some of the things that they must 
control if they are to get stable and repro- 
ducible results, or, to turn it around, some 
of the things they may deliberately change 
in order to get big changes in behavior. They 
will know that they have to look for diurnal 
variations. They will have some notion of 
reasonable watchkeeping schedules to inves- 
tigate in a full-scale simulation. Generally, 
they will know how to run a good experi- 
ment. 
In particular, time sharing has suggested 
the following technique for investigating the 
level of difficulty of some task: set up a 
realistic full-scale simulation and then intro- 
duce subsidiary. artificial tasks, and require 
the subjects to share their time between those 
tasks and their normal duties. This should 
drain off enough of their performance re- 
serve so that you can see how difficult the 
normal duties actually are. 
I think i t  is worthwhile mentioning here 
the parallel with one of the oldest and most 
successful branches of human-factors engi- 
neering; namely, the transmission of speech 
by telephone. Forty years or more ago when 
Fletcher was tackling that problem at the 
Bell Laboratories, it was, I gather, a real 
can of worms. People smiled gently and said 
you could never get any place with a problem 
like that. In the real, practical situation, 
there are just too many factors that affect 
the satisfactory transmission of speech. You 
could not begin to sort them out, or show 
how they all interact with each other. 
Yet, now a second-year graduate student 
who sat down and read perhaps five or six 
well-chosen references could do a perfectly 
competent job of setting up and running off 
a comparison of, say, the effectiveness of two 
telephone intercom systems. The background 
knowledge of what matters in the field is all 
there. He would know, for example, that he 
would not have to spend a great deal of effort 
and money on controlling the absolute level 
of the signal, but he had better be pretty 
careful about the signal-to-noise ratio. The 
point is that yesterday's research findings in 
a new field of human factors become tomor- 
row's standard laboratory practice. And 
everyday laboratory practice is the real rock 
on which a technology is built. 
Let me now try to pick up Mr. Rathert's 
challenge about a taxonomy of decisions. The 
classification I will attempt to set up corre- 
sponds, in a rough way, to the time schedule 
he was talking about, or to how far ahead 
the decision is made. It is not a terribly good 
classification, because it depends on internal 
states of the subject that are not readily 
observable; but perhaps someone will think 
of a way around that. 
One problem that psychologists have in 
thinking about classifying decisions-that is, 
psychologists of a certain stripe, who are 
heavily represented here-is that they have 
trouble thinking about any behavior that 
does not involve a decision. We are by now 
so thoroughly contaminated by computers 
that even a tracking task seems to involve 
multitudes of very rapid decisions-"The 
stimulus is to the left; now it is to the right." 
If a computer were doing the task, the pro- 
gram would be full of tests: bigger than? 
smaller than? According to the way many 
of us now think, these tests would seem to be 
decisions, and so this almost reflexive be- 
havior gets included in the world of decision- 
making. 
Our first category of decisions, therefore, 
includes the decisions that are almest like 
conditioned reflexes. These are the little 
adjustments made by a pilot hovering a 
helicopter on a moderately bumpy day, or 
by an operator performing some other kind 
of steering task. I t  is almost as if such 
decisions were made in a satellite computer. 
The reason I say "satellite" is that these 
decisions are not available to consciousness 
once the behavior becomes very skilled. (If 
any purists in the room wince a t  the word 
"consciou~ne~~," they may translate it. They 
can say these decisions do not leave traces 
that are recoverable in short-term memory.) 
It  is as if consciousness were located in a 
central machine and these decisions were 
made in some sort of a satellite machine. The 
central machine can load a steering program 
into the satellite, but once the program is 
loaded and running, its internal workings do 
not leave any records that are available to 
the main program in the central machine. 
One observes this sort of thing happening 
in flying very tight parade formation. It can 
be amusing to look out of the corner of your 
eye and see your hand moving, making small 
adjustments, and still be perfectly aware 
that the decisions on which those small ad- 
justments are based are in no sense available 
to consciousness. You can see a correlation 
between your hand movement and the motion 
of the airplane you are tracking, but you 
cannot find the decisions by intro~pecting.~ 
Here, then, is one category of decisions, an 
almost reflexive sort of behavior in which 
the decisionmaking is not available to con- 
sciousness. 
The second large category I would propose 
is the category of pattern recognition or, to 
use the term more traditional in psychology, 
"concept identification." These are the cases 
in which some pattern of stimuli appears to 
a person and he identifies i t  as a "whosis" 
rather than a "zoosis." For example, a t  
Mr. Jeffress suggested that  the original learning 
must have involved conten~plation. Mr. Yntenla 
agreed. 
breakout on a low approach, a pilot may be 
confronted with an almost infinite variety of 
visual patterns, but he has to make what is 
essentially a two-category decision. He clas- 
sifies the given pattern into a category such 
as "continue to attempt visual approach," or 
"get the heck out of here." 
This sort of decision covers a very wide 
range on Mr. Rathert's time scale (which is, 
perhaps, another difficulty in my proposed 
taxonomy). Down a t  the very short end, this 
kind of decision arises in steering a vehicle; 
that is, in the pattern identification of a 
pitchup or some of the other unstable con- 
ditions that he was talking about. It is the 
kind of thing that occurs when you are steer- 
ing a vehicle and suddenly realize, "This 
thing is oscillating and my present steering 
program is only making matters worse." 
You switch quite consciously to introducing 
another steering program into the satellite 
computer, and leave that other steering pro- 
gram in effect until the oscillations have 
been resolved. In sum, on the short end of the 
time scale, this pattern-recognition type of 
decision results in a switch of program in the 
satellite. 
On the long end, there is the sort of thing 
we are more accustomed to calling pattern 
recognition. One example I think of concerns 
a fellow who once came upon someone lying 
unconscious and said he could almost hear the 
voice of his old Red Cross first-aid instructor 
reciting, "When you see an unconscious per- 
son, look for bleeding, breathing, poison, 
shock, in that order." Here was pattern 
recognition: a pattern of stimuli that in- 
stead of triggering an immediate switch to 
another mode of motor behavior, triggered 
the execution of another program in the main 
computer. In this case it was a verbal pro- 
gram of the type that we would usually call 
a standard operating procedure (SOP). As 
I say, this second major category, conscious 
pattern recognition, spreads very, very wide 
on Mr. Rathert's time scale. 
Finally there is a third category, which I 
would call explicit weighing and balancing. 
These are what the man in the street usually 
thinks of as decisions. They are the decisions 
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typified by, "Shall I hang around here over 
field X and assume that the thunderstorm is 
going to move off before my fuel gets criti- 
cal, or shall I go to field Y, where the weather 
is quite good but my fuel will be very critical 
before I get down?" Introspectively, it seems 
that in making these decisions, a pilot 
switches his attention back and forth from 
one alternative to the other, as though he 
had in his head a program that was weigh- 
ing one alternative against the other. This 
is very different from the second kind of 
decision. There, the process of making a de- 
cision consists, introspectively, of simply 
recognizing a pattern : once the recognition 
has been accomplished, the decision is as 
good as made. There is none of the conscious, 
explicit weighing and balancing that goes on 
in this third category. 
To improve decisionmaking, we often t ry 
to move decisions from the third category 
into the second, and from the second into the 
first. I suspect that if you get to be very well 
trained on switch of control modes, the 
switch may become unconsc ious ,~h ich  
means that training has moved the decision 
from the second category to the first. Simi- 
larly, operating personnel are often trained 
to have an SOP so that they will not sit there 
weighing and balancing. The high-school 
coach tells his quarterbacks : "On the fourth 
down, if you are inside such and such a yard 
line, do not think! Punt!" He is trying to 
replace weighing and balancing by pattern 
recognition that triggers an SOP. 
WARD EDWARDS : Some educators, how- 
ever, would argue that their main function 
in life is to move decisionmaking in the 
opposite direction; that is, to replace the 
automatic responses of childhood with more 
reasoned responses. 
YNTEMA: I certainly am on their side. I 
guess the constraints of an operational situ- 
ation often shove us in a direction that would 
not be desirable in education. 
On another occasion I have called this 
weighing and balancing kind of decision 
ponderation. This antique but respectable 
word is related to the old meaning of the 
Mr. Elkind indicated that he agreed. 
word "ponder," which literally means to 
weigh in the mind. 
Inasmuch as our chairman has said it is 
all right to go off and talk about one's own 
work (and who can that opportunity), 
I would like to talk about some old work I 
did on this kind of decision, in particular, 
on the question of using a computer to make 
these weighing and balancing decisions. 
As missions speed up and become more 
complex, there is obviously going to be more 
and more pressure to have computers make 
decisions that we would really rather not see 
computers make. It is almost inevitable. 
You do not have to get terribly dramatic and 
think of a computer making big, crucial 
decisions that we want to reserve for the 
human. In most systems, there are a lot of 
little decisions that do not have immediate 
effects on the success of the mission or the 
safety of the system, but decisions that you 
would nonetheless like to have made with a 
certain leaven of human judgment thrown in. 
One way to make these decisions with some 
better approximation to correctness is to 
find a way to read out of the human expert the 
rules by which he would make decisions, and 
read the rules out in such a form that they 
could be read into a computer. Then the com- 
puter would make the decision pretty much 
as the human would. 
The easiest way to explain all this is to 
take a practical example. A few years ago 
I helped some people a t  the Mitre Corp, in 
their test of a computerized air-traffic control 
system. A more complete description of all 
of the air-traffic control work discussed here 
is available (ref. 1). They were testing two 
versions of the computerized system, and 
were concerned that the tests were so com- 
plicated that the results were going to have 
to be scored by a computer. But they did not 
know how to set down logical rules by which 
a computer could take snapshots of the state 
of the system and arrive at  a score of how 
well the system was functioning. They felt 
that the only way to decide whether an air- 
traffic control system was functioning well 
was to ask experts on air-traffic control. The 
experts they chose to ask were ATC con- 
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trollers, all 16 of whom had a t  least 5 years' 
field experience and plenty of experience run- 
ning this experimental system-presumably 
the best human judgment around. How could 
you read out from these people a judgment 
about what was a well-functioning system, 
getting the judgment in a form that a com- 
puter could use to score the results of tests? 
These controllers agreed on 12 kinds of 
troublesome conditions that they felt had to 
be considered (such as : track misidentified, 
two aircraft in violation of radar standards, 
two aircraft will be in violation of manual 
control standards in 5 minutes, and so on). 
They felt that if they knew how many air- 
craft were in each of these 12 kinds of 
trouble, they could give a fairly good judg- 
ment of how well the system was func- 
tioning. 
The controllers were given 26 pasteboard 
chits, on each of which a state of the system 
was summarized ; that is, the numbers of air- 
craft in various kinds of trouble were speci- 
fied in a notation similar to what the con- 
trollers were used to seeing on the computer- 
generated displays. Several of the chits are 
shown in figure 1. The top one on the right 
says there are two aircraft now violating 
radar separation standards, and two aircraft 
that will begin violating manual separation 
standards in 1 minute, unless something is 
done in the meantime. The bottom chit on 
FIGURE 1.-Sample cardboard chits used in control 
sin~ulation exercises. 
the left shows that four aircraft will begin 
violating radar standards within 4 minutes 
unless something is done about them, that 
two aircraft are now violating manual sep- 
aration standards, and that one aircraft is 
misidentified (in other words, the system 
is tracking the wrong aircraft, a rather 
serious business). 
The controllers were asked to express their 
evaluations of these 26 situations by laying 
the 26 chits out along a line. Figure 2 shows 
how the typical controller laid them out. 
("Typical" is used here to mean the layout 
that correlated best with the layouts of the 
individual controllers.) At the top is the situ- 
ation for which he would penalize the system 
most heavily in scoring the tests ; next comes 
the situation to which he would assign the 
next largest penalty; and so on. 
Furthermore, the way the controller spaced 
the chits was to indicate the relative sizes of 
the penalties he wanted to assign. For ex- 
ample, look at the three chits I have marked 
with white circles: they are about equally 
spaced. We told the controller that when he 
put three chits a t  equal spacing, like those 
three, we would understdnd that the penalty 
he wanted to assign to the middle situation 
was the average of the penalties he wanted 
to assign to the other two situations. In 
other words, a system that allowed the 
middle situation to occur twice would be 
penalized as much as a system that allowed 
the top situation to occur once and the bot- 
tom situation to occur three times. In psy- 
chologists' terms, we were trying to get the 
judges to lay the chits out on an "interval 
scale" of penalty. 
To get these judgments into a form that 
can be used by a machine, the simple and 
obvious thing to do is to assume that the 
penalties for the 12 trouble-conditions are 
additive. In other words, if we have a situ- 
ation in which the numbers of aircraft in the 
various trouble conditions are nl, nz, n3, 
. . . , nl,, the penalty to be assessed for that 
situation is simply 
r - 4  
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[GURE 2.-Typical controller's evaluation 
of the simulation system in various stat< 
rout 
where pi is the penalty to be imposed for 
each aircraft in the jth trouble condition. 
Given the positions a t  which the typical 
controller put the 26 chits on the penalty 
scale, it is a straightforward problem in 
multiple linear regression to solve for the pi. 
(And at the same time, to solve for the zero 
point on his penalty scale, the point that 
represents "no penalty." One has to solve 
for the zero point because an interval scale 
has no natural zero point.) Figure 3 shows 
the result. Each of the 26 points represents 
one of the chits. On the horizontal axis is 
plotted 
where ni is the number of aircraft that the 
chit says are in the jth trouble condition, 
and p j  is the value that came out of the re- 
gression analysis. The vertical axis shows 
the position a t  which the typical controller 
put the chit (the position being measured 
in arbitrary units from the zero point de- 
duced from the regression analysis). If we 
had managed to describe the typical con- 
FIGURE 3.-Plot of where controller placed the chit 
in the layout in figure 2. (Each dot represents the 
height from the bottom of the board; line shows 
the computed penalty S.) 
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troller's judgments perfectly, all the points 
would fall on the straight line. The fit is not 
bad, which shows that the typical controller 
was pretty consistent in his  judgment^.^ 
The consistency reflects, perhaps, the fact 
that these controllers were professionals 
making a professional judgment about some- 
thing that matters to them. Some of them 
took half a day a t  their desks to lay the chits 
out. They were not playing parlor games. 
So now we have a mechanical way of scar- 
ing the system tests. Every minute or so the 
machine will take a snapshot of the air- 
traffic situation and will record the nj, the 
numbers of aircraft in the various trouble 
conditions. The penalty assessed for that 
use the squared term-that is, represent the 
judged penalty by an expression of the form 
Figure 4 shows the result. As in figure 3, 
the typical expert's judgment is on the 
vertical axis and S stands for nipj. The C i 
values of pj  used here are not, however, the 
same in fig. 3. The fit is noticeably better 
than in figure 3. 
situation will be nipj, where the pi are the C I 
j 
12 values that came out of the regression .6 
analysis. 
A difficulty that arises in some judgmental 
applications of this kind is that judgments ," 
sometimes are not additive. Sometimes you .4 
cannot merely assign a penalty to each pos- 
sible component of a situation and then com- 
pute a penalty for a whole situation by just 
adding up the penalties for components that .2 
appear in that situation. In other words, the 
total penalty may not be a linear function of 
the independent variables nj. In that case 
you may have to add some higher order o .2 .4 .6 .8 
terms to the expression. Instead of approxi- s 
mating the overall penalty by nipj, you C 
j 
approximate i t  by 
where the C's and p's are all parameters that 
must be adjusted to fit the data. 
In the present case it turns out that al- 
though the fit in figure 3 was pretty good, 
it can be made a great deal better if we do 
I t  is mildly annoying that  two of the situations 
turn out to receive negative penalties, but that is no 
cause for great alarm. That sort of thing can happen 
when a judge is not perfectly consistent. 
FIGURE 4.-Change of notation, using same values 
as  in figure 3. 
The difference between figures 3 and 4 is 
not, however, the main point. The main point 
is that in this application it proved possible 
to read out of human experts a rule that you 
could give to a machine to evaluate complex 
situations much as the experts would evalu- 
ate them. This, of course, is not yet a deci- 
sion, but if you took two of these evalua- 
tions and had the machine choose the alter- 
native that had the higher value, then that 
would be a decision. 
Consider another example. Twenty Air 
Force pilots with a good deal of instrument 
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time in the  T-33 were asked to judge in 
what situations the average Air Force pilot 
with a standard instrument rating would 
be safer in landing a T-33. A more complete 
description of this experiment and of the 
technique for instructing the computer to 
refuse to make some of the decisions is 
available (ref. 2). The situations were de- 
fined in terms of ceiling, visibility, and fuel 
tha t  would remain a t  touchdown if the pene- 
tration and approach were flown according 
to the book. 
TABLE I.-Sample from Book of Conditions 
Used for Judgment Exercises 
Table I shows a page of a booklet con- 
taining 40 pairs of these situations, one pair 
to a page. The man was to look through 
the  pages and put a checkmark under the 
situation that  he thought would be safer 
for the average Air Force pilot. These 20 
pilots were then asked to follow a procedure 
similar to the one used by the controllers. 
The procedure used with these pilots was a 
little different and, I now think, not a s  good; 
so I will not describe it. Nevertheless, each 
pilot was asked to lay out some chits in a 
way that  would give the machine a rule for 
assigning a safety value to  any given com- 
bination of ceiling, visibility, and fuel. Fol- 
lowing this rule, the machine went through 
the same 40 choices that  the man had made 
in the first part of the experiment, and we 
compared its decisions with his. This was 
done for each pilot, comparing the decisions 
he had made with the decisions made when 
the machine followed the evaluation rule that  
we obtained from his chits. In only 11 per- 
cent of the  decisions did the machine fail 
to make the  choice that  the man had made. 
This result looks pretty good if we com- 
pare i t  with the way the pilots disagreed 
with each other. The 20 pilots actually went 
through the experiment in pairs, so tha t  the 
2 men got exactly the same decisions to 
make before they were asked to express their 
rules for making the judgments. On the 
average, the two men disagreed with each 
other in 14 percent of the decisions. The 
difference between 11 and 14 percent is not 
statistically significant, but i t  does tend to 
suggest that  the agreement between the 
machine and the man whose rule i t  was 
attempting to mimic was, if anything, better 
than the agreement between two men who 
were both competent judges of instrument 
flying conditions. 
The decisions on which the machine dis- 
agreed with the  man tended, a s  one would 
suspect, to be decisions tha t  were not ter- 
ribly disastrous; tha t  is, cases in which the 
safety values that  the man would assign to 
the two alternatives were evidently very 
close. If you crank that  factor into the 
amount of disagreement, you can get a good 
measure of the seriousness of the machine's 
failures to mimic the man's choices. 
That measure can be used to investigate 
the tactic of telling the  machine to refuse 
to make certain decisions: i t  hands them 
back to the man and tells him to make them 
himself. There are, of course, certain classes 
of decisions that  the machine makes well, 
and others that  i t  makes poorly; and i t  
turns out that  the machine itself can be 
instructed to compute a rough index of the 
probability that  i t  will make a serious error 
on any particular decision. If the index 
exceeds a certain threshold, the machine 
refuses to make the decision and tells the 
man to make i t  himself. 
For example, in the present experiment 
you can set the threshold in such a way 
that  the measure of the seriousness of the 
machine's failures would be improved by a 
factor of 3, a t  the expense of burdening 
the man with 19 percent of the decisions. 
In a practical application, you would, of 
course, pick the threshold according to how 
critical the decisions were going to be or, 
conversely, how much time the man could 
spare from his other duties. 
Situation B 
1000 
1 
200 
Condition 
Ceiling, ft. . . . . . . . . . . . 
Visibility, mile . . . . . . . 
Fuel, gal. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Situation A 
5000 
2 
15 
COMMENTS 
DISCUSSION 
EDWARDS: I n  all of these instances tha t  you have 
given us, there is a well-defined dimensional analysis. 
Furthermore, the dimensions are  common to all stim- 
uil of the class you expect to be dealing wlth. I find 
nia.ny cases coming my way these days in which tha t  
just  is not so. There may be obvious dimensional 
analysis of one stimulus, bu t  other stimuli tha t  a re  
going to have to be included in the same utility space 
have a different set of dimensions. I do not see any  
way of doing anything more sophisticated than just 
plain asking for a n  evaluation of each stimulus that  
comes along, do you? 
YNTEMA: No; I do not. Unless you can describe 
the situation in terms of some fairly clean, quanti- 
fiable dimensions, i t  is  going to be hard to  tell the 
machine what  the situation is. To tell the machine, 
"Here is the situation," you pretty well have to  have 
the situation broken down into dimensions t h a t  a r e  
coded into so many bits-unless you get into pattern 
recognition of a n  advanced sort, which we would all  
like to  see machines get to some day. 
EDWARDS: I would add, a s  I am sure you would 
agree, t h a t  the notion of getting human beings to 
judge utilities is  in  no sense inconsistent with the 
notion of having the machine make the  decisions. 
1. MOREY, J.  L.; AND YNTEMA, I). B.: Experiments 2. YNTEMA, I). B.; AND I~LEM,  L.: Telling a Com- 
on Systems. In :  Second Congress on the Informa- puter How To Evaluate Multidimensional Situa- 
tion System Sciences (J. Spiegel and D. E .  Walker, tions. I E E E  Trans. on Human Factors in  Elec- 
eds.), Spartan Press (Washington), 1965. tronics, HFE-6, 1965, pp. 3-13. 

Signal Recognition as an Analog to Decisionmaking 
in Limited Visibility Landing 
TRIEVE A. TANNER, JR. 
NASA Ames Research Cewter 
The purpose of this paper is to suggest 
how some decisionmaking situations in which 
pilots are  involved may be viewed as being 
analogous to  laboratory tasks in the area of 
signal detection and recognition. The re- 
search that  has been conducted in this area 
has produced a considerable amount of infor- 
mation about the  performance of human 
observers in the laboratory. Accompanying 
this research has been the  development of 
mathematical models of detection, recogni- 
tion, and related behavior. These models 
have been successful in accounting for per- 
formance under a variety of laboratory con- 
ditions. To the extent tha t  these laboratory 
tasks are analogous to decisionmaking situa- 
tions of a pilot, the  results of the research 
and the related theoretical developments may 
be valuable for the  description, prediction, 
and, through training, the improvement of 
a pilot's performance. 
Discussions of the theoretical developments 
in signal detection and recognition are readily 
available elsewhere (refs. 1 and 2).  Rather 
than discussing theory, it is my intent to 
indicate how some of the findings from re- 
cent signal-recognition studies may have 
implications for decisionmaking by a pilot. 
In one of the simpler forms of a detection 
or a recognition task, one of two stimulus 
events is presented to an  observer and he 
is aslied to judge which event has occurred. 
The two events are selected so as to be very 
difficult for the observer to discriminate. 
Any sense modality may be involved, al- 
though most of the research has been done 
with either visual or auditory stimuli. In 
signal detection, one of the events consists 
of a faint signal tha t  is embedded in back- 
ground noise, and the other event consists 
of noise alone. In  the simplest form of the  
recognition task, the stimulus events are  
two signals that  are eas~ly detectable, but 
are adjusted so as t o  be difficult to dis- 
criminate. 
Several situations faced by a pilot may be 
considered as involving a choice between 
two alternative decisions in a way that  is 
similar to these laboratory tasks. One ex- 
ample of such a situation is involved in the  
decision whether or not to eject from a 
fighter aircraft (ref. 3). My remarks will 
be directed to another example: the prob- 
lem of landing under conditions of limited 
visibility; that  is, landing through low over- 
cast weather conditions (ref. 4). My de- 
scription of the landing situation is obviously 
an oversimplification of the problems that  
are involved. However, the purpose here is 
not to provide a complete description of the 
performance skills involved in landing an  
aircraft. I am concerned merely with one act 
of the pilot: his decision whether or not to 
land. 
In the situation of interest, the pilot directs 
the descent of the aircraft through the 
clouds by reading guidance instrumentation. 
At a critical altitude and distance from the 
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end of the runway, he must decide not to 
land but to go around and, perhaps, make 
another approach, if he has not broken out 
of the clouds. The actual vallzles of these 
critical distances vary with the handling 
qualities of the aircraft and the guidelines 
issued by governing bodies like the FAA 
and the U.S. Air Force, and are not impor- 
tant  to this discussion. If breakout from 
the clouds occurs substantially farther from 
the runway and higher than what is con- 
sidered to be critical, the pilot has ample 
time to adjust to any inaccurate informa- 
tion that  might have been received from his 
instruments and to land using normal visual 
cues. If breakout occurs somewhere between 
these two points (i.e., between a mandatory 
missed approach and what is essentially a 
normal visual landing), the pilot must quickly 
decide whether or not he is "in the slot," 
that  is, in proper alinement with the run- 
way, on the  proper glide slope, and so forth. 
If he  is not in the slot, he must decide 
whether or not his altitude and distance 
from the runway will allow sufficient time 
for him to make the proper adjustments for 
a visual landing. If he decides that  he does 
not have time to make such adjustments, he 
must go around. 
There are a total of four possible outcomes 
from the pilot's two decisions. In figure 1, 
these outcomes are arranged in a 2 by 2 
matrix, which represents the intersections 
Decision Alternatives 
m 
.- Land Go Around 
73 
2 
FIGURE 1.-Decision matrix for 
low-visibility landings. 
Successful 
Landing 
A 
Unsuccessful 
Landing 
C 
of the two-decision alternatives (to land or 
to go around) and the actual conditions, 
dichotomized into those in which a success- 
ful landing is possible and those in which 
i t  is not possible. If tkie pilot decides to 
land, he may land successfully, a s  repre- 
sented by cell A, or unsuccessfully, cell 6. 
If he decides to go around, he may be correct, 
cell D (i.e., he really could not have landed 
successfully), or he may have executed an 
unnecessary missed approach and really 
could have landed successfully, cell B. 
The distinction between a successful and 
an unsuccessful landing, cells A and C, can 
be verified objectively, a t  least in principle, 
depending only on the definition of "success- 
ful." However, the distinction between a cor- 
rect and an incorrect go-around is impossible 
to measure objectively. This distinction de- 
pends on a judgment (made either by the 
pilot or some other observer of the landing 
conditions) as to whether or  not a landing 
was possible. The pilot himself may believe 
that  he is seldom, if ever, wrong when he 
decides to go around, because, a t  the moment 
he makes his decision, he is the best judge 
of the situation and of his own capabilities 
to meet it. Mis superiors, however, may a t  
times be critical and suggest that  he was 
overly cautious. I assume tha t  pilots as well 
as executives would agree that  sometimes a 
pilot may be overly cautious in executing 
a missed approach, just as he may some- 
times be overly adventurous in deciding 
to land. 
The pilot's decision to land or to go around 
obviously is influenced by his sensory ca- 
pacity to discriminate how f a r  he is from 
being in the slot. A pilot who is highly 
accurate in evaluating his position a t  break- 
out and his ability to correct i t  if necessary 
wiH, over a long series of landings, have a 
high number of outcomes in cells A and D 
(fig. 1) relative to the number in cells B 
and C. This situation is shown in the upper 
matrix of figure 2 (labeled "Higher Sensi- 
tivity"). The lower matrix shows the  situ- 
ation for a less-accurate o r  less-sensitive 
pilot. However, the pilot's decision is in- 
fluenced also by whatever factors would 
Unnecessary 
Missed 
Approach 
B 
Correct 
Missed 
Approach 
D 
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Decision Alternatives 
Land Go Around 
Decision Alternatives 
Land Go Around 
FIGURE 2,Decision matrices for pilots with 
relatively high and low sensitivity. 
cause him t o  be more or less cautious. Moti- 
vation is perhaps the most obvious factor 
that  will influence the degree of his caution. 
Motivation to maintain his own safety and 
tha t  of the passengers will tend to increase 
caution, whereas an attempt to maintain 
prestige or to save the time and cost in- 
volved in a missed approach will tend to 
reduce caution. These situations are shown 
in figure 3. A greater degree of caution 
(shown in the upper matrix) is represented 
by higher frequencies of occurrence in cells 
B and D than in cells A and C. A lower 
degree of caution (shown in the lower ma- 
trix) is represented by relatively higher 
frequencies in cells A and C. The results 
of laboratory research on signal detection 
and recognition suggest that  any factor tha t  
might influence a pilot's expectation of ex- 
periencing successful landing conditions a t  
breakout will, in turn, influence his decision 
FIGURE 3.-Decision matrices for pilots with 
relatively high and low caution. 
toward greater or less caution. The relative 
frequency with which the pilot experiences 
successful and unsuccessful landing condi- 
tions and the amount of information feed- 
back that  he receives from his decisions may 
be such factors. These will be discussed in 
more detail in relation to the laboratory 
research. 
Data to  fill the  decision matrix in figure 
1 are not available from actual landing ap- 
proaches. It is clear that  an abundance of 
entries may be obtained for cell A (success- 
ful landings). However, because the  occur- 
rence of an  unsuccessful landing is likely 
to result in fatality, only one entry in cell 
C might be obtained for a given pilot. Even 
relatively unsuccessful landings that  are 
short of being fatal to the pilot are, for- 
tunately, infrequent. As noted previously, 
outcomes that  would fall into cells B and D 
(correct and incorrect missed approaches) 
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cannot be distinguished in the actual flight 
situation. If we could obtain, from a par- 
ticular pilot, a substantial amount of data 
in each of the four cells of the performance 
matrix, then we could compare his perform- 
ance with that  of observers in the labora- 
tory situation, and we could determine the 
extent to which the two are  comparable. 
The use of an aircraft landing simulator 
would allow the collection of the desired 
data. By defining objective criteria for ac- 
ceptable and nonacceptable landing condi- 
tions, data in all four cells of the matrix 
could be obtained. I shall describe a plan 
to initiate such a simulation program, after 
discussing some of the  laboratory research 
to which I have referred. 
In the type of signal-recognition study 
that  is of interest here (refs. 5 and 6) ,  the 
two signals that  an observer is asked to 
discriminate are two 1000-Hz tones that  
differ from each other only in amplitude. 
These will be referred to as the loud and 
the soft tone. One of the two tones is pre- 
sented to the observer on each trial of a 
randomized sequence of trials. The number 
of trials in a session and the number of 
sessions vary according to the  number of 
parameters and the number of values of the 
parameters that  are investigated. The ob- 
server's task is to judge which tone is pre- 
sented on each trial. His response is a simple 
button press. Both tonal amplitudes are 
clearly audible, but they are adjusted over 
a series of preliminary trials so that  an 
observer performs a t  a level of about 75 
percent correct responses; that  is, about 
halfway between chance and perfect accu- 
racy. As with the pilot's decision whether 
or not to land, there are four possible out- 
comes for a trial. These outcomes are shown 
in figure 4. After a loud signal occurs, the 
observer can say that  the loud tone has 
occurred, cell A, or that  the soft tone has 
occurred, cell B. Similarly, after a soft sig- 
nal occurs he  can judge that  the loud tone, 
cell C, or the  soft tone, cell D, has occurred. 
Two variables that  have been investigated 
in these studies are the proportion of trials 
on which each of the signals is presented 
Decision Alternatives 
Loud Soft 
FIGURE 4.-Decision matrix fo r  
two-tone recognition task. 
to the observer, and whether or not the 
observer receives information feedback after 
his decision is made on each trial. In  the 
two experiments cited below, both condi- 
tions-that is, the proportions of loud- and 
soft-tone trials and the presence or absence 
of information feedback-were held constant 
over each session. 
In a study conducted by Kinchla (ref. 5),  
the loud tone was presented on either 0.25, 
0.50, or 0.75 of the trials of a given session. 
In each case, the soft tone occurred on the 
remainder of the trials. Following the  ob- 
server's decision of whether the loud or the 
soft tone had occurred, he was told, with 
an information light, which tone actually had 
occurred on that  trial. In addition to  this 
information feedback, the observer was told 
a t  the s tar t  of a session whether to expect 
0.25, 0.50, or 0.75 of the trials to contain 
loud (or soft) signals. 
Data collected in this study are  presented 
in figure 5. The ordinate in this figure repre- 
sents proportions of responses. The abscissa 
represents the proportion of trials on which 
a loud signal occurred. The upper curve 
represents the proportion of loud signals that  
observers co1*1*ectly judged as  loud. The 
lower curve represents the proportion of soft 
signals tha t  were incorrectly judged as  loud. 
Therefore, these curves plot the proportions 
of outcomes in cells A and C of figure 4, 
contingent on the signal that  occurred. These 
proportions usually are referred to as con- 
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- P (loud responselloud signal) - 
- 
- 
- 
- P (loud responselsoft signal) 
Proportion of loud signals 
FIGURE 5.-Contingent probabilities for a loud 
response with information feedback, 
tingent probabilities. Thus the upper curve 
may be called the probability of a loud re- 
sponse given a loud signal, PT (LR I LS) , and 
the lower curve may be called the proba- 
bility of a loud response given a soft signal, 
Pr(LR1SS). It is unnecessary to plot the 
contingent probabilities for cells B and D 
because they are complementary to the 
contingent probabilities of cells A and C, 
respectively. 
Figure 5 illustrates that as the probability 
of a loud signal increased, both the prob- 
ability of a loud response given a loud sig- 
nal and the probability of a loud response 
given a soft signal increased. It should be 
noted that the changes in these contingent 
probabilities were independent of the accu- 
racy of the observer's decisions; the total 
proportion of correct responses did not 
change appreciably as the signal probability 
increased. Because a simultaneous increase 
in both contingent probabilities for a loud 
response is independent of accuracy, i t  is 
often referred to as a response bias. Hence, 
in Kinchla's study (ref. 5), there was an 
increasing bias for the loud response, as  the 
proportion of loud signals increased. These 
results are consistent with the results of 
signal-detection studies (ref. 2). 
A study by Tanner et. al. (ref. 6) was 
similar to Kinchla's in that no information 
feedback was given to the observers and a t  
no time were the observers told what signal 
proportions to expect. In this experiment, 
five signal proportions were investigated. For 
any given session, the observer was pre- 
sented the loud signal on either 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 
0.7, or 0.9 of the trials. Again the signal 
proportions are complementary, so that the 
soft signal occurred, respectively, on 0.9, 
0.7, 0.5, 0.3, or 0.1 of the trials. 
1 .o I I I I 
P (loud responselloud signal) 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 .O 
Proportion of loud signals 
FIGURE 6.-Contingent probabilities for a loud 
response with no information feedback. 
Data from this study are presented in 
figure 6, where the decision probabilities are 
plotted against the five possible proportions 
of loud signals. As in figure 5, the upper 
curve represents the probability of a loud 
response given a loud signal and the lower 
curve represents the probability of a loud 
response given a soft signal. Under this 
condition of no information feedback, the 
trends in these curves are the inverse of 
those shown in figure 5. Rather than in- 
creasing, as in Kinchla's study (ref. 5), the 
bias for the loud response decreased, as the 
proportion of loud signals increased. 
Subsequent experiments (unpublished) 
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have confirmed the results of these two 
studies and, in addition, have given evidence 
that  the biases reported by Tanner (ref. 6) 
are not dependent on the observers being 
completely ignorant of the fact that  the sig- 
nal proportions were being varied, as were 
the observers of Tanner (ref. 6 ) .  
Thus, when observers in these laboratory 
recognition studies had information regard- 
ing the actual signal proportions, an increase 
in the proportion of the loud signals resulted 
in an increased bias toward judgment that  
the loud signaI had occurred. However, 
whenever information about the signal pro- 
portions was eliminated, an increase in the 
proportion of loud signals resulted in a de- 
creased bias toward the decision that  the 
loud signal had occurred. 
Another finding of these experiments con- 
cerns the way in which a decision is influ- 
enced by the observer's responses on pre- 
vious trials. It has been found that  when 
the observer receives no feedback, his bias 
toward reporting either the loud or the soft 
signal is high (when he reported that  the 
same signal occurred on the immediately 
preceding trial). In other words, responses 
tended t o  occur in runs. When feedback 
was given, previous responses had much less 
influence on current responses. 
Assuming a pilot in a limited-visibility 
landing approach to be similarly influenced 
by the interaction of these two variables 
(feedback and the proportions of stimulus 
events), then he would be biased toward 
landing if he were accustomed to experienc- 
ing successful landing conditions a t  breakout 
and if he received information feedback after 
every landing approach. Also, if he were 
accustomed to unsuccessful conditions with 
no feedback, we would expect him to  be 
biased toward landing. If he were accus- 
tomed to acceptable conditions with no feed- 
back or to unacceptable conditions with 
feedback, then he would be biased toward 
executing a missed approach. 
Obviously, these proposed relations are 
hypothetical. Because a pilot receives feed- 
back only when he lands, predictions of his 
decision are meaningful only when they are 
based on previous landing with feedback or 
previous missed approaches with no feedback. 
The above predictions take no account of the 
decisior, that  was a c t ~ a l l y  made by the  pilot 
on previous approaches, but are based only 
on the stimulus conditions. If predictions 
are based on the effects of previous perform- 
ance found in the recognition studies that  
have been cited, then, independent of the 
stimulus conditions, the pilot might be ex- 
pected to repeat the  decision that  he made 
on his previous approach. However, because 
this prediction is based on no feedback being 
received, i t  is relevant only to missed 
approaches. 
Therefore, extrapolating from the results 
of previous laboratory recognition research 
to predict a pilot's bias toward more or less 
caution in landing must be considered highly 
speculative. The situation in the laboratory 
could be made more similar to the conditions 
of landing if the presentation of informa- 
tion feedback were made contingent on the 
observer's decision. Such an experiment is 
currently being conducted in the Human Per- 
formance Laboratory of the Ames Research 
Center. The task-recognition of two audi- 
tory amplitudes-is essentially the same as 
that  investigated by Kinchla (ref. 5 )  and 
by Tanner (ref. 6) ,  except tha t  feedback is 
given following only one of the observer's 
two possible decisions. That is, half of the 
observers are given feedback whenever they 
judge that  the  soft tone has occurred; the 
other half are given feedback only when 
they judge that  the  loud tone has occurred. 
The purpose of the  experiment is to deter- 
mine whether or not response-contingent 
feedback with variations in the signal pro- 
portions produces decision biases that  are 
similar to those found in previous investiga- 
tions. Whether the biases are like those 
found with 100 percent feedback (ref. 5),  
with no feedback (ref. 6) ,  or if the effects 
are different from either of these should 
have implications for decisionmaking in the 
limited-visibility landing situation. There- 
fore, the results of this study will be used 
in assessing the feasibility of a more direct 
investigation of the landing problem. If the 
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contingent-feedback situation does produce 
some type of decision bias, as expected, the 
results will be used in determining a strategy 
for applying the  recognition paradigm to 
research on an aircraft landing simulator. 
In an  actual landing situation or the simu- 
lation thereof, the  views of a runway that  
a pilot experiences a t  breakout are consider- 
ably more complex than the  two tones that  
have been used in the recognition studies. 
These views may vary along several dimen- 
sions, depending on such factors as  the alti- 
tude, distance from the runway, and attitude 
of the  aircraft. In  addition, the values along 
each of these dimensions are continuous 
rather than discrete, as are the two tones in 
the auditory recogiiition task. Thus, on a 
given approach, s pilot may experience any 
one of an infinite set of possible views of the 
runway. tirirethei or not a dichotornizatioii 
of these views, into acceptable and unaccept- 
able for successflal landing, would yield data 
similar to that obtained in two-tone auditory 
recognition studies could be determined using 
a landing simulator. As suggested previously, 
recognition of acceptable and unacceptable 
landing views anafyzed similarly to the sim- 
pler two-signal recognition task may result in 
a better understanding of the pilot's decision 
whether or not to land after breakout. 
DISCUSSION 
WARD EDWARDS: I am puzzled by the apparent 
inconsistency between the data reported in figure 6 
and the typical gambler's-fallacy data that  you get 
in either binary prediction or binary production. 
Usually you are likely to get too many alternations 
rather than too many repetitions. 
TRIEVE A. TANNER: That is not what we found. 
EDWARDS: I know. I am wondering if you have 
any idea why your data do not come out in that  grand 
and ugly tradition. 
TANNER: I can refer you to a model developed by 
Haller and Atkinson, which attempts to explain the 
various results of this study (ref. 6). 
RICHARD C .  ATKINSON: A comment here, Ward. 
In that experiment (fig. 6) ,  the subject never realizes 
from day to day that  the proportion of loud and soft 
signals has been changed. His feeling about the task 
is that i t  is somewhat more difficult on some days than 
on other days, but the subjects did not report realiz- 
ing that the signal proportions change from day to 
day. 
TANNER: That is  true. I failed to mention that. 
Subjects actually have reported that  they thought 
we made the task more difficult from day to day. 
ATKINSON: What i t  amounts to is that  the task 
ceases to be one of signal detection and becomes one 
of memory. You make a judgment of a given input 
not on the basis of comparison with background noise, 
but by comparing i t  with the last input and recalling 
how you judged that  last input. When you have feed- 
back on the situation so that  the subject knows pre- 
cisely how that  last judgment should have been made, 
quits a different performance record is created as 
opposed to when the subject has only his estimate of 
how the judgment should have been made. 
EDWARDS: Feedback also sets up a well-defined 
prior probability. 
ATKINSON: If in the first task you plotted just 
the probability of a loud tone, i t  would have virtually 
matched; but in the second task, if you had plotted 
the probability of saying loud, i t  would have been 
about 50 percent, that  is to say, independent. 
TANNER: In fact, i t  actually increased slightly. 
EDWARDS: Does that  indicate that  subjects would 
find the tasks easiest when loud and soft stimuli were 
each occurring about one-half of the time? 
TANNER: That seemed to be the case. 
EDWARDS: So the nature of the difficulty in judg- 
ment is simply that subjects are committed to calling 
some loud stimuli soft if there are  too many loud and 
some soft stimuli loud if there are  too many soft. 
LLOYD A. JEFFRESS: Are the data in figure 6 
taken with the subjects explicitly or implicitly be- 
lieving that  the a priori probability is 0.5? 
TANNER: They are simply not told. 
ATKINSON: In  a more recent study, Haller (ref. 
7)  actually took a careful protocol of subjective ex- 
perience a t  the end of the experiment; to my knowl- 
edge, no one ever reported having realized that  the 
signal probabilities were changing in proportion. 
JWFRESS : Another possible approach here would 
be to tell the subject that  the a priori probability may 
be anywhere from 0.1 to 0.9, that  it  will remain the 
same during one sitting, but is likely to change with- 
out notice. 
TANNER: In fact, the third study, which I briefly 
mentioned, used subjects who were not naive with 
respect to the a priori signal probabilities. We made 
them not naive by running them in a feedback con- 
dition, but i t  took them some time. I do not have the 
final results yet, but i t  looks a s  though the ROC 
curves flipped upside down again. Subjects were put 
back in the no-feedback condition after a long series 
of sessions. 
ATKINSON: For people who are  interested in sig- 
nal detectability, let me comment on the model. It is 
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very simple. It assumes that  you have some memory 
of the last signal that was presented and that  you 
have your current input. You just compute a differ- 
ence on the two. You look a t  that difference. If the 
difference is highly positive, then what you have now 
is f a r  above what you had last time, so you tend to 
call i t  loud. If the difference is highly negative, you 
tend to call it  soft. If i t  is in the midrange, you have 
a problem of what to do. When there is no information 
feedback, the assumption is that you call the signal 
the same thing you called it last time. When there is 
information feedback, you call i t  what the experi- 
menter called it the last time. That sort of model will 
predict the change in performance from the feedback 
to the no-feedback condition. The model also predicts 
that  sequential effects are mammoth in the no--feed- 
back case, and more nearly minimal in the feedback 
case. So, i t  is  a signal detectability model, but we 
have two criteria mapped onto the difference scores- 
the difference scores being defined in terms of what 
you have now and what you remember from the last 
run. I t  fits very well with the subjects' subjective 
experience. One way of viewing this is that  over a 
whole host of trials, the subject builds up some mem- 
ory that  he is  always comparing against. Another 
way of viewing i t  is that  the subject is really just 
keeping track of the last signal and comparing with 
that. That is what subjects tell you they tend to do. 
They do not have some long average memory, but they 
tend to relate to the last signal. 
JOSEPH MARKOWITZ: Did you give the subjects 
feedback a t  the end of the run or the end of the day? 
TANNER: We have done both. 
MARKOWITZ: The reason I ask is  this: some- 
times, when you go to the asymmetric probabilities, 
subjects tell you it is harder even in the no-feedback 
case. So they are recognizing that  they have inap- 
propriate criteria, but are not changing the criteria 
-which I am not sure I understand. 
TANNER: Even when subjects are told how well 
they are doing, i t  is just that  the proportion of cor- 
rect responses does not change much. 
ATKINSON: Is  that  true? 
TANNER: Yes; not enough so that  they notice 
much difference. I am sure i t  must be noise to them. 
MARKOWITZ: Tell me why they say i t  is harder 
with the asymmetric probabilities. 
ATKINSON: I t  is harder because frequently the 
same stimulus is being presented again. 
MARKOWITZ: SO they simply have many of these 
uncertainty decisions, is that  the idea? 
TANNER: Yes. 
JEFFRESS: Carried to the extreme, if you had 100 
percent loud signals, you would have a time trying to 
decide which ones were soft. 
MARKOWITZ: Right. In the feedback case i t  is 
easy. 
EDWARDS: Have you explored asking them after- 
wards in the no-feedback case to estimate the pro- 
portion of loud stimuli? 
TANNER: NO; we have not. 
EDWARDS: Actually you could play tha t  two ways. 
You could ask them to estimate the proportion of 
loud stimuli and the proportion of loud responses. 
Chances are they would do well in estimating their 
own behavior, but i t  would be interesting to see if they 
have such a strong bias in favor of a 50-50 a priori 
probability. Obviously, you should be able to influence 
this by influencing discriminability of the stimuli. I t  
becomes essentially a random-sequence production 
task if the stimuli are completely indiscriminable. 
It becomes a relative frequency estimation task if 
the stimuli are perfectly discriminable. I t  moves 
gradually from the one kind of task to the other. 
TANNER: I think i t  may be time to ask the sub- 
jects to estimate these proportions. We did not want 
to allude to signal probabilities in the first task a t  
all because we did not want to bring these to their 
attention. 
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Attention' 
This is a review of the research on atten- 
tion, time, and human information processing 
that has been carried out in my laboratory 
during the past 4 years. For the purposes 
of this conference, I will stress the con- 
cepts that are involved and their coordina- 
tion to observables, and major conclusions 
from the experiments rather than detailed 
discussions of data. It would also seem to 
be appropriate for me to indicate generality 
when that is possible and to tell you what 
I know about the limits that must be imposed 
upon that generality. 
The term "attention" has a number of very 
different meanings. Historically, there have 
been two major meanings; one implying se- 
lectivity in perception and the other empha- 
sizing perceptual clarity. During the past 
10 years or so, a number of new meanings 
have accrued to the term as a result of the 
recent surge of research in the area, and we 
seem to have reached a point where it is 
hardly useful to continue to use the single 
term. My work does not attempt to sys- 
tematize this entire field. Instead, I am con- 
cerned with working out the details of one 
particular attention mechanism-one that 
may be described as a mechanism that con- 
trols the flow of sensory information by 
selecting among sensory inputs. 
My approach is an indirect one in that 
I make inferences about this selective mech- 
' This research was supported by the National Aer- 
onautics and Space Administration, monitored by the 
NASA Ames Research Center. 
anism through measurements of certain of 
its temporal characteristics. A concept has 
evolved out of this, linking the present theory 
to a rather large body of theories that seem 
to have little or nothing to do with atten- 
tion. I am referring to the concept of a 
time quantum or a unit of psychophysical 
time. At present, the time-quantum hypoth- 
esis is a central part of this theory and I 
will show how it is related to attention and 
to central information processing. 
Two relevant reviews have appeared in 
recent literature. In 1963, White reviewed 
the many theoretical and experimental stud- 
ies that bear upon the concept of a psycho- 
logical unit of duration (ref. 1 ) .  More re- 
cently, a rather different review has been 
presented by Harter (ref. 2),  a review of 
the various hypotheses of central intermit- 
tency in perception. Harter discussed seven 
different classes of experiments that have 
provided support for the idea of central 
intermittency and also the various theories 
of central intermittency that have been pro- 
posed. The present theory has some elements 
in common with most of the theories that 
Harter analyzes. 
EMPIRICAL PARAMETERS AND SOME 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
This project began with a specific state- 
ment of a very old, largely philosophical 
proposition concerning attention. It is the 
idea that attention is limited in that one can 
pay attention to only a small range of sen- 
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sory inputs a t  any one moment. The ex- 
treme form of this proposition is that one 
can attend to only a single input a t  any par- 
ticular point in time and that attending to 
multiple inputs requires switching of atten- 
tion from one to the other. Therefore, I 
thought that I could begin by setting up the 
working hypothesis that one can pay atten- 
tion to only one thing at a time and that 
if one is paying attention to thing A at 
the time thing B occurs, it should require 
some length of time to switch attention from 
A to B. It seemed feasible to attempt to 
measure this switching time. 
There are, however, immediate difficulties 
that arise when one sets out to do this, and 
very careful experimental procedures are 
required to surmount these difficulties. Some 
of these difficulties are inherent in the very 
simple notion that I have just described. For 
example, if one wishes to measure the switch- 
ing time between A and B, it is necessary 
to be sure that a subject is, in fact, paying 
attention to A at the time B occurs. My 
experiments lead me to believe that one 
cannot safely assume that this is the case; 
under some conditions it may be the case, 
but usually a more detailed theoretical model 
is required to take into account the fact that 
ordinarily subjects cannot meet this crite- 
rion. Another requirement is that the switch- 
ing itself must be accomplished reliably; that 
is, that attention go from A directly to B 
rather than via some intermediate channel. 
This calls for the use of experimental ar- 
rangements that are clearly defined for the 
subject and for adequate practice sessions. 
Because the switching time is undoubtedly 
very short, a third requirement is set upon 
attempts to measure it. This is that the 
times of occurrence of the sensory inputs 
must be specifiable with a rather high degree 
of precision. These considerations and others 
led me to design experiments using very sim- 
ple sensory signals. In all the experiments, 
the signals are spots of light and pure tones, 
both of which can be controlled precisely 
along the time dimension. I use lights and 
sounds to be as certain as is possible to be 
that the signals really are different things 
that cannot be attended to simultaneously. 
And, finally, the critical signal events are 
the offsets of lights and sounds rather than 
their onsets, in order that the locations of 
A and B will be well defined for the experi- 
mental subject so that he will be able to 
attend reliably and switch his attention re- 
liably from A to B. 
These considerations are not very system- 
atic and I have not presented them at all 
fully, but they do give some indication of 
the reasons why I have done experiments 
the way I have. Also, they introduce the 
general logic of the experiments. Two very 
different methods of measuring the switching 
time of attention have come out of this. The 
first one has to do with measuring the length 
of time required for a message to travel 
through the entire system, from signal to 
response. These are experiments on reaction 
time. The basic idea is that if one could 
measure the time required to respond to a 
signal B when the subject is in fact paying 
attention to B at the moment it occurs, and 
then measure the time required to respond 
to B when the subject is attending to A at 
the time B occurs, then by comparing these 
reaction times one should be able to infer 
the switching time between A and B. This 
is one approach, and one that can be applied 
only indirectly, as I will explain in a moment. 
The other approach requires the experimen- 
tal subject to discriminate the relative time 
of occurrence of two different things. If he 
cannot pay attention to A and B simulta- 
neously, than his ability to judge whether A 
and B occur simultaneously should be limited 
by the speed with which he can switch atten- 
tion between them. This second approach 
has led us to do a large number of experi- 
ments on successiveness discrimination-the 
ability of human subjects to discriminate 
the successive occurrence of different sen- 
sory events from the simultaneous occur- 
rence of such events. 
I want to go on now and describe some 
specific experiments. I would like to avoid 
details as much as possible, but because 
many of the details of procedure are of 
critical importance, as I will discuss in a 
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later section, I hope I do not create the 
impression of greater generality than is 
warranted. 
Successiveness Discrimination 
One form of the successiveness discrimi- 
nation function is shown in figure 1. I t  is 
a relationship between the probability of 
correctly discriminating the successiveness 
of a light and a sound and the time interval 
that elapses between the occurrence of the 
two signals. The time interval between sig- 
nals is shown in figure 1 to extend in the 
positive direction from zero and it is so de- 
fined that these positive values mean that 
the visual signal occurs before the auditory 
signal. At zero, the objective time of occur- 
rence of the two signals is simultaneous. 
And there is, of course, a negative side to 
this in which the auditory signal occurs first. 
Time between signals 
FIGURE 1.Theore t ica l  form of the successiveness- 
discrimination function. 
The proportion of correct discriminations 
is plotted on the ordinate from 0.5 to 1.0 
because a two-alternative, forced-choice 
method is used in which the subject is given 
two signal pairs on every trial and is re- 
quired to decide which pair is the successive 
pair. This means that even when he is com- 
pletely unable to discriminate between the 
pairs, the subject will still get one-half of 
the trials correct. 
Figure 1 indicates that the theoretical 
function that is shown is the one to be 
expected only when the time interval be- 
tween the signals in the simultaneous pair 
on each trial is within a certain range. One 
cannot assume that a light and a sound that 
o c c ~ ~ r  simultaneously will be simultaneous 
psychologically because the effects of the two 
signals are conducted at different rates over 
the two sensory systems. However, it fol- 
lows theoretically, as I will explain later, 
that, as far as this discrimination is con- 
cerned, the two signals in the simultaneous 
pair will be exactly equivalent to a psycho- 
logically simultaneous pair, provided that 
they occur within a certain range of times 
of each other. This range, translated into 
real time, is indicated in figure 1. 
The theoretical successiveness function 
that is drawn in figure 1 is a linear function 
that has three parameters. One of these 
parameters is PL, the probability with which 
the subject is paying attention to the visual 
channel a t  the moment the visual signal oc- 
curs. Figure 1 indicates that a function con- 
sisting of a single linear segment is to be 
expected only when P, is equal to 1.0. Fur- 
thermore, the other constraint-that it is 
sufficient for the interval of the simultaneous 
pair to fall within the range between x and 
(x-M)-is satisfied only when P ,  is equal 
to unity. In our early experiments, we tried 
to arrange experimental conditions so that 
PL would meet this theoretical specification, 
and so that we could analyze the data by 
using this single linear segment. 
The other two parameters are x and M. 
The first of these is the time separation be- 
tween signals a t  which the function just 
begins to exceed the chance level. In  theory, 
.2: is the interval between the signals a t  
which the relevant neural effects produced 
by the signals occur simultaneously. Because 
afferent conduction time is slower in the 
visual channel, we expect x to be positive- 
and we find that it is. The final quantity 
is the one of special interest. The function 
ascends from chance to 1.0, over the range 
between x and (x+M) milliseconds. If our 
interpretation of x is correct, then the span 
of the function, the quantity M, is the mini- 
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mum time that must separate the two inde- 
pendent neural events for them to be dis- 
criminated as  successive with complete cer- 
tainty. Stated empirically, M is the mini- 
mum time that must be added to the interval 
between the two signals to bring the prob- 
ability of a correct response from chance 
to 1.0. 
We have obtained successiveness discrim- 
ination functions that are quite well de- 
scribed by figure 1. We now know that 
figure 1 describes a limiting case that can 
be closely approached but not completely 
attained. The first experiment that I want 
to discuss does assume that the case de- 
scribed by figure 1 is actually achieved, but 
I will indicate later the extent to which that 
is not quite correct. 
Effect of Channel Uncertainty Upon 
Discrimination Reaction Time 
The time required for a subject to make 
a response to a stimulus, when he is in- 
structed to respond as rapidly as he can, is 
very different from one occasion to another. 
The amount of variance in such reaction 
times is especially great when the subject 
must discriminate between signals in order 
to determine whether or not to make the 
response on each trial. The reaction times 
to which I refer here are called discrimina- 
tion reaction times. The subject is con- 
fronted with multiple signals, but he is re- 
quired to make, or not to make, a single 
response. In a typical experiment, three sig- 
nals are presented on each trial, two visual 
and one auditory. At the end of a certain 
fixed length of time, one of the three signals 
goes off. The subject has been instructed 
to release his hand from the key as rapidly 
as he can if either the tone or the right 
light goes off, but to withhold making the 
response if the left light goes off. At the 
beginning of each trial, a cuing signal is 
given. This signal tells the subject that if 
the stimulus is a positive one it will be in 
the visual channel, or that it will be in the 
left light, may occur and it does occur on 
one-fourth of the trials, 
Two distributions of reaction times are 
obtained for the visual signal: one for tnose 
trials on which the subject is "ce~tain" and 
one for the trials for which he is "uncer- 
tain"; the same is true for the auditory 
signal. Thus, four distributions of reaction 
times are obtained in this experiment. 
We are interested in the effect of uncer- 
tainty because when the subject is uncertain 
there should be a larger proportion of trials 
on which he is paying attention to the wrong 
channel a t  the moment the signal to respond 
occurs. If uncertainty has only the effect 
of requiring the subject to switch attention 
on some trials, then, by looking at the in- 
crements of time that are added to reaction 
time as a result of uncertainty, we should 
be able to infer something about the switch- 
ing time of attention. One way of accom- 
plishing this is outlined in figure 2. 
For a particular signal, either the visual 
or the auditory, we have the measurements 
that are shown a t  the top of figure 2. There 
is a mean reaction time and a variance for 
the case when the subject is certain and 
Or that it may be in either 
Jj',,,,, 2.-An outline of the derivation of the coefi- 
of the two channels. The subject knows cient K, the effect upon discrimination reaction 
that on every trial the negative signal, the time of channel uncertainty. 
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when he is uncertain, and these are denoted 
by the symbols in figure 2. 
Let 6 be an increment of time that is 
added to reaction time as a result of uncer- 
tainty. We need not specify anything more 
about 6, not even that some value of it is 
added by uncertainty on every trial. The 
parameter P is the probability that uncer- 
tainty will add such an increment on a par- 
ticular trial. There is a distribution of 
values of 6, which remains unspecified, ex- 
cept to say that it has a mean that is called 
A and a variance for which the symbol is 
shown in figure 2. 
If uncertainty adds some unspecified in- 
crement of time to reaction time on some 
proportion of trials, then the mean reaction 
time under uncertainty will be related to the 
mean reaction time under certainty in the 
manner shown by equation (1) in figure 2. 
Reaction times will, on the average, be 
lengthened in proportion to the mean value 
of the added increments and in proportion 
to the percentage of trials on which such 
increments are added. Similarly, the vari- 
ance of reaction times under uncertainty will 
be related to the variance of reaction times 
under certainty in the manner shown by 
equation (2). This equation is just a gen- 
eral form of the familiar equation for the 
variance of a sum and assumes that the 
size of the added increment is independent 
of the value of reaction time on each trial. 
This assumption is exactly the assumption 
that the theory would make and equation 
(2) is compatible with the theory. Equations 
(1) and (2) can be combined to eliminate P 
with the result shown a t  the bottom of figure 
2. The equation shows that the variance 
of the added increments is a function of a 
coefficient K and of the mean value of the 
6 distribution. The coefficient K can be cal- 
culated from experimental data as shown 
a t  the bottom of figure 2. It is a function 
of the extent to which uncertainty changes 
both the variance and the mean reaction 
time. The theoretical meaning of K is con- 
tained in the equation, which shows that 
K expresses a relationship between the vari- 
ance and the mean of the distribution of the 
increments added by uncertainty. The ad- 
vantage of this is that K can be calculated 
from data in the manner shown, and that 
the value of K is independent of the pro- 
portion of trials on which uncertainty adds 
an increment to reaction time. Because of 
this it is not essential to control rigorously 
the direction of attention. 
The Form of Discrimination Reaction 
Time Distributions 
I would now like to describe a kind of 
theoretical model, which did not follow from 
the theory of attention, but arose as a result 
of a more detailed examination of some of 
the reaction-time data. This model not only 
seems to give us an additional interesting 
parameter, but it also provides an  exten- 
sion of the theory that is crucial for inter- 
preting some of the parameters discussed 
in the preceding sections. 
This model was obtained by plotting fre- 
quency distributions of discrimination reac- 
tion times for the certainty conditions and, 
a t  the beginning, simply abstracting common 
characteristics from the obtained distribu- 
tions. Briefly, it was noticed that nearly all 
of the distributions had a span of approxi- 
mately 150 milliseconds and that a very 
large number, well over half of them, were 
very similar in form. This abstracted form 
is shown in figure 3. The typical distribution 
has two peaks, one peak located about one- 
third of the way up from the lower limit 
of the distribution and the second peak, 
which is always a minor peak, is located 
about two-thirds of the way up. Further- 
more, many of the distributions are very 
well described by three linear segments, as 
shown in figure 3. 
An idealized distribution, like the one 
shown in figure 3, strongly implies a quanta1 
process. Figure 4 shows a logical diagram 
of a message-transmission system that would 
generate a distribution of total transit times 
of the kind portrayed in figure 3. The quan- 
tity A represents the total fixed transmission 
time between stimulus and response; that 
is, the transmission time that is the same 
on different trials. The variance of reaction 
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vides a satisfactory fit to a large number of 
obtained distributions, but there are many 
that are not well fitted by it. 
/ \ / \ Experirnentai Eesuirs 
One comprehensive set of experinients has 
been completed in which the preceding rneas- 
urements were all made on each of a num- 
ber of experimental subjects. These data 
are available (refs. 3 and 4) and I will not 
A A+Q A + ~ Q  A + ~ Q  repeat them here. Let me just summarize 
Reaction time the major findings. 
Enough data are obtained so that it is 
FIGURE 3.-A frequency distribution of reaction times 
generated by the model in figure 3. 
FIGURE 4.-A quantal model of information flow in 
discrimination reaction time. 
time is contributed entirely by the three 
stages that are shown. A message enters 
stages 1 and 3 simultaneously and it is re- 
quired to remain in stage 1 for some length 
of time that is equally likely to be any value 
from 0 to Q. It remains in stage 3 for exactly 
Q. After it leaves stage 1, it immediately 
enters stage 2, which has a delay characteris- 
tic the same as stage 1. If the message has 
left stage 2 before it leaves stage 3, then the 
stage 3 branch has no effect upon the re- 
sponse. However, if the message leaves stage 
3 before it has left stage 2, then there is some 
probability P ( S )  that stage 3 output will 
cause the message to be delayed one more Q. 
I have no desire to defend this specific 
model and I present it mainly to indicate a 
direction in which I intend to do further 
work. This model is only an illustration of 
a class of possible models that have the 
important property of consisting of central 
delay stages having quantal characteristics. 
The one particular model shown here pro- 
- 
possibIe to estimate each parameter sepa- 
rately for each experimental subject. There 
is no averaging of raw data. 
The major finding is that M ,  K, and Q are 
equal in absolute magnitude. The average 
value obtained for M was 54 milliseconds 
and K and Q both yielded means of 53 
milliseconds. 
The parameter K, which is determined 
from the effect of uncertainty upon reaction 
time, is determined twice for each subject, 
once for the visual signal and again for the 
auditory signaI. These two values of K do 
not differ. The size of K is independent of 
sensory channel, and the value that is ob- 
tained for one channel is significantly cor- 
related with the value obtained for the other 
channel over individuals. This same pattern 
of results is also obtained for Q. The time 
constant governing central processing, which 
is inferred from visual reaction times, is 
the same as that for auditory reaction times, 
even though average reaction times differ 
by a substantial amount. 
I have concIuded that these three major 
parameters directly reflect the action of a 
single temporal process, and I refer to this 
process by the term "time quantum." 
Several years ago, after many years of 
wrestling with the idea, it no longer seemed 
reasonable to expect that the temporal char- 
acteristics of the electroencephalogram would 
bear any simple relationship to behavior. 
As most of you know, this was a widely 
proposed notion a dozen years ago, but it 
did not seem to lead to any convincing ex- 
perimental evidence. With the behavioral 
data that I have just described in hand, 
however, it was difficult to resist taking the 
next step, so we proceeded to obtain electro- 
encephalographic recordings from the same 
subjects. We did this for the obvious rea- 
son that the behavioral quantum appeared 
to be very nearly equal to one-half of the 
period of the alpha rhythm; that is, to the 
interval between zero crossings of alpha. 
The frequency characteristics of the alpha 
rhythm are very well known, and, of course, 
it was no surprise to find that the interval 
between zero crossings agreed rather well 
with the measurements of the behavioral 
quantum. The purpose of the measurement 
was to determine whether there is a correla- 
tion between the magnititde of the behavioral 
quantum and the alpha zero-crossing inter- 
val. The data showed the existence of such 
a correlation. 
There was, however, one discrepancy in 
these data which, although small, was con- 
sistent and could not be overlooked. I want 
to emphasize it here. Each of the three be- 
havioral quantum estimates averaged about 
53 msec. The average value of the alpha 
interval was consistently 48 msec. The dif- 
ference is small but crucial. Furthermore, 
the distribution of values of the behavioral 
quantum was skewed in the upward direc- 
tion, suggesting that there might be measure- 
ment error, a t  least for some subjects. 
Theoretical Interpretation 
These results suggest that the quantum 
represents a limit that is imposed on neural 
information processing. I have already 
hinted a t  an interpretation of this, which I 
will go into in greater detail now. 
The linear form of the successiveness- 
discrimination function, and the conclusion 
that two independent sensory events must 
be separated by one quantum in order to 
be discriminated as successive 100 percent 
of the time, can be accounted for in the 
following way. To discriminate an event B 
as occurring a t  a later time than an event 
A when the two events cannot be attended 
to simultaneously, it may be necessary for 
the subject to note first the occurrence of 
event A, and then switch attention to monitor 
event B. If event B is seen to occur follow- 
ing the switching of attention, then B can 
be judged as later than A and the two 
events can be d~scriminated as successive. 
However, if A is seen to occur and B is 
found to have already occurred when atten- 
tion is switched to its channel, then the 
two events are effectively simultaneous. 
If attention is restricted by the quantum 
in such a way that it can switch from one 
channel to another not more than once dur- 
ing a quantum, say at the end of a quantum, 
then the probability of discriminating A 
and B as successive will be equal to the 
probability that the end of a quantum falls 
in the time interval between the two sig- 
nals. Because the time of occurrence of a 
signal bears no relationship to the time 
base of the quantum, the probability of a 
switching point falling between two signals 
will be simply the ratio of the time interval 
between the signals minus n: and the dura- 
tion of a quantum. 
This leads to the expectation that the 
successiveness discrimination function will 
be a linear, one-quantum function like the 
one shown in figure 1. It is a corollary of 
this that the time that must elapse after a 
signal is presented before the next switching 
point occurs will be a duration between 
zero and one quantum and that all dura- 
tions within that interval will occur with 
equal probability. 
What is implied by the finding that the 
coefficient K is also numerically equal to one 
quantum? The most direct interpretation 
of this can be seen by looking a t  the theo- 
retical equation a t  the bottom of figure 2. 
If the increment of time that may be added 
to reaction time by channel uncertainty is 
always exactly one quantum, then the vari- 
ance of the increments will be zero and K 
will be equal to the increment itself, and, 
obviously, the increment itself will be its 
own mean. Therefore, the conclusion that 
uncertainty adds exactly one quantum of 
time to reaction time on some proportion of 
the triaIs and exactly nothing on the re- 
mainder of the trials is a sufficient conclu- 
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sion. If the added increment is due to the 
need to switch attention on those trials, 
then it follows that the time that is added 
to reaction time as a result of having to 
switch attention is always one quantum. This 
conclusion seems to be in conflict with the 
conclusion reached above in the case of suc- 
cessiveness discrimination. Yet, i t  is not in 
conflict because the time that is added to 
reaction time may not be the time required 
to switch attention. 
This is where the third parameter is im- 
portant theoretically. If stage 1 in the model 
shown in figure 4 has the characteristics 
ascribed to it, then, on a reaction-time trial 
when attention is directed at the wrong 
channel, the time that would have been spent 
in stage 1 is, instead, absorbed by the 
switching of attention and the message then 
enters stage 1 exactly a t  the beginning of 
a quantum and must reside therein for one 
full quantum. From this it follows that the 
time that is added to the total transit time 
for the message by the need to switch atten- 
tion is always exactly one quantum. The 
time that must elapse before the next op- 
portunity to switch will be, with equal prob- 
ability, any value between zero and one 
quantum. 
This synthesis is based on the assumption 
that the time base that controls the switching 
of attention is the same as that which de- 
termines how long the message remains in 
stage 1. This is consistent with the idea 
that there is a unitary quantum generator, 
and yet I must point out that it becomes 
arbitrary to an extent when we consider 
that stages 1 and 2 of the model in figure 
4 are assumed to be independent of each 
other. The same time base controls atten- 
tion and stage 1, but i t  seems that an inde- 
pendent time base with the same period 
controls stage 2. 
The theory that is developing out of this 
work is one that deals with the temporal 
microstructure of human information proc- 
essing. The concept of attention plays a 
central part in it. In many ways, the theory 
is similar to the filter theory that was pro- 
posed by Broadbent (ref. 5) .  The similari- 
ties will be evident in the discussion of the 
structure of the theory, which will be pre- 
sented below. There are also marked differ- 
ences between the two theories. For exam- 
ple, the present theory has not yet found i t  
necessary to postulate a short-term storage 
immediately prior to the attention mecha- 
nism. The reason for this is that the experi- 
ments that have been done so far have been 
designed so that they do not depend on the 
characteristics of such a memory unit. A 
short-term memory is irrelevant to our pres- 
ent purposes. The theories also differ in 
their degree of explicitness, the present 
theory being completely explicit within well- 
defined boundaries, to the point of permitting 
quantitative tests. The theories also differ 
in the kind of data to which each is thought 
to be relevant. Broadbent's theory, as is well 
known, was designed to account for the 
handling of complex verbal messages and 
other kinds of temporally extended behavior 
such as vigilance. The present theory, on the 
other hand, deals with elementary sensory 
signals and with events that occur over small 
fractions of a second. 
A logical structure lurks behind the con- 
cepts that I have discussed above. This struc- 
ture interrelates the concepts and I would 
like to discuss it next. I t  is shown diagram- 
matically in figure 5. 
The Structural Theory 
It is convenient to begin by defining a 
central processor through which some mes- 
sages are transmitted between the stimulus 
inputs and the response outputs of the or- 
ganism. There is no need to speculate about 
the operations that are performed by the 
central processor. I t  is sufficient to say that 
some messages pass through i t  and that 
appreciable lengths of time are required 
for their transmission. We go one step 
farther and suggest that within the central 
processor a message is transmitted through 
a series of stages and that each of those 
stages consumes a certain amount of time. 
The configuration of stages is highly flexi- 
ble. Different configurations are formed 
to meet different requirements. The con- 
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FIGURE 5.-Diagram showing some of the relations among the major concepts in the 
structural theory. SA = signal presented to channel A ; dA = transmission time from 
receptor to display area; SS: switching signal. 
figuration of stages is different for different 
information processing tasks, and, for a sin- 
gle task, different individuals may arrive at  
different configurations. 
The admission of messages to the central 
processor is controlled by an attention mech- 
anism. This mechanism is assumed to act 
as an all-or-none gate. Messages from only 
one sensory channel are admitted to the 
central processor a t  any one time. If atten- 
tion is directed a t  a particular sensory chan- 
nel at  the moment a message arrives in 
that channel, then the message can be trans- 
mitted onward into the central processor 
without delay. But if attention is directed 
a t  channel B when a message arrives in 
channel A, the message is delayed by at 
least the time required for attention to 
switch from one channel to the other. One 
wonders what the factors are that determine 
which channel will be attended to at  a par- 
ticular time; there are undoubtedly many 
different factors that are influential in this 
respect, some of them to be found in the 
stimulus and others in various internal states 
of the organism. This theory does not at- 
tempt to classify or deal with these factors 
a t  the present time. However, it is impor- 
tant to point out that the theory places no 
restrictions on the way in which attention 
switches from channel to channel. No regu- 
lar order of switching is assumed and 
no particular channel is assumed to have 
priority. 
Not all of the messages that are trans- 
mitted by the organism pass through the 
central processor. Some messages may be 
transmitted via bypass routes. One reason 
for saying this is the finding that reaction 
times that depend only on the detection of 
the occurrence of the signal, rather than on 
a discrimination between the signals, seem 
to follow different principles. Detection re- 
action times are different in two important 
respects. In the first place, channel uncer- 
tainty has no effect upon detection reaction 
time when the subject is highly practiced, 
implying that attention is irrelevant. In the 
second place, the variance of detection re- 
action times is smaller than the variance 
that would be generated by any configura- 
tion of states within the central processor 
of the kind being defined here. It is one of 
the long-range goals of this research to 
define more precisely these two classes of 
messages-those which do and those which 
do not involve the central processor. The 
further development of the theory may make 
that possible. That there are bypass routes 
must be recognized. Their existence cer- 
tainly complicates the experimental program. 
I t  is necessary to assume that the atten- 
tion mechanism receives identifying signals 
from each of the many sensory channels. 
58 APPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH ON HUMAN DECISIONMAKING 
When a message arrives in a sensory chan- 
nel to which attention is not directed, the 
channel is capable of signaling the attention 
mechanism to switch over to it. This implies 
a partial interpretation of incoming infor- 
mation a t  a level prior to the processor and 
prior to attention as well. The degree of 
detail that  is required in the analysis of 
information a t  this level cannot be known 
until we have an  adequate definition of the 
concept of sensory channel and something 
approaching a catalog of sensory channels. 
The effects of switching signals are undoubt- 
edly highly probabilistic and, a s  a result, the 
switching of attention from channel to chan- 
nel is usually an unreliable and noisy process. 
Incoming sensory messages traverse sen- 
sory channels. These channels begin a t  the 
receptor organ and end in a hypothetical 
information-display area. Time elapses be- 
tween the moment of arrival of the stimulus 
a t  the receptor and the moment of arrival 
of the resulting message in the display area. 
This time, which is referred to as an afferent 
conduction time, is an important quantity. 
Because we do not know where any display 
area is located, i t  is not possible to identify 
afferent conduction time with any particular 
electrophysiological latency. It is necessary 
that  these temporal variables be included 
as parameters in the psychophysical theory. 
It is not reasonable to assume that  a par- 
ticular stimulus, no matter how simple, pro- 
duces a message in only one sensory channel. 
On the contrary, I suspect that  every stimu- 
lus produces many messages in different 
channels, and that  these different channels 
have somewhat different conduction times. 
Most tasks probably can be performed by 
utilizing information in any one of the many 
channels in which the stimulus produces an  
effect. This implies that  afferent conduction 
time may not be a fixed quantity, even under 
fixed stimulus conditions. If a subject selects 
his sensory information from one channel 
a t  one time and from another of the possible 
channels at another time, then the afferent 
conduction time may change. We have seen 
several different instances in our experi- 
ments in which this seems to be happening. 
This is another very important reason why 
afferent conduction time must appear as a 
parameter and must be calculable for each 
particular kind of experiment. 
A sensory channel, theni consists of a 
receptor, a transmission pathway, and a dis- 
play area. Messages are admitted to the 
central processor by the attention mecha- 
nism from the display area of a sensory 
channel. The display area of a sensory chan- 
nel is defined by its relationship to the cen- 
tral  processor. A sensory channel consists 
of a set of all possible messages that  can 
be admitted simultaneously to the central 
processor. In  other words, a channel con- 
sists of all possible messages to which at- 
tention can be directed simultaneously. We 
must admit that  we know very little about 
the organization of sensory channels that  are 
defined in this way. We cannot state where 
the boundaries of the sensory channels are. 
Another long-range goal of this research is 
to provide the means for discovering the 
functional anatomy of the sensory systems 
that  is implied by this definition. I have 
started by assuming that  signals in different 
sense modalities, such as visual and audi- 
tory, generate messages in independent sen- 
sory channels. This does not, however, mean 
that I wish to identify sensory channel with 
modality; quite the contrary, I believe that  
there are  also multiple sensory channels 
within each sense modality. We need a 
theory with quantitative power to enable 
us to map out these channels. 
There is one more major concept to be 
discussed to complete this presentation of 
the theory, and that  is the concept of a 
timing mechanism that controls the flow of 
messages in this system. The theory is spe- 
cific about this and proposes that  there is 
a timing mechanism, or  a "clock," that  con- 
trols both the attention mechanism and the 
central processor. The clock operates by gen- 
erating a succession of time points. The evi- 
dence to date leaves it sufficient to state 
that  under normal conditions these time 
points are generated a t  a fixed rate, a rate 
that is constant for a single individual but 
that differs to a small, although significant 
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and measurable, extent for different indi- 
viduals. 
The time points are generated a t  an aver- 
age rate of approximately 20 points per 
second, which means that the interval be- 
tween successive points is about 50 msec. 
This interval between successive clock pulses 
is referred to as the "psychophysical time 
quantum." 
Two major functions are ascribed to the 
clock pulses at the present time. They con- 
trol times when attention can switch from 
one sensory channel to another, and they 
control the flow of messages through the 
central processor by determining when the 
message can be transmitted from one stage 
within the processor to the next stage. These 
are two of the ways in which the clock co- 
ordinates and integrates the time flow of 
information. 
What does this concept of a clock imply 
neurophysiologically ? It suggests that there 
is some periodic process in the brain that 
is likely to be distributed widely throughout 
the brain and that controls the flow of in- 
formation. I t  is known that there are ex- 
tensive periodic brain processes. The most 
salient of these is the alpha rhythm of the 
electroencephalogram (EEG) . In the human 
being, the alpha rhythm is a sinusoidal vari- 
ation that has a very constant period. The 
voltage level crosses the zero axis approxi- 
mately 20 times per second. It  is possible 
that the alpha rhythm is one manifestation 
of the hypothetical clock. If this is the case, 
then we have an independent method for 
measuring the duration of the quantum, a 
method that is precise and very easy to 
apply. I do not want to imply that the 
electrical changes that comprise the alpha 
rhythm are involved in the information 
processing system in any causal way. For 
several reasons, that seems to be a question- 
able assumption and for the present time 
it is best to refer to the alpha rhythm as 
no more than a manifestation of the clock. 
SOME ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS 
There are three additional experiments 
that I would like to describe briefly. The 
first two of these have modified and slightly 
complicated the ideas concerning the suc- 
cessiveness-discrimination function. The re- 
vised definition seems to be a more satisfac- 
tory one; These experiments also confirmed 
the correIation between the behavioral quan- 
tum and the alpha half cycle. These experi- 
ments have been described in a recent paper 
(ref. 6) .  
One- and Two-Quantum Successiveness Functions 
In the early experiments on successiveness 
discrimination, we did everything we could 
think of to make it possible for the subjects 
to perform a t  a maximum level and to en- 
courage them to do so. This included giving 
them feedback on each trial, making their 
overall results known a t  the end of each 
session, and adjusting the difficulty of the 
discrimination so that it was a challenge to 
them. 
Twenty-six subjects were run under such 
conditions. This usually involved from 30 
to 40 experimental sessions for each subject. 
There is an initial practice effect, and a 
number of practice sessions must be con- 
ducted to bring performance to a stable level. 
During practice, two of these subjects dis- 
played an unusual phenomenon, which can 
be referred to as a quanta1 shift in perfor- 
mance. Very early in practice, both of them 
showed stable performance; that is, no sys- 
tematic increase or decrease in total perform- 
ance from session to session, over a period 
of 12 sessions. They were then changed to 
other experimental conditions that involved 
a similar task. Later, they were returned 
to the initial conditions and given additional 
training. In these later sessions, they 
reached a stable level of performance that 
was substantially above their initial level. 
Successiveness functions were fitted to their 
data for the early and the later sessions 
separately and it was found that in both 
cases the span of the function was reduced 
by a factor of 2 in the later sessions. 
This change is shown schematically in 
figure 6 (a). The single linear segment span- 
ning two quanta represents the subjects' 
performance during the early sessions, while 
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FIGURE 6.-(a) Theoretical one- and two-quantum 
successiveness-discrimination functions and their 
combination in the two-state model. Pz = proba- 
bility of being in state 2; q = quantum size. ( b )  An 
illustrative set of data for a single subject with the 
parameters of and the lines representing the best- 
fitting two-state function. 
the one quantum line represents their per- 
formance after they had received additional 
practice. 
This observation suggested the possibility 
that a subject may be in either one of two 
distinct states over a long period of time. 
In state 1, the span of the function is one 
quantum, and in state 2 it is two quanta. 
Which state the subject enters might be 
influenced by practice, motivation, or other 
general psychological conditions. 
I decided next to determine whether the 
proportion of subjects who enter state 2 
could be increased by manipulating feed- 
back to the subject and task difficulty. Five 
new subjects were chosen for this experi- 
ment and they were run with the usual 
procedure, except that for the first 12 ses- 
sions no feedback of any kind was given 
and the difficulty of the task was set at  a 
relatively easy level. 
Four of these subjects entered state 2 
during these early sessions. The fifth subject 
went directly into state 1. Following the 
12th session, feedback was introduced and 
the level of difficulty of the task was changed 
to the usual more difficult level. Additional 
practice sessions were conducted until the 
four subjects leveled off a t  a new, higher 
level. 
The hypothesis that M is two quanta in 
state 2 and one quantum in state 1 was 
supported in this experiment, both by the 
mean values of M and by the high correla- 
tion between the two sets of M values. The 
evidence for the existence of the two states 
seems fairly clear. We have not continued 
to pursue the interesting problem of identi- 
fying the variables that determine which 
state the subject enters. 
Two-State Successiveness Functions 
Accepting the hypothesis of two states 
and the finding that the same individual 
may be in one state a t  one time and in the 
other state a t  another time, i t  is difficult 
to assume that all individuals can maintain 
either state over a length of time to the 
complete exclusion of the other state. Yet, 
that assumption is implicit in the earlier 
methods of interpreting successiveness data. 
A more realistic assumption would admit 
the possibility of a subject being in state 2 
on some proportion of trials, even under 
experimental conditions that are designed 
to maximize performance. This might ac- 
count for the earlier finding that the span 
of the successiveness function is slightly 
larger than the alpha half cycle. 
This leads to a two-state model of succes- 
siveness discrimination in which the suc- 
cessiveness function is the weighted mean 
of two linear functions having the same 
value of z but spanning one quantum in 
one case and two in the other. The weighting 
factor is P,, the probability of being in 
state 2. An example of this two-state func- 
tion is also shown in figure 6 (a). It consists 
of two linear segments, each of which spans 
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one quantum on the time axis. The point 
of intersection of the two segments occurs 
a t  a value of P ( c )  that is related to the 
probability of being in state 2 in the man- 
ner shown in the figure. 
Data that are adequate for analysis by 
means of the two-state model have been 
obtained for 13 new subjects. Electroen- 
cephalograms were also recorded for these 
subjects in each experimental session. As 
in the earlier study, the average value of 
the alpha half cycle was found to be 48 
msec. The average value of the behavioral 
quanta determined by means of the two- 
state model was also 48 msec. The correla- 
tion between the behavioral quantum and 
the alpha interval was confirmed. 
To obtain data that are an adequate test 
of the two-state model requires setting the 
level of difficulty of the task so that it is 
relatively easy; that condition was used in 
this experiment. Under that condition, it 
is interesting to note that the probability 
of being in state 2 was not close to zero 
for any subject. This means that the one- 
quantum successiveness function is approxi- 
mately correct, but only under very special 
experimental conditions. The generality of 
the one-quantum function is quite limited. 
Experimental Alteration of Quantum Magnitude 
I should hasten to point out that we have 
not yet accomplished that which is implied 
by the title of this section. This is a project 
that is in progress. We have been working 
on it for the past 2 years and most of this 
effort has been borne by John Santa Barbara. 
There are two main reasons why I want 
to find out where alpha fits into this story. 
In the first place, I am curious about the 
alpha rhythm itself. I t  is perhaps the most 
salient aspect of brain-wave recordings and 
we have never been able to identify its 
psychological or behavioral significance. In 
the second place, the temporal characteris- 
tics of the alpha rhythm can be determined 
easily, rapidly, and with a high degree of 
precision. With the proper equipment, one 
can accomplish this for a single individual 
in just a few minutes. This is in marked 
contrast with the behavioral methods that 
we use; such methods require experimental 
sessions spread out over many weeks to 
complete a single measurement. Therefore, 
if it can be established that the conclusicn 
about alpha that I am suggesting is a valid 
one, we would have a very powerful tool 
to use both for further analytical work and 
for any attempts that might be made to 
apply this theory in practical situations. 
We need further evidence of a different 
logical nature concerning the relationship 
between alpha and the quantum. Most of 
our evidence is at the present time only cor- 
relational and it is not adequate to support 
a strong conclusion. 
Another approach is to try to exert experi- 
mental control over the magnitude of the 
quantum. If we could find a way to change 
the frequency of the alpha rhythm, we could 
then make measurements to see whether we 
get the same changes in the behavioral quan- 
tum. This project is an attempt to do that. 
Mr. Santa Barbara set out to try to find 
some agent or combination of agents that 
is effective in slowing down or speeding up 
the human alpha rhythm. This strategy 
was taken because of the greater ease of 
measuring the EEG, and it is more efficient 
first to find an agent that produces a reliable 
effect upon the EEG. 
We hope to find an agent that will shift 
the frequency spectrum in the alpha range 
and leave the remainder of the spectrum 
unaffected. Many agents have been tried, 
most of them selected on the basis of re- 
ports in the literature. They include dex- 
trose, fasting, oxygen inhalation, carbon di- 
oxide inhalation, Diamox, alcohol, Librium, 
and Dexedrine. None of these agents pro- 
duced consistent results. Most of them had 
very little effect a t  all, and when effects 
were noted they were in one direction for 
some subjects and in the opposite direction 
for others. 
We would like to produce a change in peak 
frequency of at  least 20 percent. In no case 
have we been able to produce a change that 
large. With some subjects, some agents ap- 
peared to produce a change as large as 10 
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percent, but even these changes, the largest 
ones we obtained, were very inconsistent 
from subject to subject. Speaking statisti- 
cally, the results that we have obtained are 
consistent with the results recorded in t'ne 
literature. Agents that are reputed to speed 
up the alpha, rhythm do tend to do that, and 
those that are reputed to slow it down tend 
to do that. The effects, however, are incon- 
sistent and very small in magnitude. 
On the basis of the work we have done 
so far, we are led to conclude that the alpha 
rhythm is highly impervious to external 
modification and highly stable for a single 
individual over long periods of time. 
We are continuing the search for an effec- 
tive agent. We are currently investigating 
the influence of body temperature. There are 
many reports in the literature concerning 
this. These studies have reported consistent 
effects and have often shown in detail the 
functional relationship between alpha fre- 
quency and body temperature. We also get 
consistent effects with body-temperature 
changes. Once again, however, the changes 
do not exceed about 10 percent, a t  least over 
the temperature range that we have used. 
I would like to mention an experimental 
result that seems to be emerging, but is still 
quite tentative. We have been trying to 
develop a method for changing body tem- 
perature that causes as little discomfort to 
the subject as possible. In the course of 
doing this, we are finding that if you change 
body temperature using a procedure that 
depletes water and salt, then you get the 
usual change in the alpha frequency. How- 
ever, if you take steps to prevent the deple- 
tion of electrolytes and fluid, then, even 
though body temperature changes just as 
much, alpha frequency does not change. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
My research during the next 2 years will 
be directed mainly a t  two tasks: a more 
intensive experimental and theoretical analy- 
sis of reaction-time distributions and the 
influence of channel uncertainty; and a con- 
tinuation of the attempt to alter quantum 
size and to apply this to a study of the 
relationships among the major parameters. 
I t  required most of the past year to ar- 
rive a t  a more adequate definition of the one 
parameter M. The next step is to study 
time in the hope of reducing meas- 
urement errors in those experiments. Also, 
there are other experiments underway that 
are designed to extend the theory to encom- 
pass other phenomena ; these will continue. 
This work pro-mises to have generality 
because it seems to integrate very different 
kinds of data into what is still a simple 
and coherent theory. However, all the work 
has been done in only one laboratory and 
even the basic experimental results are not 
yet firmly established. It  is my conviction 
that the generality of the theory is sharply 
limited a t  present. In 2 years, a t  the present 
rate of progress, I may feel that the basic 
results are established. We will then be in 
a position to test the generality of the theory 
along other dimensions. 
Useful empirical generalizations will be 
difficult to acquire. For example, consider the 
question of successiveness discrimination. I 
commented above that the experiments on 
the two-state successiveness function demon- 
strate that the one-quantum function is use- 
ful only under very limited conditions. The 
two-state function introduces a new param- 
eter that has been shown to influence this 
behavior extensively. I am afraid that I 
can only make crude guesses about the vari- 
ables that influence this parameter. Further- 
more, I know from a number of other ex- 
periments that successiveness functions at  
the present time have meaning only within 
a very restricted discrimination context. 
They have all been obtained using a forced- 
choice method. Other psychophysical meth- 
ods, which seem more similar to situations 
that one might encounter in applied settings, 
give results that I cannot reconcile with the 
forced-choice results a t  the present time. 
In a yes-no context, there seem to be still 
other parameters operating, and we have 
not yet succeeded even in identifying them. 
As another example, take the conclusion 
stated above that channel uncertainty adds 
a quantum to reaction time on some trials. 
ATTE 
For  one thing, I know that  this conclusion 
applies to a situation that  involves a single 
response. Whether i t  would apply if the 
subject also had to select among responses 
i s  something that  we simply do not know. 
I am quite sure that  we would find a much 
more complicated set of relationships with 
multiple responses. Also, I know that this 
conclusion does not apply to detection re- 
action times. Finally, I also know that  if 
one complicates the stimulus configuration 
in the discrimination reaction time experi- 
ment by doing nothing more than adding a 
fourth signal, an  additional negative signal 
in the auditory channel, the conclusion does 
not apply. Distributions of the parameter 
M that  are then obtained do have a peak 
in the vicinity of one quantum, but they 
hax; a second peak a t  the two-quantum 
level and the average value of K is quite 
different than i t  is in the three-signal case. 
We also do not know anything about the 
possible effects of stimulus parameters, such 
as  intensity, on the measured extent of the 
quantum, nor do we know whether similar 
results are obtained for combinations of sen- 
sory channels other than the one that  has 
been used in all of my experiments. 
A NOTE ON APPLICATION 
Despite the paucity of precise generaliza- 
tions that  would be useful in solving applied 
problems, I believe that  i t  might be helpful 
t o  use this theory, or parts of it, in formu- 
lating certain applied problems and in de- 
signing relevant experiments. I can con- 
ceive of this being done in several different 
areas, assuming that  information-processing 
efficiency is an important issue, such as  de- 
signing displays, selecting personnel, moni- 
toring the state of an operator, or evaluating 
the effects of environmental conditions, in- 
cluding physiological conditions. 
The theory contains a t  least three gen- 
eral classes of parameters. There are four 
parameters that  converge upon the quantum 
concept. Other parameters have to do with 
message transmission times, mainly within 
sensory channels. And, yet, other param- 
eters are  probability values, such as the 
probability of being in a particular configura- 
tion or information-processing state, and the 
probability of attending to a particular sen- 
sory channel. 
From my point of view, the quantum con- 
cept is the most important of these because 
i t  is the source of integration for the theory, 
and I am sure that  I have communicated 
that  attitude in this presentation. However, 
the priorities that  I attach to the various 
parameters are not necessarily those that  
should be assigned by someone who wished 
to use the theory in other contexts. 
The magnitude of the quantum, except 
insofar as i t  establishes limits upon perform- 
ance, is probably of minor significance as 
f a r  as raw performance is concerned. I say 
this because individuals differ so little in 
quantum size, minimizing the value of select- 
ing individuals according to this criterion, 
and also because i t  seems unlikely that the 
size of the quantum can be altered to any 
important extent. 
On the other hand, quantum size may be- 
come important in complex tasks that  in- 
volve mafiy serial stages of information proc- 
essing. Performance variance in complex 
tasks may be determined strongly by quan- 
tum size. However, we know very little a t  
present about the extent to which the 
quantum concept is relevant to complex 
tasks. 
I can illustrate this point with some of 
my own data taken from the two-state suc- 
cessiveness experiment (ref. 6). If one forms 
two groups of subjects by taking the six 
with fastest alpha and the six with slowest 
alpha, one can then compare the two groups 
with respect to their overall performance 
on the successiveness task. 
The correlation between alpha and the 
behavioral quantum is close enough so that  
the average values of alpha and q are  within 
msec of each other for both the fast- 
alpha and the slow-alpha groups. In  spite 
of this, the groups differ hardly a t  all in 
overall performance and, in fact, the slow- 
alpha group shows slightly better overall 
performance. An inspection of the other 
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parameters clarifies this result. The groups size (P,=0.57 for large q group and 0.25 
are identical with respect to s, but quite for the other group). 
different in the probability of being in state The implication of this is, of course, that 
1. The group with the larger quantum size some of the parameters other than quantum 
was much more likely to be in state 1- size may be much more potent determiners 
enough to more than compensate for quantum of performance differences. 
DISCUSSION 
LLOYD A. JEFFRESS: Have you tried getting your 
stimuli in accordance with the phase of the alpha 
rhythm? 
ALFRED B. KRISTOFFERSON: No; I have not tried 
that yet. I am reluctant to t ry  it because there would 
be variability in the conduction pathway that  would 
be hard to take into account. 
HAROLD G. MILLER: What about electric shock 
as a method of changing your timings? 
KRISTOFFERSON: Well, I have not tried that, but 
it would only be a very momentary thing. 
JEFFRESS: Another possibility would seem to be to 
use a different sensory modality, say, touch and hear- 
ing, and use vision to drive the alpha rhythm. 
JOHN W. SENDERS: Yes; possibly you could drive 
the alpha with touch. 
JEROME I. ELKIND: Could you clarify one thing 
for me? I t  seems to me that  you are talking about a 
clock running a t  50 milliseconds while a t  other times 
you are talking about a delay of 50 milliseconds. Are 
you always assuming you are in synchronism with 
the clock? 
KRISTOFFERSON: NO; never. I am always assum- 
ing that  the stimulus is completely independent. 
ELKIND: Yet you said that  things are going to be 
held there in stage 1 for 50 milliseconds. 
KRISTOFFERSON : Because stage 1 and attention 
are controlled by the same clock; so if the message 
is held out of stage 1 waiting for attention to switch, 
then when i t  is admitted to stage 1, it will be admitted 
a t  the beginning of the quantum. 
JOSEPH MARKOWITZ: I t  is synchronous gating. 
MILLER: YOU only tried two of all your five senses. 
Maybe you could t ry  heat too, which would be the 
third. 
WARD EDWARDS: The reaction-time questions you 
are dealing with are very similar to those dealt with 
by people interested in the tradeoff between speed and 
accuracy. You did not say much about accuracy. I 
assume i t  was very high. 
KRISTOFFERSON: It was. The probability of a 
wrong response was below 5 percent, between 2 and 5 
percent. 
EDWARDS : Suppose you manipulate the situation 
by means of your payoff matrix in  such a way that  
you get 20 or 30 percent errors. You will expect to 
get substantial decreases in reaction times. How 
would that  fit into this quantum conception? 
KRISTOFFERSON: Well, I do not know what the 
effect would be on K;  that  is not immediately obvious 
to me. Parameter K is a relation between two experi- 
mental conditions, both of which would be affected 
in the manner you are describing. Whether there 
would be a net effect on K itself, I cannot say. I do 
not think there would be. Now, the other one, Q, I do 
not know. I would be sure that would be badly dam- 
aged. 
MARKOWITZ: Do you have any thoughts on how 
you can go back from an NQ state to an ( N + l ) Q  
state? You were able to show a switch one way 
toward N. Then, do you have any feel for how you 
might go about getting them back? 
KRISTOFFERSON: They would not go from the one 
all the way back to the two but they would go in that 
direction. In other words, P2 would increase, but 
never all the way to  one, once they had been in the 
one-quantum state. 
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Comments' 
JOHN W. SENDERS 
Bolt, Beruaek C Newmum, Zec. 
JOHN W. SENDERS: My main purpose is 
to act as discussant of the presentations of 
Tanner and Kristofferson. My concern is 
not with the quality of the research that 
either of these scientists has carried on. 
Rather, I am concerned with the relation of 
this research (and its extensions and inter- 
pretations) to some of the problems that 
NASA faces in operational missions and in 
the real task requirements. 
Psychologists do not invent mathematics 
to fit psychology. They very often invent 
psychology to fit mathematics. I have been 
impressed with the marvelous ways in which 
this goes on. The particular mathematics 
into which behavior is being fitted-this 
procrustean bed-is signal detection theory 
in the one case and a sort of quantum me- 
chanics in the other case. If Elkind were 
here, i t  would be linear-servo analysis. I 
use information theory, and so forth. There 
is nothing terrible about this, but one has 
to remember that the mathematics is a con- 
venience that, in many cases, circumscribes 
what one says about what really happened. 
The statements that were made earlier, about 
the necessity for face validity if one is to 
extrapolate from laboratory work (particu- 
larly in simulations) to operational situa- 
tions, still hold. 
Tanner's presentation elicits the following 
thoughts. In the laboratory, we study the 
'Mr. Senders commented on the papers presented 
by Tanner, Kristofferson, and Alluisi and led a gen- 
eral discussion of the issues involved. 
detection of signals in noise, and the identi- 
fication of signals that differ in small de- 
grees from some other signal. We vary the 
probability of occurrence of two signals and 
ask the subjects to make estimates and to 
emit responses. From the data we calculate 
certain numbers that go into a particular 
mathematical model. The model leads to 
further inference about hypothesized internal 
variables in the operator. 
An alternative kind of research is that 
in which people are put in simulators or 
real aircraft and allowed to fly. We have 
been very well informed about the different 
kinds of situations that can exist and the 
different kinds of decisions that are made. 
However, for certain critical situations, the 
number of cases that can actually be ob- 
served is small, and the opportunity to get 
information from the people who end up 
there is even smaller. As a result, we lose 
that information most useful to us. 
Yet, there is an in-between type of study. 
Tanner suggested that an experimenter could 
use a television screen to present pictorial 
situations that might be characteristic of 
those that a pilot sees on breaking out of 
the clouds. The experimenter might then 
ask the pilot to make some kind of judgment 
as to whether he would go around or land. 
Presumably, these situations could be scaled 
so that one could know whether they were, 
in fact, good or bad. I think that this kind 
of experiment can closely approximate op- 
erational situations. At the same time, such 
experimentation can preserve the applica- 
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bility and utility of the signal-detection 
model. 
A student a t  MIT is doing experiments 
on an automobile driving simulator that  I 
think could be replicated in aircraft simula- 
tors. A model car is driven remotely with 
the help of television. The car bears a cam- 
era that lookcs a t  a model road. I n  general, 
the dynamics of the situation are, a s  nearly 
as possible, the same as those of a real 
automobile. The driver has a curving road 
to drive through with miniature traffic cones 
along the edge of it. At  a particular point 
in the path, he is required to do one of 
two things, depending on the nature of the 
experiment. In one experiment, he merely 
estimates that  he can or cannot go through 
that  particular obstacle course without 
knocking over any traffic cones. Knocking 
over a traffic cone is analogous to a bad 
landing. In  the other kind of experiment, 
he gives numerical estimates of the probabil- 
ity that he will, in fact, be able to go through 
the winding road without knocking over 
any cones. Then, of course, he continues 
driving and goes through the winding road. 
So you end up with the data that  you need 
for a signal-detection analysis of the behavior. 
You have the estimated probabilities for 
situations that  vary over a wide range. You 
also have actual data as to whether the driver 
did, in fact, knock over the cones. 
I think this could be done in an aircraft 
simulator in the same way. At the moment 
that  a pilot broke out of his television clouds, 
he could be required to make an  estimate 
and then to proceed with the landing. In 
this way, an experimenter could accumulate 
statistics on the probability of successful 
landing following a prediction of success. 
Admittedly, this would be a very long and 
arduous program of research, but compared 
with "Alluisi's heroism," as Yntema has 
called it, i t  is relatively easy. Six months 
of devoted work would, perhaps, produce a 
sufficient body of data to permit a complete 
analysis. 
Of course, one would also like to find out 
the extent to  which one can use these results 
to make predictions about the behavior of 
the same individual flying a simulator or 
a real aircraft. In  other words, is there a 
consistency in performance across situational 
variables ? Probably not, but the in-between 
type of study, in which the simulation de- 
vices that  Rathert talked about would be 
combined with the signai-detection studies 
that  Tanner talked about, might produce 
useful information. 
Kristoff erson9s work elicits the following. 
What is the relevance to operation problems 
of fundamental research on hypothesized 
internal variables; the switching of atten- 
tion or the switching of the on-line modality 
from, say, vision to audition or to touch 
or to olfaction or anything else? It has 
been claimed and, I hope, verified that  there 
are well-defined, almost invariant, time 
quanta. Within these ""moments," certain 
things happen that  are necessary precursors 
to certain other things happening, and so 
forth. What is the relevance of this dis- 
covery? I think i t  is this: The discovery 
enables us to change our evaluation of sys- 
tems from an a posteriori one to  an  a priori 
one. If we imagine some kind of a machine 
that is to go somewhere and do something, 
we can use the science of aerodynamics to 
calculate roughly what is going to happen; 
that is, what kind of signals are  going to 
flow in the system. It is very diflicult to  
calculate, a priori, the ease or  the difficulty 
that  a man is likely to encounter in operating 
the system, or to decide how much of the 
system must be automated or how one must 
allocate the workload between automatic de- 
vices and manually controlled devices. 
On the other hand, assume that  we could 
take the calculated information about the 
behavior of the system and, from this in- 
formation, derive estimates of the loading 
to be placed on the human operator. At  
relatively low cost, we could then make a 
great many decisions that, at present, are 
almost inevitably preceded by the  construc- 
tion of simulators, prototypes, flying pro- 
totypes, training of pilots, and so forth. The 
components of switching, which Kristoffer- 
son reports, would constitute, in a sense, 
the elements of demand upon the operator. 
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From these components, we could conceiv- 
ably calculate workload by examining the 
time sequences of events that might occur 
in a complex machine. (A great deal more 
work, of course, would be required.) Now- 
ever, if we had a completely predicted time 
sequence of events, we could calculate how 
many of such events the human operator 
could deal with in how much time. We could 
calculate the probabilities that for given 
amounts of time, certain events would not 
be observed, listened to, or looked at. In 
other words, by breaking a task down into 
a very large number of very small com- 
ponents, we might be able to predict the 
results of the sort that Alluisi gets on his 
performance-testing machine. I am glad that 
this is not dead; in a sense, it is what 
Mristofferson is doing. I think the possible 
success of his work will depend upon a more 
sophisticated approach to the problem with 
more a priori analysis than the simple as- 
sumption of linear additivity, which was 
the one held nearly 100 years ago. 
Workloading should be one of the major 
criteria upon which decisions are made con- 
cerning whether a system is good or bad. 
If one can decide this beforehand, it is, of 
course, much better than deciding after the 
system is built. But what is wrong with the 
other methods of estimating workloading? 
For example, the measurement of system 
performance. A number of years ago, Frank 
Taylor demonstrated quite conclusively that 
system performance is not a good way of 
finding out whether a system is good or bad. 
The adaptive nature of the human operator 
of the system tends to wipe out many of 
the effects of variations in system param- 
eters. If these effects exist a t  all, they are 
probably reflected in some internalized and 
probably unmeasurable change in the level 
of effort required for the operator to main- 
tain system performance at a constant and 
desirable level. 
Another way of measuring workload is 
that of the auxiliary task. Alluisi's machine 
is a multiplicity of auxiliary tasks, in fact, 
all auxiliary tasks. There is really no pri- 
mary task. Yntema mentioned that the use 
of auxifiary tasks in recent years has made 
it possible to increase the sensitivity with 
which our testing devices react to minor 
changes in system characteristics. 
The use of auxiliary tasks is usually based 
upon a view of the human being as a single- 
channel device. In my own research I have 
found certain problems with this view. 
Human beings are not quite a single chan- 
nel. The components of the task are not 
additive, so you have to be very careful about 
how you put things together. You cannot 
independently measure a button-pushing task 
and then a mental arithmetic task and ex- 
pect them to sum up. If you put two button- 
pushing tasks together, very often you get 
near additivity. However, when you start 
putting probability monitoring, button push- 
ing, tracking, and a lot of other things all 
in the same pot, it is rather like mixing 
up oil and water. You niay get somewhat 
less volume than the sum of the two volumes. 
There are, perhaps, more extreme examples, 
but my chemistry is very weak. 
I would say that the approach suggested 
by Kristofferson is still gestating. We do 
not have a set of usable numbers with which 
we could go into a real system, even a very 
simple one, and make explicit predictions 
about the behavior of the people. 
For a moment I am going to talk about 
my own work because it is very similar, 
although there are a few differences. I deal 
with explicit behavior, which is easier than 
dealing with hypothesized internalized vari- 
ables. I think 1 have been doing this a little 
longer than Kristofferson and I have gotten 
some results that I can use. But I have 
been aware for many years that there are 
a great many switching functions going on. 
I have modeled my man, in a, conceptual way, 
as a device with many sensory modalities. 
Some of these modalities, for example, the 
eyes, are able overtly to direct themselves 
a t  different points in space. Others, such 
as ears, in the case of humans, cannot be 
directed. (If we were donkeys, we might 
be able to do better on that.) I t  is difficult 
to tell where somebody is listening, but you 
can usually tell where somebody is looking. 
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Internally there are switching functions that 
may make a selection, as Kristofferson would 
have us do, between eyes and ears. I think 
even within a sense modality there are 
switching functions that select a particular 
attribute of either the visual or the audi- 
tory stimulus to which attention will a t  that 
particular moment be paid. If Kristofferson 
is going to give us useful information, I 
think he must eventually get down to that 
microscopic level. 
I shall talk about my own work briefly 
and then come back to Kristofferson. I have 
been dealing with the questions: Where do 
people look? Why do they look there? In 
particular, I have been concerned with the 
intervals between observations of any par- 
ticuIar stimulus or signal. For certain well- 
defined situations, the visual sampling be- 
havior of the human observer can be very 
well predicted on the basis of a sampling 
model. Subjects behave in a lawful way; 
if mathematics says they must do something 
in a particular way, they do i t  that way. 
When people want to get information from 
a time-varying signal (rather like the one 
Alluisi is using in his probability monitor- 
ing), they have to look at the signal in a 
way that is directly related 'to its effective 
bandwidth. On the basis of some elabora- 
tions of this simple notion, I and my col- 
leagues a t  Bolt, Beranek & Newman have con- 
structed models and theories of how people 
are going to look at a world composed of 
a large number of visual signal generators. 
It turns out that people pretty much obey 
the laws as we lay them down so that one 
can predict correctly much about where they 
are going to look, how often they are going 
to look there, how long they are going to 
look, what the transition probabilities are 
going to be between instrument A and in- 
strument B, and so forth. 
The power of this approach is demon- 
strated by some recent work of Warren 
Clement, Henry Jex, and Dunstan Graham 
(of Systems Technology, Inc.) that com- 
bined the describing function work of 
McRuer et al., on the one hand, with the 
scanning work of Senders et al., on the 
other. They took the equations of the Boeing 
707 and closed all the loops with their human 
operator to calculate the displayed signal 
characteristics. Then they applied a modi- 
fied sampling model and calculated the fre- 
quency with which each of the displays 
would be observed. On the basis of the 
observation probabilities, they calculated the 
transition probabilities-it is a simple 
Markov process-between the instruments. 
On the basis of a very simple cost analysis, 
i t  was possible to lay out an instrument 
panel that would minimize visual scanning 
movements. The panel of 10 instruments 
mapped one-for-one onto the existing panel. 
Either we wasted our time, because peo- 
ple obviously already know how to design 
instrument panels; or, alternatively, if we 
can postdict a system that has been the prod- 
uct of an "evolutionary" process operating 
over some 50 or 60 years of aviation, then 
we can probably predict what needs to be 
done in systems that are much different from 
present ones. 
STEVEN E. BELSLEY : Another possibil- 
ity, too, is that your data are so conditioned 
by the 707 panel that you cannot come out 
with anything else. 
SENDERS : No. These are theoretical data. 
BELSLEY: Where did you get them? 
SENDERS : According to McRuer, they 
used the dynamics of the 707 and applied 
their mathematical men to them. There are 
no real pilots involved. All this is the com- 
position of two mathematical models of a 
human operator with a real system and a 
prediction from that of how the panel would 
be laid out for this mathematical man. It 
turns out that this is how the panel is laid 
out. The people who design airplanes are 
not fools. 
Because Kristofferson is also dealing with 
the times involved in the directing of atten- 
tion and in the switching of attention from 
stimulus to stimulus or from channel to 
channel, his work may make it possible to 
compose good estimates of the demands that 
would be made on an operator by a system 
that has not yet been built but only hypothe- 
sized. I feel that this kind of fine-structured 
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analysis of behavior will, in the end, lead 
to a great deal of analytical power useful 
for the design of systems. 
I will comment briefly on Alluisi's multiple- 
task performance battery. I t  is, of course, he- 
roic. One thing that occasionally concerns me 
about that approach to performance testing 
is an assumption of additivity that is in- 
herent in the composition of such task bat- 
teries. It is assumed that each task uses 
some well-defined fraction of the human 
being's capacity, and that these fractions 
can be added up. Then, when you are at  
99.9 percent, it is very difficult to add some- 
thing else. 
I am also concerned by the lack of physi- 
cal coherence in the system that the man is 
called upon to operate in such tests. The 
task is different from all physical systems 
that men control and operate. There is no 
set of necessary relationships, no behavior 
of an integrated system reflected to the man 
through a multiplicity of channels. The data 
are isolated rather than provide the operator 
a coherent picture of some external reality. 
I think that the behavior of people in air- 
craft is probably conditioned very much by 
such an integrated picture of the whole. 
I remember, many years ago in our less- 
sophisticated days a t  Wright Field, that peo- 
ple would talk about instrument lags. The 
rate of climb indicator lags terribly. "You 
never know where you are. You always 
know what you were doing some time ago." 
Someone suggested that i t  might be better 
if we delayed all the instruments uniformly 
so the operator would know what the entire 
system is doing some seconds ago rather 
than giving him an oblique slice of the sys- 
tem in time. I am not sure that that is a 
good idea, but it is the kind of thing one 
thinks about when one thinks about coherent 
physical systems as opposed to a set of dis- 
crete stimuli which from time to time de- 
mand response and in which predictability 
is remarkably lacking from one signal to 
another. 
EARL A. ALLUISI: I do not claim that we 
have an ideal battery. I think we have one 
of the best available today, but that does 
not mean that it should not be improved. In 
fact, we are continually doing research to 
develop new tasks. We are trying to get 
more of the functions represented in a way 
that will enable us to identify the measure- 
ment and talk about it. 
We do not really make the assumption of 
additivity. I think the most important thing 
about the approach is something we have 
not talked about. I spoke earlier about the 
domain of work behavior. There are two 
domains: one of test behavior and one of 
work behavior. Man does not operate the 
same way in the two. I think we all recog- 
nize that psychological variables, such as  the 
domain in which a man places himself, his 
motivation, and others, may contribute more 
to the variance that we are measuring than 
do some of the variables that we are con- 
trolling. 
If I want to talk about performance assess- 
ment or about work behavior, my subjects 
must be in the appropriate domain-in the 
domain of work behavior, not in the domain 
of test behavior. Our failure to recognize 
this distinction in most of the work com- 
pleted prior to World War I1 explains our 
failure to show decrements in performance 
with any of numerous stresses. I can make 
predictions today regarding the outcomes 
to be expected with certain different ap- 
proaches. We have used some of the other 
approaches in our own studies. For example, 
in conducting the sleep-loss studies, we have 
used intelligence tests and we found that 
our subjects, after 40 hours of sleep loss, 
tested out the same as when they weye fresh. 
However, a man after 40 hours of sleep 
loss is not able to operate at  the same intel- 
lectual level as when he is fresh from sleep! 
You can observe that in his gross behavior. 
Our tests cannot, however, discriminate be- 
tween the man with sleep loss and the man 
without. This is partially because the man 
places himself in different domains of be- 
havior in the two cases. With the paper- 
and-pencil intelligence test, he places him- 
self in the domain of test behavior. There 
he is remarkably able to call upon his per- 
formance reserve and to perform a t  the 
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same level as when unstressed. (Even in the 
test-behavior domain, you can show a dec- 
rement with sleep loss if you have a task 
that  is highly dependent on attention for 
good performance. j 
No, we do not really assume additivity, 
although i t  may have seemed that we were 
when we attempted to derive a general index 
of performance. The general index used was 
logically the best we could devise. Virhat we 
need to have represented in the battery with 
a clear measure is something that  I can 
identify and that you will agree is a nieasure 
of what I say i t  is-one of the different 
functions or processes that  men are called 
upon to  perform in different systems. I 
would hope to be able to determine which 
of these measures deteriorate with different 
stresses, and to what degree they deteriorate 
differentially. The problem of putting every- 
LLOYD A. JEFFRESS: I t  may be a coherent taslc 
from the standpoint of the subject, but the inputs 
have no relation to one another. 
SENDERS: That is really what I meant. I t  does 
not have to be a mass with ~vings attached to tot. I t  
just does not present a picture of a meaningful world 
because the signals are completely independent. 
WARD EDWARDS: Do you know whether that  mat- 
ters? I do not know of any research comparing co- 
herent with incoherent worlds. 
SENDERS: I do not know that  it matters. My in- 
tuition tells me that i t  might matter quite a bit. 
ALLUISI: There is a kind of coherence---the kind 
that  comes with putting a job together and accepting 
i t  as a whole job. If we consider the job of piloting 
an aircraft and do not know much about it, i t  does 
not look like the elements in it form a coherent whole 
either. What I am saying is that there is a kind of 
coherence, perhaps because these people accept i t  as  
a job. 
I want to discuss figure 16 in Alluisi's paper, "Pilot 
Performance: Research on the Assessment of Com- 
plex Human Performance," presented previously. 
All experimental subjects became ill; not all of 
them showed decrements in performance. In fact, I 
found in this study the greatest differences among 
individuals that  I have ever encountered as a psy- 
chologist. I n  this particular case I was enthusiastic- 
and still am-because there is an opportunity, which 
we do not have in other studies, of finding relations 
with 'the body chemistry. In  this case, we know that  
performance is bound to deteriorate to a maximum 
degree while there are maximum body chemistry 
thing together, mixing i t  up, and predicting 
the real-life thing, is tha,t i t  is dependent 
upon the development of a task ta,xonomy 
and taslc analysis that  says how much of 
each firnction goes into each task, and what 
the interactions are. They are  not going 
to be linear, I can predict tinat. So 1 agree 
with you fully-simple additivity is just 
too simple! 
I wish also to comment on the supposed 
lack of physical coherence in the system. 
When I present the system and talk about 
i t  to the man working it, he rega,rds his task 
as a coherent job. He a,ccepts it. We have 
ha.d over 100 subjects, all of whom have 
indicated their acceptance of the taslc bat- 
tery and their perception of i t  as defining 
the job they have to do. The separate tasks 
are time shared and relaked, just like on any 
other job. 
changes ta.king place during an illness. So we rnaxi- 
n~ize the opportunity of finding correlations between 
perfornlance and physiological variables simply by 
maximizing their ranges of covariation. Of course, 
there will be much to study afterwards to determine 
which of these correlations are real and which are 
spurious. We hope to do that. 
What happens to performance? I t  seems to lag 
the illness in its changes. If you recall, temperature 
started up in the middle of the seventh day. Perform- 
ance starts down on the eighth day and continues down 
a little after the point where treatment started (and 
temperature started down), then, la-ter, performance 
picked up again. At the end of the study, the experi- 
men ta l~  are still about 15 percent below the control 
subjects. They have not recovered yet. This second 
double drop on the eleventh day, which occurred in 
the two control subjects as well a s  the eight experi- 
menta l~ ,  has occurred in each of our studies that  had 
a clearly defined period of stress. I t  occurred in both 
the sleep-loss and the illness studies. It is  a demon- 
stration that  one of the psychological variables, moti- 
vation, is potentially accounting for a t  least as  great 
a portion of the variation as  anything else. The sub- 
jects have been sick, they were started on treatment, 
and they are now feeling pretty well again. As far  
as the subject is concerned, his job is done. He was 
sick, his performance fell; he got well, his perform- 
ance rose. He asks, "What am I here for? Why do 
you not let me out?" 
In the normal course of experimentation, I would 
have gone in just prior to the time that I expected 
this second drop in performance to tell the subjects, 
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in effect: "I want your motivation to continue a t  the 
same level in order to see how the recovery takes 
place." Unfortunately, I did not get in because these 
data were collected during the blizzard of 1966, and 
I was stuck in a motel, cooking for 300 people! The 
next morning the chief experiinenter called me and 
said that performance was beginning to deteriorate. 
I said, "Well, you go in and give them the spiel." He 
did, and the performance began to rise again. The 
rise is due strictly to motivation in both the controls 
and experimentals. The fact that  the experimentals 
a re  unable to get back up to the line of the controls 
shows that they have not recovered fully-not behav- 
iorally, anyway. 
Average performance did drop during illness; the 
drop averaged about 25 percent over the eight sub- 
jects. However, the individual differences were so 
great that  we had one subject who showed essentially 
no decrement in performance while running a rectal 
temperature of 105" F, complaining of severe head- 
ache, and showing all the other symptoms of tula- 
remia. 
JOSEPH MARKOWITZ: What was his baseline per- 
formance in comparison with the others? 
ALLUISI : We cannot find a correlation with it. He 
was neither better nor worse to start  with. He was 
essentially average in performance. 
SENDERS: HOW do you control for the baseline 
level? Is  there any way you can guarantee that  the 
people when generating baseline data are maximally 
motivated and working a t  peak performance? 
ALLUISI: No. 
SENDERS : Then his baseline performance might 
not have been a t  his peak; he might have reserve 
capacity, so he could maintain performance? 
ALLUISI: NO; I do not believe that is likely. Al- 
though we have individual differences in perform- 
ance, subjects are still remarkably alike. I t  is, P 
suppose, something like playing a pinball machine. 
There are elements intrinsic to the task, which begin 
to make the people more alike. The battery itself 
begins to form behavior. Although persons may start  
off somewhat differently, they become more alike a s  
they continue to work the task. This is, I believe, 
one of the reasons that  knowledge of results is im- 
portant to every phase. They are getting full knowl- 
edge of results all the way along. Where i t  is not 
intrinsic to the task, I present i t  explicitly so tha t  the 
task is instructive. 
To pursue the topic of individual differences, how- 
ever, I had just reported to you that we had one sub- 
ject who showed no decrement. On the other end of 
the scale, we had one subject who became nonrespon- 
sive to external stimuli. By that  I mean that  a physi- 
cian could stick a pin in his leg, and he would not move 
the leg, or say anything. We had another man who 
had a 3 percent drop in performance, which is essen- 
tially no drop a t  all. We had men so ill that  they 
had to be wheeled to their duty stations, but they 
came to work in order to perform their group tasks. 
A man would come on duty just because he  did not 
want the crew to be penalized. 

Panel Discussion' 
STEVEN E. BELSLEY: I gather from 
Swets that this is to be a panel of the whole 
group and anyone may participate. I would 
like to say one thing before we get started. 
I was amazed to find out that Senders was 
using what I call an engineering approach 
to certain problems. I thought he repre- 
sented the psychological approach. To sug- 
gest that one would run through a repre- 
sentation of the real-life situation and then 
make a measurement and do this repeti- 
tiously sounds like an engineer's approach 
to the problem. 
JOHN W. SENDERS: I am glad to join the 
company of engineers. 
BELSLEY: Nowhere in this discussion 
(even Rathert did not bring up this point) 
has i t  been mentioned that the mechanism 
that has been used in gaining all those beau- 
tiful time histories, to evaluate the situation 
and to find out whether it is go or no-go is 
a device called the vocal controller, which is 
the pilot. We have tried to bypass the use 
of actual performance measures of the vari- 
ous processes that are going on, and have 
used instead an overall integrated feeling 
of how the performance goes. We have been 
successful in the past in using the pilot rating 
to measure how things are doing and how 
well the system works. Yet no one seems 
to want to correlate decisionmaking with 
' A general discussion of the  papers presented and 
issues raised during the day. The discussion centered 
around measurenlent, prediction, simulation, and mo- 
tivation of pilot performance. 
pilot ratings-if it is correlatable. Does any- 
one have any comments on this score? 
D o u w ~  B. YNTEMA: Do you mean that 
pilot rating is a decision? 
BELSLEY: You operate a system to do 
something. The question is, then, not neces- 
sarily how well the pilot does the job, but 
how hard he is working. Is he working 
at top performance? Halfway? Or is the 
task just plain easy? The pilot can give a 
vocal rating. Instead of finding out from 
someone else that he is working a t  100 per- 
cent capacity, the pilot says, "I was working 
a t  100 percent capacity." 
The question remains as to how one pre- 
dicts where he is going to come apart a t  
the seams? 
JOSEPH MARKOWITZ : Are you asking that 
we get the pilot to tell us after how many 
hours' sleep deprivation he will, in fact, 
begin to deteriorate? 
BELSLEY: It has in the past proved use- 
ful. I just wanted to point out that nobody 
talked about i t  a t  all. 
MARKOWITZ: I t  seems close to what 
Senders described when he said that you ask 
people to estimate the probability of success 
and then to do the task. That would be 
similar to asking a pilot, "How are you 
going to do after 4 days?" 
BELSLEY: Or after he is there 4 days 
you say, "How do you feel? Do you think 
you can hack it?" Otherwise you might look 
at all your data and conclude that the experi- 
ment is going along really well, 
WARD EDWARDS : There are some data on 
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the problem Senders raised, and bearing on 
the question you suggested. Consider a 
signal-detection experiment in which the sub- 
ject responds with an estimate of the prob- 
ability that a signal is there. Peterson did 
this with a single subject over a period of 
months. If the subject uses probability esti- 
mates correctly, then for all responses that 
the probability is 0.6 that there is a signal, 
whatever the stimulus situation, a signal 
should have been there 60 percent of the 
time if his reporting is correct. So, if you 
plot subjective probabilities against the rel- 
ative frequency with which there was, in 
fact, a stimulus, giving the identity line 
for reference, you find that the subject's 
estimates are nearer 50-50 than they ought 
to be. Therefore, you get an S-shaped func- 
tion, crossing the identity line at  50 per- 
cent. This turns out to be very little differ- 
ent from one subject to another and a highly 
regular function. 
MARKOWITZ : After the observation, you 
ask him what the probability was that there 
was a signal. 
EDWARDS : That is his response. 
MARKOWITZ: I thought Senders was re- 
ferring to an a priori judgment. Before the 
observation you ask the subject how well 
he thinks he will be able to do. 
SENDERS: That is right, we might be 
talking about the Cooper Scale or pilot rating. 
As he flies the machine, he says: "It is abso- 
lutely all right," or "it stinks," or "it is 
barely controllable." In a sense you are say- 
ing that if you asked the pilot to put i t  in 
quantitative terms, he might say, "I would 
guess about 50-50 it could be used for a mis- 
sion." Would he not say something like that? 
BELSLEY : Yes. 
MARKOWITZ: So he is making judgments 
before the fact! 
BELSLEY: And after the fact. 
SENDERS: To build an airplane in order 
to find out whether it is a good airplane is 
expensive and time consuming. We would 
like to be able to generate analytically a 
good estimate of what the pilot's prediction 
will be if you build the airplane. I think 
that with regard to handling properties this 
is what McRuer is doing, and with regard, 
say, to visual scanning, is what I am try- 
ing to do. With regard to total central work, 
it is what Kristoflerson is trying to do. We 
all want to avoid the necessity of construct- 
ing something and trying it out (which is, 
admittedly, a very good way of finding out 
whether you can do it, but is also expensive 
and time consuming). 
JOHN A. SWETS: DO you know of any 
data on the validity of pilots' ratings that 
used some psychological test? Part  of the 
question is that we want to test in a variety 
of different ways and we never want to 
ask the pilots. Are there any well-known 
instances in which the pilots just do not 
do very well, where the ratings are not 
reliable ? 
SENDERS: The only one I know of was, 
I think, in 1953 a t  Wright Field. A non- 
linear yaw damper was tried out a t  the 
flight test unit for comparison studies of 
the nonlinear damper versus the linear 
damper. The pilots took the aircraft up for 
simulated air-to-air gunnery. The opinions 
were in favor of the linear damper. The 
gun-camera records showed that the non- 
linear damper was superior. When the rec- 
ords were shown to the pilots, they changed 
their opinions. In a sense they said, "We 
were looking a t  the wrong criteria. We were 
looking a t  the ease of handling as opposed 
to stiffness of point of aim on the target," 
or something of this sort. In dealing with 
pilot opinion, there is always a risk that the 
pilot can be judging on the wrong criteria. 
GEORGE A. RATHERT: In those particular 
tests, you had the problem I spoke about 
earlier. That airplane was not going to be 
used with fixed iron sights. It was going 
to be used with a disturbed-reticle gunsight. 
The pilots could have subjectively made the 
judgment of what was best for the airplane 
with the weapons system they were going to 
use it with. The pilots will give you the right 
answers-if you ask the right questions. 
If you had asked them which is the best 
airplane with an iron gunsight, you might 
have gotten a different answer than if you 
had asked which is the best airplane, be- 
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cause they will answer the latter question 
in view of the use they know you are going 
to make of it. 
SENDERS: I think that the question was 
essentially to compare the aircraft damper 
systems. That may be an improper question. 
EARL A. ALLUISI: We have gotten off 
onto the question of asking the pilot about 
the aircraft, whereas I thought we had 
started with the question of asking the pilot 
about himself. Pilots have been asked how 
well they did or how well they were going 
to do in some of our work-rest schedules. 
The question was asked on the a posteriori 
side; that is, the pilot was asked how well 
he did. We collected data in a 30-day study 
with 10 rated pilots from the Air Force. 
Each subject was required to make an entry 
in a log at the end of every 2-hour period 
of work. One of the entries required of 
each subject throughout the 30 days was 
an estimation of his efficiency during the 
preceding 2 hours, where 100 percent effi- 
ciency meant (or should have meant) that 
he had operated a t  the top level of which 
he was then capable. The analysis of the 
data indicated only one significant correla- 
tion between this index of efficiency and 
any of the performance measures. That was 
a correlation of about 0.30 with performance 
on the target identification task. I would 
interpret this result as an indication that the 
pilots based their estimates more on their 
performances of target identifications than 
on the other tasks. In short, in our experi- 
mental situation, we can predict performance 
better using just about any method other 
than asking the man. 
SENDERS: Could you repeat exactly what 
you asked them to do? 
ALLUISI: They were to enter in their 
book a numeral indicating the percentage 
efficiency of their work during the preceding 
2-hour period. For each man, the baseline 
(100 percent) would be his top, the highest 
he was able to perform, 
SENDERS : At any time ? 
ALLUISI: At any time. We had no diffi- 
culty getting them to write down numbers, 
but. . . . 
SENDERS : Presumably he was always op- 
erating a t  his top wherever he was, was he 
not? You were actually asking him to esti- 
mate his capacity vis-a-vis his capacity at  
some other time? 
ALLUISI: Did he during the last 2-hour 
period work a t  the top level that he could 
work, or did he work at some point below 
that; if so, a t  what point below that? If, 
during the last 2-hour period, I operated or 
reported that I operated a t  80 percent effi- 
ciency, the figure was to have been judged 
against what I could have done today a t  that 
period if I were fresh and in best condition. 
JEROME I. ELKIND: May I change the 
subject a little bit? I want to come back to 
some of the things you talked about in your 
test matter. It seems to me that for your 
results to be really useful to a systems de- 
signer, it would be much better if you were 
measuring different kinds of things from 
the things you are measuring. Let me give 
an example. For some of your tasks there 
are now-although there were not several 
years ago-fairly good mathematical models 
of human behavior. For example, if you 
want to draw a simple model of a human 
as a continuous tracker, two things are im- 
portant: time delay and gain. These two 
things describe how he will behave as a 
tracker. As a systems designer, I would 
like to see measures of his gain and his 
time delay as a function of stress and other 
factors, rather than measures in mean 
squared error, because I can predict from 
the time delay and gain how he will behave 
in a wide variety of tasks. 
The same thing applies to some of the 
detection tasks, where you might be inter- 
ested more in d' and the criterion than in 
some of the more straightforward measures. 
I t  seems to me that it is possible to sharpen 
up the information you are getting out of 
that type of test and make it much more 
directly useful to a wide variety of problems. 
ALLUISI: To use d', I must have a fairly 
good proportion of misses, which I do not 
obtain. We have nearly 100 percent hit rates. 
ELKIND: You might have to do a some- 
what different experiment. 
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ALLUISI : I am a little conservative about 
changing the tasks to match some of the 
things we have done in other psychologi- 
cal experiments, because I do not want the 
subject in a game-playing attitude rather 
than a work attitude. User acceptance is one 
criterion that has been most difficult to meet 
in most psychological testing. We have man- 
aged to get user acceptance with our battery 
of tasks. In  fact, we have managed to get 
pilots to work i t  for 30 days, and they came 
out essentially saying, "We worked i t  for 30 
days and did not play a t  it like a game." In 
order to maintain this acceptance, we must 
provide the subjects with a realistic task, and 
to be realistic we do not present signals so 
brief that most are missed. Realistically, we 
human workers do not fail and continue 
working; we cannot keep a subject working 
if he is continually failing. 
The worst subject I have had was a GI, 
about 70-75 percent accuracy on the arith- 
metic tasks; the best was an Air Force 
Academy cadet, 95-96 percent accuracy. I 
hold that the critical point is in the 80- 
percent range. If I can hold the subjects a t  
about 80 percent, then I can maintain the 
work atmosphere and the motivation. 
Again, this is one of the grosser variables. 
We do not do things for 20 or 30 days at  
v,lhich we are continually failing. What we 
i ~ i l l  do is bring up a defense mechanism; if 
nothing else, we treat it as a game, as if it 
is not to be taken seriously. 
SWETS: You have not spoken of the pos- 
5ibiIity or the desirability of measuring gain 
and delay, have you? 
ALLUISI: NO, I have not, because I do 
not have tracking in my battery right now. 
The two that I showed were the initial bat- 
tery (which was thrown out because of unre- 
liability) and the other one is in the Douglas 
battery. I would say, yes, I hope to measure 
gain and delay when we add the psychomotor 
task, if we add it in with the appropriate 
measures. 
BELSLEY: Suppose you wanted to  find out 
born hard a pilot was working; how close to 
'2% capacity he was working when he was 
fiying in an airplane; and how much reserve 
he has in a given situation? The only mech- 
anism that I know of-or that I am willing 
to trust a t  this point-is to ask him. We are 
looking for any other quantitative measures 
that can determine what the workload is. 
SENDERS : The use of auxiliary tasks has 
been tried. 
BELSLEY: All that does is load the sub- 
ject to the point where he really stops doing 
his job. Or, in the landing situation, when 
the chips are down, he quits looking a t  aux- 
iliary instruments and only looks a t  two or 
three. 
SENDERS: In other words, even the en- 
tire cockpit is then too much for him? 
BELSLEY: Yes. You know what he does, 
he watches attitude, airspeed, and the altim- 
eter. When he cannot sample those fast 
enough he must get out. What I am looking 
for is a quantitative measure of determining 
his workload on line, other than asking him 
the question. Alluisi is talking about the 
same kinds of things, but we cannot neces- 
sarily get these data out of real-life situa- 
tions. This is the fundamental, basic prob- 
lem. 
YNTEMA: Let me object a little to what 
you are saying. You want to find out what 
the workload is. One does not want to find 
out what the workload is just to find out 
what the workload is. If the subject is per- 
forming the task perfectly but is doing so 
by drawing on his capacity almost to the 
limit, that is one thing. If, however, he is 
performing perfectly but has lots of reserve 
capacity, that is another. They are different 
because you want to know how much capac- 
ity he would have left to deal with another 
problem if it arose. The direct way to find 
that out is to give him an auxiliary task to 
deal with. 
BELSLEY: But you do not want to give 
a subject a nonsense task just to load him 
up. You want to design a task that will go 
along with what he is doing so that he is 
operating a t  a certain percentage of his 
capacity. 
YNTEMA: Maybe it would be better if 
your auxiliary task were one that would 
actually arise in an emergency situation. 
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BELSLEY: I do not necessarily object to 
doing this in an  experimental fashion, but 
we cannot do i t  by applying the results of 
basic psychological theory; and this is what 
we are really getting at. 
SENDERS: Suppose that a pilot landing 
an aircraft was instructed to maintain all 
the relevant parameters, say, with regard to 
the programing of altitude, airspeed and 
course along the localizer, and flight path as 
accurately as he could. If you were to record 
eye movements and the time functions of 
error, then I think that logically there would 
be an expansion of the errors around the 
zero error line as  he approached his limit. 
BELSLEY: I agree, but I would tell him: 
"I want you to be sure to be able to land this 
airplane. I do not care what you do up until 
the time you land it." That is the only thing 
you ask him to do. 
SENDERS : You could infer from that what 
the time course of loading on him was 
throughout the entire maneuver. 
ELKIND: I do not understand. At one 
time you say you are interested in workload, 
a t  another time you say you are interested 
in whether or not he lands the airplane. 
BELSLEY: NO. I say that really you are 
asking the pilot to land the airplane. You 
are interested in his doing this task. Yet you 
may put him in the position where he cannot 
do it. Can you predict this before he lands? 
HAROLD G. MILLER: I t  would certainly 
be interesting to find out if he can do what 
you are asking for, because we run it just 
like you do. If yoa give the pilot too many 
calls, he will blow the whole mission. 
RATHERT : This is the basic and classical 
problem in all of our simulator flight test 
work. The first piece of data we have is a go, 
no-go pilot statement of the feasibility. We 
can either ask his opinion or he can show 
us. But then you ask: "Okay, he did it suc- 
cessfully; but was he right on the ragged 
edge, or was he doing i t  well within his capa- 
bility?" This is the thing we cannot get at. 
We cannot get a quantitative approach of 
anything we measured. Sure, you can get a 
dropoff in the amount of gain the subject can 
develop, but he has already gone past physio- 
logical limits. 
ELKIND: He might still be landing the 
airplane. 
RATHERT: Sure. Pilots have landed air- 
planes under this condition. 
ALLUISI: I think the question that Rath- 
ert asked is the real one-the touchstone of 
whether we are getting there or not. We 
have two or three problems, and one of 
them is in the aircraft. We are concerned 
with safety and, consequently, back off 
from any real ability to measure. In the 
simulator, we involve the human and his 
responses; however, the fact is that he 
might not let us do what we want to do in 
order to measure his loading or his capa- 
bility to handle the system. There are two 
ways that possibly could be used to approach 
the performance limits. One is by burden- 
ing the subject or pilot with known auxiliary 
tasks. We might be able to get him to do 
this by selecting the tasks appropriately; in 
other words, by using things that he would 
not regard as a game. Perhaps by giving 
him a task that is involved in the system 
itself, we might be able to get real work out 
of him. The other way is to remove from 
him some of his normal capability, by either 
sleep loss or some other stress, then seeing 
at what point he breaks. In other words, we 
must either load him up further or remove 
some of his capability ; because, as the system 
now exists, if he is performing in i t  and 
meeting its demands, it is obviousIy within 
his capability. We want to find out how 
much it is costing him to meet the demands 
of the operations. We can do that only by 
taking some of that cost and using i t  for 
something else; for example, for handling 
the stresses of sleep loss or of other tasks. 
In the early 1950s, when we were running 
the air traffic control studies at  Ohio State, 
we found that when we put identification on 
the scope, the controllers could handIe more 
and more aircraft. They started off with the 
typical procedure of handling three aircraft. 
If there were more than three on the scope, 
the controller would order them into a fixed 
orbit. They would then handle the first three, 
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put them in a line, and bring them into the 
ground-controlled approach gate. Once we 
put an identifictaion of each aircraft on the 
blip that appeared on the scope, a controller 
could handle eight or nine aircraft at  the 
same time and bring them in-not by taking 
them 50 miles out to line them up, but by 
bringing them directly in and putting them 
in line about 10 miles from the gate. Among 
the parameters we wanted to determine for 
use in our future studies was how many a 
controller could really handle. So, one night, 
a t  the end of the evening's experimentation, 
we talked one of the controllers into letting 
us load him up-keep putting aircraft on the 
scope to see how many he could carry. It 
had taken about 3 months just to get him to 
agree to let us try! This was purely simula- 
tion ; he knew the "pilots" were sitting in the 
next room operating electronic signal gen- 
erators, not real aircraft. We had about 17 
blips on the scope when the controller called 
over his radio intercom, "All right, orbit in 
position." He reached down, cut off the 
scope, and said, "That is it !" We said, "What 
do you mean, that is i t?  You are still han- 
dling them." He said, "That is as fa r  as I 
go." He would not let a midair collision 
occur on the scope-not even a simulated 
one! We always have that sort of problem 
when trying to measure the limits of capa- 
bility. It would not have been right for us 
to have put the controller through the emo- 
tional experience that a (simulated) midair 
collision would have given him. It was too 
much for him. 
BELSLEY: That is defined as a realistic 
simulation. 
ALLUISI: In one flight we had a midair 
collision. The two controllers were really 
broken up. We had to cancel the experi- 
mentation for the rest of the evening. They 
could not take it. 
RATHERT: That is my point. Generally 
speaking, there are exceptions, but when I 
can get a pilot to the point where this con- 
troller was, I am in medical trouble. I have 
trouble with my medical supervisor before I 
ever get the pilot to that point. Perhaps I 
could do something about this by adding 
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auxiliary tasks and making the whole situa- 
tion so complex that he breaks down men- 
tally. I am not sure I am entitled to break 
him down mentally and not break him down 
physically. 
ALLUISI: He will quit before that;  he 
will stop doing those other things, that is 
what will happen. 
BELSLEY: We really need to immerse him 
in as realistic a simulation as  possible or 
else divide the situation into bits and pieces 
based on the fundamental psychological data 
available and predict where the break will 
occur. This is why we support research in 
this area: to be able to make this prediction 
based on the fundamental data. 
ALLUISI: I agree fully. That is what we 
need and that is what we should be working 
toward. We do not have it today. 
RATHERT: May I quickly introduce a 
change of subject? I like Yntema's taxon- 
omy, but it brings out the solution to the 
problem of the upset in turbulent air. What 
is happening in upset and turbulent a ir?  
The commercial jet transport pilot was 
weighing and balancing; the regular NASA 
or NACA-Ames test pilot had no trouble with 
the problem, He was not weighing and bal- 
ancing. In a problem like flying a jet trans- 
port in turbulent air, you must determine 
how to train a man to go from one stage to 
another. Is this a science? Are there people 
we can call on who can move in and look a t  
the situation and tell the airlines how to do 
the retraining? Because that did not happen. 
This problem involved paying passengers. 
No human-behavior expert set up a training 
program that took the airplane pilots quickly, 
safely, and effectively from one type of de- 
cisionmaking behavior to another. Is there 
a profession that does this? 
SENDERS: You say that the NASA or 
NACA pilot did not do whatever the jet 
transport pilot did? 
RATHERT: He did not get into trouble. 
SENDERS: Are you saying that there are 
two identical situations that occurred or 
absolutely identical situations? 
RATHERT : Within the reasonable limits 
of airplane moments of inertia, and so forth ; 
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yes. I think the key was that the test pilot is 
accustomed to unusual occurrences on his 
ship. We have got him up there with a fully 
instrumented airplane looking for them. 
BELSLEY: I want to speak on this point. 
When we made a simulation using our 
height-control apparatus, we simulated the 
rough air problem so that the airline pilots 
would say, "Boy, you have got it fixed. It 
works just fine, just the way it is up there." 
They could go through the same maneuver. 
Our pilots sat there and ran through the 
maneuver and never had a bit of trouble. 
Then i t  turned out if you told them-I can- 
not remember which i t  was-to follow air- 
speed and ignore the altitude of the air- 
plane, they flew the airplane in an entirely 
different way. The airline pilots were flying 
it purely because they remembered experi- 
ences of flying sweptwing jet fighters a t  
these high altitudes. 
RATHERT : We thought our simulation for 
flying jet transports in turbulent air was 
a total washout. Our test pilots did not get 
into trouble on the thing. We thought we 
did not have the trouble. We brought in 
some regular commercial jet transport pilots 
and off they went. In one case a pilot lost 
35,000 feet of altitude ! 
SENDERS : Which he was fortunate enough 
to have. 
RATHERT: Right, but when we put our 
test pilots in the starting environment they 
straightened the airplane out and flew it. 
We thought we were a total washout until 
we brought in some airline pilots. You can- 
not get a NASA test pilot to have that same 
experience, i t  simply would not happen. The 
reason is that they are on a different level 
of decisionmaking activity. You have con- 
vinced me i t  is still decisionmaking. Before 
this morning I would have been tempted to 
call it reflex behavior. What I want to know 
is, Is there a professional discipline that 
analyzes these things ? 
MARKOWITZ : YOU practically answered 
your own question by pointing to the test 
pilots. The more experience you have with 
this task, the better you can relegate it to 
a peripheral system called training. But the 
required level of training is beyond what 
an airline pilot might normally go through. 
The NASA test pilots, as you said, experi- 
ence these peculiarities all the time. There 
is a certain method of critical incidents. 
The ones who did not learn by experience 
probably are not NASA test pilots any more. 
So you have a select group with a highly 
overlearned skill. 
On the question of whether you can take 
commercial pilots and teach them this skill, 
the answer is probably no-for the same 
reason you cannot get commercial pilots to 
do a lot of things that you would like them 
to do. I bet we could get naive subjects to 
do this. 
RATHERT: This has been done the hard 
way, by interoffice memoranda and precept 
and by sending statistical samples of air- 
line pilots to Johnsville to fly a simulation 
on the Johnsville centrifuge. The pilots have 
spread the word. There must have been 
a simpler and more direct way to accom- 
plish this particular thing. 
MARKOWITZ: My last comment is my 
personal feeling. We could get a nonpilot 
to learn to fly your simulator in the most 
severe turbulent conditions that your NASA 
pilots can and we would have tremendous 
difficulty in getting a commercial airline 
pilot to do it. 
RATHERT: That may well be. 
YNTEMA: In answer to your question 
whether there is a body of knowledge or a 
profession that can teach people pattern 
recognition, I think that there are two places 
we could look: One, in academic psychology 
in the field of concept formation or concept 
recognition of complex stimuli. (One per- 
son who has worked on that, using computer 
techniques to give the feedback, is Swets. 
Those were auditory stimuli.) Another place 
is the training work that the Navy has 
done, in their Special Devices Center. A 
good deal of what they were trying to do, 
in retrospect, was to move decisionmaking 
from category 3, weighing and balancing, 
into category 2, which is pattern recognition. 
A subject says, "This is a situation that I 
have encountered several times before in 
80 APPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH ON HUMAN DECISIONMAKING 
the simulator, so I do this action without 
weighing and balancing." 
RATHERT: I did not mean to take this 
much time, but I had a very practical prob- 
lem in that the flying safety director of the 
airline came to us and said, "Okay. You 
have done a beautiful job with two of our 
people. What do we do about the rest of 
them?" We did not know what to tell him. 
STANLEY DEUTSCH : IS there not a corol- 
lary to this, too, in the area of pilot-induced 
oscillations? As I recall in this particular 
case, did you not find that when a pilot 
went from category 3 to control of the 
aircraft, that seemed to straighten out the 
problem itself? 
RATHERT: This is true. We had roughly 
the same experience, but, instead of an 
average commercial transport pilot, the test 
pilot was the average young, eager, Air 
Force fighter squadron pilot. The Air Force 
itself noticed that they had that distinction. 
ELKIND: We did an experiment with 
naive subjects in which we would change 
the dynamics of the vehicle quite drastically. 
Because of the nature of the experiment, 
the subjects got a tremendous amount of 
exposure to this kind of a control situation. 
Several of the subjects got to the point 
where the whole thing moved up to a sort 
of satellite computer operation. They could 
not even tell you there had been a change 
of dynamics. The whole thing was a pre- 
programed operation. Furthermore, they, in 
fact, as your test pilots must have done, 
developed the skill to handle these kinds of 
dynamic changes in general. This is a type 
of a classic problem that they learned how 
to solve. 
BELSLEY: I t  may well be that the aver- 
age airline pilot, if you want to call him 
that, never gets into this situation in flying 
his machine until i t  is crucial, and that our 
people are in and out of this more often. 
I think this is true; because, a t  the time, 
we were having our people fly aircraft that 
were slightly divergent, so they would know 
how to control the situation. They had a 
lot of practice. This makes a difference. 
In fact, for flying VTOL airplanes, our 
people maintain that the best training is 
to learn how to fly a helicopter. Once you 
qualify on the helicopter, you come back 
and fly the VTOL airplane, and then you 
can do a pretty good job. If they put a 
pilot right on the VTOL airplane, he has 
not built up this reaction or knowledge of 
what can happen to the proper extent. This 
is exactly the same thing we are talking 
about. 
EDWARDS: I would like to  say a little 
about Yntema's classifications, which I like 
very much. There was a time a long while 
ago when Tolman was presenting a cognitive 
approach to learning and was being criti- 
cized, somewhat unfairly but rather imagina- 
tively, by some of his more behavioristically 
oriented contemporaries. They described his 
psychology as leaving the rat  lost in thought, 
unable to figure out what to do on the basis 
of his well-defined cognitive map of what 
the world was like. That was in some sense 
a fair criticism of Tolman. I think Yntema's 
comments underline it. There is a similar 
sense in which many of these contemporary 
introductions of decision-theoretic ideas into 
psychology are leaving the subject similarly 
lost in inaction. Relatively low-level decision- 
making processes help provide the human 
being with a capability. This is especially 
clear in the case of motor skills, but i t  also 
applies to signal detection, learning, and so 
forth. But these lower level applications of 
decision theory say little about how a sub- 
ject will use the capabiIity or for what 
purposes. 
There are a t  least two different ways in 
which linkage between lower level and higher 
level decision processes occurs. One of them 
is that a person typically uses a skill-per- 
ceptual, motor, or anything of the sort-in 
the service of some goal. That goal specifies 
signal-detectability theory where you are 
going to put your criterion. In some track- 
ing models, i t  specifies how tightly you wish 
to control. And this is built into the theories. 
That is, you find these goals in them, but 
they tend to float in midair, and it  is not 
clear how they link with the larger goals 
being served by the skill. 
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The other linkage, which is in some ways 
more difficult and which I do not think has 
been discussed a t  all, is that perception of 
one's own sensory and motor capabilities 
has a lot to do with the weighing and bal- 
ancing kind of decision. Consider Tanner's 
example of the landing approach. Knowing 
how incompetent I am a t  following that 
localizer, I take my sensory-motor incom- 
petence very much into account in deciding 
how low an approach to make. I apply a 
personal correction to the FAA minima. 
I do not think I am alone in this either. 
I am attempting to say that there are link- 
ages between the third type of decision- 
making (which is, of course, what is tradi- 
tionally meant by decisionmaking) and 
these other varieties. Psychologists have 
produced very, very little discussion and 
very, very little theorizing about the nature 
of these linkages. 
ELKIND: I agree with you. As a matter 
of fact one of the things I wanted to talk 
about tomorrow was where this type of 
linkage was direct and explicit. I think, 
for example, that the problem that George 
Rathert talked a lot about, recovery from 
unusual flight situations, can a t  least crudely 
be put into a fairly standard decision-theory 
framework. I think that that helps to crys- 
tallize some of the training problems. It 
also turns out, if you look a t  modern control 
theory as it is now being practiced, that 
there is, unlike the sort of conventional con- 
trol theory, a very explicit statement of what 
the goals of the control are. There is a 
well-defined performance functional, and this 
is to be maximized or minimized. And the 
relationship between the control behavior 
and the performance are well established. 
EDWARDS : What about the relationships 
between the control functional, which I sup- 
pose means a utility function of some kind, 
and the broader setting in which the work 
is being done? 
ELKIND: I am not quite sure how you 
define that broader setting, really. 
EDWARDS: What is the man trying to 
do? What are his purposes? 
ELKIND: In a narrow sense, I think this 
is one of the purposes in the assessment of 
current or modern control theory. That is 
to say, you can talk about problems in which 
you want to minimize your root mean square 
error at  touchdown. You do not care what 
you do in between, but the terminal va!c~e 
must be well controlled. Now, you can solrc 
theoretically for the optimum control that 
will achieve that;  you can compare that 
with human behavior and get something that 
is appropriate. That is the type of thing 
that I think you have in mind. 
YNTEMA: Part of what you are saying 
is that when you get into a weighing and 
balancing situation or into a choice of SOP, 
which is really a short circuit for weighing 
and balancing, that you must consider pay- 
offs. I am wholly with you. The particular 
example I was talking about did not involve 
weighing both probabilities and payoffs, but 
in many of the real-life decisions, that is 
the essence of the problem. 
EDWARDS: I was saying something dif- 
ferent from that, although I certainly would 
agree. I was inquiring about the linkages 
both up and down between the different 
levels of intellectual function that you were 
talking about and was suggesting that these 
linkages are themselves both important and 
interesting topics of study about which re- 
markably little has been done. Elkind was 
talking about one class of such linkages. 
Senders mentioned another example in which 
a driver in a simulator judges whether he 
can get through an obstacle, and thereafter 
drives through it. In that case, of course, 
you compel him to drive through it. In a 
more real-world task, he might have an op- 
tion, such as to go by some other route. 
At that point there starts to be a clear-cut 
linkage between his judgment of essentially 
what his characteristics are a t  level 1 and 
his behavior a t  level 3. I think there are 
lots of these kinds of linkages, and i t  seems 
to me worthwhile to start asking questions 
about them. 
ELKIND: I really do not see the differ- 
ence between the three levels, at  least not 
in the way I think you see it. It seems 
to me that there is a temporal element 
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dominant there, that certain things happen 
very fast and weighing and balancing will 
take a long time. 
BELSLEY: That is known as weighing, 
not balancing. 
ELKIND : Deciding whether you are going 
through an obstacle as you are approaching 
it, whether you will drive through or put 
on the brakes, looks to me like a fairly auto- 
matic thing. I doubt that you have time 
to do much weighing and balancing. 
EDWARDS : AS I understand what Yntema 
said about the satellite computer-we are in 
trouble on that score too. The defining char- 
acteristic of level 1 is that you have no access 
to information about the process. 
YNTEMA: That was the point. You have 
no conscious access to these decisions. 
EDWARDS: I claim that in such situations 
I can do a retrospective-introspective analy- 
sis of what it felt like, what the considera- 
tions were. That is why I disagree with 
this long-time idea. It is easier when it is 
a long time, but I claim you can do it anyhow. 
ELKIND: I am not sure I can concur. 
YNTEMA: One could say these things a 
litle more conservatively. Tasks in the No. 
1 category can go on without any linkage 
to consciousness. You can be carrying on 
a conversation while you are doing one of 
these things. Maybe it is too strong to say 
that they are totally unavailable to con- 
sciousness, but introspectively there are some 
very skilled activities, it seems to me, which 
involve small-scale decisions that are com- 
pletely unavaiIabIe to consciousness. You 
cannot get them back any more. 
EDWARDS: I would propose that the de- 
fining characteristic for level 2 is that you 
recognize the right answer, that there is a 
right answer, and that you can be sure 
without waiting for the results of the actual 
behavior that you have it. 
ELKIND: That may also be something 
that happens that is not unconscious. 
EDWARDS: No. He was talking about 
levels 1 and 3. I am talking about the distinc- 
tion between 2 and 3. The distinction be- 
tween 2 and 3, it seems to me, is that 2 is 
essentially what they call decisionmaking 
under certainty; that is, there is no uncer- 
tainty as to what the situation is. 
Simulation Training for Flight Control Decisionmaking 
HAROLD G. MILLER 
Manned Spacecraft Ceivter 
Throughout Projects Mercury, Gemini, 
and Apollo, flight-control personnel have 
manned consoles specifically for monitoring 
and controlling the activity of the flightcrew 
and the spacecraft systems. The flight- 
controller function has progressively in- 
creased in degree of difficulty as the space- 
craft and the ground system have become 
more complex. The simulation training he 
receives in a mission environment has been 
the final hone that sharpened the flight con- 
troller to the state of readiness necessary 
for a successful mission, even under the most 
adverse conditions. Training and simulation 
objectives are directed a t  developing pro- 
ficiency and competency in the flight con- 
trollers to perform the mission-support func- 
tion. To understand the importance of simu- 
lation exercises to mission success, we must 
understand the duties of a flight controller, 
both prior to and during manned space 
flights. We also must understand how the 
flight controllers are organized and with 
whom they interface in the decisionmaking 
processes. 
Flight-controller training encompasses the 
entire spectrum of the space program. Train- 
ing begins as soon as he starts to work, and 
consists of formal, intrinsic, and simulation 
training. The training culminates in a final 
series of simulation exercises for the flight 
controllers to insure that they can handle 
specified contingencies and verify the pro- 
cedures they have established. Simulations 
also establish confidence in the flight con- 
troller of the system he must use during 
the mission. Of significant importance is 
the value the simulation system has in de- 
veloping mission rules and in determining 
the readiness of the mission facilities. This 
paper will describe the functions and duties 
of a flight controller and how the simulation 
allows him to make decisions. 
The flight controller is a planner, imple- 
menter, trajectory and systems expert, oper- 
ator, and a decisionmaker. The flight con- 
troller is a planner heavily involved in the 
area of planning of the missions and his 
console procedures. In his mission planning, 
he must specify mission rules and timelines 
that will govern his actions throughout the 
mission. He must plan aborts to insure that, 
if a contingency occurs, procedures are avail- 
able to insure crew safety. The flight con- 
troller, in conjunction with the crew, must 
determine the flight plan that is to be fol- 
lowed, and it must account for items such 
as experiments, sleep cycles, location of 
manned space flight network (MSFN) sites 
for critical activities, such as orbital ma- 
neuvers, and so forth. Also, the flight con- 
troller must determine what data are to 
be transmitted from the remote site to the 
Mission Control Center (MCC) in order that 
a proper evaluation of the spacecraft sys- 
tems can be made. The planning continues 
in an iterative cycle until the mission oc- 
curs, a t  which time the flight controller must 
implement the plans he has made. The plans 
involve the use of mission rules, detailed 
test objectives, abort plans, flight plans, 
and so forth. 
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The system and trajectory of the space- 
craft must be known and understood by the 
flight controller. He must be intimately 
acquainted with their limits and their con- 
straints so that as he performs his flight- 
controller duties in the mission control room, 
he can make decisions concerning crew 
safety. This understanding is mandatory 
because the many variables in the spacecraft 
and the ground systems preclude the possi- 
bility of documenting all but the most basic 
alternate procedures. He must listen to in- 
formation from different sources and react 
to these inputs, sometimes instantaneously. 
Pressure is ever present with a flight 
controller while he is doing his job. For in- 
stance, during the AS-204L mission, about 
97 percent of the mission objectives were 
achieved in spite of the fact that during the 
first descent-propulsion-system burn the 
lunar module (LM) guidance computer func- 
tioned improperly, and, in order to over- 
come this failure and achieve the mission 
objectives, the flight controllers had to as- 
sume the computer's function for a period 
of 5 hours. 
Finally, the flight controller is a decision- 
maker. No matter how good a planner or 
implementer he is, how good a systems 
man he is, or how good an operator he is- 
he must develop the ability to make deci- 
sions in real time at  the console in order 
to qualify as a flight controller for a mission. 
What kinds of decisions does he make and 
what actions does he take? During a mission, 
the flight controller is diagnosing the space- 
craft and trajectory continually. If an anom- 
aly is suspected, the first action is to deter- 
mine the validity of his data. Once he de- 
cides that the data are valid, he must take 
actions to correct them, and he must make 
a decision as  to what course of action to 
take. The ease with which he makes these 
decisions is a measure of the thoroughness 
of his planning and the completeness of his 
training. 
Figure 1 represents the organization of 
a typical operations team supporting a lunar 
manned space-flight mission, showing all of 
the flight controller positions. The Flight 
Operations Director is responsible for op- 
eration, mission planning, and the overall 
direction and management of flight control 
and recovery activities associated with real- 
time mission progress. The Flight Director 
is in direct command of the other flight 
controIlers and is responsible for their real- 
time decisions. In case of an emergency, he 
can terminate the mission. The Assistant 
Flight Director acts as a staff assistant to 
the Flight Director. The Flight Director's 
prime support would be the spacecraft com- 
municator group, the flight dynamics group, 
a booster and spacecraft systems group, 
flight surgeons group, and the experiments 
activity group. Each function is supported 
by specialists located in support staff rooms 
equipped to permit detailed systems analy- 
sis of the spacecraft, the crew, the experi- 
ments, and so forth. In addition, there are 
communication circuits that enable the staff 
support room personnel to discuss prob- 
lems with other specialists; for example, the 
design engineer, who may be located a t  some 
remote facility. 
During a mission, the flight controller 
interfaces with the flightcrew, support per- 
sonnel, other flight controllers, and his con- 
sole equipment. Prior to the mission, the 
flightcrew and the flight controllers must 
work together to establish their operating 
procedures and to determine what data must 
be transferred between the flightcrew and 
the flight controllers for each phase of the 
mission. The critical aspect of this inter- 
face is during the flight when you have one 
person on the ground (the capsule com- 
municator) talking to the crew. IIe is usu- 
ally an astronaut. All communications, ex- 
cept for emergencies, to the crew in the 
spacecraft are relayed through him. The 
importance of this interface is  that during 
critical phases of the mission, such as during 
launch or some of the maneuvers, you must 
get the right words, a t  the right time, in 
the right order, to the astronaut in the 
spacecraft. He must know what to expect 
in terms of data that are coming to him. 
The ground personnel, in turn, must know 
the kinds of data they are going to receive 
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FIGURE 1.-MCC-H mission operations control room organization and staff support room interface. 
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from the crew. These communications are 
a matter of timing. The entire procedure is 
as precise as a fine clock. The simulations 
conducted prior to the mission stress the 
exercising of these procedures. 
Under certain conditions, the flight con- 
trollers must interface directly with the 
technical support personnel who support the 
mission but do not have flight control re- 
sponsibilities. Such conditions exist when 
changes to spacecraft instrumentation have 
been made and the control center was not 
modified to display the information to the 
flight controllers. The technical support per- 
sonnel operating the ground equipment will 
have access to these data that are needed 
by the flight controllers. These interfaces 
become extremely important when having 
the maximum data is mandatory for reso- 
lution of a spacecraft problem. The simula- 
tion exercises test these interfaces and 
establish a repertoire between the flight 
ment as possible. This flight-controller train- 
ing environment is provided by a variety 
of mission simulations. 
The overall scope of the training a flight 
controller receives and must successfully 
complete prior to qualifying to support a 
mission is shown in figure 2. Three types 
of training are used: formal, intrinsic, and 
simulation. The formal training consists of 
lecture courses. Work is being done in the 
area of programed instruction. At present, 
we are developing programed instruction 
courses for spacecraft systems and for the 
manned space-flight worldwide network. 
Additional courses are developed as needed. 
Such courses might cover the operation of 
research equipment to be used on a particu- 
lar mission. Practical exercises and field 
trips to contractor plants are also provided. 
Flight Controller Training 
controllers and the technical support per- 
sonnel so that information can be rapidly Simulation 
obtained by the flight controller. 
The development of procedures for the System Personal Contact 
I 
Unit Training 
relations among the individual flight control Specific Design Reviews Mission Simulation 
team members is a prime objective of the Field Trips Mission Planning Network 
simulation exercise. Each team member has Practical Operational Simulation 
both his individual action he can take and Exercises Planning 
those in which one or more other flight 
controIlers are invoIved in accomplishing a 
task. The flight controllers develop docu- 
ments such as the Flight Control Operations 
Handbook, individual console operating 
procedures that detail these actions down 
to the lowest level. Some of the more com- 
plex interfaces are associated with the gen- 
eration of commands to be transmitted to 
the spacecraft. 
Through his console, the flight controller 
has access to communication loops, TV dis- 
plays, control switches, event status lights, 
and other devices that allow him to evaluate 
the spacecraft and the ground network sup- 
port systems. The flight controller must 
be completely familiar with the capability 
afforded him by his console. This can only 
be accomplished through extensive use of 
the console in as close to a mission environ- 
Procedural 
Development 
Mission 
Experience 
FIGURE 2.-Overall view of the training of a 
flight controller. 
Intrinsic training is the on-the-job train- 
ing that new flight controllers receive from 
sitting in the office with experienced flight 
controllers who work on the same job, and 
from monitoring missions. 
Three types of simulation training are 
used: unit, mission simulations, and network 
simulations. Unit training provides exer- 
cises for groups of flight controllers, such 
as the flight dynamics group. This training 
usually starts about 45 to 60 days prior to 
the mission and requires about 40 hours 
per group. In general, these exercises do 
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not include the flightcrew except where spe- 
cial flightcrew part task training devices 
are used as the data source for flight con- 
trollers. One example of this is the simula- 
tion exercises performed with the mission 
evaluator located a t  North American Rock- 
well in Downey, Calif. The mission evalu- 
ator is a simulator used by the crew and 
a group of flight controllers to develop pro- 
cedures for operation of the onboard space- 
craft computer. 
The mission simulations, which start after 
the unit training has been completed, gen- 
erally include all of the flight-controller 
groups in a concerted operation and are 
divided into mission phases. This type of 
simulation consumes most of the time spent 
training prior to each flight. In general, 
20 to 30 days of total team mission simula- 
tion exercises are required for each flight. 
Approximately two-thirds of these exercises 
are performed in conjunction with the flight- 
crew. 
Finally, about 5 to 7 days before the mis- 
sion, the network simulations are conducted. 
For these simulations, magnetic tapes of 
recorded spacecraft data are provided a t  all 
of the sites all around the world, and are 
played back in a time order sequence during 
the simulations. The primary objective of 
network simulations is to train the flight 
controllers in as complete a mission environ- 
ment as possible by exercising the total 
manned space-flight network as planned to 
be used for that flight. 
Training ground-control personnel involves 
much more than systems training. It means 
training flight controllers to operate as a 
team. They may be the best systems engi- 
neers in the world, but if they have not 
developed well-coordinated procedures for 
working with each other, they are not ready 
to support a mission. Of utmost importance 
is the work on the interfacing of flight con- 
trollers with the flightcrew. This is done 
by interfacing the flightcrew's training 
equipment with the control center for a 
complete closed-loop simulation. In this man- 
ner, with the crew in their mission simula- 
tors and the flight controllers a t  their con- 
soles, the simulation is operated identically 
w-ith a real mission. 
Another objective of simulations is to ex- 
ercise the operating procedures of the flight 
controllers and the total MCC. I t  is impor- 
tant to exercise the interface of the MCC 
maintenance and operations personnel with 
the flight controllers, so that equipment prob- 
lems can be resolved quickly. 
Through the simulations, the controllers 
develop confidence in the systems and com- 
puter programs that will be used during 
the flight. This in no way substitutes for 
the rigid verification testing of the computer 
program. The mission operations programs 
for a typical mission exceed 500,000 instruc- 
tions and are contained in one computer in 
the real-time computer complex (RTCC). 
Throughout the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo 
programs, it has been found that, in spite 
of extensive testing performed to find faults 
and weak points in the program, when the 
flight controller operates his console and 
the system is loaded down, i t  usually con- 
tains some anomalies the first time. This 
fact does not reflect on the quality of the 
program testing, which is very detailed and 
very complete; the problem stems from the 
fact that flight controllers will do things 
that the system was not originally designed 
to permit. The objective, of course, is to 
have the flight controller feel that the sys- 
tem he has will support him in the mission 
environment. Our approach to simulation 
is to make maximum use of the operational 
facilities so that we can validate the systems 
operation, the computer programing, and so 
forth, as configured to support that mission. 
Use of the flightcrew-training facilities as 
a data source is also necessary to meet the 
training objectives. As noted earlier, this 
allows the crew and the flight controllers to 
work together and establish their procedures 
and operational problems prior to the actual 
mission. For additional flexibility in simu- 
lation schedules, we have augmented our 
data source capability with mathematical 
models of the command and service module, 
the lunar module, and the Saturn launch 
vehicle. This computerized simulation of 
88 APPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH ON HUMAN DECISIONMAKING 
major flight systems provides a completely 
independent system for training flight con- 
trollers. Mathematical models for the net- 
work exist, so that input data into the con- 
trol center are representative of data as 
they would come from the MSFN. And 
finally, by using operational facilities, we 
keep the equipment for simulation facilities 
to a minimum. 
Figure 3 is a functional diagram of the 
simulation system and how i t  interfaces 
with the MCC. To meet one of our objec- 
tives, the simulation system must input data 
to the MCC in the format and rate identical 
Functional System 
MSFN Network 
Operational Facilities 
Simulation Facilities 
FIGURE 3.-The simulation system. 
with that received from the MSFN. In the 
same manner, the simulation system must 
also respond to all data transmitted from 
the MCC. The block labeled "simulation 
equipment" (fig. 3) represents the func- 
tions performed by the Goddard Space Flight 
Center and part  of the Kennedy Space Cen- 
ter. Data to and from the MCC are switched 
into this equipment. The simulation com- 
puter and flightcrew trainers represent the 
airborne system of the spacecraft and 
booster. Simulation operators man consoles 
and monitor the MCC data and control the 
activity of the simulation facilities. The 
simulation facilities required for Projects 
Gemini and Apollo represent an outlay of 
approximately $10 to $15 million. 
The organization of the simulation con- 
troller is shown in figure 4. Simulation con- 
trollers are located in two areas-each rep- 
resenting diff event functional jobs. One 
group is located near the flight controllers 
in order to monitor their activities. From 
this vantage point, the simulation controller 
can determine if the simulation is proceeding 
normally. For instance, an exercise may con- 
tain several faults that require flight-control 
activity; if, however, it turns out that the 
flight controllers are not handling the planned 
faults properly, or are having trouble with 
a procedure, the simulation controller can 
FIGURE 4.-Operational organization for the simulation controller. 
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alter the flight situation by either eliminat- 
ing, changing, or adding faults in order to 
insure that  the flight controllers obtain maxi- 
mum benefit from the exercise. Practice and 
experience have shown that too many faults 
in an exercise can result in very little train- 
ing of the flight controller. This is especially 
true in the first few exercises conducted 
for a mission. On the other hand, as the 
flight controllers progress through the simu- 
lation program leading up to a flight, they 
develop the competence to handle more and 
more complex problems. Thus, the simula- 
tion supervisor must decide when to either 
add or eliminate faults. This decision is 
based on inputs he receives from the other 
simulation personnel who are closely moni- 
toring the flight controller activities. Once 
a decision has been made to change the 
faulting scheme for an exercise, the simula- 
tion controllers make the various necessary 
entries into the simulation computers and 
insure that  the changes are effective. The 
simulation controllers have the responsibility 
of making all of the necessary computer 
entries and of insuring that  the simulation 
system is working properly. 
Scripting for the simulation exercises re- 
quires a minimum of documentation because 
the simulation system is designed to use 
mathematical models to represent spacecraft 
and booster operations. Therefore, a fault 
entered into the mathematical model results 
in a correlated set of data for evaluation 
by the flight controller. This ease of docu- 
mentation permits much flexibility and speed 
in developing the most effective exercises 
for  the flight controller. Because the simula- 
tions are used by the flight controllers to 
help validate, and in some instances estab- 
lish, mission rules, any scripts written prior 
to the start  of simulations may become 
invalid as  a result of changes to the mission 
rules derived from the simulation. There- 
fore, the flexibility afforded by the simula- 
tion system allows the simulation controller 
to rapidly adjust the exercises as needed, 
either just prior to the sim~llation or, more 
importantly, during the actual exercise. A 
typical example of a portion of a simulation 
exercise script is shown in figure 5. 
A!though the doctmmentati_on for simula- 
tion scripts is relatively simple, there is a 
voluminous amount of documentation that  
the simulation controller must review prior 
to their development. A typical list of cate- 
gories of such documents includes accurate 
system drawings, operational procedures, 
mission rules, trajectory papers, flight plan, 
network documentation, and control center 
documentation. The documentation that  the 
simulation controller must publish months 
before the s tar t  of simulations in order to  
provide the necessary training of the flight 
controllers includes scripts, simulation con- 
figuration documents, simulation operations 
plans, flight operations plans, and simula- 
tion requirements. 
The simulation system used today to train 
flight controllers is in concept the same a s  
that  used in Mercury and Gemini. Although 
a digital mathematical model of the Agena 
was used in Gemini, extensive use of math- 
ematical models for independent flight- 
controller training only began with Apollo. 
Throughout the programs, the flight con- 
trollers have become much more sophisti- 
cated in their handling of each mission. The 
simulation systems in response have become 
more complex in order to meet the needs 
of the flight controllers. Various changes 
to mission profiles late in the program have 
dictated a simulation system that  is flexible 
and has a fast  response in order to provide 
accurate training. The simulation system 
that  is in use was designed to these goals 
and has adequately met these requirements. 
It has proved itself as an  effective training 
system, in addition to verifying the hard- 
ware and software systems within the con- 
trol center. As future spacecraft and ground 
systems increase in complexity, the training 
system used to exercise the flight controllers 
must grow with the various programs. 
APPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH ON HUMAN DECISIONMAKING 
Description 
Drift in Pitch Axis of .15 degree per second in IMU. 
SYSFLTCC, G N  - 005, . 15, , , , , ; 
Cause: Excessive launch phase dynamic loads cause Pitch IRlG 
to output erroneous signals to the Stab loop. 
Result: IMU drifts in Pitch axis at rate of .15 degree per 
second. FDO will send RTC 12 with G&N "no go". MR4-8B. 
Cues: GO521 M0683 AGCU and I M U  Pitch attitudes differ 
Backup: GN-007 AGC Pwr Supply Fail 
Sy 9 ADR K ASAP 
S-IVB Main Low Valve Fails Closed 
Before Engine Ignition 
Cause: The mainstage solenoid fails in a deenergized state. 
Result: S-IVB will fail to ignite when the Early Staging 
Command is sent. FDO will command Abort. MR4-5A. 
Cues: GO305 and M1405. Parameters G3-401 and Dl-401. 
Backup: PPS-412, Lox Prevalve Fails Closed 
Sy 3, ADRK ASAP. 
PPS-413 Fuel Prevalve Fails Closed 
Sy 4, ADRD ASAP. 
S-I 1 Fuel Ullage Pressure Leak 
SYSFLTCC, PPS - 206,, 20.0,, , , ; 
Cause: Fuel ullage gas (gaseous hydrogen) leak 
Result: When fuel ullage pressure drops to point where fuel 
pump inlet pressure is less than 20.5 psia, all 5 engines 
will go out (must be between 00:03:06 and 00:07:53). 
BSE #1 will send Early Staging Command. MR5-12. 
Cues: GO304 and M1402. Parameters 0252-219, D253-219, 
D13-201,013-202, Dl 3-203, Dl 3-204, Dl 3-205 
FIGURE 5.-Portion of a simulation exercise script. 
DISCUSSION 
STEVEN E. BELSLEY: I wondered if you might 
say something about how this system design evolved. 
HAROLD G. MILLER: YOU mean for  simulation? 
BELSLEY: Well, your overall mission control sys- 
tem evolvement. Your simulation is a representation 
of it. 
MILLER: YOU had the same people t h a t  worked on 
Mercury working on Gemini and setting down the  
requirements fo r  the ground system. The Gemini 
system and the Apollo system, simply stated, a re  
overgrown Mercury systems. W e  replaced meters 
with cathode r a y  tubes. Instead of having cross- 
amplitude telemetry ground stations, we have pulse 
code modulation telemetry ground stations. The sys- 
tem got bigger. 
BELSLEY: But  during the  first p a r t  of Mercury 
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there was a tremendous development of their concept, 
was there not-from the suborbital flight on up? 
MILLER: The system changed very little. When 
you talk about system, are you talking about the 
actual hardware or the system used for control? 
BELSLEEP: I am not talking about hardware. I am 
talking about the overall systems concept of control. 
I wanted to find out whether this system was designed 
by the operational people or whether i t  was designed 
by some psychologists to work to a set of specifica- 
tions. 
MILLER: If YOU had asked me that, I would have 
told you I do not know. 
GEORGE A. RATHERT: The technology used would 
be of interest in other grossly similar problems; air 
traffic control for the supersonic transport (SST) 
immediately comes to mind. This technology does not 
seem to be documented. Admittedly when you start 
charging through these missions, the mission time 
schedules are of overwhelming importance and the 
documentation never catches up. But there must have 
been a large body of research or a t  least a large 
amount of thinking done which would be very inter- 
esting. 
MILLER: The Mercury system was very simple. 
You had 88 parameters coming from the spacecraft. 
You had capsule systems monitors, aeromedics, a 
flight dynamics officer, a network controller, and sev- 
eral other guys. You had 15 to 20 meters on each 
console. 
RATHERT: But look a t  how many parameters are 
conling down from the SST. As I say, the technology 
is not being applied. So there may be 30 parameters 
instead of 88, but the technology is not being applied 
in the same way. 
MILLER: I do not know. I do remember one pro- 
posed design for the Mercury control center that  was 
simply two men and a red light. Everything would 
be in a computer. If something went wrong, a red 
light would flash and the man would push the switch. 
Proposed configurations certainly did run the gamut, 
I can tell you that  much. 
LLOYD A. JEFFRESS: A lot of the communication 
in these flights is line of sight. Why do we use ampli- 
tude modulation for voice when frequency modulation 
is so much more intelligible? I suppose somebody in 
his infinite wisdom made that  decision, but I would 
like to know why, if there is  a reason. 
MILLER: The Soviets are on 20 megacycles, and 
they transmit all the way around the world. We use 
ultra high frequency and line of sight only. I really 
could not tell you. The quality of communications is 
much better, I do know that. 
JOSEPH MARKOWITZ: I would wager tha t  if you 
had started out with the simple two-man, red-light, 
big-computer system and began to exercise people 
on that system, then these people, being professional 
and having a certain professional pride, would grad- 
ually request more and more explicit information. 
MILLER: The system grew. Designed i t  was, grow 
it did. How else would you say it? As the people be- 
came more familiar with the control system, they 
started saying, "I need this capability or that  capa- 
bility." Between Mercury and Gemini the system grew 
some more. There were more data coming from the 
spacecraft and more flight controllers. Apollo just 
compounds the situation again, but we are doing i t  
the same way. 
BELSLEY: There is a pervading influence that  
you have not talked about: the ability to identify 
problems and effect solutions while the spacecraft is 
in orbit. If you were to take the go, no-go position, 
that all you had to do was abort, you would never 
have gotten any place. At all times in this whole sys- 
tem, you can identify the fault and t ry  to rectify i t  
without scrubbing the mission, is that not true? This 
is why you have got this complete set of data re- 
trieval systems a t  your beck and call. 
MARKOWITZ: In  point of fact, any of these op- 
tions could have been exercised by an automatic 
system. 
MILLER: In 1959 you would have been pushing it. 
BELSLEY: I do not think you can do i t  now. 
MARKOWITZ: That is exactly why the mission con- 
trol console evolved as  it did, because every one of the 
controllers and personnel voiced exactly that  argu- 
ment. And because there is no real counterargument, 
then, in fact, these pieces were added. In every case, 
the request for more explicit information came not 
from the planning people but from the operations 
people. 

Controller Decisions in Space Plight' 
Ewgi~eering Psychology Laboratory 
University of Michigan 
The basic idea of contemporary decision 
theory is so simple that i t  is trivial. Every 
decision depends on the decisionmaker's sub- 
jective, personal answers to two questions : 
What is a t  stake? and What are the odds? 
The answer to the former question requires 
construction of a payoff matrix and measure- 
ment of utilities. The answer to the latter 
question requires either direct estimation 
of probabilities, or, more often in real- 
world decision, the kind of information proc- 
essing for which Bayes' theorem is the 
optimal mathematical model. Use of these 
subjective stakes and odds to determine 
decisions requires application of the subjec- 
tively expected utility (SEU) maximization 
model. 
This set of ideas has been developed sub- 
stantially on the basis of laboratory experi- 
ments with college student subjects, nickel- 
and-dime stakes, and pinball machines or 
bookbags full of poker chips as random 
devices around which subjective odds esti- 
mates must be structured. The claim to 
generality is made by almost all of us who 
work in this field-indeed, you have heard 
several versions of it already a t  this meet- 
ing. But instances of application of these 
ideas to real-world decisions are rare, and 
not especially convincing. 
When Huff of the Ames Research Center 
of NASA told me that I could have the 
opportunity to study real decisionmaking 
' The research was sponsored by NASA, and mon- 
itored by NASA Ames Research Center. 
in the mission operations control room of the 
Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) , Houston, 
I was therefore delighted. When I discovered 
what MSC is like, my delight increased be- 
yond reasonable bound. For one thing, every 
middle-aged scientist who hides under his 
graying hair and sagging waistline the soul 
of a teenaged science-fiction addict has no 
choice but to be thrilled a t  MSC, not only 
because MSC's business is to get men into 
and out of space, but also because all the 
fantastic resources of the latest and most 
expensive technology are so obviously and 
lavishly used to do so. I must have seen 
at least 24 computers there, each one as 
large as any I have seen in a university 
computing center. Most are on line, attached 
to delightfully science-fictional consoles that 
have pushbuttons and flashing lights and 
steady lights and meters and two TV screens 
each; there must be 70 or 80 such on-line 
consoles at  MSC. 
After I recovered from the initial shock 
of recognizing a world of which (I  have 
known ever since my teens) I have to be 
a part, I found more sophisticated reasons 
for delight. One of them is here now, listen- 
ing: Harold Miller, Chief of the Mission 
Simulation Branch. Miller's job-indeed, in 
many ways the job of most of MSC-is to 
train mission controllers. More specifically, 
he prepares and operates simulated missions. 
The actual men, actual control room, and 
actual controls used in real missions are 
used for these simulations; the rest of t'ne 
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world, including spacecraft, ground stations, 
communications, and so forth, is Miller- 
plus a team of 15 or 20 others, plus several 
large computers and, of course, lots of 
consoles. 
Mission controllers sitting in Houston have 
little real work to do during a mission-as 
long as everything is normal (or nominal, 
in MSC jargon). If, however, something 
goes wrong, then the mission control room 
starts  to hum like a disturbed beehive, as 
the controllers strive to determine what is 
wrong, how i t  can be fixed or coped with, 
and what to do about it. Naturally, there- 
fore, the part  of their training with which 
Miller is primarily concerned is response 
to emergencies, and each simulation consists 
of one emergency piled on top of another. 
So i t  seemed reasonable to Huff and to me 
that  emergencies designed to meet our ex- 
perimental needs could, without detriment 
to the purpose of these training sessions, 
be inserted into certain simulations. Miller 
agreed and turned some of his most able 
lieutenants loose on the task of working 
up appropriate cases, and his various bosses 
and colleagues, including, especially, the key 
man to be studied, Eugene Kranz, the Flight 
Director, agreed also. 
In  order for you to understand what we 
did and what was found, I must go into a 
fair  amount of technical detail about the 
launch phase of the Apollo AS-204L mis- 
sion. To make i t  more difficult, during 
months of working with this material, I 
have become brainwashed. At MSC they 
rarely speak English; they prefer a sort of 
alphabet soup of acronyms mixed with a 
great deal of jargon. Like a schoolboy show- 
ing off his French, I find myself talking that 
way, too, when I talk about MSC. To help 
you out, I have included a list of acronyms 
and their definitions. It may cover the terms 
I will use-but I can guarantee you that i t  
does not exhaust MSC's supply. About 18,000 
acronyms can be made from all possible 
combinations of one, two, and three letters, 
and I doubt that MSC has missed many. 
At Miller's recommendation, our cases 
concentrated on the launch phase, before 
too many unforeseen controller responses to 
previous malfunctions could foul up our ex- 
pectations about what might happen. More- 
over, they were for unmanned missions, 
because i t  was decisions by controllers, not 
by astronauts, that  we wanted to study. 
One of our two cases, the less successful 
one, concerned a leak in a helium tank, a 
malfunctioning reaction control system 
thrustor, and a premature cutoff of the 
Saturn booster. The background goes like 
this. I n  a normal mission, after  insertion 
of the booster and everything attached to 
i t  into orbit, the lunar excursion module 
(LM) is detached from the booster prepara- 
tory to the module tests for which the 204L 
mission is intended. To achieve this separa- 
tion, locks holding the LM to  the booster 
are released, and then some very small rock- 
ets called the reaction control system (RCS) 
thrustors are fired to move the LM away 
from the booster. These same RCS thrustors 
are also used for later attitude control of 
the vehicle. Normally, four of them fire 
during this separation. Of these, two are 
driven by a fuel and oxidizer supply system 
called the A system ; the other two are  driven 
by the B system. A crossfeed valve permit- 
ting A system fuel and oxidizer to  go to B 
system thrustors (and vice versa) exists, but 
is closed except in emergency. Associated 
with each system is a high-pressure helium 
tank; the helium forces the fuel and oxi- 
dizer out of their tanks and into the thrus- 
tors. Thus, zero pressure in, say, the B 
system helium tank would put all B system 
thrustors out of action, unless the cross- 
feed valve were opened. 
If the Saturn booster stops firing before 
orbit is achieved, the time pressure becomes 
intense. Such a case is called a launch 
abort and, depending on the particular con- 
ditions that  prevail, a number of different 
things can happen. In  this one, the abort 
occurred a t  a time when orbit clearly could 
not be reached. In that  case, there is a 
rather brief period of free fall outside the 
atmosphere, 3 minutes or so, and then the 
spacecraft burns up, or, a t  any rate, its 
signal is lost due to reentry. So the goal 
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in such a case is to perform as  many of 
the tests for which the mission is intended 
as  is possible during the short time available. 
There are  two ways in which such a sub- 
orbital sequence (SOS) can be controlled. 
One is the LM guidance computer (LGC), 
the  computer carried in the LM. This is 
the preferred way. If for some reason that  
cannot be done, a n  alternative is to use a 
tape reader also carried in the LM, called 
the program reader assembly (PRA).  The 
PRA can command functions in proper se- 
quence and timing, but cannot modify i ts  
actions contingent on their outcomes. For 
reasons that I do not understand, the SOS 
under LGC control can be initiated only if 
the initiating command is received within 
60 seconds of the premature booster cutoff; 
after that, the LGC will not listen to com- 
mands from the ground. 
With that much background, let me de- 
scribe the details of our first case, a s  shown 
in figure 1. At about 1 minute 30 seconds 
after liftoff, the system B helium tank de- 
FIGURE 1.-Sample simulation exercise script. 
SAMPLE SIMULATION EXERCISE SCRIPT 
3. Page 1 of 3 Pages 1. Exercise No. 501 lLS1005b 
4. Setup (Fault init., Timing, Modes, Vectors, etc.) 
Fault Init: a) 1. PPS-416 6. PPS - 214 
2. PPS - 206" 7. PPS - 235* 
3. PPS-412 8. GN - 005" 
4. PPS - 41 3 9. GN -007 
5. PPS - 202 
b) Contingency Group 1 
* Change value by MED 
ModesITiming: Ten minutes prelaunch. Real GMT. 
5. Exercise Summary/Objectives 
The objective of this case is to cause a Mode 2 abort condition with attitude control for proper entry attitude. 
Booster initiation of early staging command is exercised by early cutoff of the S-ll stage. The Mode 2 condition 
i s  caused by the subsequent failure of the S-IVB ignition. A drift in the IMU pitch axis will force failure of the 
G & N by command by the GNC. 
6. Comments 
VAN acquisition will be early and short,if at all. A possibility exists for a short SPS burn if the G&N i s  not failed. 
If this does happen,the SPS will be shut down by FlDO using RTC 12. 
2. Date 
4-20-67 
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FIGURE 1.-Sample simulat ion exercise script-Continued. 
SIMULATION EXERCISE SCRIPT CONTINUATION 
1. Exercise No. 2. Date 
501/LS/005b 3. Page 2 of 3 Pages 
Description 
velops a leak, designed to exhaust the helium 
supply in that tank well before orbital in- 
sertion. Also, around that  time, one of the 
thrustors needed for separation jars closed; 
the closed one is driven by the A system. 
Thus, if nothing is done, only one thrustor 
will be available for separation. A one- 
thrustov separation is ,  probably impossible : 
the LGC will sense the asymmetric thrust 
and shut the action down. So, before separa- 
tion, it will be necessary either to use the 
PRA to read off a program that will open 
(a) 0:00:15 
GN - 005 
SY 8 
ADRK 
(b) 00:03:00 
PPS - 416 
sv 1 
ADRK 
(c) 00:05:00 
PPS - 206 
sv 2 
ADRK 
the A system thrustor, or open the cross- 
feed valve and thus drive B system thrustors 
from A system fuel, or both. Of course, 
there will be plenty of time to do this after 
arrival in orbit. 
But the vehicle does not arrive in orbit. 
The booster cuts off after about 9 minutes. 
And now there are exactly 60 seconds in 
which to do whatever needs to be done, which 
includes not only dealing with this thrustor 
problem, but also a sequence of commands 
required to separate the LM from the booster 
Drift in Pitch Axis of .15 degree per second in IMU. 
SYSFLTCC, GN - 005, .15 ,,,,,; 
CAUSE: Excessive launch phase dynamic loads cause Pitch IRlG to output 
erroneous signals to  the Stab loop. 
RESULT: IMU drifts in Pitch axis at rate of .15 degree per second. FDO will 
send RTC 12 with G&N "no go." MR 4-88, 
CUES: GO521 M0683 AGCU and IMU Pitch attitudes differ 
BACKUP: GN-007 AGC Pwr Supply Fail 
Sy 9 ADRK ASAP 
S-IVB Main Low Valve Fails Closed 
Before Engine Ignition 
CAUSE: The mainstage solenoid fails in a deenergized state. 
RESULT: S-IVB will fail to  ignite when the Early Staging Command i s  sent. 
FDO will command Abort. MR4-5A. 
CUES: GO305 and M1405. Parameters G3-401 and 01-401. 
BACKUP: PPS-412, Lox Prevalve Fails Closed 
Sy 3, ADRK ASAP. 
PPS-413 Fuel Prevalve Fails Closed 
Sy 4, ADRK ASAP. 
S-ll Fuel Ullage Pressure Leak 
SYSFLTCC, PPS - 206,, 20.0 ,,,,; 
CAUSE: Fuel ullage gas (gaseous hydrogen) leak 
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FIGURE 1.-Sample sinlulat ion exercise script-Concluded. 
SIMULATION EXERCISE SCRIPT CONTINUATION 
and to s tar t  the SOS. Should the controllers 
open the closed thrustor during launch? It 
is against the mission rules to send com- 
mands during powered flight, both because 
of the enhanced possibility of malfunction 
and because anything like that  might dis- 
tract and confuse the controllers. After cut- 
off, should they t r y  to open the A system 
thrustor, or open the crossfeed? The latter, 
we thought, would take longer but might be 
the better solution. 
Let me add that  there are more than 30 
1. Exercise No. 
501 lLSl005b 
communication loops available to all con- 
trollers, and most listen to 10 or more loops 
a t  a time. If i t  occurs to  you that  the over- 
lapping voices can get confusing-you are 
right. 
When we wrote the script, we thought 
that  the flight director (FLIGHT) would 
have to make a quick, tough decision be- 
tween opening a crossfeed valve, and open- 
ing a closed thrustor, or  doing both. But we 
were wrong. In  order to open the crossfeed 
valve, the LGG had to be in a state called 
2. Date 
4-20-67 3. Page 3 of 3 Pages 
SEOISGET 
Fault ID 
SyISe Loc 
4. Fault Summary 
Description 
RESULT: When fuel ullage pressure drops to point where fuel pump inlet 
pressure is less than 20.5 psia, all 5 engines will go out (must be 
between 00:03:06 and 00:07:53). BSE#1 will send Early 
Staging Command. MR5-I 2 .  
CUES: GO304 and M1402. Parameters D252-219, D253-219, D13-201, 
D l  3-202, D l  3-203, D l  3-204, D l  3-205. 
BACKUP: PPS-202, Eng 2 Fuel Prevalve Fails Closed. 
Sy 5, ADRK 00:07:25 
PPS-214, Eng 4 Oxid Prevalve Fails Closed 
Sy 6, ADRK 00:07:30 
PPS-235, Eng 5 Fuel Pump Degradation 
Rate: 3.5%/sec Limit: 0% 
SYSFLTCC, PPS-235,,0.0, 0.035,,,; 
Sy 7, ADRK 00:07:30 
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program zero zero, (POO), and this can 
not be done before orbital insertion. In- 
stead, we had presented FLIGHT with a 
very interesting but unanticipated question : 
Should he or should he not violate mission 
rules by sending PRA 7, which would have 
opened up the closed A system thrustor, 
during powered flight. He decided not to, 
with the result that he failed to achieve 
the best possible outcome of the situation: 
SOS under LGC control. Unfortunately, not 
only had I not anticipated this as the crucial 
decision, but I did not respond to it quickly 
enough to be able to treat i t  as the main 
point of this case in the postcase interviews. 
So, as you will see, most of the procedures 
I went through in the interviews had to do 
with an issue that did not really require a 
decision. Still, I will review the procedures 
briefly, as a preparation for the second and 
more successful case. 
I interviewed FLIGHT, the flight dynam- 
ics officer (FIDO) , the guidance and naviga- 
tion officer (GUIDO), and the officer in 
charge of guidance and control systems 
(G&C). All interviews were essentially the 
same. First, we reviewed the main facts 
of the case, to make sure that the interviewee 
had them clearly in mind. Then I encouraged 
him to talk about the issues bearing on the 
choice of what to do and on the question 
of whether it could have been done in the 
60 seconds available. The main purpose of 
this was to make sure that we understood 
the technical issues properly and, in the 
second case, the key technical fact of the 
case emerged in this portion of each inter- 
view. 
Next I asked the interviewee to list each 
possible outcome of the decision situation. 
For this case, each list included three pos- 
sibilities. I asked the interviewee to rank 
these possible outcomes in order of desir- 
ability. Then I invited him to assign a value 
of 1 to the most favorable, a value of 0 to 
the least favorable, and then to use this 
scale to assign a value or utility to the 
intermediate possibility. As i t  happens, in 
this case there were no decisions to make 
and no information to process probabilisti- 
cally, so the interview ended with a few 
miscellaneous probability estimates. The 
second case is more sophisticated. 
To give some idea of the resulting utility 
scales, the relevant numbers are presented 
in table I. As you see, there is good agree- 
ment about utilities, and perfect agreement 
about orderings in utility. 
TABLE I.-Possible Outcomes of Case 1 
and T h e i ~  Utilities 
Those are the useful results of case 1. Let 
us turn to case 2. Again, I must explain tech- 
nicalities so you can understand the case. 
There are several kinds of aborts. Those 
of case 1, resulting in a suborbital sequence 
of tests, are called mode 3 aborts. Shortly 
before the whole system reaches orbit, how- 
ever, it reaches a point a t  which, if the 
booster cuts off prematurely, it is possible to 
separate the LM from the booster, fire the 
LM's descending propulsion engine (DPS) , 
and use that engine to put the LM and the 
remainder of the spacecraft into orbit. Once 
in orbit, the desired tests can, of course, be 
conducted leisurely, except insofar as the 
firing of the DPS has interfered with subse- 
quent DPS tests because of fuel depletion. 
However, it is quite undesirable to attempt 
this unless the spacecraft actually has the 
capability of reaching orbit. Otherwise, it 
will get too far  out over the Atlantic, capa- 
bility for controlling it or for monitoring 
events on it will be lost for a while because 
no ground station is conveniently located, 
and by the time it gets in range of a station 
again it may be ready to reenter; thus, not 
even the abbreviated tests of the suborbital 
sequence will get done. Moreover, in this 
Outcome 
PRA 7 followed by 
LGC SOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
PRA 7 followed by 
PRA SOS . . . . . . .. . .. . 
Abort without PRA 7 .  . . . 
Utility for- 
G&C 
1 
.8 
0 
FLIGHT 
1 
.9 
0 
GUIDO 
-- 
1 
.75 
0 
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case it may land on Africa, politically a 
highly undesirable event. 
The main display used during launch phase 
is called a v-y plot: v is the velocity of the 
vehicle; y is the angle between a linear ex- 
tension of the vehicle's present flight path 
(such as it would follow if its engines cut off 
and all gravitational influences were re- 
moved) and the path it will follow once in 
orbit. A large display of the v-y plot is lo- 
cated a t  the front of the control room, and 
any controller can call up the display at any 
time on one of his TV tubes. A line on that 
plot represents the boundary between modes 
3 and 4 ; when the dot representing the space- 
craft crosses that line, it has mode 4 capa- 
bility. 
In order to maintain the v-y plot, the 
computers must know where the spacecraft 
is. There are three sources of that informa- 
tion: radar data, collected from all over the 
world and interpreted by a computer com- 
plex a t  Cape Kennedy called the impact pre- 
dictor (IP) ; inertial guidance calculations 
made on board the Saturn launch vehicle by 
the launch vehicle digital computer (LVDC) 
and telemetered to the ground; and similar 
inertial guidance calculations made by the 
LGC. One of FIDO's many functions is to 
decide which of these sources shall be se- 
lected to drive the v-y plot; various kinds 
of reliability information bear on the selec- 
tion of the source. 
The point of case 2 was to destroy one 
source and cause the other two to disagree, 
with some not-very-good data bearing on 
which is correct, and then to initiate an abort 
a t  a time when one source says mode 3 and 
the other says mode 4. Then FIDO must 
decide which to believe, with much depending 
on the decision. 
The first step in this process was to initiate 
a small progressive disagreement between 
the two computers. At 6 minutes after lift- 
off, an accelerometer in the Saturn booster 
was given a bias such that it reported less 
acceleration along the flight path than actu- 
ally occurred; the effect was initially unde- 
tectable, but gradually accumulated. At 6 
minutes 30 seconds after liftoff, a11 radar 
transponders failed, causing complete loss 
of I P  data. Then, at  exactly the moment a t  
which the LGC says mode 4 and the LVDC 
says mode 3, the booster was to be cut off 
prematurely. The only information available 
was the 30 seconds of information beginning 
when the two computers started to disagree 
and ending when the transponders failed. 
As the case worked out, the 30 seconds of 
information was never used. When the dis- 
crepancy was noticed, about 8 minutes after 
liftoff, FIDO simply trusted the LVDC better 
than the LGC, and so used i t  as the selected 
source. Unfortunately, the simulation staff 
was a few seconds late getting the booster 
cutoff in, so the LVDC source and the LGC 
source both said mode 4, and a successful 
mode 4 abort was executed. 
This discouraging experience stimulated 
us to try the case again, with a few changes 
to prevent the controllers from noticing that 
they had seen this case before. One irrele- 
vant change was that the radar data this 
time failed because of a computer malfunc- 
tion on the ground. Another very relevant 
change was that this time the booster cutoff 
was at  exactly the right time. The third 
change, which was intended to be irrelevant 
but actually turned out to be crucial, was 
that early in the launch phase a leak was 
inserted in the gas talik that provides gas 
under pressure to drive the gyroscopes of the 
Saturn stable platform. Actually, this leak 
had no prospect of affecting the stable plat- 
form during the launch phase. However, 
when the discrepancy between the two com- 
puters developed, FIDO remembered that the 
accelerometers for the LVDC are mounted 
on the Saturn stable platform, took the stable 
platform pressure leak into account, con- 
cluded that because of the leak the LVDC 
information was less likely to be right than 
the LGC information, used the LGC data to 
drive the v-y plot, and thus correctly called 
mode 4 when the booster cutoff came. This 
is a fine example of being right for the wrong 
reasons. 
In interviews after the case, FLIGHT, 
FIDO and GUIDO all agreed that normally 
the LVDC would be preferable to the LGC, 
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simply because the LGC, as part of the LM, 
is new and untried, while the LVDC is a 
familiar system. They also agreed that the 
platform pressure problem was the reason 
for choosing the LGC over the LVDC in this 
case, and considered the choice appropriate. 
This was a situation in which a real de- 
cision was made, in the sense that FIDO 
and, on FIDO's recommendation, FLIGHT, 
in effect had to decide between mode 3 for 
sure and a gamble that could lead to either 
a successful or an unsuccessful mode 4;  an 
unsuccessful mode 4 is clearly less favorable 
than a successful mode 3. Moreover, in this 
case, real information processing occurred. 
Not, to be sure, the information processing 
of 30 seconds worth of old radar data that 
we had had in mind when we designed the 
case; rather, the interpretation of the plat- 
form leak. So I applied the apparatus of de- 
cision theory to the analysis of the situation. 
As before, after the unconstrained part of 
the interview was over, I asked each inter- 
viewee ( I  interviewed only one man at  a 
time) to list, rank, and then judge the value 
of each possible outcome. FLIGHT listed 
eight possibilities; FIDO and GUIDO each 
listed four. Table I1 shows the utilities as- 
signed. The discrepancy between FLIGHT'S 
and the others' lists is less substantial than 
it  appears; all possibilities listed only by him 
have very low probability, and the last three 
may have been lumped in with the fourth one 
by FIDO and GUIDO. However, if a trans- 
formation on FLIGHT'S utility judgments is 
made so that the fifth outcome is taken as 
having zero utility, then the numerical dis- 
crepancy between his judgments and those 
of the others is increased. But, as usual, the 
ordinal agreement is perfect. 
I asked each interviewee to estimate some 
odds. First, I asked him to imagine that he 
was being interviewed just before the real 
204L mission. Suppose, I said, that he knew 
for sure that he was going to lose, say, LGC 
data, and that the I P  and the LVDC were 
going to disagree about the location of the 
vehicle. Which would be more likely to be 
right and, in a ratio sense, how much more 
likely? Similarly, for I P  versus LGC in the 
absence of LVDC data, and for LGC versus 
LVDC in the absence of IP  data. These three 
odds are related such that any two specify 
the third. To see this, note that 
TABLE 11.-Possible Oz~tcomes of Case 2 
and Their Utilties 
P (LGC right) P (IP right) 
P (IP right) P (LVDC right) 
Outconle 
Successful mode 4 . . . . . . .  
Try  mode 4, get to  
Australia, refire DPS . . 
Successful mode 3, 
LGC control . . . . . . . . . .  
Successful mode 3, 
PRA control . . . . . . . . . .  
Try  mode 4, discover can- 
not make orbit, do what- 
ever tests a re  possible. . 
Try  mode 4, overfly Africa 
Try mode 4, get African 
impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Total loss because exces- 
sive delay leads to loss 
of signal . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
- 
P (LGC right) 
- P (LVDC right) 
Utility for- 
1 
Naturally, the interviewees did not have this 
internal consistency rule in mind, and all 
three initially made inconsistent estimates. 
I pointed out the rule and the inconsistencj- 
to them and invited revision of any or all 
estimates; the resulting revisions were typi- 
cally in the direction of greater consistency, 
but not enough to produce perfect consist- 
ency. For the data, see the first three rows 
of table 111. The estimates, after revision 
for consistency, are sufficiently consistent. 
Moreover, they agree qualitatively, although, 
of course, not numerically. 
Then I explained what a likelihood ratio 
is and asked for an estimate of the ratio of 
the probability that the stable platform pres- 
sure problem would have occurred if the LGC 
were going to turn out correct to the proba- 
bility of that symptom if the LVDC were 
going to turn out correct. Communicating 
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TABLE 111.-Odds and Likelihood Ratio Estimates, Case 2 
the idea of a likelihood ratio was quite diffi- 
cult. 
Finally, I asked for an estimate of the odds, 
after observing the platform symptom, of 
LGC being right versus LVDC being right. 
Having obtained that number, I pointed out 
that, again, an internal consistency relation- 
ship applies to the three estimates having to 
do with LGC and LVDC : this relationship, 
of course, is Bayes' theorem. In symbols, it 
says that- 
Quantity estimated 
Prior odds for- 
LGC right: I P  right. .................. 
I P  right: LVDC right . .  ............... 
LGC right: LVDC right..  ............. 
Likelihood ratio : 
P (platform problem/LGC right) . . , 
P (platform problem/LVDC right) 
Posterior odds estimated : 
LGC right : LVDC right. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Posterior odds calculated from revised prior 
odds and likelihood ratio: 
LGC right; LVDC right . .  ............... 
P (LGC right before datum) 
P (LVDC right before datum) 
P (Datum given LGC right) 
P (Datum given LVDC right) 
- P (LGC right after datum) 
- P (LVDC right after datum) 
The datum, of course, is the Saturn stable 
platform pressure problem. Finally, I in- 
vited further revision of any estimate to 
improve consistency; all but FLIGHT made 
such revisions. All posterior odds estimated 
are more extreme in favor of the LGC than 
the calculation from prior odds and likeli- 
hood ratio would imply. I speculate that the 
reason for this is that the case was being 
discussed after the truth (that the LGC was 
right) was known ; these posterior estimates, 
but not the prior estimates and not the like- 
lihood ratios, reflect this knowledge of the 
FLIGHT GUIDO 
truth. But in no case is the after-revision 
violation of Bayes' theorem large. 
Now, consider the actual decision to try 
mode 4. For FLIGHT, if we take the value 
of a successful mode 3 as 0.5 and that of an 
unsuccessful mode 4 as 0.3, we see that for 
any odds for success of mode 4 greater than 
2 to 5 he should choose mode 4; on any esti- 
mate, his odds for successful mode 4 were 
greater than that. Similarly, for both FIDO 
and GUIDO, if we take the value of a sue- 
cessful mode 3 as 0.75, we find that any odds 
for success greater than 3 to 1 should lead 
to trying for mode 4;  their estimated odds 
were greater than 3 to 1. The calculated 
5-to-3 odds for FIDO raise a problem; the 
value of a successful mode 3 would have to 
be less than 0.625 to justify trying mode 4 
with those odds. That happens to be mid- 
way between his two value estimates for 
mode 3 ;  but I assume he considers mode 3 
under LGC control much more likely in this 
case than the less desirable mode 3 under 
PRA control. Still, with that minor excep- 
tion, the decision looks entirely reasonable 
in the light of the value and probability 
estimates. 
That ends the data analysis. What does 
it all mean? 
First, I should caution you that my con- 
clusions grow much more from the informa- 
tion I picked up while performing this study 
1st 
estimate 
1 : l O  
10:l 
1 :6 
2 : l  
2 : l  
1:l 
F'IDO 
1st 
estimate 
1 :8 
4: l  
1 :6 
1 O : l  
6 : l  
5 : l  
Revised 
estimate 
1 :20 
......... 
1 :2 
......... 
......... 
......... 
1st  
estimate 
1:11 
10:l 
1:3 
3:l 
5 : l  
5 :3 
Revised 
estimate 
1:6 
3 : l  
1 :2 
......... 
......... 
......... 
Revised 
estimate 
......... 
5:l 
......... 
5 : l  
4: l  
......... 
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than from the outcome of the study itself. 
The study, as, of course, you have long since 
recognized, is clinical rather than experi- 
mental in nature. As with all clinical proced- 
ures I know of, it is suggestive to intuition, 
but not suited to proving what it suggests. 
A first conclusion is that nothing in this 
exercise denies, and much confirms, the 
major premise with which I began: that 
every decision, including those made on line 
by space vehicle controllers, depends on sub- 
jective answers to the questions what is a t  
stake and what are the odds. And the results 
also support an unstated but clearly implied 
premise : that decisionmakers can report 
fairly clearly and precisely- on their subjec- 
tive stakes and odds if you ask them prop- 
erly. Incidentally, I should emphasize that 
I did not ask them properly, particularly 
about odds and likelihood ratios. To do so, 
I should have first given them 5 hours or so 
of training in how to estimate these quan- 
tities. Had I done so, I am confident that the 
residual incoherences in the data would have 
vanished. As it is, I feel they were extraor- 
dinarily consistent, considering that they 
had only 10 minutes of explanation of some 
of the most difficult concepts of modern sta- 
tistics before being asked to use them, not 
arithmetically, but intuitively. 
A second conclusion is that irreducible un- 
certainty plays a remarkably small role in 
on-line control of space flight. This conclu- 
sion wi1I probably horrify contro1Iers who 
hear i t ;  they must feel that they struggle 
with uncertainty all the time. And of course 
they do. But what they struggle to do is to 
reduce or eliminate the uncertainty, and 
mostly they can do so very well. The reason 
is simply that the capability of eliminating 
uncertainty is one of the major design goals 
of the entire system. Rare, indeed, is the 
question about which three or four or five 
definitive sources of information are not de- 
signed into the system ; in order to set up our 
cases, we had to produce quite artificial com- 
binations of malfunctions to frustrate the 
purpose of this redundancy of information 
sources. Such combinations can and do occur 
in real space flight, but they are very rare. 
A third conclusion is that value judgments 
play an extremely major role in space flight. 
Very nearly every decision that must be 
made, ahead of time or during a mission, re- 
quires juggling the various goals of the mis- 
sion, choosing how much to compromise one 
goal in order to achieve another; of course, 
this is especially true in case of a serious mal- 
function. So it is in what it has to say about 
values, not what it has to say about prob- 
abilities, that decision theory is most rele- 
vant to mission control. 
A fourth conclusion, growing out of the 
last two, is that PIP, an on-line system for 
diagnosis that I have been advocating in 
many contexts recently, has little, if any, 
prospect of being useful in on-line mission 
control. The reason is simple. PIP  is a 
method for combining Bayes' theorem with 
human judgments to perform diagnostic in- 
formation processing. It requires a prese- 
lected exhaustive set of mutually exclusive 
diagnoses, and this set cannot be too large. 
Moreover, i t  is best suited to exploiting in- 
conclusive data. But in on-line diagnosis of 
spacecraft malfunction, the set of possibili- 
ties is extremely large and initially unspeci- 
fied, and the data are in general conclusive, 
in the sense of conclusively eliminating 
hypotheses. 
I hasten to add that the basic ideas of PIP 
are, nevertheless, very relevant to mission 
control; I will explain in a moment. 
A fifth conclusion is that the key place to 
apply decision theory, including both its diag- 
nostic aspects (and diagnostic tools like PIP) 
and its value judgment aspects, in mission 
control is in writing the mission rules docu- 
ment. The mission rules document is a large 
book of premade decisions, an attempt to 
anticipate all possible contingencies and de- 
cide what to do if each occurs. It now uses 
an explicit but ordinal set of value judgments 
and no explicit but many implicit proba- 
bility judgments. I believe that addition 
of cardinal values, explicit probabilities, 
and rules for combining and using them to 
the armament of those who write mission 
rules would be extremely helpful, particu- 
larly in resolving difficult cases-which, I am 
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told, are frequently encountered in writing 
the document. Especially important in thus 
formalizing the development of mission rules 
would be a mechanism for combining incon- 
sistent value dimensions ; the weighted linear 
average rule so prominent in formal decision 
theory is the obvious candidate. 
I would like to conclude with a question 
and an observation. The question is this. 
Immense amounts of money, engineering 
effort, and complexity have been invested in 
protecting controllers and astronauts against 
uncertainty. Was i t  worth i t ?  If informa- 
tion systems (as distinguished from propul- 
sion, life support, and other systems that do 
something more than just transmitting and 
displaying information) were less redundant 
and less oriented toward certainty, the whole 
system would be less complex. Quite pos- 
sibly, the gain in reliability resulting from 
decreased complexity would exceed the loss 
in reliability resulting from reduced infor- 
mation availability. Even if it did not, the 
loss in reliability might be minor compared 
with the savings in money. I do not know 
the answer to my question ; I wonder if i t  has 
been carefully asked. 
My concluding observation has to do with 
the future of mission control and mission 
controllers. I t  assumes that manned space 
flight has a post-Apollo future, an assumption 
with which I hope Congress comes to agree. 
It  also assumes that the future will consist 
primarily of interplanetary flights, neces- 
sarily lasting for weeks or months. 
The original Project Mercury controllers 
were highly trained engineers and highly 
motivated, intensely committed men. Ac- 
cording to my informants, both the level of 
training and the level of motivation is now 
lower than it was in Mercury days, though 
still very high. Most control procedures de- 
pend on the high quality of the controllers, 
and would be impossible otherwise. 
But really long missions are going to con- 
sist mostly of periods during which nothing 
is happening. Even if such able controllers 
are available, they are not going to be willing 
to spend weeks or months of boring, inactive 
console duty. Yet there will often not be 
time, if an emergency arises, to call in the 
first team of controllers from their other 
activities. The implication, it seems to me, 
is that lower level personnel, such as are 
now found in FAA Air Traffic Control Cen- 
ters, will necessarily come to man the NASA 
consoles also. They will be high school, not 
college, graduates. Their work will be to 
them a job, not a priesthood. 
Present procedures, or extensions of them, 
just will not work if such men are manning 
the consoles. The computers will have to do 
much more of the job. Procedures will have 
to be far more formalized and prespecified 
than they are now. Detailed technical knowl- 
edge of all the systems, spaceborne and 
ground, cannot be assumed. 
In such an environment, formal decision 
theory is very likely to be crucial to making 
the on-line decisions. The form this will 
probably take is that the mission rules will 
be oriented toward the use of decision theory, 
and the computer will know and apply them 
to new situations as they arise. If this is the 
shape of the future, then NASA should begin 
now to find out how to move toward it. Ap- 
plying formal rules to the writing of mission 
rules documents is a good first step. 
APPENDIX A 
On September 17, 1968, two more launch 
abort cases designed to present controllers 
with decision problems were run, and I inter- 
viewed controllers as  before. These simula- 
tions were for the Apollo 7 mission, whose 
objectives and personnel were different from 
the LM-1 mission used for the studies re- 
ported above. The Flight Director, Glynn 
Lunney, was fully as  helpful as Ksanz had 
been. During the simulations, astronauts in 
a simulator a t  Cape Kennedy were in voice 
communication with the controllers ; the in- 
struments in their simulator, linked with the 
simulation computers, behaved as though 
they were in flight. But the launch phases of 
the two missions are very similar, and the role 
of the astronauts in these two cases was en- 
tirely peripheral (except during debriefings) . 
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In the first case, a leak was started a t  
launch in the service propulsion system 
(SPS) engine oxidizer supply. (The SPS is 
the main thrust engine of the command serv- 
ice module (CSM) .) The instrumentation 
prevents determination of which is leaking- 
the oxidizer or the helium contained in the 
system to force the oxidizer into the engines. 
Then the booster failed in the mode 4 region. 
Normal procedure, in the absence of the leak, 
would be to separate the CSM from the 
booster and get into orbit by firing the SPS. 
If the leak is only a helium leak, this would 
still be the best procedure. But, if the SPS 
is fired posigrade (that is, in a direction in- 
tended to produce orbit; the opposite direc- 
tion of firing is called retrograde) and cuts 
off before orbit is reached, as i t  will if the 
oxidizer has been badly depleted, the result- 
ing impact point may be in some very un- 
desirable location, like Africa. Moreover, 
even if orbit is reached, there may not be 
enough SPS oxidizer to permit deorbit; in 
that case, the difficult and hazardous pro- 
cedure of reentering using the reaction con- 
trol system (RCS) thrustors may have to be 
used. Moreover, the loss of large quantities 
of SPS oxidizer affects the SPS burn in two 
other ways: the changed mass of the vehicle 
will have to be allowed for, as will the possi- 
bility that the changed center of gravity of 
the vehicle may not be adequately compen- 
sated for in the thrust vector control (TVC), 
which controls the exact direction of firing of 
the SPS loop. 
This case was designed to highlight a 
loophole in the mission rules, which fail to 
specify what to do when it is uncertain 
whether the leak is of helium or of oxidizer. 
Linking a case with a flaw in mission rules 
both highlighted the flaw and gave some feel- 
ing for whether explicit value and odds judg- 
ments could be helpful in formulating mis- 
sion rules. 
In the simulation, the leak was discovered 
a t  about 1 minute 44 seconds after liftoff 
and was carefully tracked. After the booster 
cutoff, a controller recommended to the 
Flight Director that they do an SPS burn 
to orbit. But the Flight Director decided not 
to burn the SPS. Instead, they successfully 
executed a mode 2 abort. 
In debriefing, the Flight Director ex- 
plained that G&C had reported that if the 
leak was an oxidizer leak, then the impact 
point would have been somewhere in Africa ; 
that is why he chose to do the mode 2 abort. 
If he had been committed to a landing re- 
gardless of which abort he tried, he would 
have chosen the SPS burn to orbit--the mode 
4 abort. 
In the interview afterward, the Flight 
Director clarified that the leak rate was quite 
slow for a helium leak, but of reasonable rate 
for an oxidizer leak; this evidence favored 
the hypothesis that it was an oxidizer leak. 
His decision, however, was based more on 
value than on odds considerations. His esti- 
mate of 1 to 1 prior odds may have reflected 
a feeling that he had initially no relevant 
information rather than a judgment that the 
two kinds of leaks are equally frequent; later 
informal comments suggest this. His value 
and odds estimates are presented in table 
A-1. Given these, he clearly did the right 
thing. 
TABLE A-1.-Values, Odds, and Likelihood 
Ratios, Case 3 
The other interviewee in this case was 
G&C. His reasoning was qualitatively like 
that of the FIight Director ; his estimates are 
also contained in table A-1. When the incon- 
sistency between his prior odds, likelihood 
ratio, and posterior odds estimates was 
pointed out to him, he felt uncomfortable 
about it, but did not wish to change any of 
Quantity 
Estimated utility for- 
Successful mode 4 . .  . . . . . 
Successful mode 2 .  . . . . . . 
African impact . . . . . . . . 
Prior odds: liquid to gas leak 
Likelihood ratio . . . . . . . . . . . 
Posterior odds . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Calculated posterior odds . . . 
Flight 
Director 
1 
.90 
0 
1 :1 
3 :1 
3:l 
3 :1 
G&C 
1 
.50 
0 
1 :19 
7: l  
3: l  
7:19 (=I :2.7) 
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the three numbers. (Time was too short to 
permit careful exploration of his opinions.) 
In spite of the substantial difference in values 
between G&C and the Flight Director, the 
odds and values of each would lead to the 
decision actually made. 
The final case was once more a launch 
abort, this time in what is called an apogee 
kick situation. This is a case in which the 
booster has burned long enough to produce 
orbit, but the perigee of the orbit is too low. 
In this case, further propulsion is necessary 
to produce a satisfactory orbit, but a sub- 
stantial delay in initiation of that propulsion 
is desirable. 
There are two alternating current (ac) 
buses. Normally, current from ac bus no. 2 
operates the thrust-vector-control (TVC) 
system for the SPS. The first malfunction 
in this case caused the astronauts to lose all 
capability of monitoring ac bus voltages. 
The second malfunction was a short in ac bus 
no. 1, which the controllers were expected 
to diagnose without too much difficulty. The 
final and crucial malfunction was an inter- 
mittent partial short on ac bus no. 2 that 
causes its voltage to oscillate around a mar- 
ginal value. Then, when premature booster 
cutoff made an SPS burn necessary, the 
Flight Director had to decide whether to go 
ahead and call for the burn, with the possi- 
bility that lack of TVC would cause the 
spacecraft to tumble, or whether to initiate 
an RCS deorbit, with probable landing in the 
Indian Ocean. The purpose of the case was 
to highlight the arbitrary character of mis- 
sion rules built around "magic number" cut- 
off values. 
As the case worked out, all malfunctions 
were detected and treated as expected. When 
the booster cutoff came, it was treated as a 
mode 4 case, not an apogee kick case. (These 
cases are actually different only in the time 
of initiation of the SPS burn; little harm 
results from treating an apogee kick case 
as a mode 4 case.) The SPS burn was called 
for and executed. In  debriefing, the Flight 
Director said he had assumed the TVC sys- 
tem was satisfactory. 
In an interview afterward, the Flight 
Director explained that the crucial point is 
that all systems driven by bus no. 2 were 
working satisfactorily, regardless of the 
marginal and fluctuating voltage readings, 
The electrical environmental and communi- 
cations systems engineer (EECOM) , inter- 
viewed separately, agreed. 
The value judgments and probability judg- 
ments were both interfered with, in both 
interviews, by shortage of time. Both men 
agreed that a successful mode 4 was best, 
and that an unsuccessful mode 4 leading 
either to a land impact or a tumbling space- 
craft was worst. The other possibility, which 
both considered, was that the mode 4 might 
get the spacecraft into orbit, but that the 
buses might thereafter both fail, making 
immediate deorbit necessary. The Flight 
Director valued that a t  0.7 to 0.8; EECOM 
valued i t  a t  0.6. Both agreed that the odds 
were high in favor of ac bus no. 2 being able 
to operate the TVC system. The Flight Di- 
rector put those odds a t  30 or 40 to 1; 
EECOM put them a t  a million to 1. For 
either figure, the decision made was obvi- 
ously correct. I believe these numbers would 
all have been somewhat different (especially 
EECOM's) if more time had been available. 
The conclusions from these two cases are 
basically the same as the conclusions pre- 
sented in the body of the presentation. Both 
cases were designed to exhibit how explicit 
value and probability judgments can be used 
to guide the selection of (necessarily arbi- 
trary) cutoff numbers for use in mission 
rules. In the first case, the cutoff is on a 
probability judgment; in the second, it is on 
a voltage. One byproduct was the observa- 
tion that information on which such cutoffs 
should be based (e.g., What is the minimum 
voltage required to operate the TVC system, 
and what will happen below that voltage?) 
may not be easily available. The manufac- 
turers of equipment provide such numbers- 
usually with a built-in safety factor. When 
such safety factors are piled on top of one 
another as more and more systems interact 
with one another, they may become entirely 
unrealistic. But performance testing in the 
spacecraft under actual mission conditions 
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is impossible, and performance testing on the the various possible outcomes of the actions 
ground is both costly and of doubtful rele- being considered, would permit the optimal 
vance. Moreover, exhaustive exploration of selection of cutoffs in those mission rules 
tolerances of all systems to all possible devi- that must be based on such cutoffs-as many 
ations from design parameters is prepos- must. 
terous; i t  would take too long. Clearly what Unfortunately, simulations cannot substi- 
is needed is more explicit tolerance-of-varia- tute for work with the real systems in select- 
bility information from the manufacturer- ing these cutoffs. The simulation must sim- 
without any built-in safety factors. Such ply accept the design information provided 
numbers would provide the probabilities by the manufacturer; i t  cannot examine the 
that, combined with the value judgments for precision of that information. 
GLOSSARY 
AGS-Abort guidance section: An auxiliary guidance 
system on the LM. (See PNGS.) 
AOS-Acquisition of signal: The moment a t  which a 
ground site is able to receive signals from and 
transmit them to the spacecraft. (See LOS.) 
apogee kick-When booster has burned long enough 
to produce orbit, but the orbit perigee is  too low. 
Further propulsion is necessary to achieve satis- 
factory orbit. 
APS-Ascent propulsion system of the LM. (See 
DPS.) 
A System-One of the two fuel-and-oxidizer systems 
serving the RCS thrustors. (See B system and 
RCS.) 
A T C A i r  traffic control. 
Booster-The controller who monitors Saturn launch 
vehicle engines. 
B System-One of the two fuel-and-oxidizer systems 
serving the RCS thrustors. (See A system and RCS.) 
CAP COM-Capsule communicator. 
COI-Contingency orbit insertion: What is done in a 
successful mode 4 abort. 
CSM-Command service module. 
DPS-Descent propulsion system of the LM: Pro- 
nounced dips. (See APS.) 
EECOM-Electrical, environmental, and communi- 
cations systems engineer: A controller. 
EMR-Engine mixture ratio. 
FIDO-Flight dynamics officer : A contl.oller. 
G&N; GNCGuidance and navigation systems con- 
troller. 
GUIDO-Guidance officer: A controller; not the same 
as G&N or GNC. 
IGM-Iterative guidance mode. 
IGN-Ignition. 
IMU-Inertial measurement unit. 
IP-Impact predictor: A computer complex a t  Cape 
Kennedy that processes radar data. 
IRIG--Inertial reference integrating gyro. 
IU-Instrumentation unit of the SLV, containing the 
LVDC. 
JZ-An engine on the SLV. 
L G C L M  guidance computer. 
LM-Lunar excursion module (formerly LEM) . 
LMP-LM mission programer: A g~-oup of programs 
in the LGC. 
LOS-Loss of signal. (See AOS.) 
LVDCLaunch vehicle digital computer, located in 
the IU. 
MAP-Message acceptance pulse: A signal that  the 
spacecraft has accepted a command. 
MCCMission Control Center, located a t  MSC. 
MED-Manual electric device. 
M&O-Maintenance and operation. 
MOCR-Mission operations control room, part of the 
MCC; controllers sit here. 
Mode 3-An abort in which COI is not possible. 
Mode 4-An abort in which COI can be achieved by 
separating the LM from the SLV and firing the DPS. 
MSCManned Spacecraft Center (Houston, Tex.). 
PLUS X -Forward direction, parallel to  spacecraft. 
PNGS-Primary navigation and guidance system of 
the LM; pronounced pings. 
Po-Program zero zero: A null program in the 
LGC. 
posigrade-In the direction of orbit. 
PRA-Program reader assembly: A magnetic tape 
reader in the LM. 
RETRO-Retrofire officer : A controller. 
retrograde-Opposite to the usual orbit direction. 
RCS-Reaction control system: A system of small 
attitude-control rockets on the LM. 
RTCReal-t ime computer. 
SIM SUP-Simulation supervisor: Controls the simu- 
lation staff during simulations. 
SLA-Spacecraft-LM adapter: The unit that con- 
nects the Saturn to  the LM. 
SLV-Saturn launch vehicle. 
SOS-Suborbital sequence, executed in case of a mode 
3 abort. 
SPS-Service propulsion system. 
TCA-Thrust chamber assembly. 
TVC-Thrust vector control. 
ullage-Empty space in a fuel tank. To make fuel flow 
out of a tank, ullage must be produced; this can be 
difficult under 0-g conditions. 
v-y-Plot of spacecraft velocity against flight path 
angle. 
EDWARD M .  HUFF 
Ames Research Center 
EDWARD M. HUFF: The suggestion has 
been made that we deviate from the schedule 
a t  this point and try to elicit as many re- 
sponses as possible concerning the two 
papers. I will just summarize briefly. I do 
not know that I can say anything that has 
not been said or implied already. 
I think Miller's paper gives us an excellent 
general summary of flight-control operations. 
I think, by implication, that we can see vari- 
ous ways in which academic psychology can 
fit into the picture. Whether we want to 
refer to all the potential applications as 
decisionmaking is a subject I will not go 
into. I understand that Rathert has some 
comments concerning relationships between 
Edwards' discussion and the SST control 
operations, so I would like to turn the con- 
versation over to him. 
GEORGE A. RATHERT : The point occurred 
to me that Edwards' remarks were, to an 
extent, forecasting future trends of manned- 
control-center requirements. I am struck by 
the similarities between simulation com- 
plexes for overall mission control for the SST 
and simulation complexes for the overall 
mission control for post-Apollo. The manned 
control center is being dragged down to the 
level of air-traffic control (ATC), because of 
the degradation of personnel quality. On the 
other hand, the SST with its multiple re- 
dundant systems, multiple potential for 
failure, is approaching the complexity of the 
' The discussion concerns Miller's and Edwards' 
papers. 
spacecraft that Houston control works with. 
I do not know whether manned space opera- 
tions and operations of the SST are heading 
toward the same point, whether they are still 
several miles apart, or whether there has 
been crossover. I do know that there is great 
urgency in solving the problems connected 
with both. You cannot afford to make a 
mistake. In both of these cases, you will 
have to resort to decisionmaking technology, 
the academic psychological impact that Ed- 
wards is talking about. I think that both 
operations will become similar enough so 
that the people responsible for these opera- 
tions will actually listen to people like Ward 
and let him participate directly in opera- 
tional applications. I do not know where 
these trends will start, but a group like this 
that knows both ends of the spectrum is prob- 
ably a pretty good place. I think this point 
should not be missed. 
Edwards' type of analysis and observation 
at Houston is equally applicable to the strug- 
gle we see going on in the FAA over the 
ATC systems. There are several differences 
that are interesting. The command control 
center in the SST will be in the cockpit. In 
the example that I used-flying from London 
to New York and having a combination of 
in-flight systems failures making i t  necessary 
to divert and land at Gander-the pilot on 
the flight deck makes the decision. Then he 
notifies ATC and uses its facilities to get 
himself a clear air path and approach. I 
think, perhaps in the long-range missions a t  
Houston the same thing will happen. Im- 
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mediate command will move to the vehicle 
itself. Communication problems and a lot of 
things point toward this, but the application 
remains the same. Aids in decisionmaking 
remain the same. 
Suppose, for instance, that the pilot of an 
SST breaks out of clouds and has to judge 
his landing approach. This is something 
every pilot does in every airplane. But, in 
the case of the SST, the pilot may be sitting 
there saying, "I have got a triply redundant 
longitudinal control system. One control has 
failed. Of the two remaining, there is a cer- 
tain increased probability that they will fail 
and compromise my ability to make a suc- 
cessful landing." In this case, the decision 
should be made on the basis of weighing 
factors that are based on a statistical history 
of those control systems in that particular 
configuration. The pilot is not going to carry 
this information in his head. It must be 
stored, evaluated, and presented to him in 
a form that he can use. 
HUFF: In this particular case, as you 
envision it, you should have a well-trained 
specialist making the ultimate corrective 
actions? 
RATHERT: I am not really deeply in- 
volved in this area. When I go to Boeing and 
say, "I am going to simulate an overall mis- 
sion control, what is it going to be?" The 
answer I get does not give me any confidence 
that they know of Edwards' work. 
STEVEN E. BELSLEY: I do not neces- 
sarily disagree, but I believe that there is an 
application of decisionmaking that is of more 
importance than the traffic-control problem. 
There is a need to establish minimums under 
which a pilot will land an aircraft. This is a 
real-life situation. I read in Aviation Week 
that some simulator tests were run by the 
Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) . Now I 
understand that the ALPA, the airlines, and 
the FAA are all in a three-ring circus argu- 
ing with one another. The FAA has already 
taken a position. The manufacturers are 
happy. The pilots are mad. You ask them if 
they have any data on which they base the 
setting up of these rules, which is really a 
decision matrix, and you cannot find out. 
This is a very important question. It is al- 
ready with us in the present jet transports, 
and it is going to be with us when the bigger 
jets have 300 or 400 people aboard. 
WARD EDWARDS: First, let me say that 
decision theory is no panacea for decision- 
making. Fisher once said about analysis of 
variance that it was just an orderly way of 
arranging the work, implying that the com- 
putations of means and variances were what 
people were going to do anyhow. In just that 
same sense, decision theory is really little 
more than an orderly way of arranging the 
process of making decisions. It will not end 
arguments between persons with different 
points of view or different value systems. 
Instead, it will focus the arguments by invit- 
ing people to consider the detailed issues 
about which they are arguing and by provid- 
ing a language and a set of numbers to em- 
body the result of that consideration. 
Second, Mission Rule Documents are only 
an example of a very large class of docu- 
ments that constitute elaborate sets of pre- 
made decisions. You just named another. I 
have in my plane a briefcase full of approach 
plates generated by Jeppersen & Co. Each 
such approach plate contains a table of the 
ceiling and visibility minimums for instru- 
ment approaches. Of course, as you rightly 
point out, every such table is a set of pre- 
made decisions. I am utterly confident that 
the decisions were made by an unthinking 
application of a set of formal rules. Some 
thought probably went into the rules, but I 
am quite sure none went into the application 
in many of the individual plates. Of course 
there are hundreds of other examples of such 
precanned decisions. I think i t  is quite likely 
that formal structuring procedures can be 
applied to every instance of writing such 
documents, where it is socially worthwhile 
to spend the additional effort, time, and 
money to do so. 
JOSEPH MARKOWITZ: In one of the cases 
you brought up, there was a disagreement in 
redundant systems. The trend in instrumen- 
tation displays is to go to displays that may 
be predictive but, in a sense, contrary to the 
information that one needs to make decisions 
DISCU 
in divergent redundant elements. What you 
would like to know is the past history over 
some point in time. You currently just allow 
whatever memory the operator has. I am 
suggesting that in the SST program, where 
you do not have elaborate support personnel, 
there is an advantage in having instruments 
that will carry some past history with them. 
RATHERT: The jet engines are presently 
carrying instrumentation for measuring cer- 
tain critical parameters that indicate the 
need for an overhaul. In fact, instruments 
are continually monitoring the specific engine 
to predict its failing point so that it can be 
overhauled just short of that point. 
BELSLEY : There is another point I would 
like to make. A study, run by Serendipity 
Associates, indicated the desirability of hav- 
ing a flight director aboard the SST-type air- 
craft. The flight director would not be a 
flyer but would command the system as the 
captain does from the deck of a ship. This 
type of a thought has to be examined, because 
you can predict on the basis of workload 
analyses and timeline analyses that there are 
certain parts of the flight where three mem- 
bers of the SST crew would reasonably be 
overloaded. 
JEROME I. ELKIND: How did Serendip- 
ity go about predicting that the workload 
was going to be so high that another man 
would be needed ? 
BELSLEY: They figured on a time-avail- 
able basis that each man had just so much 
time for each job. They plotted every minute, 
RATHERT: It  was a statement of all the 
functions required on board. 
ELKIND: Has anyone gone through that 
kind of an analysis for the mission control 
center ? 
HAROLD G. MILLER: Yes. Every time a 
task occurs that we cannot perform with the 
people we have. 
RATHERT: I think the need for a better 
approach to this is quite obvious from the 
current controversy over the 737, two pilots 
versus three. The argument is going on be- 
tween the head of a pilots' union and the 
certification authority, neither of whom 
know anything about the human-factors 
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problem involved. They have no professional 
help. 
BELSLEY : You mean that there is appar- 
ently none. There may be some, but we do 
not know about it. 
Examining the problem is very simple. 
The airline operator wants to have a mini- 
mum amount of people on board, because of 
salaries. The Air Line Pilots Association 
likes to have as many people as possible; 
they are also concerned about safety. This 
is what must be decided in some manner, 
shape, or form. I am not aware of how one 
goes about making this determination. 
MARKOWITZ: In this case, where there 
was a decision to go PRA-7 a t  some partic- 
ular point, the decision had been made. Is  
there a way the decision could be delegated 
from flight so that it could be made auto- 
matically a t  the appropriate time? 
MILLER: They talked about what they 
could do automatically to get to the SOS 
program. They say, "If this situation hap- 
pens, rather than going through the flight 
director, go ahead and implement." That is 
always dangerous. And probably the man 
that made the decision to go PRA-7 was the 
man on the front row, G&C. 
STANLEY DEUTSCH : Instead of asking 
the various members of the flight-control 
crew what their estimates are in terms of 
"Should we take mode A or mode B?" why 
not punch these estimates in the computer 
and have it provide guidance for an answer. 
MILLER: I think that this is what Ward 
was getting back to. There are so many com- 
binations and possibilities of things that if 
you took a specific case, I think you could 
do i t ;  but the probability of ever using a 
specific case may be fairly small. 
EDWARDS: I can tell you how to set up a 
program for any 10 possible malfunctions, 
perhaps even for 50. But you are dealing 
with numbers of possible maufunctions in the 
many, many thousands. Sometimes in a wel- 
ter of possibilities some are more probable 
than others. So you can set up a procedure 
to take care of the probable ones and provide 
an escape route into the direct human judg- 
ment for the improbable ones. But that is 
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not the situation at MSC. Here they are all 
improbable. 
DEUTSCH : The kind of problems you pre- 
sented earlier struck me as having very 
logical answers. Now you are getting down 
to value judgments on the part of the peo- 
ple involved, GUIDO, FIDO, G&C, and so 
forth. I have the feeling these judgments 
could be preprogramed and still not solve 
the problem. 
D o u w ~  YNTEMA : If I could make a com- 
ment. . . . In a few years it will be entirely 
practical to have the mission control books 
on-line and accessible much faster than a 
human being can turn the pages. 
EDWARDS: I assume that can be done. 
But the mission rules are already condensed 
representations of an elaborate decision 
process that would be elaborate whether i t  
were done in the head or in some more formal 
sense. 
What will happen is that the decisions will 
be premade and stored in the computer. 
However, I do not think that the decision 
process will go on-line in the computer. 
DEUTSCH: It  strikes me that the advan- 
tage of the equipment is that i t  provides the 
routine work for the man, leaving him to 
make the final decisions. I am aware that 
these are random emergencies and perhaps 
the probabilities are very low, they are mul- 
tiplicative and, over a period of time, some 
of them will occur. But if the pilot can ask 
certain questions of the computer and the 
computer can provide answers, then the pilot 
still must make the final decisions. I do not 
think that you will ever take the pilot out of 
the decisionmaking loop. But he now has 
obtained routine information that he can use 
to make decisions, instead of having to ask 
everyone else for what should be standard- 
ized information. 
Signal Detection' 
JOSEPH MARKOWITZ 
Bolt, Beranek G Newrrzua, Znc. 
I find it fitting that the topic of signal 
detection should be included within the 
framework of a conference designed to bring 
theoretical advances of a portion of science 
closer to the applications demanded by men 
in the field. I find it fitting because, of the 
topics listed here today, signal detection has 
most consistently, even flagrantly, flirted 
with the realm of applications. 
For the moment, let me broadly define 
"signal detection by the human observer" as 
the processing of any sensory input. And let 
me furnish you with a capsule version of the 
historical forerunners of current research in 
signal detection. 
Man's concern with his own sensory appa- 
ratus began quite naturally with an interest 
in causality; that is, what aspects of man's 
sensory system, or what elements of the 
physical world around him, combine to  pro- 
duce the sensations as he knows them? It 
became clear, however, that certain aspects 
of sensory functioning were more interesting 
a t  the quantitative level as opposed to the 
qualitative level. The field known as psycho- 
physics is an outgrowth of such quantitative 
endeavors. 
There was, for example, the work of 
Weber. His concern was to ascertain what 
minimum increment or decrement in the 
energy of a physical stimulus would produce 
a noticeable change in sensation. 
'This research was accomplished in part under 
the sponsorship of the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, monitored by  the NASA Ames 
Research Center. 
In Weber's work, we have the first of a 
number of examples that show how close 
psychophysics has been to the applications 
so often demanded. Indeed, what could be 
more applications oriented than a table that 
tells us how much additional energy need be 
added to, or subtracted from, a stimulus to 
make a noticeable impression on a human 
observer ? 
In fact, however, the just-noticeable dif- 
ference of Weber was destined to play the 
role of a building block in the theoretical 
developments of the father of psychophysics, 
Fechner. Fechner's abiding interest was in 
the measurement of sensation. He saw in 
Weber's work the unit for his scale, which 
cmld be used as a yardstick of sensation. 
That is, Fechner would construct a scale of 
sensation that used as its unit a just-notice- 
able difference (assuming they were every- 
where equal). And so we see that an idea of 
Weber's, promising for its applications, turns 
out to be grist for the mill of a theoretician. 
Nor was the just-noticeable difference the 
only practical concept that Fechner levitated 
to higher purpose. Consider the threshold of 
sensation: that amount of stimulus energy 
which, if increased fractionally, will lead 
always to a sensation and which, if decreased 
fractionally, will never provoke a sensation. 
Who could deny that knowing the threshold 
for a given sensory modality, for a given 
observer, would be useful and practical? 
For Fechner, however, the value of the 
threshold was rather as the zero point in his 
scale of sensation. Once again a practical 
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notion becomes but a piece in a theoretical 
tinkertoy. 
Nonetheless, we might applaud Fechner's 
attempt to measure sensation. Had he but 
been successful I have no doubt that each of 
us could have put his scale to good use. In- 
stead we find the literature brimming with 
discussions of fine theoretical points rather 
than illustrations of the utility of his scale. 
Closer to us in both time and interest is 
the development of signal-detectability the- 
ory-a development that runs a remarkably 
parallel course from practical problems to 
abstract considerations. Indeed, signal de- 
tectability theory is, in its way, an instru- 
ment for measuring sensation, a t  least for 
weak stimulation. We prefer to think that 
it is a more sophisticated measuring instru- 
ment, defining, as it does, its zero point and 
unit statistically rather than absolutely. 
Moreover, the theory recognizes that the 
apparent sensation of an individual is a 
function not only of his sensitivity to the 
stimulation, but of his biases of predispo- 
sitions as well. 
Others present today couId better describe 
the genesis of signal-detectability theory. Its 
early development was intimately related to 
the practical problems of target acquisition 
and identification by radar operators. In 
addition to the hardware constraints of the 
radar system, such as antenna gain, direc- 
tionality, bandwidth, and scope resolution, 
the human operator introduced vagaries of 
his own into the system. The operator was, 
it seems, able to trade off certain kinds of 
errors, such as missed targets for other types 
of errors, such as acquisition of targets that 
did not exist. Ignorance about the way in 
which these tradeoffs were made prevented 
accurate quantification of the performance 
of the radar system as a whole. 
Signal-detectability theory was able to do 
several things in this context. First, it quan- 
tified the trading relationship between the 
various aspects of the observer's perform- 
ance. Second, i t  was able to ascertain the 
observer's criterion. Third, i t  was able to 
isolate certain variables that might influence 
the setting of that criterion, Fourth, i t  pro- 
vided a way of estimating the sensitivity of 
the total system independent of the criterion 
held by the observer. And, finally, i t  was able 
to set up optimal standards of performance 
against which the actual performance of the 
observer might be judged. 
Further applications of the theory must 
have looked promising indeed. For example, 
i t  turns out that the variability associated 
with any measurement of the system depends 
heavily upon the value of the criterion that 
the observer employs. 
Thus, the ability to manipulate that cri- 
terion could lead to increased efficiency for 
each measurement of the system's perform- 
ance. Alternatively, the cost of an observa- 
tion, perhaps in terms of the risk involved in 
the measurement in a field situation, depends 
also upon the criterion. Again, being able to 
manipulate this criterion should reduce the 
cost of measurements on the system. 
Moreover, the ability to measure and cor- 
rect an observer's criterion in a training 
context, so that i t  reflects realistic costs and 
values, should be particularly useful. Finally, 
the theory seems to offer the comparison, 
under certain conditions, of complex and 
dissimilar systems, or evaluation of system 
performance when subsystems are changed. 
It turns out, however, that relatively little 
work was done in actually applying the tools 
of the theory. Instead, a great deal of work 
was put into refining certain aspects of the 
theory and establishing its scientific validity, 
rather than establishing its practical utility. 
A portion of our work has been devoted to 
trying to reverse this trend and broaden the 
application of the theory. An example of 
expanding the theory to new applications is 
our use of certain laboratory recognition 
experiments to study and evaluate road 
signs. 
The use of recognition experiments is cer- 
tainly not new to investigations of this type, 
although the specific form of the subjects' 
responses that we solicited departs somewhat 
from tradition. In addition to asking observ- 
ers to tell us which of a set of stimuli was 
presented on a given trial, we asked also for 
a rating of confidence on, say, a four-point 
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Observer's response 
Stimulus 
Stop sign Other 
Stop sign ................. Pl 1-pl 
Other .................... Pz 1-p2 
scale. Acquiring raw data of this type allows TABLE I.-Four Possible Combinations of 
us to apply certain aspects of signal-detect- Events and Their P,robabilities 
ability theory. As I mentioned previously, 
the chief advantage of such an analysis is 
that i t  yields a pure measure of recogniza- 
bility uncontaminated by the biases or pre- 
dispositions of the observers. 
To give an example, the costs and values 
of driving on the highway may predispose 
individuals to give a "stop-sign" response 
with the slightest of provocations. That is, to change in concert with each 
a driver may have a strong ~ ~ t ~ ~ - ~ i ~ ~  bias." other, for a constant level of recognizability 
As we shall see, the theory allows us to assess the sign. This is where the 
separately the recognizability of a stop sign US- 
and the bias toward responding stop sign. 
,,o 
Moreover, the index of recognizability that 
we arrive a t  is a pure number and, as such, 
allows not only easy comparison of different 
.8 
signs, but allows as well the quantification 
of the deleterious effects of such independent 
variables as, for example, glare. 
In brief, we have applied signal-detecta- .6 - - 
- bility theory as follows. When the observer $ 
- is presented with a stimulus, say a picture of a 
a stop sign, we can consider his choice as a .4 - - 
binary one between the response stop sign 
and the set of all other permissible response 
alternatives. In fact, we could put precisely ,* - 
this question to the observer: "Was that a 
stop sign you just saw? Yes or no?" 
Because we could have asked this question - I I I I 
about any one of the response alternatives, o .2 .4 .6 .8 1 .o 
no loss of generality is implied. Moreover, P ( S / O )  
we could have questioned the observer about 
whether a stop sign was presented when, in 
actuality, some other sign had been pre- 
sented. In this example, then, there are only 
four possible combinations of events, and 
with repeated trials we can estimate the rel- 
ative frequency, or probability, of each event 
and enter these in a table such as table I. 
As we have indicated, all the information 
in the table can be summarized by the two 
probabilities p, and p,. If an observer sud- 
denly increased his predisposition to respond 
stop sign, we would expect both p1 and p, to 
increase. We would not, however, be willing 
to say that the stop sign had suddenly be- 
come more recognizable. What we need to 
know is how the two probabilities can be 
FIGURE 1.-Example of the conditional probability of 
the stop-sign response given the presentation of a 
stop sign as a function of the conditional proba- 
bility of the stop-sign response given the presenta- 
tion of some other stimulus. 
The theory tells us that if we plot one 
probability against the other for various 
biases, we can draw a smooth curve through 
the points, as shown in figure 1. In this con- 
text we might call this an equirecognizability 
curve. If a second sign under identical con- 
ditions yielded a curve above the one shown, 
we could conclude that the second was more 
recognizable. 
In short, we need to know what the curves 
for two stimuli look like in order to compare 
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them. Recent developments in signal-detect- 
ability theory allow us to obtain these curves 
from the ratings that, as I mentioned, we 
solicit from the observers. 
In practice, before dealing with the com- 
plex sign, we dealt with the design elements 
of the sign system. Let me briefly describe 
an experiment conducted to determine the 
recognizability of shape. 
We felt that in real life the chief con- 
straint is the time that must be spent in 
actual viewing if one is to differentiate be- 
tween alternative shapes. As a consequence, 
extremely brief visual exposures were used 
during the laboratory testing. A slide was 
projected for perhaps 10 to 30 thousandths 
of a second. The observer had then to indi- 
cate which of the alternative shapes he 
thought was shown. He also had to indicate 
numerically how sure he was. 
In figure 2, we see the alternative shapes 
used in the experiment. Each observer had 
a sheet showing the alternatives. 
FIGURE 2.-The shapes used in the shape-recognition 
experiment. 
Figure 3 shows the format of a portion 
of the data after they were analyzed accord- 
ing to the guidelines of signal-detectability 
theory. The data are for a single shape, the 
triangle, and represent the results of a num- 
ber of observers over a number of trials. 
I have changed the scale along each axis, 
as suggested by the theory, in order to be 
Normal deviate 
.99 2 1 0 - 1 -2 
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.- 
L Y black surround 
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Probability of calling another shape a triangle 
FIGURE 3.-Selected data from the shape-recognition 
experiment. 
able to fit straight lines to the data rather 
than curves of the sort that you saw pre- 
viously. 
The vertical axis shows how often a tri- 
angle was actually called a triangle. That is, 
the vertical axis shows how often observers 
correctly identified a triangle. But, remem- 
ber that this is not the whole story. We 
realized that an observer could increase the 
percentage of times he was correct in calling 
a triangle a triangle simply by saying "tri- 
angle" most of the time. In the extreme, he 
would correctly identify every triangle by 
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stubbornly saying "triangle" each and every 
time we showed him any shape. That is why 
we include the horizontal axis. The horizon- 
tal axis shows how often one of the other 
shapes was identified, mistakenly, as a tri- 
angle. 
The line that best fits a set of points gives 
us the trading relation of these aspects of 
observer performance, taking into account 
the observer's bias toward saying "triangle." 
The actual degree of recognizability is given 
by how close to the upper left-hand corner 
the data fall. Thus we can see that when a 
triangle is presented for 30 thousandths of 
a second i t  is more recognizable than when 
it is shown for only 20 thousandths of a sec- 
ond, as we might expect. The positive diag- 
onal represents purely chance performance. 
The data on the top are for a white tri- 
angle on a black background. On the bottom 
are the data for similar exposure times for 
black triangles on a white surround, and you 
can see, the improvement in recognizability. 
As you can see, both lines move up toward 
the upper left-hand corner. The data were 
similarly treated for each of the shapes so 
that we could compare their recognizability. 
Using similar techniques, we are also study- 
ing other design elements in the road-sign 
context and will then move toward testing 
complex signs. We will also move out of the 
laboratory and use similar techniques to test 
under actual conditions of driving on the 
road. 
Another way in which we have broadened 
the range of applications of signal-detecta- 
bility theory is to consider the deferred- 
decision problem. We recognize that people 
do not always make decisions on a one-shot 
basis, as we so often call upon them to do in 
the laboratory. Instead, they may make 
repeated, independent observations of the 
same circumstance. Over the course of these 
repeated observations, there is an accrual of 
information such that the final decision is of 
higher quality than a decision could have 
been on the basis of any single observation. 
In  addition, we recognize that in practical 
situations there may be some uncertainty as 
to which of a number of stimulus alterna- 
tives is to be considered a t  any particular 
time. 
Figure 4 represents data from an experi- 
ment dealing with these questions. The ver- 
tical axis, labeled d', represents the detect- 
ability of the signal, or, as we might say, the 
quality of the decision. The horizontal axis 
represents successive stages of observation 
on the part of the observers. 
Average of 
three observers 
Eight frequencies 
El Constant signal frequency 
0 Varied within trials 
A Varied between trials 
Observation stage 
FIGURE 4.-Detectability of the signal d' a s  a function 
of observation stage for  three experimental con- 
ditions. (The solid curve is  a theoretical prediction.) 
The actual experiment was one in acoustic 
detection, where observers had to detect the 
presence of a brief pulsed sinusoid in  a back- 
ground of gaussian noise. Three degrees of 
uncertainty were used in this experiment, 
the uncertainty being about what the fre- 
quency of the signal was. 
In the first experimental condition, a con- 
trol or baseline condition, there, is no uncer- 
tainty about signal frequency. That is, the 
signal frequency remains fixed over the mul- 
tiple, successive observations of a trial, and 
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over a group of trials. This is a case which 
we might call "signal specified exactly." 
The second condition presents uncertainty, 
but nominally provides for no opportunity to 
reduce that uncertainty, nor does It permit 
adaptive adjustment. In this case, the signal 
frequency varies randomly from one obser- 
vation to the next within a given trial. 
The third condition presents uncertainty 
that could be overcome with time and is the 
condition of primary interest. Here, the 
signal frequency varies randomly between 
trials, but is fixed over successive observa- 
tions of a given trial. 
For every condition, a signal is present, or 
noise alone is present, in all observation 
intervals of a given trial. As the trial pro- 
ceeds, the observer is required to respond 
after each observation with his best judg- 
ment about signal presence and to indicate 
numerically his confidence. The actual signal 
parameters are of little importance in this 
context. Instead let me discuss the data of 
the experiment in rather more general terms. 
Consider, first, the data represented by the 
squares in figure 4. This is the case where 
the signal is specified exactly; that is, there 
is no uncertainty. As you can see, the quality 
of the decision improves with successive 
observations, although, in fact, the marginal 
improvement per unit observation seems to 
decrease. The dashed line is a theoretical 
prediction that says that the quality of the 
decision should improve as the square root of 
the number of observations. This prediction 
assumes that each observation is independ- 
ent and as useful as any other observation. 
As we have noted, this seems to hold for the 
first few observations, but we then reach a 
point of diminishing returns. 
Consider next the data represented by the 
circles. These represent the case of maximal 
uncertainty in the sense that successive ob- 
servation cannot serve to reduce the uncer- 
tainty. The first thing to note is that there 
is a considerable decrement in performance 
as a function of the uncertainty. Note the 
additional number of observations that need 
to be taken in this condition to bring the 
decision quality to what it would have been 
on the first observation in the case where 
there was no uncertainty. This turns out to 
be about 9 or 10 observations. The solid line 
in figure 4 is a fit to the circles predicted by 
a model, which says that the observer can 
listen for each of the alternatives simulta- 
neously, but that for each alternative consid- 
ered, a little more noise is introduced into 
the system thereby degrading the quality of 
the decision. The prediction is made from 
the no-uncertainty data represented by 
squares, and taking into account the number 
of stimulus alternatives-in this case, eight 
different frequencies. 
The prediction seems to provide a reason- 
able fit for the data, and it seems tenable that 
an observer can pay attention to all eight 
frequency alternatives a t  one time. Later 
on we shall have occasion to see a case in 
which a similar hypothesis seems not to hold. 
Now let us consider the condition of un- 
certainty that could be overcome by succes- 
sive observations. These data are shown as 
triangles in figure 4. Again we note quite 
an initial decrement in performance in this 
case as compared with the condition of no 
uncertainty whatsoever. However, if we 
compare this case to the condition of max- 
imal uncertainty, we find that the first few 
observations are extremely helpful in reduc- 
ing the uncertainty, and that the marginal 
improvement in performance per unit obser- 
vation is higher. If we use the same meas- 
ure of decrement from the perfectly certain 
condition, namely the number of additional 
observations necessary to overcome that un- 
certainty, we find that in this case only four 
or five observations are needed. This is in 
contrast to the 9 or 10 needed in the maximal 
uncertainty condition. 
So far we have covered only one aspect 
of the deferred-decision problem. We have 
left unanswered the question of who should 
be responsible for putting off the decision. 
We have dealt with this problem in the lab- 
oratory, however. Let me describe the two 
alternative procedures for postponing de- 
cisions that we have considered. 
The first is what we might call a directive 
from above. In this case, the number of 
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observations to be taken is predetermined, 
and the observer simply looks that many 
times. 
In the second case, we rely on individual 
initiative. That is, the observer keeps re- 
questing additional looks until he is satisfied 
that an adequate decision can be made. Each 
of these alternatives has certain advantages 
of its own. 
The first may be much more simply imple- 
mented. The second, as we shall see, may 
lead to a certain economy in the number of 
observations required to make an adequate 
decision. 
Figure 5 illustrates a comparison of the 
two approaches. In  each block, the square 
represents performance achieved when the 
initiative is left to the individual. The solid 
dots represent performance where the num- 
ber of observations to be taken is predeter- 
mined. 
5 
4 Group II rating 
d' 3 
2 
./' 
1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1  2 3 4  5  6 7 8 9 1 0  
Number of observations. m 
FIGURE 6.-Value of d' as a function of the number 
of observations for groups I and 11. The figure 
shows average results. The circles represent data. 
The solid lines represent the prediction of V m  
improvement in d'. The points plotted as squares 
were obtained with the deferred-decision proce- 
dure. 
Taking our standard measure of efficiency 
-the number of observations that i t  takes 
to achieve a given quality of decision-we 
find that when the initiative is left to the 
observer, he requires only half the number 
of observations. 
Thus, in practice, other things being equal, 
we would recommend that considerable effi- 
ciency can be gained by having the observer 
decide when he has enough information to 
make the decision. Keep in mind, however, 
that other things are not always equal. To 
provide the two-way communication neces- 
sary for an observer to request additional 
observations may be prohibitively expensive. 
I should also explain the meaning of the 
two groups that are shown separately. The 
difference was in how the observers were 
trained to make decisions. On the left, the 
observers were trained to make decisions in 
a relatively coarse manner. That is, the 
answers that were solicited in training were 
purely binary responses. The observers com- 
prising the group on the right, on the other 
hand, were trained to give much more finely 
graded responses. 
As you can see from the two dashed lines 
fitted to the points, the accrual of informa- 
tion over successive observations seems much 
more efficient when the observers have been 
trained to give such finely graded responses. 
We have also recognized that not only is 
the quality of decisions important, but also 
the speed with which observers can arrive 
a t  such decisions. Moreover, this aspect of 
performance becomes increasingly important 
with technological advances. Let me illus- 
trate this point. 
Advances in machine performance are  
almost always accompanied by increased 
demand on the human controller, as, for 
example, in the latest generation.of high- 
performance aircraft. When demands upon 
the pilot become critical, a factor of prime 
importance is the speed with which an appro- 
priate response can be made. In most cases, 
the signal of impending danger to which a 
response must be made is a visual one. In 
some circumstances a warning signal can be 
arranged to precede the danger signal, but, 
because of the inherent uncertainty in such 
situations, the warning signal is neither a 
completely accurate predictor nor can i t  pre- 
cede the danger signal by a precisely defined 
time interval. 
We have recently completed the first of 
several studies designed to shed light on 
what improvements in response time might 
be expected when such a warning signal is 
available. Because of the prevalence of visual 
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signals as warning indicators in practical 
situations, we have used visual indicators in 
the study. The danger signal was a red light, 
and the warning signal a yellow light. Both 
signals were of moderate intensity. The re- 
sponse used was the depression of a foot 
pedal. 
To simulate the practical use of such a 
warning indicator, we used a warning light 
that had the two properties previously dis- 
cussed. First, it was not always followed by 
the red light to which a response was to be 
made. Instead, the probability with which a 
red light followed the yellow light was a pa- 
rameter of the experiment. The second prop- 
erty of the warning light was that the inter- 
val by which it might precede the danger 
signal was a variable one. This interval was 
also a parameter of the experiment. 
For purposes of comparison, we did not 
use a yellow light for half the sessions. In 
those sessions that did not use the yellow 
light, the frequency of the red light coming 
on was varied over the probabilities, 0.2, 0.5, 
and 0.8. 
The duration of the yellow light took on 
eight different values with equal likelihood. 
In the comparison session, the duration of 
yelIow on-time is also treated as a variable, 
even though the subjects could not see the 
yellow light. I t  should be noted that one of 
the intervals used was 0 second. In this case, 
there was no warning signal. As we shall 
see, this O-second case is not identical with 
performance in those sessions where no 
warning light a t  all was used. In the 0- 
second case, the subjects were expecting the 
warning light. 
The first finding is illustrated in figure 6. 
All data are the averages of the individual 
subject medians, and in each case the graphs 
are representative of individual subject per- 
formance. In figure 6, the reaction time to 
the red light is plotted against the relative 
frequency of the red light. In the case where 
the yellow light was inoperative, given by 
the dashed line, the reaction time is seen to 
decrease slightly, simply as a function of 
the increased density per unit time of the 
occurrence of the red light. 
3N HUMAN DECISIONMAKING 
460 I I I I 1 
Y 3400 
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Probability of red 
FIGURE 6.-Reaction time as a function of the prob- 
ability of occurrence of a danger signal (following 
the warning signal-solid line). 
The case where the yellow light was oper- 
ative, indicated by the solid line, shows a 
steeper decrease, reflecting not only a de- 
crease in reaction time due to the increased 
density of red-light occurrences, but also 
reflecting a decrease in reaction time due to 
increased probability that the yellow light 
would be followed by a red light. Figure 6 
also indicates the decrease in reaction time 
that can be achieved by preceding the visual 
signal with a warning signal. 
In figure 6, the data arising from the con- 
dition of zero on-time for the yellow light 
are purposely omitted. The reason for this 
omission is illustrated in figure 7, which 
shows the reaction time as a function of the 
duration of the yellow light. The probability 
I I I I f I 
Probability of red = .5 
Red only 
0 
Duration of yellow, sec 
FIGURE 7.-Reaction time to a danger signal as a 
function of the interval between the warning and 
the danger signals. 
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of occurrence of the red light for these data 
is 0.5, and they are representative of the 
data a t  the other probabilities. 
As expected, the reaction times are con- 
stant when the yellow light was inoperative. 
In the case where the yellow light was oper- 
ating, the reaction times are everywhere 
faster except where the yellow light did not 
precede the red light-that is, a t  the zero 
interval. In fact, the reaction times a t  the 
zero interval are quite a bit longer when 
the yellow light is operative in this case as 
compared with the case when no yellow light 
is used. 
That is, of course, a reflection of the use- 
fulness of the warning light and the sub- 
jects' reliance upon it. It does, however, 
point up a hazard that must be faced when 
an early-warning system is implemented. In 
a practical application, the zero interval 
would represent performance in the event of 
a failure of the warning indicator. As a con- 
sequence, we emphasize the need for high 
reliability, perhaps achieved through redun- 
dant encoding for such an indicator. 
To summarize our findings here, the value 
of such an early-warning indicator would be 
greatest when i t  is followed quickly, and 
with high probability, by the signal to be 
responded to, and we should reemphasize the 
necessity for high reliability of the warning 
indicator. 
We are also mindful of the fact that, in 
many practical situations, the visual and the 
auditory systems of humans may be over- 
loaded. For this reason, we have begun to 
explore a range of vibratory stimuli. Within 
the aeronautical context, i t  is an interesting 
sidelight that, having designed out the seat- 
of-the-pants feel from aircraft, we may end 
up designing back in pertinent vibratory 
stimuli. 
There are other reasons, too, aside from 
the need for a new information channel, that 
compel us to consider vibratory stimuli. 
There is, of course, the desire to investigate 
a new sensory modality per se, to find out 
how it works and how it compares with other 
modalities. 
There is also the desire to demonstrate the 
generality of our theoretical approach. If we 
can show theory-bound similarities in the 
quantification of one sensory modality to an- 
other, then, even though in quality they may 
be quite disparate, we may be able to treat 
them as interchangeable subsystem com- 
ponents. 
We undertook an initial investigation to 
see if vibratory stimulation to the fingertips 
would summate ; that is, if detection is better 
when the signal is applied to two fingers 
than when the signal is applied to only one. 
Figure 8 shows that the proportion of correct 
responses (in a two-interval forced-choice 
test) was no greater if two fingers were 
stimulated than if only one was. 
A model consistent with this behavior is 
that the observer can attend to inputs to a 
single channel only-in this case, a single 
finger-at any given instant. This model is 
in contrast to the multiband model that we 
applied to the problem of deferred decision 
with uncertainty. 
I should mention that this experiment did 
not involve uncertainty. The observer knew 
which of two, or both, fingers would be 
stimulated. 
Figure 9 shows what happens when there 
is, in fact, uncertainty about which finger or 
fingers would be stimulated. Here we see 
that performance for two fingers is superior. 
While this might be interpreted as summa- 
tion, i t  is consistent with the single-channel 
model. The interpretation here is simply 
that when a single finger was stimulated, the 
observer might well have been paying atten- 
tion to the wrong finger. If both fingers were 
stimulated, then he was certainly paying 
attention to a relevant finger. Thus perform- 
ance would be superior when the two fingers 
were stimulated. 
By no means is all of our work of an 
applied nature, nor does it permit direct and 
immediate application. Much of our work is 
oriented toward future applications-per- 
haps the distant future. For a fraction of 
our work we see no applications; however, 
we trust that others will. 
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Signal specified exactly (condition 1) 
-+- Finger 1 
Signal specified statistically (condition 2) 
-+- Finger 1 
---A--- Finger 2 ---&.-- Finger 2 
+ Fingers 1 + 2 
Observer 3 
0 3 6 0 3 6 
Signal level from reference, dB 
--C)--- Fingers 1 + 2 
0 3 6 0 3 6 
Signal level from reference, dB 
FIGURE 8.-P(C) versus signal lewel for three ob- FIGURE 9.-P(C) versus signal level for three ob- 
servers, and the average for finger 1, finger 2, and servers, and the average for finger 1, finger 2, and 
fingers 1 i-2, with the signal specified exactly. fingers 1 + 2, with the signal specified statistically. 
DISCUSSION 
LLOYD A. JEFFRESS: Did the observer know that ALFRED B. KRISTOFFERSON : Were these brief sig- 
both fingers would be stimulated in both cases? nals? 
JOSEPH MARKOWITZ: In figure 8, the observer MARKOWITZ: NO. We started with brief signals of 100-millisecond duration, then switched to 500-milli- 
knew what finger or combination of fingers would be second duration, So these are 500-millisecond signals 
stimulated, so there was perfect certainty. In figure 9 in both figures 8 and 9, not what I call brief. 
he knew that either one or both would be stimulated, JEROME I. ELKIND: What kind of vibration? 
so he knew that was a viable option. MARKOWITZ: 250 Hz, more or less. 
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Effects of Chromatic Adaptation on Color Naming  
The four color names-blue, green, yellow, 
and red-were employed singly or in pairs 
by the subjects in identifying the color pre- 
sented to them after a period of chromatic 
adaptation. The responses were scaled as 
follows : blue was graded 3 ; blue-green was 
scaled 2 for blue and 1 for green; green-blue 
was scaled 2 for green and 1 for blue; and 
so forth. There was a possible total of 72 
points for each test wavelength. The graphs 
show the percentage of total points assigned 
to each wavelength indicated along the ab- 
scissa. Figure 1 ( a )  is the results for three 
subjects after 5 minutes of initial neutral 
adaptation at 195 ft-L. The test stimuli were 
of the same luminance and were presented 
for 300 milliseconds a t  18-second intervals, 
alternating with the adaptation light that 
was on between test trials. The stimuli were 
presented in Maxwellian view subtending 
40". 
Figure 1 ( b )  shows the results after adap- 
tation with a W 92 filter (646 nanometers). 
The red has almost disappeared, the yellow is 
shifted well toward the red, the green has 
been extended over a wide range of wave- 
lengths, and the blue is virtually unaffected. 
Figure 1 (c) shows the effect after adap- 
tation with a W 98 filter (452 nanometers). 
Here the blue has been greatly restricted 
and moved to the left. The red has shifted to 
the left and even appears in the blue region 
as red-blue or blue-red. The extent of the 
green has been greatly reduced and shifted 
to the left, and the area of yellow has been 
increased and shifted to the left. 
Figure 1 (d) shows the effect of adapta- 
tion with a W 74 filter (538 nanometers). 
Here the red and blue have been expanded 
toward the middle, and the green and yellow 
responses completely suppressed for one 
subject and greatly restricted for the other. 
The results, in addition to indicating the 
effect on hue of prior adaptation, illustrate 
the effectiveness of color naming as a quan- 
titative experimental research procedure. 
Split-half reliability correlations for the data 
were mostly in the high go's, and the method 
is much less time consuming than matching 
procedures. 
One practical suggestion from the results 
concerns the use of colored light in the 
illumination of sonar and radar maces. The 
- 
' Work performed under National Aeronautics and red commonly employed on board ship to 
Space Administration grant to the Defense Research preserve dark adaptation is about the most Laboratory of the University of Texas. The work re- 
ceived additional support from the Naval Ship S ~ S -  inappropriate lighting when the color to be 
tenls Command. The work on vision was conducted by detected is the greenish-yellow of scope 
Dr. Gerald H. Jacobs, of the Psychology Department phosphors.  it.^^ neutral light or blue 
of the University of Texas a t  Austin, and his grad- 
uate students. would be much better. 
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( a )  Wavelength, n m  ( C i  Wavelength, n m  
Id )  Wavelength, n m  
FIGURE 1.-Effects of chromatic adaptation on color 
naming: ( a )  neutral adaptation ; ( b )  W 92 adapta- 
tion; (c) W 98 adaptation; (d) W 74 adaptation. 
ibl  Wavelength, n m  
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Saturation Estimates and Chromatic Adaptation 
In addition to assigning color names reli- 
ably, subjects prove to be able to estimate 
the saturation of colors presented after 
various types of adaptation. The subjects 
were instructed to assign numbers ranging 
from 0 to 10 to the saturation of test colors 
presented after adaptation. Figure 2 ( a )  
shows data for three subjects after neutral 
adaptation for 5 minutes (Maxwellian view, 
40°, same procedure as in the previous ex- 
periment). The bars indicate one standard 
deviation above and below the mean estimate. 
Figure 2 ( b )  shows the effect of adaptation 
to a long wavelength (W 92, 636 nanome- 
ters). Note that saturation estimates for 
the long wavelengths have been greatly re- 
duced. Figure 2 ( c )  shows the effect of 
adaptation to a short wavelength (W 98, 452 
nanometers). Here there is a marked reduc- 
tion in saturation for wavelengths from 
medium to short, with increased saturation 
for wavelengths a t  the other end of the scale. 
Figure 2 (d) shows the effect of adaptation 
for green (W 74, 532 nanometers). There is 
depression of the estimates in the middle, 
with a considerable increase in the estimates 
for the long wavelengths, and, for one sub- 
ject, for the short as well. The relatively 
small spread for any particular wavelength 
indicates that the judgments are being made 
with consistency. 
Effects of Adaptation on Visual Detection 
It is frequently suggested in recent litera- 
ture (but originally by Barlow in 1964) that 
the effect of exposing the retina to light is to 
make the retina's behavior in subsequent 
darkness noisy. This implies that the detec- 
tion of a weak visual signal in the dark fol- 
lowing a brief flash of adaptation light is 
essentially the detection of a signal in noise. 
For this, and a number of other reasons, the 
present experiment was undertaken as a 
detection task. A rating-scale procedure 
was employed to permit the construction of 
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
curves from the subjects' responses. 
The adaptation light and the signal were 
presented in Maxwellian view. The former 
J.F. 1 
0 0  
400 450 500 550 600 650 
Wavelength, nm 
(a) 
FIGURE 2 ( a )  .-Saturation estimates and chromatic 
adaptation : neutral adaptation. 
2 
0 
subtended an angle of 25"; the latter sub- 
tended an angle of 5" in the center of the 
adaptation field. The exposure of the adap- 
tation light was controlled by a mechanical 
shutter that allowed the light to be presented 
- - 
D.D. 
I I I I 
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J.F. 
M.R. I 
Wavelength, nrn 
FIGURE 2 ( b )  .-Saturation estimates and chromatic 
adaptation : W 92 adaptation. 
for 200 msec. The retinal illuminance pro- 
vided by the adaptation light was 6.74 log 
trolands. The test light (signal) was a glow- 
modulator tube, which was flashed electron- 
ically for 20 msec a t  a constant illuminance 
( c )  Wavelength, nrn 
FIGURE 2 (c) .-Saturation estimates and chromatic 
adaptation: W 98 adaptation. 
level (constant spectrum) and attenuated by 
a series of neutral filters ranging from 2.04 
to 0.54 log trolands of retinal illuminance in 
0.1 log unit increments. A bite board and a 
dim red "grain-of-wheat" fixation light 
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(d! Wavelength, nm 
FIGURE 2 (d) .-Saturation estimates and chromatic 
adaptation : W 74 adaptation. 
maintained the desired orientation of the eye. 
After spending a minimum of 10 minutes 
in a dimly lighted room, the subject entered 
the dark test booth. After 2 minutes of dark 
adaptation, the fixation light was turned on 
and he signaled by means of a pushbutton 
virtual certainty that there had been a signal. 
Forty such 6-second periods following the 
adaptation flash constituted 1 run, and 5 to 
10 such runs, separated by 2 minutes of dark 
adaptation, constituted an experimental ses- 
sion. The luminance of the test signal was 
varied during the run and from one run to 
another, according to a planned-haphazard 
program, so that any of 6 or 7 illuminances 
might occur during any trial in the run of 40. 
The values were chosen so that the percent- 
age of correct responses at any period fol- 
lowing the adaptation flash fell within a 
reasonable range for getting ROC curves. 
Some 400 ROC curves were obtained during 
the course of the study and the values of 
PC were determined from their area as 
measured by a planimeter. Figure 3 shows 
that he was ready- The adaptation light was 
 ROC curves for 0.54 log troland 
then turned on for 200 msec, and every 6 
seconds following the termination of the 
adaptation light, a 1-second warning tone 
was presented. At the termination of the 
tone, the test signal was either turned on or 
was not (with an a priori probability of 0.5). 
The subject responded with an appropriate 
pushbutton to indicate his assurance that a 
signal had or had not been presented. A re- 
sponse of 1 represented virtual certainty that 
there had been no signal; 10 represented 
a family of ROC curves for the average of 
the three subjects. These data were taken a t  
a test-light illuminance of 0.54 log troland. 
The parameter of the family of curves is the 
time following the adaptation flash a t  which 
the data were taken. 
Figure 4 shows the course of dark adap- 
tation. The abscissa is time after the adap- 
tation flash, and the ordinate is the illumi- 
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FIGURE 4.-Course of dark adaptation for one subject. 
nance needed to reach the percentage correct, 
indicated as  the parameter of the family of 
curves. Figure 4 is for a single subject. The 
others showed similar results. The subjects 
were asked to report the moment when the 
positive afterimage of the adaptation light 
disappeared. This occurred about 2 minutes 
after the exposure, but was not accompanied 
by any discontinuity in the recovery curve. 
The retinal noise apparently does not depend 
on the presence of the positive afterimage. 
This study is forming the basis for a doc- 
tor's dissertation by Mr. Heinz Gaylord. 
The Bezold-Briicke Hue Shift 
Although the Bezold-Briicke shift is im- 
portant to theories of vision, much of our 
knowledge of the phenomenon is based on a 
study by Purdy, made over 30 years ago on 
a single subject. It therefore seemed appro- 
priate to examine the effect with a substan- 
tial population. In the present study, 72 
subjects (33 females and 39 males) were 
employed. The color-naming procedure de- 
scribed earlier was used. The apparatus was 
a two-beam device, with one beam providing 
the low-level adaptation light and the other, 
the test wavelength. Measurements were 
made in the range from 470 to 630 nanome- 
ters, using a grating monochromator ad- 
justed to yield a passband of 15 nanometers. 
Two luminance levels, 320 and 3200 trolands, 
were used with central fixation in Maxwel- 
lian view subtending an angle of 3". Test 
stimuli were presented for 300 msec once 
every 18 seconds in random presentation 
order. The adaptation light was viewed dur- 
ing the times intervening between test stim- 
uli. Every subject was given several practice 
stimuli before data collection was under- 
taken. Each subject served for 1 hour and 
received as many stimuli as  could be pro- 
gramed in that time. 
The color-naming values were converted 
into nanometers of shift and are presented 
in figure 5. The plotted points are the means 
for the sample of observers tested, and the 
bars represented two standard errors of the 
mean for the point. In general, the shifts 
shown here are smaller than those reported 
by Purdy, but the so-called invariant points 
occur at  584, 502, and 474 nanometers for 
the mean of the present sample-about the 
same locations as found in earlier studies. 
450 500 550 600 650 
Wavelength, nrn 
FIGURE 5.-Bezold-Briicke hue shift. 
The variability shown in figure 5 probably 
is largely the result of individual differences, 
because an earlier study shows that the 
method can be highly reliable. 
It was also possible from the data to 
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determine the spectral location of unique 
yellow and unique green a t  the two lumi- 
nances employed. The location of the unique 
yellow did not change systematically. The 
mean was 580.55 nanometers under the low- 
luminance condition and 580.50 nanometers 
for the high. However, the location of the 
unique green showed an interesting effect. 
Table I shows the finding. 
TABLE I.-Unique Green Loci (in nanome- 
ters) for 2 Classes of Obse~vers a t  2 
Luminance Levels. Results of Statistical 
Evaluations of Row and Column Differ- 
ences Are Indicated. 
menters working on dissertation problems, 
and subjects who receive hourly pay for their 
services. The addition also made it possible 
for us to construct considerably more flexible 
programing and recording equipment. At 
the present time, most of our data are re- 
corded on punched cards that are then an- 
alyzed by means of the laboratory's CDC 
3200 computer. Four subjects at  a time can 
be run in psychophysical studies. Several 
signal levels can be employed in a single 
session, and single-interval, two-interval, 
forced-choice, or rating-scale responses can 
be recorded. Where desired, examinations of 
serial effects and multiple-observer responses 
can be made. 
Group 
I . . . . . . . . 
I1 . . . . . . . 
Most of our recent work in audition has 
been concerned with detecting a signal in 
noise, although earlier a considerable amount 
of research was devoted to various problems 
in the loca!ization of sound. The masking 
studies have fallen into two main categories : 
those concerned with the detection perform- 
The subjects appear to fall into two groups ance of the single ear, and those concerned 
in their location of unique green a t  a low with the binaural release from masking, 
luminance level. The difference disappears which can occur when stimuli to the two ears 
a t  the high luminance level. Both groups are not identical. 
show a shift in the location of the unique 
green a t  the low level, but the shift for 
group I1 is much greater than for group I. 
In addition to the psychophysical work 
just reported, Jacobs and his students are 
conducting behavioral and neurophysiolog- 
ical studies on animals, with additional sup- 
port from the National Science Foundation. 
This work involves both color and spatial 
sensitivity of single units of the lateral ge- 
niculate. The findings of the work on color 
sensitivity are shown to correlate highly with 
the behavior of the animals in discrimination 
tasks. 
N 
19 
11 
AUDITORY RESEARCH 
Beginning in May 1964, the National Aero- 
nautics and Space Administration provided 
support for work in audition already receiv- 
ing support from the U.S. Navy Bureau of 
Ships. The addition alIowed us to increase 
our efforts in this field and to provide assist- 
ance for more graduate students, both experi- 
Low 
luminance 
513.1 
525.5 
p<O.Ol 
BINAURAL STUDIES 
Time and Intensity Differences and Lateralization 
This was a study conducted by a Summer, 
Science-Participation, high-school student 
(Brant T. Mittler) under National Science 
Foundation support, and supervised by Dr. 
Charles S. Watson. The student and his sub- 
jects were 17-year-olds. The subject's task 
consisted of drawing lines across a sketch of 
the head to indicate the range of movement 
of a commutated sound. The sound, a 500- 
Hz tone, was presented via earphones with 
either a level difference or a phase difference 
between the inputs to the phones. The inputs 
were commutated a t  half-second intervals 
and produced a distinct impression of move- 
ment within the head. The locations of the 
ends of the lines represented where the sub- 
ject thought movement began and ended. 
The data sheet was located behind a slit in a 
sketch of a face and moved between trials so 
that each judgment could be made without 
High 
luminance 
509.9 
511.0 
11>0.05 
Difference 
p<0.05 
p<O.Ol 
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reference to previous ones. Figure 6 shows 
the mean length of line associated with the 
intensity difference or the time difference 
shown on the abscissa. The "trading ratio" 
obtained in this way agrees with others in 
the literature, about 60 p,sec/dB. 
.- 
% 0 Noise signal (time delay) 
2 4 Noise signal (phase shift) 
A Tonal signal 
2 (Wideband masking noise 
in phase throughout) 4 
Phase, deg 
I I I I I I I 
0 .17 .33 .50 .67 .83 1.00 
Time, msec 
FIGURE 7.-Masking- leve l  d i f f e r e n c e s  for tone a n d  
n a r r o w b a n d  noise. 
I I I I I I I 
0 60 120 180 240 300 36Opsec 
Binaural difference 
FIGURE 6 . - L e n g t h  of lateral movement of a s o u n d .  
Masking-Level Differences for Tone and 
Narrowband Noise 
A 50-Hz wideband of noise centered a t  
500 Hz, and a 500-Hz tone were employed as 
signals in a binaural masking experiment. 
Hirsh and Webster had reported much larger 
masking-level difference for a noise signal 
than for tone. The present experiment was 
undertaken, in part, to check their findings 
for which no theoretical explanation was 
apparent. The major results are presented 
in figure 7. There is no significant difference 
between the masking-level differences for 
noise and tone, and i t  makes little difference 
whether the noise is shifted in time, by a 
delay line, or in phase by a phase shifter. 
A second experiment was an attempt to ex- 
plain the findings of Hirsh and Webster and 
revealed that they had employed the same 
noise generator for their masker as for their 
signal. When these conditions were repli- 
cated, our findings agreed with theirs. A 
large masking-level difference (18 dB) was 
obtained when the masker and signal were 
in phase opposition. It occurred, however, 
because of the considerable increase in the 
signal needed in the NO SO reference con- 
dition, not because of any great release from 
masking under the antiphasic condition. 
Binaural Detection as a Function of the 
Bandwidth of the Masking Noise 
Earlier work has suggested that the band- 
width involved in binaural detection is some- 
what wider than that for monaural detection. 
The present experiment was undertaken to 
study this possibility. Equivalent rectan- 
gular bandwidths of 2900, 508, 422, 303,185, 
160, 130, 109, 50, 22, and 12.6 Hz were em- 
ployed for the masker. The signal was a 500- 
Hz tone of 150 msec duration and a rise-fall 
time of 25 msec. Three levels of noise were 
employed: 50, 45, and 30 dB spectral level. 
A low-level, wideband background noise was 
used to mask the second harmonic of the 
signal, which was about 60 dB below the 
fundamental. The stimuli were presented 
either with both noise and signal in phase a t  
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the two ears, NO SO, or with the signal 
reversed in interaural phase, NO ST. Figure 
8 ( a )  shows the results for one subject for 
the diotic condition NO SO. I t  will be seen 
that the effect of band narrowing is not very 
- $ 48 
- 
46 
E i  
;7j 44 
42 
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Equ~valent rectangular bandwidth of noise, Hz 
(b)  
significant, until a bandwidth of about 50 
Hz is reached; whereas, figure 8  ( b )  shows 
very substantial improvement beginning a t  
bandwidths as wide as 200 Hz. The results 
strongly suggest that a much wider range of 
frequencies is involved in the detection of a 
500-Hz tone under the NO ST condition than 
is involved in monaural or NO SO detection. 
This is probably not surprising, because we 
are presumably concerned with a population 
of auditory nerve cells that are different in 
binaural phenomena from these for monaural 
detection. Neural "funneling," as BQkQsy 
calls it, probably occurs in narrowing the 
bandwidth for monaural detection, whereas 
probably only the filtering provided by the 
mechanical action of the basilar membrane 
determined the bandwidth for binaural detec- 
tion. 
Binaural Electrical Models and Detection 
In an attempt to replicate human perform- 
ance, we have tested several electrical 
models of the binaural detection mechanism 
in psychophysical experiments. Two such 
models have been run as subjects along with 
three human observers in a ZAFC experi- 
ment. The first model converts the interaural 
time difference produced when a signal is 
added antiphasically to an in-phase noise into 
a voltage that is averaged and sampled a t  
the end of the observation interval. To avoid 
perfect performance when the noise is in 
phase a t  the two ears and the signal reversed 
in phase a t  one ear, a small amount of uncor- 
related noise is introduced into one channel 
of the model. This simulates the "noisiness" 
of the subject's transduction of waveform 
into nerve impulses. The model yields psy- 
chometric functions that fit human functions 
either at  high signal levels or at  low, depend- 
ing on the noise correlation used. It has not 
been possible with this device to fit human 
performance over the whole range of the 
psychometric function. This fact may be 
the result of a major inadequacy of the 
model. It takes into account the time differ- 
FIGURE 8.-Effect of bandwidth on homophasic and ences based on axis crossings, but fails to 
antiphasic detections. (a) Homophasic, ( b )  anti- make use level differences that 
phasic. adding the signal to the noise. A second 
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model, based on Durlach's equalization- 
cancellation model, has so far failed to per- 
form as well as the one just described. A 
third model employing the cross correlation 
between the two earphone channels will be 
similarly employed if some of its present 
weaknesses can be eliminated. 
MONAURAL PHENOMENA 
Effect of "Vigilance" in an Auditory 
Detection Experiment 
Many attempts to improve detection by 
manipulating the values and costs matrix 
have failed to produce an appreciable im- 
provement in detection over a block of trials. 
The present experiment was undertaken with 
the idea that enhanced vigilance can be 
maintained for only a short stretch of time. 
Accordingly, certain trials were selected as 
the "important" trials and their presence 
was signaled to the subject by a light. In 
the first experiment, the subject was told 
that these were the important trials and 
that they must be particularly careful to 
respond correctly (in a 2AFC setting). This 
preliminary experiment failed to reveal any 
improvements on the important trials. The 
next experiments involved various schedules 
of punishment for incorrect responses on 
the indicated trials. Punishment was a mild 
shock (1.6 milliamperes) applied to the 
ankle, and the experiments differed in the 
number of successive trials that were in- 
cluded in the critical block. Figure 9 shows 
.-- 
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FIGURE 9.-Effect of punishment on detection 
performance. 
the results of an experiment where the num- 
ber of important trials was four. The shock 
for an incorrect response could occur in any 
of the four trials. The results show a sub- 
stantial improvement by the second trial, but 
a falling off after that. The postshock trials 
showed a considerable decrement for two 
of the subjects, with a gradual return to a 
normal level of performance. The first points 
on the graph are the average for the preced- 
ing 16 days of training without the inter- 
polated trials. The findings show that im- 
proved detection can be achieved for a very 
short time but is not maintained. The aver- 
age for the whole block of trials was the 
same with and without the shock. 
Width and Shape of the "Critical Band" 
Involved in Masking 
Considerable disparity exists in the litera- 
ture between the estimates of the "critical 
band" width. We undertook the present 
study to obtain a better idea of both the 
width and the shape of the band of frequen- 
cies involved in masking a 500-Hz signal. 
The experiment used a set of high-pass and 
a set of low-pass filters in order to approach 
the signal frequency from one side a t  a time. 
The results, which are being prepared for 
publication, show that the shape of the ear's 
filter is distinctly asymmetrical (having 
much higher skirts on the low-frequency side 
than on the high) and that the equivalent 
rectangular width is of the order of 50 to 
80 Hz. One important finding appears to 
be that subjects differ in their bandwidth. 
One subject who performed more poorly 
than the others began to improve a t  con- 
siderably wider bandwidths than the others. 
That is, he required less narrowing of the 
masking noise to show improvement than the 
others did. Apparently, in experiments where 
the task is the detection of a tonal signal, 
the Fletcher-type estimates of bandwidth are 
appropriate. 
Models: Electrical and Mathematical 
The mathematical theory of signal detecta- 
bility (TSD) is based, in the usual deriva- 
tions, on sampling theory-on taking a series 
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of 2WT samples of noise (N)  or noise plus 
signal (SN), where T is the temporal dura- 
tion of the sample. There is some confusion 
about the meaning of W .  Some writers treat 
i t  as if it were the bandwidth of the masking 
components of the noise (the critical band- 
width) ; others treat W as if it were the band- 
width measured from zero; that is, as if it 
were the highest frequency present in the 
noise sample. In any case, N and SN are 
sampled in the same way and for the same 
duration. These assumptions immediately 
lead us into trouble when we attempt to 
apply the theory to human observers or to 
electrical models. The assumption that N 
and SN are sampled similarly means that 
they are sampled after being filtered; that 
is, that the gate follows the filter. In hear- 
ing, the filtering is presumably being done 
by the ear and the gating in advance of the 
earphone. Thus, the transient responses of 
the filter become involved. The mathematical 
theory neglects this aspect of hearing. 
Also, when we consider the common ex- 
perimental condition where the noise is con- 
tinuous and only the signal is gated for a 
time T, we are forced by mathematical theory 
to assume that somehow the subject is able 
to gate the noise in the same way that the 
experimenter gates the signal-not a very 
realistic assumption. The question of when 
and how long to sample becomes one of major 
concern when dealing with a physical model 
of the auditory system. 
The Role of Signal Duration 
The classic study of the role of duration 
in the detection of a gated signal in a con- 
tinuous noise background by Green, Birdsall, 
and Tanner in 1957 employed a constant- 
energy signal of various durations and used 
a four-interval forced choice procedure for 
determining the observers' d"s. The basic 
finding was that observers did best over a 
range of durations from about 20 to 200 msec 
and fell off rather sharply for durations 
much longer or shorter than these. 
We attempted to replicate the results on 
signal duration by an electrical model that 
consisted of a narrow filter, a half-wave 
rectifier, and a postdetection (envelope) fil- 
ter. When the postdetection filter had the 
short time constant needed to obtain a close- 
fitting envelope, the data failed to resemble 
that of the experiment by Green et al. In- 
stead of being reasonably flat across a range 
of durations, the data showed a decided 
peak at a duration that was the reciprocal 
of the filter bandwidth. Only when we in- 
creased the time constant of the postdetection 
filter to 50 or 100 msec did we succeed in 
replicating the psychophysical data. This 
time constant is of the same magnitude a s  
that obtained by Zwislocki from a very differ- 
ent set of experiments. 
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FIGURE 10.-Effect of signal duration on detection. 
Figure 10 shows the results of the final 
series of experiments. The circles show the 
averages for the subjects of the experiment 
by Green et al., the triangles show the data 
obtained with the model using a half-wave 
rectifier, and the squares show the effect of 
employing a square-law (energy) detector 
instead of the half-wave. Closer observation 
of the tenets of TSD, by gating both the 
masking noise and the signal in the same 
way, obtained the solid circles. This sug- 
gests that if subjects are presented with 
gated noise and signal they should perform 
better, for a constant energy signal, when 
both the noise and signal are gated than when 
the noise is continuous and only the signal 
is gated., 
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Gated Noise and Signal 
Following the lead suggested by figure 10, 
we undertook an experiment in which sub- 
jects were presented signals of various dura- 
tion but constant energy with continuous 
noise and with noise gated for the same 
duration as  the signal. Figure 11 shows the 
d' O----- Average for gated 
0- -- Average for continuous 
Stimulus duration, msec 
FIGURE 11.-Detection for continuous and gated noise. 
averages for three subjects. Note that the 
subjects performed better with gated noise 
than with continuous noise. They did not, 
however, show, as the model did, continued 
improvement for gated noise and signals a t  
the short durations. 
John Whitmore (a postdoctoral student 
here) suggested that detection of a signal 
in a brief gated noise is a very difficult judg- 
ment, and that possibly our findings would 
be different with highly trained subjects. 
The experiment was therefore repeated using 
trained observers, with the result that the 
predicted improvement in performance as 
the signal was shortened was actually ob- 
served. The subjects did better a t  5 msec 
than a t  10 and better a t  10 msec than a t  20 
or 50. The results are being prepared for 
publication. 
Electrical Model as a Predictor of 
Observers' Responses 
Because the electrical model appeared to 
simulate human performance in several im- 
portant respects, i t  was employed as a sub- 
ject along with human observers in several 
psychophysical experiments. In the first ex- 
periment (by Thomas L. Nichols), the model 
was run as a subject along with a human 
observer in a yes-no experiment (four sub- 
jects were tested in this way). I t  proved to 
predict the subjects' responses better than 
whether the signal was present or not. I t  
also proved to be a better predictor than 
another electrical measure of the stimulus. 
This was a peak device that recorded the 
largest envelope peak that occurred during 
the 250-msec observation interval. Both noise 
and signal were gated for 250 msec. The 
two electrical measures showed a correlation 
of 0.5 to 0.6 for the 250-msec duration. 
Shorter durations increased the correlation 
to near unity for very short durations. The 
250-msec duration was chosen to permit the 
two electrical measures to be reasonably in- 
dependent with the possibility that they 
would respond to different aspects of the 
stimulus and predict the subjects' responses 
better than either measure alone. Actually, 
the peak detector added only about 1 percent 
to the predictions of the other electrical 
model. 
A second experiment with the model was 
carried out-this time employing it along 
with three human observers in a 2AFC ex- 
periment using seven levels of signal, and 
some trials on which noise alone was pre- 
sented in both intervals. Table I1 shows the 
results. 
The first column is the signal employed, 
ranging from an E/N ,  of 12.8 to 0-noise 
alone presented in both intervals. The sec- 
ond column is the percentage correct for 
the model, and the third is the average per- 
centage correct for the three subjects. The 
model yields superior detection throughout 
the range of stimuli. Recent work shows 
that we could have obtained a more nearly 
human fallibility from the model by employ- 
ing a shorter time constant in the post- 
detection filter. 
The fourth column is the percentage of 
agreement between the model and the aver- 
age of the three observers. Note that the 
model's prediction of the subjects' responses 
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TABLE 11.---Comparison of the Electrical Model With Human Observers 
in  a .%-Alternative, Forced-Choice Experiment 
is better than their percent correct. That is 
to say, the model predicts their response bet- 
ter than the presence of the signal does. 
When no signal occurs in either interval, the 
model predicts their responses 65 percent of 
the time. 
The fifth column is the average percentage 
of agreement between one observer and the 
other two. When this column is compared 
with column 4, i t  is seen that the model 
predicts the responses of the human sub- 
jects better than they predict each other. 
The sixth column is the percentage of 
correct responses made by the subjects to 
the stimuli on which all three agreed, whether 
right or wrong. The column shows that 
the percentage correct, for the stimuli on 
which the three observers agree, is consid- 
erably higher than their percentage correct 
for all of the stimuli. This is, of course, to 
be expected-the multiple observer is better 
than the single observer. The last column 
shows the agreement of the model with the 
subjects on those stimuli where the subjects 
all agree. Again, the percentages are higher. 
Even when no signal is present, the model 
agrees with the three subjects on more than 
80 percent of the trials. 
We may conclude that the model is ap- 
parently responding to the aspect of the 
stimulus most important in human signal 
detection, a considerably smoothed represen- 
tation of the stimulus envelope. 
A Mathematical Model of Monaural Detection 
A brilliant paper by McGill in 1967 has 
shown that the results of an early experi- 
ment by Marill in 1964 can be explained 
in terms of an energy-detector model. Marill 
had employed an envelope detector in his 
derivations and had arrived at a formula for  
predicting the percentage of correct re- 
sponses in a two-alternative, forced-choice 
experiment. McGill arrives a t  the same for- 
mula by way of an energy detector. He 
assumes that a narrow band of noise, or noise 
plus signal, is gated for a time T and the 
resulting voltage squared and then inte- 
grated. The integrator is discharged between 
observations. From the statistics of this 
device he derives Marill's equation. 
McGill then goes on to show that the 
bandwidth assumptions made by Marill in 
fitting his theoretical function to human ob- 
servers are inappropriate, and that a better 
adjustment can be made by assuming a differ- 
ent number of degrees of freedom in the 
probability functions. He shows that the 
Rayleigh-Rice statistics employed by Marill 
can be replaced, and more generality 
achieved, by employing the noncentral x2 
distribution. 
The electrical model we have been dis- 
cussing can not only vote in a 2AFC experi- 
ment but, by recording samples of its output, 
can generate the distribution functions of 
its underlying statistics. If we sample the 
noise distributions measured a t  the output 
of the postdetection filter, we obtain a prob- 
ability density function that resembles, but 
differs from, the Rayleigh distribution. It 
is less skewed, but still has considerable 
skewness. I t  does not resemble any x2 dis- 
tribution. The resemblance to the Rayleigh 
134 APPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH ON HUMAN DECISIONMAKING 
distribution suggests that  the appropriate 
function would be a Rayleigh-like distribu- 
tion with more degrees of freedom, and this 
proves to  be a special case of the x density 
function. Figure 12 shows a x distribution 
with 14 degrees of freedom. The points 
represent 10 000 samples of the output of 
the postdetection filter. 
Because the x distribution fits the data 
for noise alone, the next question is whether 
the noncentral x distribution, with the same 
number of degrees of freedom, will fit the 
data for noise plus signal. Figure 13 shows 
the resulting "psychometric" function. The 
abscissa is  the signal-to-noise ratio and the 
ordinate is the difference of means divided 
by the standard deviation of the difference. 
The fit appears to justify the assumption 
about the appropriateness of the distribu- 
tion functions. 
Noncentral x Distribution and Psychometric Data 
Figure 14 shows the same x distribution 
and another with 10 degrees of freedom 
along with data for Marill's two subjects. It 
will be seen that  one of the subjects fits 
the curve for v = 7 (14 degrees of freedom) 
very well. The other subject apparently re- 
quires fewer degrees of freedom and even 
FIGURE 12.-x distribution, v =  7 and data from 
electrical model. 
FIGURE 13.-Noncentral x distribution and 
data from electrical model. 
FIGURE 14.-Noncentral x distribution and 
psychometric data. 
then yields a rather ragged fit. Apparently, 
the parameters chosen for the electrical 
model (50-Hz bandwidth and a time constant 
for the postdetection filter of 50 msec) cor- 
respond reasonably well with the parameters 
employed by the first subject. The data for 
the second subject require the assumption 
that  he employs either a wider filter (Marill's 
conclusion) or  that  his integration time is 
shorter. At the present state of our knowl- 
edge of individual differences, i t  is not pos- 
sible to decide which (or both). The rag- 
gedness of the second subject's fit also sug- 
gests that nonstimulus factors are influenc- 
ing his behavior, attention lapses, indecision 
about which button to press, and so forth. 
VISUAL AND AUDITORY SIGNAL RECOGNITION 135 
The rather surprising agreement between ployed are well within the range of values 
the data for the model and for one of Marill's estimated for detection experiments-a 
subjects suggests that this subject, like the "critical" bandwidth of 50 Hz and a time 
model, is governed in his responses almost constant of 50 msec. The latter is the figure 
wholly by the statistics of the stimulus. The recently reported by Zwislocki for the audi- 
parameters chosen for the distribution em- tory system. 

THEODORE G. BIRDSALL: I would like to 
talk about the problem of research and real 
solutions to real problems. I think I know 
what research is and I think I know what 
real problems are, because I have had a lot 
of exposure to them. But I have seen very 
few real solutions, even though research is 
supposed to give them to you. 
There have been a lot of nice quotations 
concerning this business of research and 
real solutions. One that keeps coming back 
to my mind is from John Pierce, a research 
director at  Bell Laboratories : "For every 
good research idea that comes out of basic 
research, it takes 100 good engineers to make 
i t  useful." That seems about the right pro- 
portion to me. Even when most people in 
the research atmosphere say they are finished 
with a problem, the solution is a very long 
way from doing anybody any good. We 
need to think about these 100 engineers. I 
do not think they are always in the right 
places, especially in connection with univer- 
sity-type research. They are nonexistent in a 
lot of places. In fact, I think we are missing 
what should be a whole profession. 
The goal of this profession would be to 
connect some of the research ideas and the 
real problems and t ry to get some real solu- 
tions out of them. They should not be doing 
the research but they should be aware of 
its present state. When we train Ph.D.'s 
now, they imitate people who are doing 
Mr. Birdsall commented on and led a general dis- 
cussion of problems associated with applying the 
results of scientific research to the  real world. 
research or they do research themselves in 
a field that has not been touched. This 
trains them to do new research. However, 
I am not looking for people who will do 
more research. I am looking for people 
who can understand it, and understand very 
thoroughly all the things that it is not. 
They must be able to do this with a great 
many pieces of research and then look a t  
the real problems with all their nasty par- 
ticulars and t ry to get the two of them 
together. 
There is also product-oriented research. 
Most of the companies that I am familiar 
with care only about the product that is 
going to come out of it and how the product 
will affect sales and profit. 
I am not going to break research down 
into basic research and applied research. 
That is a very dangerous cut to make. I am 
talking about both. But there is certainly 
what we call mission-oriented research. As 
a Navy contractor, I am reminded repeatedly 
that my mission is to make that fleet stay 
above the water, or below the water, which- 
ever i t  is supposed to do. Whatever I may 
want to do in signal detectability, the main 
object is the particular mission. 
We also have educational institutions that 
are interested in knowledge-oriented re- 
search. Again, I want to emphasize that I 
am not distinguishing between basic re- 
search and applied research even in this 
knowledge-oriented research. Often we go 
after certain kinds of knowledge because we 
know that i t  is necessary if we are to accom- 
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plish some goal. But first we have to get 
the knowledge. The same kinds of people 
man all three categories of research. We do 
not have people in between who are selecting 
various items of knowledge research to put 
into actual use. Of course, there is always 
the pressure to just "get the job done," al- 
though the pressure is not so much felt in 
the universities. But this applications work 
needs a lot of attention and I think the prob- 
lem is more than just a lack of communica- 
tion or information. If the problem were 
only a lack of communication, i t  might be 
handled by something like publications. But 
I think that a lot of hard work is needed if 
we are going to continue converting partial 
results of research-and almost all the re- 
sults are partial results-into some sort of 
practical engineering theory and then into 
some sort of engineering practice. 
DISCUSSION 
LLOYD A. JEFFRESS: We know a couple of things 
as  a result of knowledge-oriented research that  I have 
tried to tie up  to mission-oriented research. 
One is  this 10- to 15-dB improvement in the detec- 
tion you get with two ears over one. The other is the 
remarkable ability of the ear to detect differences of 
direction. Every attempt to realize 15 dB in practice 
has just not produced anything. I keep wondering 
about localization. Maybe this has some practical ap- 
plications. A pilot might be able to use his ears to 
determine bearings instead of the eyes when his eyes 
are busy looking a t  instruments. It seems to me to 
have considerable promise, but i t  would take quite a 
bit of engineering to realize that. 
BIRDSALL: That is part  of the point I am trying to 
make. I t  does take considerable engineering. It is not 
trivial work, and it is  very hard work. With the people 
I have been associated with in this type of research 
the typical problem goes like this. They have a piece 
of gear that  was designed 8 years ago and i t  does not 
work today. I t  will be with them for the next 5 years. 
It must work tomorrow, and they want answers now. 
They do not have time to look a t  some abstract idea 
that you have which looks very promising. It is not 
something tha t  they can assign to a man and have him 
think about for a while. It is something that  might 
require the work of a team for a year, and then they 
might come to the conclusion that there is no con- 
ceivable use for this kind of an  idea a t  this time. We 
do not seem to put our money on anything until we 
have a large task problem that must be solved. There 
are occasional cases where somebody is sufficiently 
personable or arrogant to do everything himself. He 
gets out of the research climate and becomes a manu- 
facturer. This is sort of an  anarchistic way of getting 
things done, although some people have claimed that  
the best way to handle a good idea is to take i t  all the 
way from the research through the development: 
through the manufacturing, through the prototype 
trials, and all the way to the final field test trial. 
That is the only way to get the job done. I t  seems like 
a waste to have a research man do all that, because 
he is probably particularly good a t  only one of those 
tasks. 
JOHN A. SWETS: HOW could YOU change the payoff 
structure in order to turn out people who would spend 
their lives being acquainted with research and with 
actual problems and converting one into the other? 
I agree that we are missing that profession of people. 
Is there any chance of bringing about tha t  profession, 
and how would you bring it about? 
BIRDSALL: I think the biggest motivator for i t  
would be to have i t  recognized as a profession in the 
sense that there are jobs, and people doing this kind 
of thing. At Michigan we have a so-called profes- 
sional degree in engineering. I t  is not a very honor- 
able degree and does not confer the title "doctor." 
You have to study just as  hard and do everything 
about the same, except you do not have to pass both 
languages. Also, the thesis does not have to be an 
original piece of research. Usually the student takes 
a doctoral thesis on something he has been working 
with and turns i t  into a practical system. It is a 
very dishonorable degree. Very few people go for 
it, because i t  does not have the word "Ph.D." tacked 
on i t  and the persons capable of finishing this degree 
are capable of getting a Ph.D. The payoff is not the 
same. 
I think that what is most needed is a profession, a 
recognized body of people doing such work. Not 
doing research but getting the results of research 
into use. It is done in the large companies. Certainly 
Bell Labs puts pressure on their research people to 
first save the company a million dollars, then they 
can go off and play with what they want. But first 
they have to do something useful and profitable. So 
the people coming in from the bottom get into this 
work force. Their objective is not to make a name 
for themselves, but rather to do something that  really 
helps the company. That is the name of the game and 
i t  works quite well. The company takes their research 
results and starts getting them into the practical sys- 
tem. For example, someone doing research in pattern 
recognition designs a little writing board that a very 
sloppy telephone dialist can use to write the number 
across and which then dials the telephone. These 
things get used. 
This is something that I feel there is  a great lack 
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of in smaller groups and in Government contracting. 
The contractor usually has the burden of making the 
research useful. But this is  not the kind of thing you 
can do by direction; i t  takes a lot of effort. 
JOSEPH MARKOWITZ: YOU said i t  might be a waste 
of a person's time to take an idea and follow i t  through 
all the way to product development, perhaps to sales, 
because some people are better suited to sonie of 
these occupations than to others. And yet you treat 
your two degrees as if the qualifications for one were 
identical with the qualifications for the other. I s  
there not a way to emphasize the difference? 
Maybe you should make both programs much more 
difficult, so as to take advantage of the inherent spe- 
cialties that  you propose are really in people. 
BIRDSALL: I think I was mixing two kinds of 
points there. 
MARKOWITZ: Alternatively, is that a way to get 
people into this field you want? 
BIRDSALL: The majority of people who are in re- 
search are not always the best ones to put into re- 
search applications. There are occasional ones who 
can do both. But the people who are going for engi- 
neering Ph.D.'s are pretty much oriented toward 
research. Why? That is what our business is. We 
do a lot of research. You have got to have a thesis to 
graduate. Besides, I do not think you really want 
people who are very good a t  research t o  be doing 
research applications. They may not be very prac- 
tical. Whatever makes a person imaginative and 
causes way-out ideas t o  come into his head may be the 
same thing that  prevents him from thinking logically 
and in cold, hard terms. 
SWETS : But universities hire those kinds of people 
for their faculties. It is a little hard to understand 
how those kinds of people are going to turn out prac- 
tical people. If you are looking for a man who will 
go around finding out where research is and applying 
it, the chances are you will not find him in a graduate 
program a t  a university. And the chances are that  
he should not be there. He ought to  be where he can 
get some decent practical training, rather than the 
kind that  the university will give him. 
BIRDSALL: The Ph.D.'s are pretty much aimed 
toward research, and that is not a prerequisite for 
practical work. 
MARKOWITZ: Would you propose some kind of an 
apprenticeship ? 
BIRDSALL: Primarily, I propose a job. I do not 
think we lack for people who are capable of doing 
this kind of work. My own experience, which is  very 
limited, is  with the Navy laboratories. We are trying 
to make university research more useful. What 
problems are Navy laboratories saddled with? They 
either have prototype equipment that  is  going into 
the fleet as  soon as  possible or they have equipment 
tha t  does not work. 
STEVEN E. BELSLEY: I want to know why the 
Navy thinks i t  has to turn to the universities for this 
kind of a service. I t  seems to me that  this is just what 
a contractor is set up to do. The product people are 
supposed to produce equipment to perform certain 
missions, and they draw upon a broad spectrum of 
resources to do this, including the products of uni- 
versity research. If you can divide research into your 
three categories and assume they never overlap. . . . 
BIRDSALL: I am not worried about their overlap- 
ping. I am worried about the large empty set in the 
middle. That is what I am trying to fill. For example, 
one of these research outfits predicts a 15-dB improve- 
ment in certain circumstances. What does that  have 
to do with practical detection situations where it 
might be useful? This man over here has a piece of 
gear that must work every place in the world under 
all sorts of different conditions. He does not have a 
year to determine whether i t  is worth the extra 
weight and cost to use it. He does not know if there 
will be the appropriate conditions under which he can 
get the 15-dB improvement. He looks a t  i t  and he 
says, "Forget it." 
BELSLEY: It seems to me that  you are  talking 
about mission-oriented research, which is the proper 
subject of a Government laboratory operated for that  
- - 
purpose. The product-oriented research is  the proper 
subject of a manufacturer. Knowledge-oriented re- 
search is  the proper subject for the university. 
BIRDSALL : And Government laboratories also. 
BELSLEY : They participate in knowledge-oriented 
research to some degree, but that  is not their prime 
object in life. Their prime object should be mission- 
oriented research. Between 1950 and 1955 there was 
a flow of prominent people from the Government lab- 
oratories into industry to do product-oriented re- 
search. In order to fill the gap, Government labora- 
tories have turned to the universities. 
BIRDSALL: If you look through the ideal indus- 
trial structure, it goes all the way from research 
through manufacturing and sales, and into profit. 
There is a nice orderly progression to workable ideas. 
What I am trying to say is that  there is something 
missing. There is a gap. It is  a long way from re- 
search to advanced development. For advanced de- 
velopment you almost have to have a block diagram 
and the circuitry you are going to build. 
BELSLEY: That is the way the Department of De- 
fense runs its railroad. That does not necessarily 
mean i t  is the right way to do it. 
BIRDSALL: That is  the way it is being done. 
BELSLEY: Not always, but there are other ways 
of doing business. Advanced development is so much 
dependent on the goal that  has been set by the cus- 
tomer. I t  is heavily structured within that  framework. 
You have to consider that  there are certain things 
structured within the desires of the customer. You 
get an idea that  you think could be applied to one of 
his burning problems and then you start  to develop 
along that  line. Then you bring the idea up to a given 
state so the customer can make a decision as to 
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whether he wants to proceed. When you are trying 
to sell the idea that  you should do research and you 
are interested, from the research standpoint, in how 
soillebody could use this research, you should struc- 
ture research w?th the customer in mind. If you are 
going to fiddle for fiddling's sake, you belong in 
education. 
BIRDSALL: I agree with you, but I do not think 
most of the people in research-in advanced develop- 
ment-are the ones best suited to help make the tie 
between research and applications. Often the people 
in research make up little stories and convince them- 
selves that they are doing something useful. They 
do not have much contact with the real world. We 
need persons who are not spending all their time 
doing research and who are not spending all their 
time putting together hardware, but who are trying 
to get better cooperation between research and ad- 
vanced development. 
MARKOWITZ: IS there really much intrinsic re- 
ward in the task? 
BIRDSALL: I t  is fantastic. I would gladly join 
them. 
MARKOWITZ: Then why are there no people? 
D o u w ~  B. YNTEMA: Let me answer that. I think 
you are missing the crucial point. I t  is true that you 
have to find a group of people who have or will be 
given the right n1oti.i ation and the right training. 
I suspect tha t  you are also quite right that the system 
is not developing people who will be satisfied with 
this type of job. This is a problem, but I think the 
big problem is organizational. YO~J said earlier that  
as many as 100 such people might be needed for one 
research idea. This work has to be done by large 
organizations, like Bell Labs. These organizations 
are large enough to have the depth and resources that 
enable them to build a team of 10 or 20 men. When 
their job is done 5 years later, the men becolne nlem- 
bers of other teams. 
BIRDSALL: Most of the people I know in advanced 
development are given a mission for a specific piece 
of gear. They just do not look a t  anything that is not 
obviously related to that piece of gear. Somebody has 
to tie together several pieces of research and make 
them into a working system that  these people can 
understand and almost prejudge for its potential 
usefulness. 
BELSLEY: IS that  not an area where the systems 
research analyst fits neatly? He considers a broad 
spectrum of possible applications in the broad spec- 
trum of ways that information can be fed into the 
system. He then tries to put i t  together into a con- 
ceptual pattern that will meet these goals-all with- 
out having to build any equipment. These are what 
are called feasibility studies. 
BIRDSALL: YOU must know some good systems 
people. 
MARICOWITZ: I t  seems to me the situation is sort 
of hopeless. We do not have enough people because, 
in the long run, every research idea has got to take 
up a large number of people to keep track of it as  
well as the mission-oriented problenls. 
BIRDSALL: HOW long does i t  take to ratify a re- 
search idea? Four, five, six years? But somebody can 
'ead 18 months of research in 18 minutes. 
MARKOWITZ: Are you now saying that  it does not 
take as  many as 100 applications people per re- 
searcher? 
BIRDSALL: That is right. You need a large num- 
ber of them conlpared with the number of researchers, 
but, for mission-oriented research, the ratio may only 
be 8 to 1. 
BELSLEY: I think what you are  calling mission- 
oriented research is what Bell Labs calls systems 
research. 
BIRDSALL: A lot of the young people doing so- 
called research a t  Bell are in very directed research. 
Their objective is to look throughout the whole tele- 
phone system and see where certain ideas can be put 
to use. 
BELSLEY: They are not doing research. They are 
seeing where they can apply what they have learned. 
Once they have got an application, then Bell says, 
"You turned out to be a good applications man, now 
do some research." 
BIRDSALL: One out of eight passes from systems 
research to basic resarch. 
SWETS: SO we can identify 100 people a t  Bell who 
are doing applications research, and 50 people a t  
Linccln, or maybe 500. That is not very many. There 
ought to be other groups besides Lincoln and Bell. 
There are a few systems analysts in companies 
around, but I do not see them doing very much of 
what we are talking about. 
I am also worried about another thing: I do not 
think that  the universities are going to build these 
people with strange degrees. The question comes 
to mind: How might an agency with a n~ission build 
some people to fill the need? 
JEFFRESS: A t  the present, if you work on a mili- 
tary problem, you do so a t  the cost of your own career, 
so to speak. But a few years ago, the Defense Ce- 
partment was offering overtime pay to faculty mem- 
bers who would devote some of their time to these 
problems. I t  seems to me that this encouraged a lot 
of intelligent people in the academic field to work 
on such problems. 
SWETS : To work on military problenls of interest 
to them. But they were not really looking a t  what re- 
search was coming out and what problems existed? 
JEFFRESS: NO; that  is true. But i t  was a closer 
bridge than we have got now. 
YNTEMA: What do you think of the institutional 
pattern the medical people have set up? Would you 
think that  their ratio is more nearly correct and 
that their institutional structure is more nearly cor- 
rect? 
BELSLEY : Recently, the medical profession has 
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been criticized for spending too much money and 
time gathering information, and not enough applying 
this information to medical problems per se. The 
main complaint is tha t  for 10 years we have been 
dumping a billion dollars a year into the medical re- 
search field. How is this being used to prolong life, 
to  cut down strokes, to cut down heart attacks, and 
so forth? As a result of these complaints, the medical 
profession is gradually orienting its research or- 
ganization toward thinking in terms of applying all 
this information. They are not saying that they in- 
tend to cut off medical research per se, but they have 
set up a new institute that  is essentially mission- 
oriented. 
R. MARK PATTON : The profession Birdsall is sug- 
gesting seems to me not so different from the ideal 
concept of human-factors engineers within an in- 
dustry. I emphasize "ideal," because rarely do such 
people have sufficient impact on the system develop- 
ment process. I spent several of the most frustrating 
years of my life a s  a human-*factors engineer, and 
finally came to the conclusion that the job was all 
hopeless. You are always operating in the context of 
a very complex tradeoff situation and the human- 
factors requirements often have to take second place 
to weight, volume, power, and cost. The earlier phases 
of system development, where future systems are  
being outlined are just as bad. The tradeoffs are still 
there, and deadlines are such that you usually have 
a maximum of about 3 days to respond to the flap of 
the moment. I feel tha t  human-factors engineering 
ought to work somehow-I have no idea how-to bring 
the best available research knowledge to bear in some 
very realistic way on the development of a system, 
but there are many obstacles. 
BIRDSALL: That is why I say there has to be a 
profession in which persons have a chance to sort out 
the research that should go with some development 
before the flap comes along, because when that  flap 
comes, you only have about 3 days. 
EARL A. ALLUISI: There is an easy way to get 
such a profession in our capitalistic society. Create 
the positions and attach salaries to them. Pretty soon 
you will have people going into that  line of work. 
PATTON: There is also the question: Is the aca- 
demic Ph.D. really the proper training for an indus- 
trial human-factors person? If you look a t  the roster 
of the Human Factors Society, a typical training is 
either a master's or doctorate in psychology. Some- 
time ago in The Human Factors Society Bzlletin, 
there was a list of the places that  even pretend to 
offer a specialized training in human factors. The 
list was only one page long. I think maybe that  is  
part of the problem. 
ALLUISI: I have argued for 15 years that  to put 
us a t  the board doing human-factors engineering is  
a misuse of Ph.D. training in psychology. That is  
engineering; i t  is not what a Ph.D. in psychology is  
aimed to train a person best to do. There should be 
a specialty in the engineering school where psychol- 
ogy is taught and its application is  t a u g h e j u s t  a s  
in mechanical or civil engineering. I can name a t  
least a half a dozen engineering schools that  are now 
beginning human-factors-engineering programs a s  
a basic engineering curriculum. I suspect this will 
develop further, and I believe tha t  in a few more 
years we will have more people doing applications, 
provided the market remains one that  encourages 
them to get into it. We train Ph.D.'s to be researchers, 
and we t ry  to make them knowledge oriented. Knowl- 
edge orientation may be mission-knowledge orienta- 
tion or even product-knowledge orientation, but a 
Ph.D.'s orientation is going to be slightly different 
from what you want in applications. It is going to be 
just as  different as that  expected between a physicist 
and an engineer. You cannot easily get a physicist 
to do engineering. 
MARKOWITZ: Assuming that  we can create the 
position and attach sufficient monetary gains to it 
to attract the right people, it  seems to me there is 
still a problem. I can tell these persons where to look 
to find out about basic research. I tell them what 
journals to look a t  and teach them how to read jour- 
nal articles. I can identify good people in the field to 
help them sift through the material. I can get them 
fairly well acquainted with current research effort. 
I would like to know how to acquaint them with mis- 
sion-oriented problems. 
JOHN W. SENDERS: Was there not once a Gov- 
ernment publication of things that  the Government 
would like to see invented? 
BIRDSALL: I do not think there is  as  much prob- 
lem getting people acquainted with mission orienta- 
tion. That  is where the pressure is. The pressure is  
on the people who have the problems. I personally 
feel you would get ten times the usefulness out of 
research if you take half the people in research and 
put them together with some other good people who 
are mission oriented. I favor making the research 
useful instead of just making research good. 

Application of Decision Theory to Manual Control 
Bolt, Bermek & Newmum, Zm. 
In the last couple of days, we seem to have 
progressed from some very specific problems 
to some very general ones. I want to return 
to some specific simple problems and to 
some of the issues that Rathert and Yntema 
raised yesterday. I am still dissatisfied with 
the taxonomies that have been presented, 
largely for the reasons that Birdsall just 
mentioned: from the theoretical point of 
view, the various kinds of decisions that 
we have been talking about look the same. 
Thus, are they really different, and if so, in 
what respects ? 
To illustrate this similarity of decisions, I 
will spend a few minutes talking about what 
Rathert called reflex kinds of decisions or 
what Yntema spoke of as decisions that are 
made by satellite computers. Let us con- 
sider some very simple manual-control prob- 
lems in which a decision theory framework 
is appropriate. These are control problems 
in which the reflex kinds of activities are 
dominant, and in which the basic behavior 
that we are interested in looks as though 
i t  can be modeled nicely by the kinds of 
models that are used for some of these more 
complex decisions. First I will describe the 
kinds of control situations that we have 
investigated, then I will describe briefly an 
experiment and, without going into too much 
detail, will discuss some of the results. Fi- 
nally, I want to say a few words about the 
direction of current work in manual control. 
This work is based heavily upon optimal- 
control ideas, which I think tie in nicely 
with the kind of decision theory that we 
have been discussing today and yesterday. 
In the experimental situation with which 
we have worked, there was a random gaus- 
sian type of input signal with low bandwidth. 
This input is compared with the response of 
the system and an error signal is derived. 
The human operator looks at  the error and 
makes an appropriate control movement that 
is fed to a dynamical system. The system, 
in turn, responds to this input. This is the 
classical kind of feedback-control system. 
Our experimental situation differed from 
that used in most previous work in that 
the dynamics of the system were time vary- 
ing. The human operator had to maintain 
control of the system in spite of the varia- 
tions in dynamics. An extreme example of 
this kind of control situation would be the 
Eastern Air Lines plane that, when flying 
from Boston to New York recently, encoun- 
tered another aircraft, lost much of a wing, 
but landed satisfactorily. 
In our experiments, at  some arbitrary, 
random time the vehicle's dynamics suddenly 
changed. When a change in dynamics (which 
we call a transition) occurs, the subject must 
first detect the fact that the dynamics have 
changed, he must identify the new dynamics, 
and then he must adopt a new control strat- 
egy appropriate for the new dynamics. This 
whole decision process must be accomplished 
in a very short time to prevent the system 
from reaching a nonrecoverable state. 
We had four possible sets of dynamics 
that could be operating at any one time. The 
one that the subject was tracking was called 
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Co(s).  Maybe once every 15 seconds during 
the course of a 4- or 5-minute tracking run 
these dynamics could change. Any given 
dynamics could change to any one of two 
others. We gave the subject a button that 
he was to release when he had detected a 
change. This enabled us to distinguish the 
subject's detection of the change in vehicle 
dynamics from the subject's identification 
of the new dynamics and modification of his 
control status. 
Figure 1 shows the time history of a 
typical transition. The input-forcing func- 
tion and the system response are superim- 
posed on each other. The control movements 
that the subject made and the error signal 
are shown separately. ! 
was one in which the polarity of the dy- 
namics changed and the gain of the dynamics 
increased.* Figure 1 shows that the subject's 
behavior remained relatively unchanged for 
about 1 second after the transition, in spite 
of the fact that the system was highly diver- 
gent. During this time, the error remained 
small. About 1 second after the transition, 
the error suddenly started to increase very 
rapidly. The subject apparently detected a 
transition; shortly after this he made some 
fairly violent movements to t ry  to cancel 
the rapid increase of the error. During this 
period, he obviously modified his character- 
istics and must have completed an identifica- 
tion of the new dynamics. 
About 4 seconds after the transition, the 
subject managed to get the system more or 
less under control and the error settled down. 
The subject's movements were more or less 
of the same character as they were before 
the transition. He had canceled out the ini- 
tial transient, but it took a little while before 
his movements settled down to an appro- 
priate amplitude. Notice that the posttran- 
sition movements tend to be smaller than 
+.- 
the pretransition; an effect that is accounted 
40 for by the increase in the gain of the 
@ 20 dynamics. 
I;g 0 
- 
You can play a lot with these kinds of 
g -20 records. We have studied the control char- 
C s -40 acteristics as well as the things that are 
pertinent to the decision process itself. But 
-10 today I want to talk about the decision parts 
-5 E of the process, mainly those that we call 
6 O detection and identification : detection of 
L 
" . ' 5  the transition and identification of the new 
dynamics. 
loo  2 4 6 8 10 12 14 Once a subject detects a transition, he 
Time, sec is able to make very rapid, gross changes 
FIGURE 1.-The time history of a typical transition. 
Input-forcing functions and system response are 
superimposed. 
The actual change in dynamics occurred 
a t  the point marked to. For this run, the 
dynamics were K/s? That is, the system be- 
haved like a pure inertial system and the 
subject controlled the acceleration applied 
to the system. The transition in this run 
in his control strategy. This is illustrated 
in figure 2, which shows polarity reversal 
of transition with K / s  (velocity) dynamics. 
The gain of the human operator's describing 
' By polarity change we mean that  the movements 
that the subject was making become inappropriate in 
the sense that  they were in the wrong direction, re- 
sulting in an unstable system. By gain increase, we 
mean that  the system amplifies the subject's control 
movements more than before. This can also lead to 
instabilities. 
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FIGURE 2.-The polarity reversal of transition (time 
from detection signal versus KT,). 
function is plotted in figure 2 as a function 
of time from the release of the detection 
button. This kind of transition usually oc- 
curred about 0.4 second prior to the release 
of the detection button. In about 0.4 second, 
the subject has changed the polarity of his 
gain. However, his movements are a little 
low in amplitude as he cancels out the tran- 
sient. After a couple of seconds, he starts 
to increase his gain gradually until it finally 
has approximately the same value as it was 
before the transition, except polarity is 
reversed. 
We observed that the whole adaptive pro- 
cess happens very much a t  the subconscious 
level after subjects gather experience with 
the experimental situation. If they did not 
have the detection button to release, subjects 
would often not be aware that a transition 
had occurred and that they had changed 
their control strategy. They would just go 
ahead and do it. So here is a case where, in 
Yntema's terms, the whole pattern recogni- 
tion process and the selection of a new com- 
puter program is a t  the unconscious level. 
STEVEN E. BELSLEY: What sort of a 
device is the subject operating? 
ELKIND: For the experiments that I am 
discussing, there were two kinds of dynam- 
ics: K/s, pure velocity control, or K/s2, pure 
inertial control. Physically, the subject is 
sitting in a room with a scope and a joystick 
in front of him. 
BELSLEY: IS it an overdamped system? 
ELKIND: It is just pure integrator. We 
have done some work with overdamped and 
with unstable systems of various kinds, but 
none of it was done systematically enough 
to present. 
I think this is an essential point to be 
made: Most of us have been talking about 
models that we think have the right struc- 
ture for representation of human behavior 
in complex tasks. In most of the cases that 
have been reported, these models have been 
applied to very simple situations only. I 
think the importance of these experiments 
lies not so much in the results as in the 
structure of the models. 
Now consider the problem of detection. 
For this kind of problem, detection is ex- 
pressed very simply. You might argue that 
the breakdown into detection and identifica- 
tion, which are two separate problems, is 
somewhat artificial. But we do have the 
detection button, which presumably indicates 
detection, so it is worthwhile looking at. 
There are two probability measures that 
the subject is going to be concerned with: 
one is the probability, based upon his obser- 
vations of the error signal and his knowledge 
of the stick movements he is making, that 
the initial dynamics are C,; the other is the 
probability that they are not. We postulate 
that the subject makes estimates of these 
probabilities. Whether or not the subject 
wants to push the detection button depends, 
of course, on such things as his utility func- 
tions, and so forth. The tracking problem 
is very much one of sequential decision- 
making. Things are going on all the time. 
When the polarity of the dynamics change, 
not only does the subject have the oppor- 
tunity of making repeated observations, but 
he can tell from the signals if he is doing 
something wrong. The result is a complex 
interaction between what the subject is doing 
and what he is seeing. 
Rather than t ry to work with continuous 
signals, we have quantized them and as- 
sumed that the subject makes observations, 
say, every 0.2 second, which corresponds, 
roughly, to the time i t  takes for him to 
make a movement. Under these assump- 
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tions, the subject is viewed as operating on 
sample values of the signal, which allows 
us to know, more or less, what data he is 
observing. 
There are two components to the data: 
the error and the control movement. The 
subject takes samples of the error signal 
and also the control movement, which are 
the only two kinds of information available. 
In a real airplane where there are motion 
cues and other information, the system re- 
sponse would be much more complex. Note 
that the error is somewhat complex, because 
in general the subject must worry about the 
error magnitude, the first derivative, and so 
forth. Thus, the error state is a multidimen- 
sional quantity. Actually, we need to be con- 
cerned with only those properties of the 
error that the subject can perceive. In these 
simple experiments, we were able to simplify 
things considerably on the basis of some 
earlier work that we had done. Most of the 
detection and identification of behavior can 
be well predicted from the change in error 
rate from one sample to another. 
Our model looks only a t  the subject's 
change-in-error rate from sample to sample 
and the control movements that he makes 
during a sample. There are some control- 
theoretic reasons for concentrating on error 
rate, but I will not go into them a t  this 
point. Suffice it to say that the model seems 
to work fairly well, and there are reasons 
why it should. 
The next step is clear. We want to use 
Bayes' rule to devise the posterior prob- 
ability that the dynamics are still Co after 
the subject has made each observation. We 
express posterior probability as 
where Ae is the change in error rate and c 
is the control movement during the nth in- 
terval. Keep in mind that we have the se- 
quential situation here. The prior proba- 
bility a t  the beginning or the nth control 
interval, P(CI,;  n) ,  is derived from the pos- 
terior probability a t  the end of the previous 
interval. 
One can derive a similar expression for 
the posterior probability where the dynamics 
are not C,. However, because this is a se- 
quential problem, most of the behavior of 
the model is going to be determined by the 
conditional probabilities P ( n e  1 C , ,  c ; n) and 
not by the initial assumptions made about 
the prior probability of Co. 
We are actually concerned here with sub- 
jective probabilities, with the subject's per- 
ception of the conditional distribution that 
a particular error Ae would be observed if 
the dynamics were Co and if he made the 
control movements that he did. There are 
several sources of error that affect these 
probabilities. First, the subject does not 
know the input signal. During the control 
interval, the input signal could have changed 
its rate appreciably and contributed to the 
variance of the subject's estimate. Second, 
the subject does not always make the control 
movements that he thought he made. Third, 
the subject does not always see the real error. 
So we have some distribution of the Ae.  
We make the following assumption, which 
I will justify briefly. All input signals to the 
system are gaussian. We also assume that 
the subject makes an unbiased estimate of 
the mean of that distribution. That is to say, 
the mean of the conditional distribution is 
exactly what the change in error rate ought 
to be, if, indeed, the subject made the con- 
trol movement c, and if there were no input 
disturbance. Then we would go on to say 
that the variance of this distribution will 
have two components: one that is the vari- 
ance of the input signal, the other that is a 
proportional to the mean n e .  If the subject 
makes a larger movement, there will be a 
larger change in error rate. We would expect 
that the subject's estimate o.f change would 
show larger variance. This is a case of a 
constant proportional error. 
We have ways of estimating, or a t  least 
placing reasonable bounds on, the various 
components of the variance. We simulated 
this model on the computer and exercised it 
with the actual data used in the experiment. 
I would now like to compare the experimental 
results with the model results. 
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In figure 3 is plotted detection signal times 
(the time after the transition at which the 
subject released the button) against the de- 
tection time predicted from the model. Data 
are shown for three of the six transitions 
we worked with. The points are scattered, as 
would be expected, but they fall along the 
line of unity slope, intersecting the origin a t  
0.4 second. The intercept, 0.4 second, is the 
effective reaction time to this kind of transi- 
tion in this particular kind of experiment. 
I I I I I I 
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Predicted detection time, sec 
FIGURE 3.-Detection signal times versus the predicted 
times. 
The next problem is one of identification, 
in which the subject is concerned with more 
than just whether the dynamics are Co or 
not. He must determine which of the three 
possible dynamics are in effect: C,,, C1, or C,. 
If one is willing to assume equal values for 
all outcomes, then the subject should decide 
in favor of the dynamics whose posterior 
probability is largest. 
Figure 4 shows how the posterior probabil- 
ities computed from the model change as a 
function of time from the transition. The 
initial dynamics in this case is Co and C, is 
-1.2 -.8 -.4 0 .4 .8 1.2 
Time from transition, to, sec 
FIGURE 4.-Posterior probabilities computed from the 
model as a function of time from the transition. 
the correct choice that the subject should 
have made. The dynamics actually change 
from Co to C,; the alternative dynamics are 
C,. The transition occurred at the point 
marked to. We find that the probability esti- 
mate of Co drops, starting a t  the transition 
time, and gets below about 0.5 at  about 0.4 
second. The probability that the dynamics 
are C, rises above 0.5 a t  about the same time. 
In this case, all of the probability estimates 
of C, remain small. According to our detec- 
tion model, the subject should have released 
the detection button a t  about 0.4 second after 
the probability of Co became less than 0.5. 
We will now consider the identification 
performance of the model and the subjects. 
In figure 5, I have plotted results from four 
transitions: ( a )  gain increase, ( b )  gain de- 
crease, (c) polarity reversal, and (d) an- 
other gain decrease. The probability of the 
correct dynamics, P (C,) , are plotted against 
the probability of the incorrect dynamics, 
P (C,) . The probability estimates are those 
generated for the first time interval that the 
model said that identification should have 
occurred. The black points indicate that the 
subject correctly identified the transition, 
and the open points indicate that the subject 
incorrectly identified the transition. If the 
points lie above the diagonal line, P(C1) is 
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* Correctly identified 
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FIGURE 5.-Results from four transitions: ( a )  gain 
increase; ( b )  gain decrease; (c) polarity reversal; 
(d) gain decrease. Probability of the correct dy- 
namics P (C1) are plotted against the probability of 
the incorrect dynamics P (C2). 
greater than P (C,) and the model would have 
correctly identified the transition. 
Let us consider the transition (fig. 5 ( d )  ) 
in which many of the points lie below the 
diagonal line. Most of these points are open, 
meaning that both the model and the subject 
would have incorrectly identified the dy- 
namics. In this transition, there was a gain 
decrease that the subjects mistakenly took 
to be a polarity reversal. This kind of error 
is not uncommon and is easily explained. 
When a gain decrease occurs, the control 
becomes more sluggish than it was before, 
so that the same control movement has much 
less effect on the output. If the input signal 
is moving fairly rapidly a t  the time of transi- 
tion, the error will increase with every 
movement that the subject makes. This be- 
havior resembles that obtained with a polar- 
ity reversal, where every movement by the 
subject typically results in a larger error. 
The errors shown in figure 5(c l )  are, there- 
fore, a result of the coincidence of a rapidly 
changing input signal and a gain decrease 
transition. 
BELSLEY: The subject would not neces- 
sarily make this error if he were tracking on 
zei-o error. 
ELKIND : He was tracking with the error 
near zero. This was not a terribly hard track- 
ing task. If the system were essentially 
quiescent, so that the subject was not re- 
quired to make any movement, he would not 
get much information upon which to make a 
decision. Presumably, he would stick to the 
initial dynamics. Only when the subject 
really starts making movements can he get 
information from the system. 
About 13 of the transitions were incor- 
rectly identified by the subject, and 8 of 
those were also incorrectly identified by the 
model. Actually one of the transitions that 
the model identified incorrectly, the subject 
identified correctly. But we nevertheless get 
surprisingly good matches between model 
and subject behavior in terms of the number 
of incorrect identifications. 
We checked the same model with the same 
parameters on another set of dynamics, K/sz.  
Figure 6 compares the predicted and ob- 
served detection times. We did not have a 
detection button in these experiments so we 
had to estimate when we thought detection 
Predicted identification time, sec 
FIGURE 6.-Comparison of the predicted and observed 
detection times. 
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had occurred from looking a t  the subject's 
control behavior. 
Table I illustrates the identification per- 
formance of the model with these dynamics 
and the posterior probability of each of the 
possible posttransition dynamics. Again, the 
same model seems to work pretty well. Oc- 
casionally, the dynamics having the highest 
probability would have a gain differing by a 
factor of 2 from the correct gain. For 
example, when the transition was 4/s2, the 
model might declare it to be 2/s2. This is 
not a serious error. 
I would like to comment about conditional 
probabilities P (ae 1 Ci, c ; n)  that play such 
a central role in the model. The interpreta- 
tion of these probabilities is relevant to some 
of the questions that Rathert raised yester- 
day and perhaps also to some of the problems 
to which Belsley has been alluding. One in- 
terpretation of this conditional probability 
is that it indicates the extent to which the 
subjects, who in this case were well trained, 
had developed good internal models of the 
dynamics of the systems that they were con- 
trolling. The subject's state of training is 
embodied in this conditional probability and, 
more specifically, in the variance of the prob- 
ability density. If the subjects are well 
trained, the variance should be small. Pre- 
sumably, they can adapt very rapidly and will 
not make very many mistakes. 
If, on the other hand, the model is not very 
well developed, and it has a large variance 
and maybe even the wrong mean, then the 
subjects will need more information to make 
the detection and identification decisions. 
They will take a longer time to get the addi- 
tional data and they will be more likely to 
misidentify. So their state of training is 
embodied in this conditional-probability 
term. 
Of course, the prior probabilities, or maybe 
the probability of a transition, come into the 
model in an important way. It ought to be 
related to the probability that a particular 
failure can or cannot occur. Perhaps one of 
the reasons that you see longer times for 
adaptation in actual flight situations than in 
laboratory situations is that failures do not 
happen very often. Thus the probability that 
a change will occur is low and it takes more 
data before the subject or the pilot decides 
that something has indeed happened. 
In terms of data, none of these results 
solves practical problems. I would argue, 
however, that the model provides an  appro- 
priate structure for looking a t  these prob- 
lems associated with system failures. It 
would be interesting to take Rathert's simu- 
lator, run some real dynamics on it, and try 
this approach in a fairly realistic problem. 
My guess is that it would yield reasonable 
results. 
BELSLEY: Are you talking about a fixed- 
or moving-based simulator? You modify the 
problem by the introduction of motion that 
you have not taken into account. 
ELKIND: I have not taken motion into 
account because I do not have it. But, in 
terms of the structure of the model, motion 
comes in very nicely. Take some quantity X 
TABLE I.-P (Ci) K/s2 Transitions for Identification Ci 
Transition 
8/s2 -4/s2 
4 / s 2  
4 / s 2  
-4/s2 
8/$ -8/s2 
8/sZ -16/s2 
8/sZ 16/s2 
8/s2 2/s2 
c, (8) 
-16/sZ 
0.04 
.002 
.02 
.03 
.65 
C.751 
0 
0 
-8/sZ 
0.33 
.04 
.19 
-13 
E.201 
.19 
0 
0 
-4/s2 
C0.351 
l.291 
C.311 
C.431 
.06 
.04 
0 
.02 
-2/s2 
0.22 
.44 
.25 
.12 
.03 
.01 
0 
.12 
2/s2 
0.03 
-10 
.06 
.06 
.006 
.002 
0 
C.561 
4/s2 
0.006 
.02 
.02 
.03 
.003 
' .0005 
.0001 
.17 
8/s2 
0.02 
.09 
.16 
.003 
.06 
.006 
.36 
.13 
16/s2 
0 
.0001 
.0003 
.0009 
0 
0 
[.641 
0 
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that is multidimensional and represents the 
set of things that the subject can perceive. 
These may be motion cues as  well as lots of 
other attributes of the system, and just the 
error. Whether an experimenter can deal 
with all those things is a real question. That 
is essentially the question that Edwards 
raised in connection with a real situation. 
The complexity becomes enormous and it is 
difficult to do good experiments. 
YNTEMA: You have got a nice line of 
defense in that the variance increases if the 
subject is finding the situation too complex 
to perceive very exactly. You have a param- 
eter already sitting there. 
ELKIND: That is the parameter of the 
subject's response to complexity. The ques- 
tion is the experimenter's response to com- 
plexity, and that is another question. This 
is very much like most of the other decision 
processes we have been talking about. 
Let me t ry  to draw a couple of more paral- 
lels between the kinds of things that are go- 
ing on in manual control and those in decision 
theory. There is one theoretical framework 
with which you can build a theory of complex 
manual control systems-optimal or modern 
control theory. It is a theory that is designed 
to handle complex control problems. If one 
is going to worry about complex situations, 
it seems to me that one wants to invoke this 
theory which was designed to handle such 
situations. 
The way in which problems in optimal con- 
trol theory get formulated is as follows : We 
have some vehicle dynamics with disturb- 
ances driving it, and the state of the vehicle 
is represented by x. We have some displays 
that present to the pilot some transformation 
of x, which we call yd, a vector. 
There is some perceptual process that the 
pilot employs to look a t  these displays and 
to perceive yd. He derives from that percep- 
tion some variables y, which is what he 
thinks the displays are telling him. From 
them he must try to reconstruct the real state 
of the system, because that is what he is 
really interested in if he wants to control it. 
What he must do is to derive some estimate 
of the true state of the system, which goes to 
the controller and produces some control ac- 
tion on the pilot's part. The control action is 
then passed on to the vehicle. In most air- 
planes, the instruments are spread around 
the panel and there is a visual sampling proc- 
ess that results from the fact that the pilot 
generally moves his eyes around. 
One way of representing this perceptual 
process is to say that the pilot derives the 
displayed state of the system, delayed by 
some amount, and corrupted by noise. The 
noise represents the error in the pilot's read- 
ing of the instruments. But the variance of 
this noise depends upon where the pilot is 
looking. If he is looking directly a t  a display, 
then the variance would be smaller than if 
he is viewing it peripherally. Thus, the 
pilot's estimates of the state of the system 
are a function of the sampling strategy by 
virtue of the hypothesis that the noise asso- 
ciated with instrument observation is a func- 
tion of the sampling strategy. 
One of the nice things about modern con- 
trol theory is that i t  explicitly states what 
the pilot is trying to achieve by the control 
process. To solve for the controller and esti- 
mator characteristics, we start  by writing 
down a performance functional. The per- 
formance functional can have a variety of 
forms, but one reasonable form is a weighted 
sum of the mean-squared error, and the 
mean-squared control movements. The cost 
of sampling of moving the eyes can also be 
introduced into the cost functional. The 
computational problems involved in solving 
the optimization problems are not simple. 
However, the problem can often be seg- 
mented so that the controller and estimator 
characteristics can be found separately. If 
the cost functional is quadratic, the esti- 
mator will have the form of a Kalman filter. 
An intrinsic part of such an estimator is a 
model of the system being controlled. This 
ties in with the decision-theory model in 
which the state of the subject's training was 
represented by a model of the system being 
controlled. 
Finally, one other small point. We have 
done simple preliminary experiments to look 
at the subjective cost functional issue. Al- 
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though a subject may be told to minimize 
some cost functional, he may, in fact, have 
some other (that is, a subjective) cost func- 
tional in mind. We have done some experi- 
ments with single-axis compensatory control 
systems in which we told the subjects to min- 
imize a cost functional of the form: 2 + p z 1 2 ,  
a linear combination of mean-squared error 
and mean-squared control movement. We 
changed p and observed how the subject's 
performance changed. He should have 
adopted different control strategies for dif- 
ferent values of p. We observed that the sub- 
ject changed his control strategy in much the 
same way that an optimal controller would 
when p changed. However, he did not use the 
correct values of p. In particular, the range 
of the values of the pilot's subjective p was 
less than the range of the objective ones 
chosen for the experiment. 
DISCUSSION 
HAROLD G. MILLER: Your comment on the system 
and the data reconstruction that represents the 
actual vehicle hit a nerve, because we have been con- 
sidering something like this for some time for flight 
controller's use in the bay wing of the spacecraft. 
JEROME I. ELKIND: HOW will YOU provide him a 
data reconstructor if you will? 
MILLER: What we do is to circumvent that. May- 
be we will have a piece of hardware back a t  the 
plant. If we get a problem, we operate i t  and see 
how it works. 
ELKIND: It is the same idea, really, except in the 
control model the reconstruction is implemented on- 
line, and the data are fed to it. 
MILLER: The thing that  holds this up is  the com- 
plexity, cost, and time. I t  is a pretty big job, really, 
unless you can prove some positive results out of it 
to undertake something like this. 
ELKIND: Belsley would object if I said "imple- 
menting," because we are not implementing. We have 
just a model. The reconstruction and all the rest are 
in the pilot. We can use these techniques without 
worrying about reliability and implementation. 

Decisionmaking in Manned Space Plight' 
R. MARK PATTON AND JULIE A. RAUK 
NASA Ames Resertrch Ceater 
The history of the manned space-flight 
program reveals a trend toward increasingly 
greater use of the pilot as the primary opera- 
tor of various subsystems. When one com- 
pares the general design philosophy that 
existed a t  the beginning of the Mercury pro- 
gram with that of present systems, Apollo, 
and its proposed successors, the contrast is 
evident. The original design philosophy of 
the Mercury program was that all critical 
functions were to be fully automatic, with 
man overriding only in the event of system 
failure. Such things as spacecraft attitude 
stabilization, retrorocket firing, and drogue 
and main parachute deployment were made 
fully automatic. Man was .to go along pri- 
marily as a passenger and an observer, and 
the idea of his ever having to "take over" 
seemed remote to many. I think it fair to say 
that a decade ago, design engineers typically 
had more faith in the reliability of fully auto- 
matic systems than they do now. If that 
seems too sweeping a statement, a t  least it 
was far easier then than it is today to find 
someone who would argue that man is unnec- 
essary, because his reliability can never ap- 
proach that of the machine. 
As i t  turned out, during each of the four 
manned orbital flights of Mercury, one or 
more failures in the automatic systems oc- 
curred, man was able to take control, and the 
mission was successfully accomplished. By 
the end of Mercury, man had proved to be a 
capable performer in space. Even during the 
Paper presented by Mr. Patton. 
program, the growing emphasis on manual 
operation was evident. Prior to MA-9, White 
and Berry (ref. 1, p. 44) noted that "each 
flight plan has further reduced the automatic 
activity and provided more necessary pilot 
input." Succeeding projects have been de- 
signed from the beginning around the concept 
of greater pilot involvement. 
In operating current manned spacecraft 
systems, the pilot is heavily involved in over- 
all mission or systems management. Com- 
pared with aircraft piloting, control of the 
flight path is a minor part of the total task. 
By its nature, systems management often 
requires complex decisionmaking on the 
part of the operator. When we consider 
human limitations in spacecraft piloting, 
these are more likely to be limitations in the 
information processing/decisionmaking area, 
rather than limitations in psychomotor abili- 
ties as was the case with aircraft. Human 
error is more likely to occur in decisionmaking 
than in perceptual-motor activity. My belief 
is that the potential contributions of decision- 
making research to the manned space-flight 
program are great. Areas of application in- 
clude the design of system hardware, the 
specification of operational procedures, and 
even the selection and training of astronauts 
to be effective decisionmakers. 
As a starting point, one would like to have 
a classification scheme covering the decisions 
that are likely to have to be made by the 
space vehicle pilot. I have in mind some sort 
of classification based on the circumstances 
under which decisions are likely to be re- 
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quired, t h e  nature of the information inputs, 
and the nature of the required actions. Such 
an  analysis would be valuable in suggesting 
directions in which our laboratory work ought 
to proceed. We made what must be consid- 
ered an abortive attempt to develop a classi- 
fication scheme by looking a t  all of the Mer- 
cury and Gemini flight reports, attempting to 
identify decision situations, and further at- 
tempting to  categorize them in some sensible 
way. Frankly, we did not get very far. When 
you t ry  to  use them for this kind of analysis 
you find tha t  the information contained in 
flight reports is not very detailed, and tends 
to concentrate on the major and dramatic 
items. These are the items that  get into the 
newspapers a t  the time. I am sure that  every 
flight involves a multitude of decisions that  
are relatively obscure, but no less important 
and, perhaps, no less complex and difficult 
than the "big ones." 
Because we found few usable examples, I 
thought tha t  I might describe two outstand- 
ing and dramatic examples, simply to  illus- 
trate the approach that  we were trying. 
Doubtless you remember the case of the loose 
heat shield during Colonel Glenn's MA-6 
flight (ref. 2). You could list the major char- 
acteristics of the situation somewhat as fol- 
lows : 
(1) The inputs were ambiguous. For ex- 
ample, was the heat shield really loose, or 
was the light that  indicated this condition 
malfunctioning ? 
(2) The course of action was determined 
on a probabilistic basis; that  is, that  the 
retropack would probably burn off during 
reentry and thereby cause no difficulty. 
(3) Much of the information pertinent to  
the decision was available only to  ground 
personnel. Thus, there was a need for com- 
munication between the ground personnel 
and the astronaut. As a sidelight, Colonel 
Glenn felt that  the  communication that  did 
occur was inadequate. To quote a portion of 
his flight report (ref. 2, p. 136) : 
I feel i t  more advisable in the event of suspected 
malfunctions, such as the heat shield retropack diffi- 
culties, that  require extensive, discussion among 
ground personnel, to keep the pilot updated on each 
bit of information rather than waiting for a final 
clear-cut reconlmendation from the ground. This 
keeps the pilot fully informed if there would happen 
to be any communication difficulty and i t  became 
necessary for him to make all decisions from onboard 
information. 
(4) The required deqision and control ac- 
tions were dichotomous. 
( 5 )  A team effort was involved in gather- 
ing and evaluating information. 
(6) Colonel Glenn's decision posed danger 
only to himself. 
(7) A great deal of time was available 
before the decision had to be made. 
By comparison, consider t h e  decision made 
by Captain Schirra in an abortive attempt to 
launch Gemini VI (ref. 3, p. 19). He elected 
not to eject on the pad when an equipment 
failure caused cockpit instruments t o  indicate 
that  liftoff had occurred, but that  the 
missile had generated insufficient thrust  to 
fly, and therefore was settling back onto the 
stand. Captain Schirra, who had experienced 
the  physical sensations of liftoff during the 
MA-8 mission, felt that  it had not, in fact, 
occurred in this case. One must remember 
that  the decision to remain with the  vehicle 
had to be made in a very brief time, on the 
order of a second or so, with catastrophic 
results if the decision not to abort was wrong. 
Because ejection did not occur and because 
the  vehicle had not lifted off, i t  was possible 
to launch the vehicle only 3 days later, in time 
for i t  to rendezvous successfully with the 
Gemini VIII. In comparison with the  MA-6 
heat-shield problem, items of similarity were 
that- 
(1) Information was ambiguous. 
(2) Probabilistic decisionmaking was in- 
volved. 
(3) Information was available to  ground 
personnel that  was not available to the  crew. 
(4) The decision and control actions were 
dichotomous. 
Differences were that- 
(1) A team effort was impossible; the 
decision had to be made by one man. 
(2) Because there was a two-man crew, 
Captain Schirra was making a decision about 
the other astronaut's life. 
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(3)  Unlike the previous case, there was 
no time to solicit information from ground 
personnel. 
I think that such an analysis, examining 
both those parameters which may be ex- 
pected to change from flight to flight and 
those which may be expected to remain con- 
stant, would provide a wealth of material 
that we could use in pinpointing areas of 
research need. 
I am sure that there are better sources of 
information upon which such an analysis 
might be based than the ones we used. One 
candidate is the failure task analysis. Greth- 
er  (ref. 4) describes the process : 
One of the more interesting activities of the 
McDonnell group was their failure task analysis. 
This consisted of an analysis of possible equipment 
failures that  could occur during flight, as determi- 
nation of the symptoms which the pilot or ground 
crew would have of the failure, the appropriate 
actions to take, and the consequences to be expected. 
Such an analysis should provide excellent 
material for developing the classification 
scheme that I envision. 
We were able to locate a number of articles 
that deal to some extent with the topic of 
decisionmaking in space-vehicle operation 
(see bibliography). Most simply contain 
passing references, stating such opinions as 
that decisionmaking is an important aspect 
of astronaut activity, and that man's decision 
capability is the primary reason for his being 
sent into space. Few authors attempted to 
be very specific on the subject. 
One document (ref. 5) dealt extensively 
with the maintenance of alertness during 
manned space missions and the development 
of means to monitor the crewmembers' state 
of alertness. The role of alertness in influ- 
encing the quality of decisionmaking is em- 
phasized. The author suggests that objective 
indicators can be developed that would be cali- 
brated to each crewmember. One or more 
"key" indicators, or some weighted combina- 
tion of indicators, would be developed using 
data gathered in simulation exercises per- 
formed under both normal and stressful (such 
as  fatigue) conditions. This is, of course, a 
statement of a particular approach to the 
universal question of objective performance 
measurement in real-life systems operation, 
and is always easier to propose than i t  is to 
do. However, it seems to me that the author 
has some good ideas regarding possible ap- 
proaches to monitoring techniques, and has 
kept his suggestions within the bounds of 
what seems possible in the manned space- 
flight programs. 
Thus far I have spoken only of complex 
decisionmaking. The range of behavior that 
can be thought of as  having a t  least an ele- 
ment of decisionmaking involved is very 
broad indeed, as we have noted several times 
during this conference. Jerison and Pickett 
(ref. 6) attempt to account for performance 
on vigilance-type tasks (that is, signal detec- 
tion tasks where signals are weak, infre- 
quent, and temporal uncertainty is great) in 
terms of the decision processes involved. This 
article attracted my attention, and I report i t  
here because the authors attempt to relate 
their research and theories to decisionmaking 
behavior in manned space flight. 
Tasks requiring vigilance are well repre- 
sented in spacecraft. In Jerison and Pickett's 
words (ref. 6, p. 211) : 
Vigilance remains a human-factors problem in 
space missions because there may be no alternative 
to man as a monitor. This might occur accidentally 
if there is a breakdown in an automatic detection 
system, or unintentionally if the design delays or 
weight penalties for using automatic detection equip- 
ment are great and the penalty for an occasional 
missed signal is moderate. Furthermore, the man in 
a space vehicle will want information on the status 
of the vehicle's systems, even if these systems are 
intended to be automatic and self-correcting. Such 
supplementary information systems might most con- 
veniently be visual diplays that  are monitored only 
occasionally. 
Jerison and Pickett take a particular view 
of the vigilance problem: that the quality of 
performance is determined primarily by the 
observer's decisions on whether or not to 
attend to the display. They feel that  this 
contrasts, for example, with a notion that 
there are changes in the observer's criterion 
of signal/no-signal during the vigil. Their 
particular interest is in cases in which the 
probability of a signal's appearing is so low 
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as to be virtually nonexistent. They believe 
that although the penalty for a missed signal 
would be high, perhaps death, the "essentially 
zero probability for signal appearance . . . 
would result in a zero expected value for 
observing." Their guess is that if an astro- 
naut were assigned to monitor a display, with 
the "best bet" being that no signal would 
ever appear, "then he and his colleagues 
would redesign their jobs to eliminate the 
monitoring task." Perhaps their response 
would not be so extreme, but I do not doubt 
that the frequency of monitoring could be- 
come very low, thus the probability of a 
missed signal high, whether the decision in- 
volved were explicit or, as seems more likely, 
implicit. Jerison and Pickett make several 
suggestions of ways in which procedures 
might be altered to accord with what we 
know of decision and vigilance behavior as 
a result of laboratory investigations and still 
satisfy operational requirements. These in- 
volve either presenting artificial signals to 
increase signal probability, increasing system 
sensitivity, or, where possible, storing signals 
on tape for occasional review in "fast time." 
I want to mention briefly selection and 
training as these relate to decisionmaking. 
From the beginning, people involved with the 
selection and training of astronauts have 
been concerned with man's decisionmaking 
ability. In a review (ref. 7, p. 173) of factors 
considered in the selection of the original 
seven astronauts, Voas cited as a criterion, 
"a good ability to make decisions," but he 
did not elaborate on the method used to 
measure this ability. Perhaps the fact that 
this was listed as a "personality factor," 
rather than as one of the "aptitude and abil- 
ity factors," suggests that it was not based 
on any specific test, but was more a matter 
of general impression. There is a widespread 
belief that engineering test pilots, especially 
those still living, are particularly adept a t  
making correct decisions in complex and 
rapidly changing situations. Because all of 
the early applicants, and most of those com- 
ing later, were of this profession, then the 
problem would be one of making a choice 
among individuals coming from such a well- 
qualified population. The development of 
better methods of accomplishing this could be 
a useful contribution to the space program. 
The failure-task-analysis approach has 
been used both in the ongoing process of 
design refinement, and in the development of 
crew-training procedures. On the basis of 
this analysis, and subsequent simulation of 
the various potential failures, attempts have 
been made to take as many potential emer- 
gencies as possible out of the high-level deci- 
sion category, by reducing perceived ambi- 
guity and uncertainty and by training the 
astronauts so that response to foreseen emer- 
gencies becomes virtually automatic. In 
Yntema's terms, attempts are made to move 
as many potential situations from the "ex- 
plicit weighing and balancing" type to the 
"pattern recognition" type. SimuItaneous fail- 
ure of components, partial failures leading to 
ambiguous cues to the malfunction, and pos- 
sibly the occurrence of the totally unexpected, 
suggest that explicit weighing and balancing 
must remain a factor to be considered. Voas 
(ref. 8, p. 114), asserting a limited value of 
ground simulation in maintaining high-level 
decisionmaking skills, noted that in ground 
simulation "the penalty for failure is merely 
the requirement to repeat the exercise," and 
doubted "whether skill in making such deci- 
sions can be maintained under radically al- 
tered motivational conditions." This reason- 
ing led to the inclusion of high-performance 
aircraft piloting in the astronaut training 
program, on the grounds that skill in high- 
level decisionmaking would best be main- 
tained in a situation in which danger is real 
and motivation is high. This presumes a 
great deal of transfer from one situation to 
the other. 
Occasionally it has been suggested that 
formal, general training in decisionmaking 
skills be included in the training program. I 
do not know if a suitable course exists a t  
this time, but I believe that one could be 
developed. I do not think that we know 
enough a t  this time to state with assurance 
that such a course would improve on the 
present, less formal methods. 
I will close with a few thoughts concerning 
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the future. I t  seems to me that for a long 
time to come many NASA manned space mis- 
sions (extended Earth-orbiting missions and 
any exploration of the near side of the Moon) 
will be accomplished using techniques, par- 
ticularly mission-control operational proce- 
dures, substantially like those in use a t  the 
present time. At least early expeditions to the 
far  side of the Moon, and any interplanetary 
voyages, will require that the present ap- 
proach to mission control be altered. Trans- 
mission delays will be very long, and the 
rapid exchange of information between Mis- 
sion Control Center and the vehicle that 
occurs on present missions, particularly when 
emergencies arise and complex decisions must 
be made, will not be possible. 
Time from departure, day 
FIGURE 1.-Spacecraft-Earth distances during 
Mars missions., 
With the help of William Allen of the 
Mission Analysis Division a t  Ames Research 
Center, we have prepared two figures that 
show the duration of the communication lags 
involved in typical Mars missions. Figure 1 
shows two such missions, plotting the round- 
trip communications lag a t  various times in 
the mission. The longer duration mission in- 
volves distances of the spacecraft from the 
Days 
FIGURE 2.-Mars-Earth distances. 
Earth of almost 2 astronomical units a t  a 
maximum, which represents a round-trip 
communication of approximately 2000 sec- 
onds. The shorter duration mission involves 
less distance, only slightly over 0.8 of an 
astronomical unit, but is less attractive from 
the standpoint of power requirements. Fig- 
ure 2 plots the distance of Earth and Mars 
from each other, varying in a cycle whose 
period is almost 2 years in duration. These 
data would be applicable to communications 
between a permanently manned Mars station 
and the Earth. With such delays inevitable, 
many more decisions will have to be made 
by the vehicle crew, solely on the basis of 
onboard information, than is the case a t  
present. Team decisionmaking is now, and 
will continue to be, an area of great impor- 
tance in research. Also, techniques might be 
developed that would permit the early identi- 
fication of impending decision situations, per- 
haps on a probabilistic basis. Then, prior to 
its actually being required in the decision 
process, information could be requested by 
the spacecraft crew, and transmitted back to 
them, when both line-of-sight communica- 
tions and adequate time are available. 
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Models for Memory' 
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Stamjord Uaiaersity 
This paper incluc!;~ a fairly general theo- 
retical framework for human memory, begin- 
ning with an outline of the theoretical sys- 
tem and followed by some specific experiments 
and models derived from the overall frame- 
work. A great deal of research has been 
carried out in recent years on human mem- 
ory, especially short-term memory, and the 
models proposed by various researchers have 
begun to dovetail into a commonly accepted 
theory. 
The most important theoretical distinction 
of the system is that between structural 
features of memory and control processes. 
The structural features are permanent and 
include both the physical system and built-in 
processes that do not vary from one situa- 
tion to another ; for example, the hypothesized 
short- and long-term memory stores. Control 
processes, on the other hand, are selected, 
programed, and used, a t  the option of the 
subject. The use of a particular control 
process a t  some moment will depend on 
such factors as  the task, the instructions, 
and the subject's particular response history. 
ExampIes of control processes are coding, 
mnemonics, visual imagery, and rehearsal 
strategies. 
Control processes were examined exten- 
sively around the turn of the century, pri- 
marily because they are what the subject 
' Paper presented by the first author. Preparation 
of this paper was supported by the National Aero- 
nautics and Space Administration, monitored by the 
NASA Ames Research Center. 
reports when asked to describe what he is 
doing in a particular task. For many reasons, 
consideration of control processes tended to 
drop into disfavor, and even today some 
experimenters hesitate to ask their subjects 
to introspect about what they are trying to 
do. It is often assumed that the various 
strategies used by the subjects are not im- 
portant, or that they vary enough from sub- 
ject to subject to randomize away any con- 
sistent effects in large groups. The point I 
should like to emphasize is that this position 
is wrong: control processes are in most cases 
extremely important determiners of perform- 
ance in human-memory experiments. Dif- 
ferent control processes not only affect the 
level of performance but also the functional 
relationships found. As an example, consider 
a series of experiments examining mental 
imagery and coding by Bower (ref. 1) a t  
Stanford University. In the course of these 
experiments, subjects are told to encode ver- 
bal material by forming vivid mental images. 
Compared with control subjects, the subjects' 
performance was higher by a factor of 5 or 
more. Their rate and form of forgetting also 
were markedly affected. Furthermore, these 
subjects continue to use these techniques in 
future experiments they enter. As a result, 
it has been necessary to ask prospective sub- 
jects for our experiments whether they have 
previously taken part in Bower's experiments 
and, if so, eliminate them. This is one exam- 
ple of the importance of control processes. 
Experiments will be described in which per- 
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formance is primarily dependent upon a sub- 
ject-controlled rehearsal strategy called the 
"buffer." 
Having distinguished between processes 
amd structural features, I now want to  cate- 
gorize the memory structure into three com- 
ponents : the sensory register, the short-term 
store, and the long-term store (see fig. 1). I t  
is possible to further subdivide these com- 
ponents on the basis of the sensory modality 
of the stored information, for there is clear 
evidence indicating that the characteristics 
of memory for different sensory inputs may 
differ considerably. In this paper, however, 
the distinction will not be emphasized, for it 
complicates the presentation. 
Rehearsal Buffer 
-------- Long-Term 
Short-Term Store 
Store 
-Activate rehearsal mechanism 
Response Response -Modify information flow from SR to STS ( output 1 Generator HI ~~;z~~~2~;;z;;2~;~Tm~~~t~ L ~ s  
'I-1 I I 2r;2;;i~;;r;:a on stored information 
FIGURE 1.-The theoretical memory system: struc- 
tural distinction between memory and control. 
The sensory register accepts incoming 
sensory information and holds it fairly accu- 
rately for a very brief period of time, perhaps 
several hundred milliseconds ; the informa- 
tion then decays and is lost. The short-term 
store is the subject's working memory; i t  re- 
ceives selected inputs from the sensory regis- 
ter and also from the long-term store. Infor- 
mation in this store decays and is lost in a 
period of about 30 seconds or less, but may be 
maintained via control processes, such as  re- 
hearsal, as long as the subject desires. The 
long-term store is a fairly permanent reposi- 
tory for information, which is transferred 
from the short-term store. Note that trans- 
fer does not imply that information is re- 
moved from one store and placed in the next; 
rather transfer is used here to imply the 
copying of selected information from one 
store into the next without affecting it in the 
original store. Note, also, that the term "in- 
formation" is used in a nontechnical sense; 
it does not refer to bits but to the various 
sounds, codes, and so forth, that are stored. 
We now turn to an outline of the char- 
acteristics of the three memory stores, and a 
description of the major control processes 
associated with each. 
The prime example of a sensory register 
is the visual image investigated by Sperling, 
Averbach and Coriell, Estes and Taylor (refs. 
2, 3, and 4, respectively), and others. If an 
array of letters is presented on a T-scope and 
the subject is asked to report as  many letters 
as possible, usually about six letters are 
reported; even a 30-second delay until report 
does not affect performance. It appears that 
the subject is transferring about six letters 
from his sensory register to an auditory 
short-term store where they are rehearsed 
until a report is requested. This hypothesis 
is in line with introspective reports and the 
fact that response confusions tend to be audi- 
tory rather than visual. In order to examine 
the visual image itself, partial-report proce- 
dures have been used. For example, a matrix 
of letters is presented and, a brief period 
after the tachistoscopic display, a tone sig- 
nals the subject as to which row of letters to 
report. When the delay until the tone is 
very short, performance is virtually perfect. 
As delay increases, performance decreases, 
reaching asymptote after several hundred 
milliseconds. In addition to this decay with 
time, i t  has been found that succeeding visual 
stimulation modifies preceding images. At 
present, not much is known about the form 
of the decay; whether the letters decay to- 
gether or individually, probabilistically or 
temporally, all or none or continuously. 
Transfer to the short-term store takes place 
during the period before the image decays: 
the limited amount transferred is not so 
much dependent on the time needed to scan 
the letters (about 10 msec) as  the capacity 
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of the short-term store itself. The dotted 
line in figure 1 indicates a noncommittal 
attitude as to whether direct transfer to 
long-term store takes place from the sensory 
register. At least it is clear that there exists 
direct communication between the sensory 
register and the long-term store, because a 
visual letter may be transferred to an audi- 
tory short-term store. In order for this to 
occur, the auditory representation of the 
visual image must be retrieved from the 
long-term store and then placed in the short- 
term store. 
Control processes relevant to the sensory 
register include the following: the decision 
as to which sensory register to attend to if 
several are activated simultaneously; where 
and what to scan within the decaying image; 
how to perform the long-term matching of 
the information residing in the sensory regis- 
ter, if a search is being made of the decaying 
image; and what information to transfer to 
the short-term store. 
The short-term store is the next feature to 
be considered. Discussion will be restricted 
to the verbal-linguistic short-term system 
rather than, say, visual or kinesthetic short- 
term memories. The short-term store is 
viewed as the subject's working memory be- 
cause control processes are based within it 
aud directed from it. For a number of rea- 
sol~s, the characteristics of the short-term 
memory trace are difficult to determine. For 
one thing, rehearsal processes can maintain 
selected information for indefinitely long 
periods. For another, while an item resides 
in the short-term store, information about it 
begins to accumulate in long-term store, and 
consequently test performance will be a joint 
function of retrieval from both stores. Some 
evidence has been accumulated however; Nor- 
man and Wickelgren (ref. 5) have carefully 
controlled rehearsal in a task where subjects 
listen to rapid sequences of three-digit num- 
bers. Following the sequence, a three-digit 
number is presented for test and the subject 
must decide whether the test item was in the 
presented list or not. These data were accu- 
rately fit by assuming an item reached a 
given strength level, depending upon the 
presentation time, and that this strength 
then declined exponentially with the number 
of succeeding items. In this situation, the 
number of items rather than time per se was 
the important variable determining decay. 
Other experiments, such as Peterson and 
Peterson (ref. 6 ) ,  in which a single-con- 
sonant trigram is followed by arithmetic and 
then attempted recall, have indicated that 
short-term decay takes place in about 30 
seconds or less whenever rehearsal is inhib- 
ited. 
Of the many control processes in the short- 
term store, I shall be primarily concerned 
with rehearsal mechanisms. Henceforth, "re- 
hearsal" is taken to refer to the maintenance 
of information in short-term store, through 
vocal or subvocal repetition. That is, each 
decaying trace in short-term store is, so to 
speak, reset by each repetition, whence i t  
begins to decay again. A little consideration 
makes it clear that the optimal rehearsal 
method for maintaining a maximum number 
of items in short-term store occurs when a 
fixed set of items is being rehearsed a t  any 
one time, probably cyclically, such that each 
item is rehearsed just before it decays. This 
kind of fixed-size rehearsal set is called a 
buffer and is shown in figure 2. The buffer 
consists of a selected portion of the informa- 
tion currently in the short-term store. At 
any one time, there may be information in 
the short-term store not in the buffer, but 
this information is rapidly decaying, whereas 
that in the buffer is maintained by rehearsal 
as long as the subject desires. The size of 
the buffer, or the number of items concur- 
recently rehearsed, is denoted by r ;  r will, of 
course, depend on such factors as the nature 
of the items being rehearsed; if each item is 
an eight-digit number, r might be 1, whereas 
if each item is a single digit, r might be 8. 
For verbal rehearsal, it seems likely that r is 
absolutely determined by the auditory length 
of the rehearsal material. This hypothesis is 
consistent with the estimates of r recovered 
from our experiment. In most experiments 
with a continuous sequence of presented 
items, the subject must decide when an item 
is presented whether to enter i t  into the 
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loss of strength, etc.) 
FIGURE 2.-Fixed-size rehearsal set: a buffer. 
buffer or not; if i t  is entered, then the subject 
must decide which item currently undergoing 
rehearsal should be removed to make room 
for the new entering item. 
It should be emphasized that this rehearsal 
buffer is a control process set up a t  the will 
of the subject in appropriate experimental 
situations. Factors such as difficult items, 
short study-test intervals, and complex or 
rapid presentation rates will tend to induce 
subjects to utilize a buffer and will determine 
its size, r. On the other hand, an experiment 
in which word-word paired associates are to 
be learned over an extended number of trials 
will probably result in the subject coding 
rather than rehearsing. 
The short-term system I have been describ- 
ing is not as easy to examine experimentally 
as one would like. One problem is that during 
an item's stay in the short-term store, infor- 
mation about it accumulates in the long- 
term store; thus the probability of a correct 
response will always be a combination of the 
retrieval probabilities from both stores. The 
working of the short-term system would be 
much easier to examine if long-term storage 
could somehow be blocked. For this reason 
i t  is interesting to consider some remarkable 
results reported by Milner (ref. 7) who ac- 
complishes this effect surgically. She reports 
that patients given large bilateral hippo- 
campal lesions demonstrate a marked mem- 
ory deficit, being unable to store new infor- 
mation permanently, or to recover such 
information if i t  is stored. Thus a patient, if 
he changed addresses following the operation, 
will, if left alone, return to the old address, 
not knowing he has moved. This inability to 
store new information is quite general, the 
only possible exception being an ability to 
improve in some simple rote motor skills. 
On the other hand, information stored pre- 
operatively is recovered without difficulty. 
Furthermore, the patients have an unim- 
paired short-term store so that they demon- 
strate unchanged I& as measured by standard 
tests. If given a sequence of instructions to 
carry out, they can do so by rehearsing the 
instructions, but immediately forget if re- 
hearsal is interrupted. If given various mate- 
rial to remember for a short time period, 
they can do so as long as the material is 
verbally encoded for rehearsal. If inter- 
rupted, however, the material is forgotten. 
If the material presented is not easily encoda- 
ble (such as tones and figures), then memory 
of this material is lost in about 30 seconds, 
even if there is no interruption. Incidentally, 
these operations, originally performed to  
eliminate seizures, have been discontinued. 
Nevertheless, the effects have been validated 
in other ways. For example, sodium amytal 
injected into the carotid artery will tem- 
porarily knock out one hemisphere-if the 
other hemisphere has a hippocampal lesion, 
or damage, then the patient exhibits the 
above memory deficit. Furthermore, patients 
suffering from Korsakoff's syndrome tend to 
exhibit the same effects and this syndrome is 
often associated with hippocampal damage. 
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All in all, these results tend to lend consid- 
erable support to the memory system previ- 
ously outlined, particularly in regard to the 
division into short- and long-term memory 
stores, and also the characteristics, such as 
rehearsal, of the short-term store. 
Next consider the transfer of information 
between the short- and long-term stores. 
Quite often transfer of information occurs 
from the long-term to the short-term store, 
as  during coding, hypothesis testing, stimu- 
lus naming, and so forth. However, the 
transfer from short- to long-term store is of 
greater interest a t  the moment. The assump- 
tion is made that a t  least some transfer takes 
place during the period that any information 
resides in the short-term store, regardless of 
whether any active attempt is made to store 
or not. Experiments supporting this assump- 
tion were performed by both Hebb and Mel- 
ton (refs. 8 and 9, respectively) : subjects 
were given a series of digit span tests, in each 
of which they had to repeat a series of 
digits read to them. There was no reason to 
t ry  and learn the individual sequences. Un- 
known to the subjects, however, some of the 
digit sequences were repeated a t  intervals. 
Without the subjects noticing the fact, per- 
formance on the repeated sequences improved 
over trials. Apparently a long-term trace 
was being stored and strengthened for the 
individual sequences, as a result of brief 
rehearsal in the short-term store. Although 
we assume that storage always takes place 
during an item's residence in the short-term 
store, the amount and the form of the trans- 
ferred information are markedly affected by 
the control processes used. If the subject is 
using simple rehearsal, the long-term trace 
stored may be only a weak auditory image 
of the repeated item. Coding, on the other 
hand, might result in the storage of a rich 
visual image, containing not only the infor- 
mation in the stimulus input but much more 
besides. 
The final major structural component of 
the system is the long-term store. Although 
i t  is possible to subdivide this store on the 
basis of physiological evidence pertaining to 
consolidation, for present purposes we will 
view it as a single store, obeying fixed rules 
throughout. The two basic questions to be 
answered are : "What is stored ?" and "What 
happens to the memory trace as time passes 
and other information is stored?" The form 
of the memory trace will be dependent on 
the control processes governing the transfer 
from the short-term store. Most generally, 
the memory trace may be viewed as a multi- 
component information array, stored in 
either one place or in many (single versus 
multiple-copy model). Somewhat less gen- 
eral, but more useful in applications, is the 
representation of the trace by a numerical 
strength value, the higher strengths indicat- 
ing storage of greater amounts of available 
information. Restrictions of these general 
models for the form of storage lead to specific 
alternatives that may be appropriate in indi- 
vidual situations, depending both upon the 
nature of the task and also the control proc- 
esses invoked by the subject for transfer, 
search, and retrieval. An example is the 
simple all-or-none one-element model, in 
which a single complete information copy is 
either in memory or not, and once stored, 
stays stored. This model has been used ap- 
propriately in fixed-list, paired-associate 
experiments in which the responses contain 
minimal information, often consisting of the 
two letters, a and b. Other models that have 
been applied include single-memory copies of 
partial information; many-memory copies, 
each of complete information; and many- 
memory copies, each of partial information. 
I t  should be emphasized that the question is 
not which of these versions is correct ; rather 
it should be asked which model is appropriate 
for a given situation, the answer depending 
upon the nature of the task and the type of 
control processes that the subject is induced 
to use. 
The next feature to be considered is the 
change in the memory trace in long-term 
storage and its retrievability over time and 
intervening material. In considering this 
topic, we are plunged into the large body of 
literature roughly classified by the term "in- 
terference theory." In the present discussion, 
however, I will use the term "interference" 
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in a restricted manner to refer to the decay 
or destruction of information over time. 
Thus, interference models will assume per- 
manent loss of information occurring be- 
tween study and test, and forgetting can be 
viewed as  a structural feature of the memory 
system. At the other extreme are the models 
assuming no loss of information over time; 
rather, forgetting occurs because of the de- 
creasing effectiveness of the memory search 
a t  the moment of test. Note that the usual 
theories of forgetting, such as decay theory, 
response competition, unlearning, and so 
forth, can be liberally interpreted so as to 
be consistent with either of these models. 
Unfortunately, i t  is not easy to distinguish 
between the two models : structural change 
occurring during delay, on the one hand, 
versus decreased search effectiveness as  a 
result of increased information storage. Each 
has a certain amount of face validity. Gross 
physical considerations of nerve-cell destruc- 
tion, seizures, conditions of anoxia, and so 
forth, make it virtually certain that a t  least 
a small amount of information is lost over 
time. On the other hand, such effects might 
be relatively negligible in the typical memory 
experiment. Certainly the assumption that  
stored information is never changed or lost 
has a certain elegance. Furthermore, long- 
term memory search is one of the most com- 
mon subjective features in everyday experi- 
ence. Slightly less obvious than the fact that  
memory search exists is the fact that the 
search routine is very highly under the con- 
trol of the subject, in terms of where in mem- 
ory to search, how to search, what criteria 
to set for terminating the search, and so 
forth. If one is asked to name the countries 
of Asia, for example, one can search memory 
in a free associative fashion, or alphabet- 
ically by first letter, or geographically, to 
name just a few mechanisms. In general, 
the various search mechanisms will result 
in markedly different performance. In a test- 
retest procedure, for example, a random 
search for the names of the countries of Asia 
will result in differing responses, whereas an 
ordered geographic search will result in 
essentially the same output in the same order. 
Our discussion of long-term storage began 
with the consideration of the structure of 
long-term forgetting. In reference to the 
large body of literature, we will simply state 
here that the pattern of results is highly com- 
plex and not amenable to simple description. 
This state of affairs is likely to remain until 
a better grasp is gained on the control proc- 
esses involved, such as what the subject 
thinks he is to remember, what he rehearses, 
how he codes, and how he searches memory 
a t  test. 
This concludes a very brief outline of the 
memory system. Although much of the sys- 
tem is quite tentative, and some areas have 
barely been touched, the main gist of the 
theory should be relatively clear. I will next 
describe some specific experiments and mod- 
els that  should illustrate applications of the 
overall system, and also how certain types of 
control processes can be dealt with quanti- 
tatively. 
The first experiment is easy to describe. 
A series of cards was placed in a row before 
the subject. Each card had a colored patch 
on one side, the color always picked randomly 
from four possibilities. The cards were pre- 
sented a t  a rate of one every 2 seconds; as 
each card was presented, the subject called 
out its color and the card was then turned 
over. The list length was varied from trial 
to trial, but the subject always knew prior 
to the start  of a list how many cards would 
appear in that  list. At the end of the display, 
the experimenter pointed to one of the cards 
and the subject guessed the color under it. 
He also gave a confidence rating from 1 to 4 
of the probability that his guess was correct, 
1 being most confident. 
The display size took on the values 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 11, and 14. Figure 3 shows the prob- 
ability correct as a function of serial position 
for the different display sizes. The most 
recently presented item is to the fa r  left. The 
circles are the observed data. Displays of 
sizes 3 and 4 were always responded to cor- 
rectly and are not graphed. The major fac- 
tors to be explained are the strong recency 
effect to the left of each figure, with its ten- 
dency toward an S-shape; the less-strong 
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Serial position of test item 
FIGURE 3.-The probability of a correct response as a 
function of serial position for the different display 
sizes. 
primacy effect to the right; and finally, the 
decrease in performance as list length in- 
creases. 
Now, what kind of model is applicable 
here? Because each color is read aloud when 
presented, we assume every item successfully 
passes through the sensory register and en- 
ters the short-term store. Within the short- 
term store, there are a number of a priori 
reasons for expecting the subject to use re- 
hearsal as his primary strategy. For one 
thing, long-term coding would be inefficient 
because something well-learned for one dis- 
play would undoubtedly confuse the subject 
on immediately following displays. For an- 
other, the very short displays can be handled 
perfectly by rehearsal alone, and this strat- 
egy may then be carried over to longer 
displays. Finally, a posteriori, subjects re- 
port rehearsal as their usual method of oper- 
ation. For these reasons, we shall apply a 
version of the buffer model described earlier. 
That is, it is assumed that a fixed number of 
items is being rehearsed at any one time. 
For any presented item the subject must 
decide whether to rehearse i t  or not. In other 
studies where subjects used a rehearsal 
scheme, it was found that the act of reading 
each item aloud as it was presented led them 
to enter every item into rehearsal. Because 
the colors were read aloud by the subject 
in the present case, we shall assume that 
every item enters the rehearsal buffer. The 
initially presented items fill the buffer; once 
the buffer is filled to capacity, the next 
entering item must take the place of an item 
already in the buffer. It could be assumed 
that the item to be lost is chosen randomly; 
however, this model will predict an exponen- 
tially decreasing recency effect rather than 
the S-shaped one found. The recency effect 
arises, of course, because any item in the 
buffer a t  the time of test is reported cor- 
rectly. The observed S-shaped effect can be 
predicted if i t  is assumed that there is a 
tendency for the items that have been under- 
going rehearsal for the longest time to be 
the ones lost from the buffer first. This is 
actually a fairly rational strategy for the 
subject to use; for example, the longer the 
items remain in the buffer, the more strength 
is built up in long-term store for them. 
Under fairly general conditions, it is an 
optimal strategy to drop from rehearsal the 
item that has accumulated the greatest 
amount of longtevm strength. In order to 
quantify the notion of a tendency for the 
oldest item to be the first lost, we let Pi be 
the probability that the ith oldest item is 
the one dropped from rehearsal, and we set 
where 6 is a parameter to be estimated and 
r is the buffer size. Note that this function 
has appropriate properties : if 6 approaches 
0, then a random item is dropped from the 
buffer; if 6 is 1, then the oldest item is al- 
ways dropped from the buffer. 
The model as described so far, without 
any long-term storage, will predict an S- 
shaped decreasing recency effect for each 
list length. It will not predict a primary 
effect and it will not portray the decrease 
in performance with increasing list length. 
The transfer of information to the long- 
term store will be assumed to take place as 
a linear function of the total time an item 
undergoes rehearsal. This is the typical as- 
sumption we use in experiments in which 
the subject utilizes a rehearsal buffer, but 
would not necessarily apply if coding or some 
other strategy were used. In particular, 
transfer of information takes place at  a rate 
0 per unit of rehearsal time, where 0 is a 
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parameter to be estimated. The retrieval 
assumptions are that, a t  test, the subject 
first searches the buffer. If the item is in 
the buffer, it is reported correctly; if the 
item is not in the buffer, a search is made 
of long-term store, and the probability of 
recovery will depend on the amount of in- 
formation stored. In particular, recovery 
will be an exponential function of the amount 
of information stored. That is, P (R)  =I- 
exp (-I), where I denotes the amount of 
stored information. This function has the 
appropriate properties : when I is 0 the prob- 
ability of recovery is 0, and if I-+w then 
P (R)  + 1. If retrieval is not successful, then 
the subject guesses. The model to this point 
will now be able to predict the primacy effect 
in the data. More information is stored 
about early items in the list, both because 
they reside longer in the buffer (while the 
buffer is filling) and because they receive 
more rehearsal time before the buffer is 
filled. (If n items are in the buffer, each is 
rehearsed l/nth of the time.) This model 
still fails, however, to predict the decrease 
in performance as list length increases. The 
reason is evident, because no consideration 
of interference effects, or of long-term search 
problems, has been undertaken. Clearly, the 
probability of recovery from long term 
should decrease as the number of items in- 
crease; either because interference from 
other items will reduce the amount of in- 
formation stored, or because a search 
through an increasing total amount of stored 
information will be increasingly less effec- 
tive. Of these two possibilities, we choose 
to quantify the first. The simplest interfer- 
ence assumption possible is made: for any 
item in the list, each item preceding it, and 
each item following it will cause its stored 
information to be reduced by a proportion 
T, where is a parameter to be estimated. 
The model is now ready to be applied. It 
has four parameters: r, the buffer size; 6, 
the tendency for the oldest item to be dropped 
first; 0, the information transfer rate; and 
T, the proportional loss of information due 
to interference. A minimum x2 technique 
was used to pick the best set of parameters: 
r-5, 8 ~ 0 . 3 8 ,  0=2.0, and ~=0.85. The 
predictions are the solid lines in figure 3. 
That the predictions are accurate is indi- 
cated by a x2 of 44.3 on 42 degrees of freedom. 
If this model is really accurate for this 
situation, we should expect that it could be 
applied to the confidence-rating data also. 
Consider confidence rating 1 (most confi- 
dent), for example. The natural and simplest 
assumption would hold that any item in the 
buffer is always given a confidence rating 
of 1. The probability of giving a confidence 
rating of 1 for an item recovered from long 
term would be a function of its strength 
similar to that for probability correct; that 
is, the more strength, the higher the aver- 
age confidence rating. If these assumptions 
are correct, serial position curves for con- 
fidence ratings of 1 should be very similar 
to the probability correct curves. Figure 4 
Serial position of test item 
FIGURE 4.-The probability of an R1 confidence rating 
as a function of serial position of the test item. 
shows the data. One new parameter was 
used to generate predictions : this parameter 
determining the probability of giving a con- 
fidence rating of 1 for a given amount of 
long-term strength. The predictions are 
fairly accurate, as can be seen. Not graphed 
are the curves for the other confidence rat- 
ings, but, as predicted (because they do 
not include items from the buffer), they 
demonstrate a missing recency effect. It 
is impossible in this paper to consider all 
the various alternative models that might 
be applied to these data, but one example 
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is rather interesting. Suppose a model is 
proposed with only one memory store, con- 
taining traces that rise and fall in strength 
according to unspecified rules, but rules that 
somehow or other generate the probability 
correct curves. Such a model would predict 
that items at different serial positions that 
have the same probability correct should 
have the same distribution of confidence 
ratings, or at  least distributions similar in 
structure. Such is not the case, however. 
For example, positions 6 and 14, for 14-item 
displays, have about the same probability 
correct; as seen in figure 4, they also have 
about the same proportion of confidence 
ratings of 1-about 0.40. Position 6, how- 
ever, has a proportion of confidence ratings 
of 2 which is 0.36, a decrease from 0.40; 
position 14 has a proportion of confidence 
ratings of 2 which is 0.48, a large increase. 
This is, of course, expected from the buffer 
model, because position 6 has a fair pro- 
portion of recoveries from the buffer, 
whereas position 14 has almost none, but 
the result is not easy to reconcile with a 
single-memory assumption. 
Of the assumptions of this model, that 
one most susceptible to alternative formula- 
tion is undoubtedly the one dealing with 
the decrease in stored information in long- 
term store. This assumption stated that all 
other items in the list caused a propor- 
tional decrease in stored information. How- 
ever, this interference p~stulate may readily 
be replaced by one in which a subject- 
controlled search through an increasingly 
large store of information becomes progres- 
sively more difficult. In order to gain a 
perspective on this point, we turn to an 
entirely different set of experiments, those 
referred to as free-verbal recall. 
In a free-verbal recall experiment, a list 
of words is presented to the subject one 
word a t  a time a t  a fixed rate. Following 
this presentation, the subject recalls as many 
words from the list as he can, in any order. 
Figure 5 shows some typical results from 
Murdock (ref. 10). Graphed is the prob- 
ability correct as a function of serial posi- 
tion. Note that the most recently presented 
I I I I I I I I 
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Serial position 
FIGURE 5.-The probability correct as a function of 
serial position. 
item is plotted to the far  right, just the 
opposite of the plots in the previous study. 
The list lengths are 10, 15, 20, 30, and 40, 
and the presentation rates are either one 
word per second or one word every 2 sec- 
onds. It is easy to see in these curves a 
marked similarity to those from the pre- 
vious study, and a natural hypothesis would 
hold that a similar model should apply. Is 
it reasonable in this case that subjects util- 
ize a rehearsal buffer? Several factors make 
it seem likely: First, rehearsal, if used, will 
contribute a large proportion of the per- 
formance actually observed, because subjects 
only report about eight words on the aver- 
age, and the buffer can hold 4 or 5 ;  the 
rehearsal will be efficient. Second, the fast 
presentation rates used will make coding 
relatively difficult. Third, many subjects 
report using rehearsal mechanisms of the 
sort hypothesized. Finally, one can use ex- 
perimental manipulations to examine effects 
of the short-term store in this situation. 
Remember that the recency effect (to the 
right on figure 5) arises because items in 
the buffer a t  test are reported correctly. 
If, following presentation, a manipulation 
is performed that will cause items in the 
buffer and short-term store to be lost, then 
the observed data should no longer have a 
recency effect ; in particular, the primacy 
effect and the asymptote (in the central por- 
tion of the curves) should remain untouched, 
but the recency effect should disappear. Ex- 
perimentally, the short-term store has beer, 
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emptied by having the subject perform 30 
seconds of arithmetic following presentation 
of the list; then recall is requested. Figure 
6 shows results gathered by Postman and 
Phillips (ref. 11) using this technique. Fig- 
ure 6 (a) shows the standard results without 
arithmetic; (6)  shows the results with 30 
seconds of intervening arithmetic. List 
lengths of 10, 20, and 30 are shown. As 
predicted, the recency effect disappears but 
the rest of the curve remains unchanged. 
I t  therefore seems quite reasonable to apply 
a buffer model to this situation. 
I I 1 1 1 1  I I 
30 sec 
I I 
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 
(b) Serial position 
FIGURE 6.-Frequency of recalls as a function of serial 
position. ( c t )  Standard results without arithmetic; 
( b )  results with 30 seconds of intervening arith- 
metic tasks. 
The precise model to be used is similar to 
that used in the previous study but even 
simpler. The buffer size is T. Every item 
is assumed to have entered the buffer. Items 
lost are chosen randomly, rather than with 
a biased probability as in the previous study. 
The reason for the change is primarily that 
we are not going to try to fit the recency 
portions of the curves (although i t  could 
be done) in the present analysis. Long-term 
information is again assumed to build up 
as a function of time spent in the buffer. 
Changes in presentation rate are thus re- 
flected in amounts of long-term information 
built up. In this model, however, interfer- 
ence is not assumed to occur ; rather a search 
process is invoked in order to account for 
the observed decrease in performance as list 
length increases. This model was originally 
proposed because it seemed quite obvious 
that the task required an extended search 
of long-term memory on the part  of the 
subject. The strong assumption is thus made 
that no information stored is lost. 
The search scheme is assumed to be, to 
a large degree, random. Suppose that; a t  
test, the strengths in memory for different 
items are Si and the total strength is xSi=S. 
We assume that in his search the subject 
makes n independent picks into the total 
stored pool of information, where n is de- 
termined primarily by the time allotted for 
responding. On any one pick, the prob- 
ability of finding the information relevant 
to item i is simply Si/S. Having found this 
information, the probability of recovering 
the correct word will depend upon the 
strength Si. As usual, the recovery prob- 
ability will be set equal to an exponential 
function of the strength. In  this model, 
the presentation rate affects the strength Si 
for an item and, hence, affects the recovery 
probability following a successful pick. The 
list length, on the other hand, affects the 
total amount of information stored S, but 
not the individual amount Si, and, hence, 
list length affects the probability of a suc- 
cessful pick, but not the probability of re- 
covery following a successful pick. This 
model has only three parameters: T, the 
buffer size; 0, the transfer rate of informa- 
tion per unit of time; and n, the number 
of picks into memory. The data to be fit 
come from four different experimenters 
(Murdock, Postman, Deese, and Shiffrin) . 
Presentation rates were either 1, 2, or 2.5 
words per second, and list lengths were 6, 
10, 11, 17, 20, 25, 30, 32, and 40; 16 differ- 
ent serial position curves altogether. A least- 
square technique was used to estimate pa- 
rameters, and they were as  follows : r = 4, 
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0=0.04, and 72x34. Table I presents the 
theoretical and observed values; overall, 
the predictions are about as accurate as 
noise in the data would allow, the primary 
effects and asymptotes being accurately fit 
for each of the 16 conditions examined. This 
is especially impressive because only three 
parameters were estimated, because a wide 
range of conditions with related wide ranges 
in performance was examined, and because 
the data were collected from a number of 
separate sources. 
These results demonstrate the workability 
of search mechanisms as an alternative to 
interference formulations, but do not, by 
themselves, allow us to choose one over the 
other. Nevertheless, there are a number of 
ways to experimentally demonstrate that 
search processes do exist in many situations. 
For example, the search theory assumes that 
on a retest some information skipped the 
first time will be found and reported: such 
is the case. We have even found, in free 
verbal recall, that an item not reported from 
a list is sometimes reported in error, as 
an intrusion, in recall of the following list. 
In any case i t  seems clear that a consider- 
able array of data may require a search 
mechanism for explanation. Because this 
mechanism can also predict effects predict- 
able by interference, the interference models 
tend to become redundant. I will conclude, 
therefore, with a prediction that the next 
few years will see many of the results of 
long-term forgetting cast in terms of appro- 
priate search models. 
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Comments 
GEORGE N.  CHATHAM 
NASA Ofice of Aduamed Research a d  Techmlogy 
GEORGE N. CHATHAM : Most of the con- 
ference thus far  has involved problems in in- 
dividual decisions, decisions made by an indi- 
vidual in a tight situation. Long-term space 
flight is not in that category, yet it is what 
you might call a t  this stage a hypothetical 
mission. As a hypothetical mission, it is an 
important analytical tool for decisionmaking 
of a different type. The whole category of 
decisions for long-term space flight could be 
considered an applied category, because there 
is an object in mind. But, of course, such 
flights have a whole hierarchy of problems 
associated with them, some of which are 
applied and some of which are not a t  this 
stage. 
The kinds of decisions that enter into long- 
term space flight are such decisions as when 
should we actually start such a venture? 
Which flight should precede or which should 
be the next? One must consider the feasibil- 
ity of the flight in terms of its mechanics, 
what contribution i t  will make to science, to 
space-flight problems, to national require- 
ments, or national problems. The chances 
are that the space program is going to be 
twice as old as i t  is now before the decision 
is actually made to begin work for a long- 
term space flight. But what class of problems 
must be solved for such a flight? The prob- 
lems must be anticipated as best we can, 
because obviously they are not going to be 
answered in the final form. 
Why would NASA be interested in research 
in this area? Because they want to be pre- 
pared and because they want to improve the 
second flight, which means they must know 
what went on in the first one. 
What is needed for correct decisions regard- 
ing the formation of these long-term mis- 
sions? First, we must provide the facilities 
that will make correct decisions possible. 
Second, we must make sure that i t  is possi- 
ble for the astronaut to make the correct 
decisions once he has the facilities. The first 
category involves problems in architecture, 
which is a relatively new thought in NASA. 
There is only one very small effort involved 
on what kind of architecture you can do in 
space. It is a completely different concept in 
architecture, in which the central purpose is 
to maximize the use of volume and surfaces 
that are available within the weight limita- 
tions. They are studying ways to provide 
maximum utility for the finite amount of 
space for 7 to 12 men. Whatever number is 
eventually decided upon, the architectural 
principles will remain fairly constant. 
The first category also raises questions 
with regard to the equipment. I think that 
any equipment should be as fail-safe as  possi- 
ble. But it should also provide time for deci- 
sions; that is, it must maximize the time 
available for decisions. 
There is also the matter of the type and 
amount of communication that you wish to 
provide, within the ship and also to Earth. 
To have complete ground control for such 
a long-range flight would be fairly difficult. 
Medical provision for emergencies on 
board, both of a physical and mental type, 
is another very important area that is some- 
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times omitted. Also, what do you do in the 
event of death? These decisions must be 
made before beginning final design of the 
ship. All of these items are in what you 
might call the facilities area, the mechanics 
of the spaceship itself. 
In the human area, one of the main prob- 
lems is that of selecting persons who would 
be suitable for such a trip. This is an area 
that has been investigated a great deal and 
the findings are very contradictory. It is a 
quagmire of opinion a t  the present time. 
Cross-training is, of course, essential; there 
are only a few men on board and the dan- 
gers are not completely foreseeable. Prefer- 
ably, every man should know every other 
man's job well enough to do it, not only in 
terms of running the craft, but also in 
terms of giving medical treatment or the 
carrying-out procedures that are called for 
in the book of ship's rules. 
Another major question is what kind of 
social structure shall be provided? Obviously 
there is going to be a book of ship's rules, 
some of which are obvious and can be fore- 
seen readily, others of which we will have 
to make best estimates on, such as the de- 
gree of authority that is present on the ship. 
Also ship's rules should spell out the use 
of time, on duty as well as off. 
These are the main areas of concern. They 
contain problems, many of which we have 
talked about. Decisions will have to be 
made in these problem areas prior to the 
initiation of long-term space flight. The 
important message is this: there is a hier- 
archy of these decisions. People who are 
wondering what areas would be most rele- 
vant to work in have to think in terms of 
this hierarchy. They must consider whether 
they are really worrying about the fifth 
decimal place or whether they are  making 
a contribution that will be actually needed. 
In reviewing the research in this area, I 
have found that a great deal of what is 
done under the label of long-term space flight 
is simply teasing a decimal place that no 
one is particularly interested in. This is 
unfortunate when there are many glaring 
problems facing us. 
The persons interested in getting into this 
area and working with the Government on 
such projects would have to consider first 
of all what kind of hierarchical structure the 
problems have. The writer of a proposal 
has to think in these terms: what problems 
exist, and what is their relative importance? 
And, of course, what is the commonality, 
which is one of the things I think is most 
important in this meeting. The answers to 
many of these problems relate to many 
problems. An answer might have been de- 
veloped for a specific problem, but, of course, 
generality is an important aspect of it. 
This paper was initially supposed to be a 
review of the research on long-term space 
flight presented here. There was not really 
enough aimed a t  that problem to review. 
What I have done is to capsule the whole 
problem in terms of how a planner would 
view i t  a t  this time. 
Panel Discussion 
STANLEY DEUTSCH, Chairman 
NASA Ofice of Aduanced Research and Technology 
EDWARD M. HUFF: I would like to ask 
your views about the capabilities of the 
astronauts on long-term flights. There seems 
to be some contradiction in strategy between 
having scientist-astronauts and having a 
meaningful redundancy capability. 
GEORGE N. CHATHAM : The ability of each 
astronaut to do the other's job refers to 
their versatility in the maintenance and 
running of the ship as well as their ability 
to provide the medical treatment required 
to maintain each other. In order to estab- 
lish the scientific training they would need, 
we must first define the purpose of a long 
mission. For example, are we to bring back 
50 pounds of Mars, as we are doing from 
the Moon? Once this task is determined, 
perhaps the category of the personnel on 
board can be more clearly examined. Whether 
or not a scientist is needed, as opposed to 
a test pilot, is a question that will have to 
be settled then. It certainly is not settled 
now. I have no hint of it. Do you? 
R. MARK PATTON: NO; except that my 
impression is that the space program will 
tend to go the way it is going unless some- 
thing drastic happens. I have read from 
time to time that someone is proposing that 
the typical present astronaut will not be 
able to make it because of personality or 
temperament. The proposals can be as ex- 
treme as sending a legless Buddhist monk 
to save weight, and a t  the same time get 
someone who can stand the psychological 
stresses. I presume that people like the 
present pilot astronauts will, in fact, go on 
any Mars trip. Any realistic planning must 
presume this. 
CHATHAM : You can take the other side, 
too, and say: Is the scientist such a beauti- 
fclly balanced personality that he could make 
it when the typical astronaut could not? 
PATTON: The one thing we have been 
thinking about, but are not really far enough 
along with, is that we may find differences 
according to the motivation. It seems to 
me that the trip to and from Mars might 
be very exciting for the scientist-astronaut, 
particularly if he is carrying out his experi- 
mental activities all along the way. But the 
trip might turn out after a while to be very 
tedious and dull for the pilot-astronaut. It 
might be very tedious for him to monitor 
never-occurring warning lights for system 
failures. So I see a possible dichotomy. We 
have been interested in this from a labora- 
tory approach, because we thought we could 
manipulate the effects of inherent job inter- 
est on various things that occur in groups, 
the interpersonal relationships. Virtually 
no research has been done in this area. We 
have some ideas along the line, but they are 
not easy to implement. 
Research in the area of team performance 
more commonly concerns itself with such 
things as leadership roles and coalition for- 
mation. The question of who forms a coali- 
tion in a mixed pilot-scientist group should 
be a matter of interest. 
CHATHAM : There has been work in this 
area. The armed services have had a prob- 
lem in small group behavior for a long 
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time and have written a great deal about 
it, some of which is useful. This is currently 
being surveyed by Dr. Sells a t  Texas Chris- 
tian University, under a study Deutsch is 
managing. Part  of it is already out, is i t  not? 
STANLEY DEUTSCH: Yes. To go back to 
Huff's question, basically the redundancy 
will be in terms of the operational, the 
maintenance, the command structure, or the 
station-keeping activities. I do not feel that 
we will be able to afford redundancy in terms 
of scientific capabilities. If we get the sci- 
entist on board, the men will represent 
separate technical specialties. And if, in- 
deed, you wipe out part of your scientific 
program, this is not as catastrophic as wip- 
ing out part of your operational program, 
which could mean the safety of the crew. 
WILLIAM ALLEN The results of Mission 
Analysis Division maintainability studies, 
matching the crew with the reliabilities of 
the system, show that you must have main- 
tenance people available a t  all times; there- 
fore, a scientist-until you get a crew of 
12 or more-will have to have some main- 
tenance skill. 
CHATHAM: There will be no room, I 
assume, a t  this time for a prima donna on 
board. 
ALLEN: He can be a prima donna, but 
he must also be a good electrician. 
PATTON : My theory has always been, not 
a good electrician, but an electronic genius, 
if I were going along. 
JOSEPH MARKOWITZ: IS there any infor- 
mation on pilots, with a relatively low work- 
load on a long flight, going off autopilot and 
introducing motivation ? 
GEORGE A. RATHERT: It happens all the 
time. They will interrogate the system or-- 
STEVEN E. BELSLEY: Have you never 
taken an 880 from San Francisco to St. 
Louis ? 
RATHERT : It  is more than possible-it is 
highly probable. 
DEUTSCH: In one of the studies, we are 
trying to determine what you do with off- 
duty time. There has been a lot of consider- 
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ation to structuring the tasks for the astro- 
nauts and astronaut-scientists. Everybody 
says that they are going to be very busy. But 
for 500 to 600 days, will they continue the 
level of intensity of effort? The question 
then is what kind of off-duty or discretionary 
activities should be provided ( I  say discre- 
tionary, not programed, not forced) that will 
permit them to avoid the problems men- 
tioned? 
MARI;OWITZ : I have one other question. 
Over such a long time period, say, a 2-year 
mission, may people lose interest in their 
own tasks and get interested in tasks that 
were not originally assigned to them? The 
scientist being most interested in flying the 
craft manually and the pilot being quite 
interested, for example, in teaching him? 
And a t  the end of the mission they might 
have quite different roles; that is, the pilot 
may become very interested in the scientific 
observations. 
DEUTSCH: Actually this strikes me as 
something that should be encouraged, pro- 
vided that the scientist remains the scientist 
and the engineer does not become the scien- 
tist solely because he has a strong person- 
ality. These are the kinds of problems, I 
think, Patton is referring to. 
MARKOWITZ: AS long as  people's skills 
are rank ordered according to their com- 
mand responsibility, that would be all right. 
Suppose, however, that the scientist ends up 
being a better pilot than the pilot, or vice 
versa? 
PATTON: I have heard people state that 
it is easier to train a pilot to be a scientist 
than it is to train a scientist to be a pilot. 
WARD EDWARDS : We have several scien- 
tist-pilots in the audience. They might dis- 
agree. 
MARKOWITZ : My last question is whether 
the pilot's performance may deteriorate as 
he increases his specialty in some other field? 
RATHERT : I would say the probability of 
that occurring is extremely small. 
DEUTSCH : Constant refresher training, 
perhaps. 
MARKOWITZ: YOU are not going to fly 
any onboard simulations ? 
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HAROLD G. MILLER: They had better 
plan to. 
DEUTSCH : HOW would YOU do that? With 
real-type problems? If you give meaningless 
tasks, you will have problems. In agreement 
with Miller, we ought to try to provide re- 
fresher training. The nature of this re- 
fresher training is, however, still a good 
question. 
MILLER: This is going to impact space- 
craft design and computer size. 
RATHERT : You are discussing a problem 
that has been with us for a long, long time. 
I have never met a test pilot who did not 
think he was a better airplane designer than 
I am; and I am sure that most of the test 
pilots think I act like I know more about fly- 
ing than they do. There is conflict in your 
own field of psychology about the design of 
instrument displays. This has been going 
along forever-the pilots claiming you are 
trying to tell them how to fly the airplane, 
and you thinking that they are encroaching 
on your field and telling you how to solve 
information-processing problems. . 
CHATHAM: I agree with you fully. You 
do not have to be ordained to be a scientist 
any more than you do to be a pilot. It is just 
a matter of the application of certain infor- 
mation or skills in any case or any profes- 
sion. 
D o u w ~  B. YNTEMA: YOU draw a rather 
dark picture about research in decisionmak- 
ing in this area. At least if we accept what 
Edwards was urging: that discussion of 
decisionmaking must involve the question, 
"For what purpose are these decisions being 
made?" 
CHATHAM: The purposes are also se- 
lected by decisions. You must consider what 
i t  is that would be the biggest payoff on the 
first flight. This, too, is a decision. 
RATHERT: I think you are very, very 
conservative in your estimates of the moti- 
vation on the very long flights. 
We put a test pilot and a scientist together 
in an Apollo mockup, 65 cubic feet per man. 
We did a 7-day experiment. We were told 
before we started that we would never get 
a serious NASA research test pilot to sit 
still for this kind of confinement. He walked 
out of our test, flew across the country, and 
went through the same experience again for 
Martin Marietta voluntarily. The motivation 
is extremely high and extremely untapped. 
I hear an awful lot of what I must frankly 
call hot air, people expressing doubts about 
the motivation. The motivation for actual 
mission is there, and we are going to have to 
stop worrying about it. 
YNTEMA: There is a good deal of prac- 
tical experience with a slightly larger volume 
of space per man and a slightly shorter 
period of time (like 8 months in the South 
Polar station, with a community of scien- 
tists), except that some of the variables are 
a couple of decibels off. 
RATHERT: I always remember our expe- 
rience with the astronauts and our own test 
pilots when we were determining minimum 
habitability space for the lunar mission. A 
lot of elaborate tests were made and a lot of 
money was spent, and the basic pilot answer 
was the one you gave a t  the start:  "If you 
are selecting me as the astronaut for the first 
lunar mission, I will go in a telephone booth." 
And they showed they could do it. 
MELVIN SADOFF:' I would like to react 
to Huff's original question with respect to 
whether you would have a scientist aboard 
or a test pilot aboard. I t  seems to me that we 
would have an awfully difficult time selling 
any trip to Mars, Venus, or any interplan- 
etary flight just because we have capability 
to get there (like climbing Mount Everest 
because it is there). A multibillion-dollar 
program will require scientists on board. 
Many documents available in NASA publi- 
cations say just exactly this; namely, the 
reason we are going is for scientific inquiry. 
Now, the extent to which test pilots and 
scientists will be combined is, perhaps, the 
question that needs to be included in the 
decisionmaking processes involved in space 
mission planning. 
CHATHAM: Actually when words like 
"scientist" are used, ordinarily one thinks 
that reference is made to a specific person. 
"Chief, Man-Machine Integration Branch, NASA 
Ames Research Center. 
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More properly, a scientist is a person con- 
ducting scientific work. No matter whom 
you train to do this, a t  the time he is working 
as a scientist, he is a scientist. These points 
must be considered, too, when you are think- 
ing about who will go. 
BELSLEY: This argument that you are 
discussing right now has been solved, a t  least 
a t  one level, by saying that the scientists do 
not believe that astronauts can become sci- 
entists, so they insist on scientists becoming 
astronauts. This is the position the Space 
Science Board, or whatever, took to force 
the inclusion of scientists in the cadre for 
going to the Moon. 
JOHN W. SENDERS: In the 1962 summer 
study a t  Iowa, this problem, as I recall, was 
aired for the first time. The document that 
came out of the study specified a hierarchy 
of differential degrees of scientism and astro- 
nautism, culminating with the conceivable 
notion that there might be situations in 
which people who had no astronaut capa- 
bility whatsoever might be sent along as 
pure scientist passengers. This was pro- 
jected for sometime in the 1970's, but none- 
theless it still remains a possibility. 
LLOYD A. JEFFRESS : The astronaut must 
make decisions every once in a while about 
which of two lines of action to take, and it 
seems to me the same thing is going to be 
true of the scientist. Unless a person has a 
fairly rich background on which to base the 
decisionmaking, he is not going to be as 
useful a member of the crew as if he were 
merely trained to do certain things. Maybe 
these things are not practical and something 
totally different will turn out to be the thing 
that should have been done. 
HUFF: Along these lines, exactly what 
kind of conflict situations could exist between 
the scientific activities and maintenance ac- 
tivities? If one allows for the fact that vari- 
ous problems can arise a t  any time, then, 
depending on the scientific workload and the 
necessity of using scientists for maintenance 
purposes, you get into a decisional bind as to 
what should be sacrificed for what. Not all 
emergency situations have catastrophic im- 
pact. Some could be postponed and delayed. 
Really, as I see it, it comes down to a matter 
of workload. 
CHATHAM : It does come down to a mat- 
ter of workload, but it comes to something 
else too, in terms of which action comes first 
when neither would be catastrophic. This 
goes back to another problem: the degree 
of authority on board, the kind of social 
structure established on board. If the cap- 
tain decides which action comes first, even 
when no emergency exists, the social struc- 
ture is highly authoritarian. On the other 
hand, are we going to leave i t  up to a vote? 
This will have to be settled. 
PATTON: Chatham, do you not think 
this problem is almost directly analogous to 
the Antarctic situation in which, as I under- 
stand it, there is a military-scientist inter- 
face? The military has the authority over 
the base and the military functions, and the 
scientists have the authority over their sci- 
ence. I t  seems to me that there is a direct 
analogy here that would suggest you do the 
same thing in space flight. I cannot imagine 
setting up a really democratic space flight 
society. 
CHATHAM: I do not think anyone can. 
There is no such precedent in any ship that 
ever existed. 
PATTON: The commander is going to be 
the commander. And, if in his judgment 
mission safety is endangered by anything, 
he is going to make the decision that i t  must 
be the other way. 
CHATHAM : I do not think any command- 
er would attempt to control the scientist to 
the degree of telling him how to conduct his 
experiment. His concern should be the rela- 
tionship of the experiment to the overall 
mission in terms of safety, the use of facil- 
ities, or whatever. 
DEUTSCH: If current plans go through, 
we may see a study that will take another 
tack. Chatham indicated the fact that he 
cannot think of any mission, certainly any 
real-role mission and probably simulated 
missions as well, where command structure 
was not formalized. But we are thinking of 
the possibility of an undersea habitability 
study of four men in a habitat 50 feet below 
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the surface of the water for some 60 days. 
They will be monitored both physiologically 
and psychologically. This may give us an- 
other slant on the question you raised: Is 
the only reason that a commander will be 
designated because he has had prior experi- 
ence in a study of this nature? The subjects 
will not know each other and will not have 
lived together for very long before they go 
under water. In addition to this, there is no 
reason to believe that the predesignated com- 
mander is the best qualified man, except by 
virtue of experience, to head up this activity. 
In some of the prior Sealab studies, the most 
experienced diver has become the functional 
commander. Maybe this will carry over. We 
do not know. But this is a case where there 
is not a highly formalized, structured system. 
It is deliberately set up this way from the 
social dynamic standpoint to see what hap- 
pens in the command structure. 
PATTON : I am reminded of the Admiral 
Hornblower books, in which the admiral 
must defer in certain matters to the captain 
of whatever ship he happens to be on. Even 
though Admiral Hornblower really might 
know more about sailing the ship, it would 
be the most gross, inexcusable violation of 
etiquette of the situation for him to tell the 
captain anything about how to trim the sails, 
or whether the wind is coming up, and so 
forth. I think this still goes on because there 
are admirals aboard Navy ships today who 
do not tell a captain how to run his ship. 
DEUTSCH : The captain is responsible for 
the safety of the ship. If anything happens 
to the ship, it is the captain, not the admiral, 
who will get roasted. This may be why the 
admiral does not interfere. 
BELSLEY: They tell him where to go, but 
they do not tell him how to get there. 
RATHERT: YOU are overlooking one con- 
flict. When you begin to get the research 
results of Serendipity on the mission, some 
of the conflicts between the scientists will 
make the conflicts between the scientist and 
the pilot look like nothing. 
YNTEMA: I understand that in the little 
12-man station close to the South Pole, the 
command structure was interesting and 
somewhat flexible and might well be worth 
interviews. There has also been a good deal 
of experience with long research voyages. 
I gather that there is a rule book, but the 
actual decisionmaking processes are rather 
subtle. 
CHATHAM: That is an excellent point. 
There is another too, that backs your state- 
ment that there will be squabbles among the 
scientists. A good portion of the Antarctic 
study showed that things become more im- 
portant as the number of available stimuli 
decrease. In other words, things become ex- 
aggerated. This seems to be a uniform ob- 
servation of people in small isolated groups: 
the problem of exaggeration, not only of 
things to do but also of irritations. We 
should anticipate squabbles, and should pro- 
vide ways of settling them. 
RATHERT: Ames has its Convair-990 
flying laboratory, a large 4-engine jet air- 
liner that carries typically 8 to 10 scientific 
experiments (aurora observations, comets, 
eclipses, this sort of thing). There are 8 to 
10 investigators, typically rather senior men 
from the universities. Ames sends along on 
this airplane a senior scientist, a peer of the 
investigators, who is there for the obvious 
reason and appears to be a necessary part of 
the crew. These are only 8- to 10-day expe- 
ditions, but it seems necessary even there to 
provide a peer judgment. In other words, the 
pilot of the airplane conceivably could act as 
the captain in determining how to position 
the airplane, but it is actually done by the 
process of having a peer of the investigators 
on board. 
PATTON : Does he have authority over the 
pilot ? 
RATHERT: He has authority to tell the 
pilot what to do, until, in the judgment of 
the pilot, he is endangering the ship. 
RICHARD C. ATKINSON: I wonder about 
this concept of conceiving of the crew as the 
onboard personnel. Given modern communi- 
cation systems and all, why must one con- 
ceive of the crew as people sitting on board 
the ship ? The executive officer on the bridge 
of the ship makes instantaneous decisions 
without consulting the captain-if they are 
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called for. Why not redefine the concept of 
the crew as certain specialized people sitting 
on the Earth plus those in flight? Frankly, 
I am not much impressed with the idea of 
sending a scientist off in space. The only 
rationale, from my point of view, in sending 
a scientist is not instantaneous decisionmak- 
ing, but his ability to communicate the sci- 
entific data to an Earth station. I wonder if 
there is not something to be said for chuck- 
ing this idea of onboard personnel and rede- 
fining the concept of the crew as a limited 
set of people sitting on Earth. That does not 
mean everybody a t  Houston Center. 
MARKOWITZ: There is almost this idea 
now. The same argument you advanced for 
sending a scientist up was the reason that 
Cap-Com has been an astronaut. 
PATTON : Long communications delays 
are a factor. On the Venus swingby, a 30- 
minute delay for getting scientific advice 
from Earth would be intolerable. A lot of 
scientific decisions will have to be made de- 
pending on the state of the equipment a t  the 
time the ship goes into the swingby. There 
has to be the competence on board to make a 
decision, whether the man is labeled a sci- 
entist or a scientist-astronaut. 
MILLER: The inertia of the system is 
such that the flight director and mission 
director and people on the ground say sort 
of when to come home over the objections 
of the crew, and the crew maybe acts like a 
captain; but in major directional decisions 
the ground has the final say. I would see no 
reason for this to change in the longer flights. 
PATTON: They are acting like the ad- 
miral, are they not? 
MILLER: Yes. 
DEUTSCH : IS that not like the story about 
the man who says that he and his wife have 
decided she is going to make the minor de- 
cisions and he is going to make the major 
decisions, and so far  there have been no 
major decisions to be made? 
MILLER : NO, that is not the case. In fact, 
history will bear me out. On the GT-8, where 
the people on the ground told the crew to 
come down because they had violated the 
mission rule of using the reentry attitude 
control gas and broken the seal, they said, 
"If you do that, come back, because it could 
leak out." The crew did not object, but they 
would have liked to stay up a little longer. 
DEUTSCH: Let me take the chairman's 
prerogative and cut off this line of discussion. 
I want to indicate a feeling of frustration 
on my part in this respect: There were a 
number of problems identified, and I fee1 
that we are going to have another session in 
which those problems identified become the 
topic. I think it is typical of meetings of 
this nature that you usually raise more prob- 
lems than you answer. Along these lines, 
then, I am not certain of the rules of the 
game that permitted discussion here of some 
of the research that I heard described. I am 
not sure how these discussions fall within 
the rules of the game of decisionmaking. I 
feel intuitively that the studies could move 
in that direction, but I do not have a satis- 
factory feeling of closure that the applica- 
tions were made in terms of the name of the 
game for decisionmaking concepts, even with 
the three categories that Yntema described. 
We know that if a man is on line, he can 
respond more rapidly than if he is off line; 
he has to get on line to find out what past 
history has just evolved that may have led 
to the emergency and what steps he can take 
to satisfactorily resolve the problem. Should 
an astronaut always be on line, to what ex- 
tent, and within what time frame must he 
operate ? 
I am not sure that the discussions of the 
research really fit into providing answers to 
some of these problems. Does anybody have 
any suggestions as to how these types of 
research can provide the kinds of answers 
for some of the problems raised? 
ALLUISI: I want to go back to what 
Birdsall was saying. I would say that the 
question you just asked and the approach 
you took to it is fully an approach of a re- 
searcher and not a development man, in the 
sense that we would always like to know more 
than we now know when we build a system. 
When we get ready to build a system, we have 
to build it on what we have and know. We 
have to make our estimates ; we have to make 
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our guesses ; we have to make them the best 
way we can. We very often know of areas 
in which we do not have good research back- 
ing up the design, but in many cases we do 
not even know we lack the research. But this 
is not peculiar to psychology. I t  is generally 
true with every field of knowledge in the 
world. 
The problem is how to get the research 
kind of information into the form that the 
applications person, the actual designer, can 
use. I do not know that we will ever have a 
solution. It is like a different language. 
I am not even sure we can solve our prob- 
lem if we put people in the middle. What 
would the person in the middle do? We are 
hunting for a solution in which we ask for 
a man to be the Renaissance man, the jack- 
of-all-trades who knows all ends. Most of us 
do not know enough about either the re- 
search or the application ends. There is too 
much on both sides for any one person to 
know. All the middle man can do is be a 
catalyst. All he can do is try to bring to- 
gether the people with the knowledge on the 
two sides. 
I have done research for a number of years 
on reaction time that is directly related to 
decisionmaking, specifically showing that 
reaction time is a linear function of the num- 
ber of alternatives in a choice reaction task, 
and showing that the rate of gain of infor- 
mation is a constant. This research also 
shows that the rate of gain of information 
may be varied by changing some aspect of 
the performance situation, such as the stimu- 
lus-response compatibility. I show that if 
stimulus-response compatibility is high, as 
it is in a compact console, the rate of gain of 
information will be a constant, but it will be 
a t  a lower slope than when the stimulus- 
response compatibility is low. Mainly, what 
this says is that with training, the stimulus- 
response compatibility will be increased, and 
decisions may enter the class of behavior 
that is essentially automatic. Decisions will 
be made more rapidly, and may even become 
independent of increases in the number of 
alternatives. What does this mean? As we 
learn things well enough-as we overlearn 
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them-we can handle a wider variety of 
things with essentially a flat reaction time. 
Now you ask me to apply that. How do I 
apply that in the design of a system? 
CHATHAM : You must give the engineer 
the criteria that he needs. The engineer 
does not have these criteria. You said a com- 
patible ensemble flattens this curve. The 
engineer must be given the parameters that 
you know will make that ensemble compat- 
ible, otherwise he is going to spread i t  out 
to suit his own convenience. 
ALLUISI : We are never going to find that 
we can have a large body of researchers who 
are doing exactly what the design engineers 
would like to have them doing, nor can we 
have a group of design engineers who are 
doing exactly what the researchers would 
like them to be doing. 
We have different goals to achieve. And 
we are going to keep approaching our goals 
in our own best way. What we need to do 
is to come together like this more often and 
come together a little less formally than we 
have, not merely with some people stating 
problems and some people stating research, 
but rather with some of the people who are 
stating research sitting down with some of 
the people stating problems and the two of 
them jointly looking a t  each from the other's 
point of view. I would like to get some of 
the design people looking a t  the research, 
because they will assimilate it and they will 
be applying it without even knowing what 
the rules are. 
Again, I want to stress that I do not think 
this is peculiar to our field. I think it is the 
same in every field. I think you might have 
a very fine physicist who is the world's 
expert on the tensile strength of metals as  
a function of temperature but who cannot 
design a bridge. 
DEUTSCH: I did not want to give the 
impression that I felt Ihat the research 
described was useless and meaningless. What 
I did mean to imply was that certain prob- 
lems were identified. You cannot provide all 
the problems in advance to the speakers and 
say, "All right, here are the problems." 
ALLUISI: I do not shy away from the 
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application. I think any scientist who shies 
away from the application is that much less 
a scientist and more of a theologian, because 
the test of any science is the technology. If 
it does not work, i t  is not right. 
DEUTSCH: I would agree. I think you 
gave some very pertinent examples. Again 
I did not mean to imply that the application 
was not there. But how does control theory 
tie into the decisionmaking problems that 
were expressed here? 
JOHN A. SWETS: May I speak to that 
point? You are asking about the organiza- 
tion of the conference, and I protested on the 
first day that we did not start with a topic 
and then choose speakers. If we had done 
that and started with decisionmaking, we 
might have had any number of people. In 
fact, we started with speakers, with people 
doing research under Ames support, and then 
probably did a poor job of choosing a title 
rubric to bring these people together. I pro- 
tested that maybe human information proc- 
essing might have been a more appropriate 
term that would include memory, attention, 
and a few other things; manual control is 
another. But even if we worry about de- 
cisionmaking, i t  depends in many instances 
on memory, on attention; in many cases it 
is implemented through a manual control 
process. 
EDWARDS: I thought, initially, when I 
heard what was going to go on here, that the 
meeting was misnamed, but found myself 
being argued out of it by the speakers I 
listened to, even though they were talking 
about things like manual control. Perhaps 
the key to the arguing-out process was the 
point made first by Yntema and then made 
again by a number of us that a convergence 
is visible in trends in this kind of research. 
I think that perhaps your concern illustrates 
this particularly well. I t  is increasingly 
clear that the researchers on manual control 
are really looking for the places where values 
of various kinds get in, where decisions 
really do enter the process. 
Signal detectability theory is a clear-cut 
attempt to use decision theoretical ideas in 
what was traditionally an area of research 
not thought of in this way. A great deal of 
the motivation for that analysis was to give 
an account of decision effects so that sensory 
aspects of the total system can be studied 
without contanlination by decision aspects. 
But inevitably the decision aspects have been 
studied too. About the only traditional area 
of human experimental psychology research 
that is somewhat resistant to this ingress of 
decisions is verbal learning, and even there 
the signal detectability ideas are being fruit- 
fully applied. 
So I was argued out of the feeling that a 
lot of this conference did not have much to 
do with decisionmaking, essentially because 
a t  the abstract level it seems to become in- 
creasingly clear that you cannot talk about 
any kind of human intellectual activity or 
human purposive activity without introduc- 
ing decision-theoretical concepts. 
DEUTSCH: I think somewhere you must 
define the limits. It is like saying that any 
research that you do in any of the areas is 
applicable across the board. I suppose to 
an extent they are. 
EDWARDS: My point is that this recog- 
nition of the pervasiveness of decisions is 
more than lipservice. The lipservice could 
have been available 20 years ago because, as 
a sort of abstract point, it was clear 20 years 
ago that actions are the result of decisions. 
But, increasingly, this is coming to be not 
only obvious but theoretically useful. 
JEROME I. ELKIND: I disagree with the 
prior statement. I t  seems to me that one of 
the beauties of this theory is that the limits 
are not clear. You do not want to define the 
limits; you want to extend the range of 
applications. 
One main reason is the kinds of systems 
with which you are concerned. If you can 
find a common basis for talking about many 
of them or most of them, you have a way of 
starting to deal with them. 
SWETS: You stated one problem-if you 
let the machine make the decisions and the 
human operator dope off, then he does not 
do very well when he has to override the 
system, the automatic decisionmaker-and 
two or three others of that sort: I suspect 
that if we had invited people to come to speak 
precisely on those problems, these people 
would not be here. In fact, i t  is nice to have 
researchers here, because you want them to 
start  thinking about some of those problems. 
DEUTSCH : This is why I indicated that 
this is perhaps not the last meeting. Perhaps 
the problems that were thrown out will pro- 
vide grist for the mill, if you will, and pro- 
vide indications of things that might be 
looked a t  that are of direct interest to those 
who are working in these research areas. 
SWETS : We did not hope the first meeting 
would be the last meeting. I guess we do not 
think we are that far along. 
THEODORE G. BIRDSALL : Let me add one 
point along with Edwards'. I think that a 
lot of the human-performance measurement 
reported shows that the abstract models or 
just mathematical models or the models the 
engineers use for decisionmaking in equip- 
ment can indeed be applied to human beings. 
You can begin to quantify a lot of it and i t  
can be talked about in the same terms. 
If we talk about human decisionmaking or 
machine decisionmaking in the same terms, 
then we can build equipment to replace the 
human. Yet, the kind of decisionmaking 
that almost always comes up, and, I think, 
the kind that requires the human to be there 
is the override-type decisionmaking on the 
things you do not plan for, the things that 
you cannot take into account when you do 
build the equipment. In Edwards' examples, 
the decisions were made on the basis of facts 
that were there, but that were not in the 
original model. The original model for the 
decisionmaking did not take them into ac- 
count. That is one problem with hardware. 
You design it and it has limitations. If you 
tell it to forget about something, i t  beauti- 
fully forgets it. A lot of the human's job 
is to keep track of all the information inputs 
that really must be thrown in all the time 
so that he can override the machine on those 
things for which the machine is just too 
stupid to have remembered had happened or 
was never programed to even realize that 
those things might be relevant. 
That is a hard line to draw. If we thor- 
oughly understood everything that was going 
to go in, we could automate the whole proc- 
ess. We must realize that we cannot. So 
we put a tremendous burden on the human 
being. He has to be the supergenius who 
is better than the equipment designer who 
takes into account a11 the things that might 
happen, all the very small, low-probability 
things for which the machine designer said, 
"Well, we will just take those out." If you 
want to automate i t  completely, how would 
you ever build the automatic equipment that 
is going to take this into account? How would 
you feed this information into i t ?  How 
much storage, how much capacity, how much 
real computation of all these possibilities 
would i t  have to account for? I think some- 
how working down this line will be the 
kind of research that will pay off in what 
the human part in this decision is going 
to be. 
ATKINSON: I get the feeling from some 
of the remarks you have made that the feel- 
ing is that if the scientists would just really 
take some time and get familiar with these 
problems, they would be able to come up with 
a lot of clear answers as to how to proceed. 
I am really aghast at  behavioral scientists 
looking at a problem area and coming up 
with very clear principles as to how to 
proceed. Look a t  Skinner's suggestions as  
to how to write a programed text. It is 
really frightening to think of someone turn- 
ing to the curriculum community and say- 
ing, "Look, you cannot possibly understand 
the psychological research underlying all 
these principles, but if you proceed in the 
following way you will design a good cur- 
riculum." I t  is just utter nonsense. What 
we are going to provide is worse than pro- 
viding nothing a t  all. 
DEUTSCH: I am not sure that is totally 
true, insofar as there are all levels of scien- 
tists and all levels of engineers. And there 
are those who are involved in purely basic 
research and those in highly applied re- 
search. In this case you do have those who 
fill a gap. Perhaps the area of human fac- 
tors is one that is really applied engineer- 
ing, applied psychology, what have you. It 
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does attempt to fill this gap because its 
workers can speak, to a certain extent, both 
languages. I agree that if you do not keep 
providing the raw material a t  the research 
end, the development work cannot continue. 
On the other hand, if we prepare a bunch of 
reports and put them in a file and forget 
about them, we cannot expect some prac- 
titioner to come along and pick them up and 
utilize them. 1 think there is a necessary 
middle of the box, if you will. 
Along the lines Birdsall brought up, I 
would agree, how do we make these decision- 
making processes available, in this case, to 
our population, our customers, the astro- 
nauts? I am thinking in terms of the prob- 
lem of training in decisionmaking. What 
can we do in this area, for example, to pro- 
vide training for astronauts, and in what 
areas and to what extent would this be 
advisable ? 
EDWARDS: Those are two quite different 
questions, of course. You can do a lot about 
training once you are committed to a par- 
ticular decisionmaking process. But whether 
i t  is possible to reach a firm enough con- 
clusion about how you want the process 
structured to permit a training program- 
that is another question. And that is some- 
thing about which a lot of research needs 
to be done. 
I believe that explicit decision processes 
are better than intuitive ones, but that is 
only a bias. And I do not know of any data 
that satisfactorily establish that principle, 
even in the laboratory, much less in more 
nearly operational situations. I think maybe 
one of the things we can do in settings like 
MCC is to t ry  to get some inputs relevant 
to questions like: Do you want to train these 
guys to make decisions explicitly, and if so, 
how? 
DEUTSCH: In a sense, what you are say- 
ing is that they can be trained in decision- 
making intuitively. So you believe this? 
EDWARDS : No question about it. 
DEUTSCH : HOW YOU do i t  is another ques- 
tion, however. 
EDWARDS : I am saying, sure, I know very 
well how to train people in formal proee- 
dures for decisionmaking. What I do not 
know is whether it is better to train them 
in formal procedures or just let them make 
decisions the way they do now. 
RATHERT : At this exact point I am stand- 
ing right in the middle. The X airlines' 
training man is saying, "How do I train 
pilots to handle the decision when they enter 
turbulent air?" How do I get you two people 
together ? 
EDWARDS : I am not hard to find. 
RATHERT: In this case I have found you, 
but the problem in general is:  What is the 
next move? This is an example of the prac- 
tical everyday problem that walks into my 
ofice, where I am in the middle and see 
the development man with his problem and 
not the slightest idea of how to tackle it, 
and see the research man who thinks he 
might know how if he knew more about 
the problem. You cannot depend on seren- 
dipity to find both ends. 
PATTON: It seems to me that the role of 
Government people in the matter is twofold. 
There is, of course, our in-house work, where 
we continually attempt to bring the real 
world and the laboratory together in a mean- 
ingful way. But the matter of research con- 
tracts and grants is equally important. In 
evaluating proposals and making decisions 
on funding, we are very conscious of this 
factor. In my experience, very few proposals 
show a good grasp of a real-world problem, 
as well as a promising scientific approach 
to its solution. I do not think that covering 
both sides is too much to ask, because occa- 
sionally it does happen. 
On the positive side, I think that there is 
a growing awareness of the need. Really, it 
is the primary reason for this conference. 
I do not expect that we will go away with 
some final solution. Our idea was to pro- 
vide an opportunity to do some interacting, 
and hopefully to bring the two domains a 
little closer together. 
ALLUISI: It is a big part of what DOD 
is trying to get a t  in its THEMIS program, 
in what they refer to as the coupling mech- 
anism. That has been our problem. 
PATTON: If you are at a university, and 
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want your work to be meaningful and to 
have an impact on system development, you 
ought to spend your sabbatical year as a 
member of a systems development team in 
industry. Then when you return to your 
laboratory, you should have a wealth of in- 
formation that will make your work more 
realistic. The alternatives are to gather the 
information on an occasional basis, or to 
hire people (team members or consultants) 
who know about the problems, and can edu- 
cate the others. I sometimes think that 
people expect some formula to be developed 
that will allow one to do system-related re- 
search without investing a lot of time and 
energy in learning about systems. The fact 
is that you do have to learn about systems 
and thus become expert in two domains, 
which few people are willing to do. 
BELSLEY : IS not the problem one of try- 
ing to couch the terms of your research, 
done a t  whatever level you want to do it, 
such that the man who has a practical prob- 
lem can recognize that there is a body of 
knowledge that could be applied? If he could 
recognize it, he would go out of his way 
to apply it. The basic trouble is that there 
is a fuzzy area in which one guy talks in 
one language and the other guy is looking 
for something in another language. You 
can do this by writing summary papers in 
which you try to do things in a broader 
sense. If the information is put forth so 
that the development people can recognize 
it, they will use it. They are not stupid. 
SWETS : DO not overlook Birdsall's point 
in this respect. Real progress has been made 
in describing human performance in the 
same terms that machine performance has 
been described. That ought to be couching 
i t  in language that the development people 
can use. 
BELSLEY: I am not saying that it is not. 
I am saying that you must put it so that 
they can recognize that there is something 
there and they will use it. But, if the re- 
searcher insists that he is just going to 
communicate with himself, then we get back 
to the theology business. 
DEUTSCH: I recall a meeting held in 
Washington a couple of years ago on com- 
puter augmentation of human reasoning- 
which sounds like it would be very much 
allied with this type of program. And yet 
as I listened to more than 2 days of con- 
stant discussion, I heard some wonderful 
ideas on data retrieval systems that were 
quite advanced, I heard some wonderful ideas 
on storage techniques, and so forth. But 
nobody looked a t  the customer. The won- 
derful computerized methodologies provided 
the capability for a customer to use them, 
but nobody looked a t  human reasoning and 
the requirements it imposed on the computer 
programs. They only looked a t  making in- 
formation available for human reasoning. 
I feel that that did not tie the loop properly. 
That part of i t  was left open. I looked a t  
our title, again forgive me, "Applications 
of Research on Human Decisionmaking," let 
us say even human information processing. I 
think that this part has got to be tied in, 
tying the loop together, otherwise we take 
our material, but we do not achieve what 
I consider to be a basic human feeling or 
desire. We like to see results come from the 
things we do. If we can see some of the 
results of our research go into an Apollo 
capsule or a flight to Mars, then that is a 
wonderful reward system. Otherwise the 
reward system is that which we get from 
our peers, but is that sufficient to justify 
our efforts here? 
ELKIND: I guess we all realize that the 
reason we are having this conference is be- 
cause we have not done a very good job 
thus far. It is not surprising that you do 
not see many applications represented, only 
a few false or good starts. We will find out 
in a few years. 
Edwards has tried to do something. I 
would not be a bit surprised to see him get 
discouraged in about 6 months. 
PATTON: I would not be surprised to see 
him a mission controller in 6 more months. 
ELKIND : IS it a purpose of this meeting 
to discuss how to bring about more appli- 
cations? 1 think that that is reasonable. 
It may turn out that some ideas come forth. 
SWETS: You talked a b o u t a  conference 
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on computer augmentation of human reason- 
ing, where nothing really was directed to- 
ward the customer. I am wondering how 
many conferences you know of where the 
customer was invited a t  all, let alone in 
such quantities as have been invited to this 
meeting, primarily, as I previously pointed 
out, to keep us honest and to educate us. 
It is the first step in some respects, and 
frankly, I do not want to be too defensive 
about this, but i t  hurts a little to make a 
first step and have somebody say, "What 
have you done for us lately?" We are look- 
ing ahead. As the title suggests, we hope 
to identify a few applications or a few re- 
search ideas that look close to application, 
but if in point of fact we do not do that 
but let people leave in a slightly different 
state than they came, then I submit that 
that is not a bad objective. The value of 
a conference like this cannot be ascertained 
at its conclusion. If there is going to be any 
real value, as Birdsall pointed out, there 
must be a lot of hard work between people 
learning about development problems and 
people learning about research problems. 
It seems to me that the value, if any, of this 
conference will be apparent 5 years from 
now at the earliest. 
TRIEVE A. TANNER: One thing that 
should be pointed out is the fact that every- 
body who came to this conference did not feel 
obligated to do so. Some of the people here 
had no obligation at all to NASA and just 
the fact that they came indicates that they 
are interested in helping to solve our prob- 
lems. I think that is a good thing in itself. 
MILLER: May I say something from a 
customer's point of view? With due respect 
to Birdsall's comments that you need a mid- 
dleman, maybe you discount us from gain- 
ing some ideas from what we sit around 
and listen to. Elkind's mathematics befud- 
dled me, but he did strike a nerve when he 
talked about his feedback loop. It brought 
home a point that I put to bed years ago 
that was using a model of the actual system 
to determine what is wrong with the thing. 
Now I am going to go back and look a t  i t  
ON HUMAN DECISIONMAKING 
and see where I can apply that idea. This 
has happened several times. 
DEUTSCH : Maybe you are suggesting, in 
essence, that the audience is too restricted. 
Swets tried to keep i t  as a working group; 
and perhaps there are people who could 
benefit from some of the discussions and 
ideas that have been thrown out, but we 
are limited to what we have here. I assume 
there will be proceedings published. By the 
same token, i t  is reaching a limited clientele. 
Is there, in fact, a requirement for expand- 
ing a meeting of this sort? 
MARKOWITZ: You cannot argue both for 
more informality and a wider audience on 
line a t  the same time. I think those are 
incompatible. 
PATTON: I would love to have had 20 
people, such as Miller, sitting here just for 
the reason that he has spoken of as this 
being a success. But this is not easy. Again, 
it is something we will work toward if we 
have such a conference in the future. 
RATHERT: You are talking about com- 
munication problems between development 
and research. This is something that the old 
NACA wrestled wi,th for years and years. 
The problem was solved by arranging peri- 
odic conferences where the research workers 
got up and gave 20-minute papers and we 
then attempted to put the research in the 
context of something that couId be under- 
stood from that start. The whole subject 
of communication between the development 
people and the research people is one we 
could talk about for hours. I am in the mid- 
dle. I have that job of communication. 
There are a lot of factors inhibiting the 
flow of information. One of them might not 
occur to you. In the old NACA days we did 
not buy anything from anyone. We were 
not anyone's customer, and any time any- 
body in the aircraft industry had a problem, 
they came to us. The taxpayers all con- 
tributed to make us possible and to sit there. 
Our job was to solve their problems. 
Now we are a customer. The last thing 
in the world the man from North American 
Aviation would think of doing would be to 
come to me and say, "Hey, there is a problem 
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in aircraft control design I cannot solve, 
but I want some help," because that may 
disqualify him on the next research con- 
tract. This is just one of the many factors 
like this I could mention. How do you solve 
this communication problem? 
This point I mentioned is one of the many 
inhibiting factors. You said you would like 
to have 20 Millers here. Well, this is fine, but 
you are going to have trouble getting them. 
BELSLEY: AS long as we pay their way, 
they will come. 
RATHERT : But they will not discuss their 
problems frankly. 
BELSLEY: I t  depends on whom you ask, 
George. They must feel that we might be 
able to help them. But if they feel that our 
only purpose in life is to tell them they do 
not know what they are doing- 
RATHERT: We have got to get them to 
say that they need help. 
MARKOWITZ: We have come here and 
made, perhaps, sacrifices in the sense of 
admitting what can and what cannot be 
applied and of recognizing our own short- 
comings. And I think maybe we feel, per- 
haps unjustly from your point of view, that 
this is no more and no less than we can ask 
from a contractor. 
ATKINSON: I do not know how Miller 
gets in the center of all this, but I really 
found his comments very interesting. And 
I can see myself going down there and really 
becoming very interested in what is going 
on, and maybe having some input in terms 
of the training problems. I think nothing 
could be more disastrous than for someone 
to think that they are going to become more 
applied and consequently just take the stand- 
ard laboratory experiment and dress it up 
in some way, some artificial sense that simu- 
lates a NASA-type problem. I think that 
is the disturbing possibility. On the other 
hand, the possibility for communication is 
a very important one. I sometimes think 
the problem is that people often turn to us 
and say, "What is the answer?" When they 
really should be saying to us, "Is there an 
answer?" And if there is no answer, they 
should be happy with the fact that they 
have now supposedly gotten the necessary 
scientific evaluation and some judgments and 
also the information that there is a gap. 
RATHERT: Somebody once said that the 
problem is that we are asking you to climb 
down off the basic research perch and go 
down to the development area. What we are 
saying is that somehow the information must 
be communicated that you do have some- 
thing that would be of help. Secondly, what 
you have that is of help must be expressed 
in an understandable and usable form. 
ATKINSON: But I am afraid that that 
must be face-to-face contact. I do not think 
people can write about it. I cannot write 
about what may be useful to NASA. 
EDWARDS: It is two different kinds of 
communication. It  can be done, it just takes 
special effort. 
MARKOWITZ: I talked a little bit about 
road signs and made what seems to many of 
us very trivial application of concepts of 
signal detectability. I could have written 
about the principles until I was blue in the 
face a t  as low a layman's level as you would 
care to have me go, as anybody would care 
to have me go,- and few in the Bureau of 
Public Roads would recognize those con- 
cepts. But when I use the words "stop sign," 
that is different. Many are product oriented 
in a different way, and they do not know to 
look for principles. No matter how well I 
explain the principles or the uses of the 
theory, until I get to their product, they 
cannot appreciate it. I think i t  is not too 
pessimistic of you to say there are too many 
products. 
EDWARDS : As I see it, you have described 
some of the principles that underlie that kind 
of communication. 
MARKOWITZ: I am saying a t  the same 
time that there are too many products. I 
simply cannot go around showing the same 
sort of payoff matrix over and over again 
first with stop signs, then with apples, then 
with airplanes, then with what-have-you. 
RATHERT: Maybe instead of this com- 
puter going between Russian and English 
it should go between technical English and 
English. 

Conclusion 
JOHN A. SWETS 
Bolt, Beraeek G Newman, Znc. 
JOHN A.  SWETS: Let me begin this con- 
cluding session by attempting a summation. 
I would remind you of some themes of our 
discussion: some problems and ideas that 
we have turned to on more than one occasion 
in the past few days. 
Several people presented operational prob- 
lems in need of research help. Rathert dis- 
cussed a variety of problems having to do 
with the flight path-the attitude about it, 
the short- and long-term control of it. He 
isolated problems having to do with terrain 
following, weapon system operation, collision 
avoidance, choice to go automatic or manual, 
allocation of function, and so forth. Miller 
alluded to many problems in discussing th,e 
function of flight controllers. Chatham and 
Patton raised a variety of problems con- 
nected with long-term missions. Belsley 
pointed out that i t  is essential to "substitute 
measurements for pilot ratings." No one, 
he said, is close to doing this. Belsley also 
emphasized the problem of "quantifying re- 
serve work capacity." People are working 
on this-Alluisi, for one. However, no one 
would assert that we are very close to solv- 
ing this problem. The specific problem 
Belsley hammered on us was "the problem 
of landing under poor visibility." The pilot 
breaks out, and has to decide in a brief time 
whether to land or not. Here we seem to 
be coming a little bit closer to the point of 
applying results of behavioral research. 
Tanner talked about research directly re- 
lated to this problem. 
I would like to come back to the problem 
later, but let me mention now some other 
themes that came up. 
We talked on various occasions about 
"task analysis" and the requirements for 
predicting from a battery of tests to an 
actual situation. Senders pointed out that, 
if we could really do that, then we could 
bypass simulation. Someone mentioned the 
task analysis, performed by Serendipity 
Associates, that disclosed that the spaceship 
needed a commander who was not the pilot. 
Miller pointed out an interesting and, per- 
haps, not too strange result, that is, that 
every time a task analysis is made for his 
group, it turns out that the people who are 
doing the job now could not possibly be 
doing that job. The analysis suggests that 
it takes at  least twice the number to do what 
they are already doing. 
Another item we discussed was the pos- 
sibility of a "taxonomy of decisions." This 
subject received impetus when Yntema re- 
sponded to Rathert's challenge. I think we 
remember Yntema's three categories well 
enough, so I will not repeat them. 
Another related theme concerned the 
"allocation of functions between man and 
machine." Yntema made the point that 
computers are likely to be making decisions 
where really we would prefer what he 
called "the leaven of human judgment." 
In some of the examples we talked about, 
machines do about as well as humans. 
Yntema gave one example in connection 
with judging the seriousness of air-traffic 
conditions. 
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Jeffress gave another example where ma- 
chines were detecting a t  least as well as 
humans-although the real import of that 
very nice piece of research is that if we 
can predict human performance on a trial- 
by-trial basis in a psychophysical setting, 
then we are getting close to understanding 
what the human is doing. 
The question of allocation of function came 
up again when Edwards made a prediction 
that, with respect to long-term flights, future 
flight controllers would be people with high 
school, rather than college, diplomas. There 
would be a need for computerizing decisions 
because the people who could stand the te- 
dium of controlling long-term flights would 
be people incapable of making some of the 
more complex decisions. Rathert made the 
interesting observation that, while the capa- 
bilities of flight controllers may be going 
down, the movement is in the other direc- 
tion with respect to air-traffic control and 
the SST. The two paths might cross or they 
might meet, and there should be a common 
focus of interest in what it is the controller 
should do and what decisions might be made 
better by computers. 
That led us to the subject of "training." 
I recall from that discussion Rathert's ques- 
tion of whether or not there is a discipline 
that will undertake to "move decisions from 
category 3 to category 1" in Yntema's sys- 
tem. The more I think about it, there may 
be people who can undertake to do that. 
Atkinson might be one of those people. His 
background in learning and memory, and 
in computer-assisted instruction, gives him 
the right qualifications. 
We talked a little about "selection and 
motivation." My contribution a t  this point 
is that John Pont, who is the football coach 
at Indiana, chose his team by giving all the 
candidates a personality test on the first day 
of practice. He chose the members of the 
team according to whether or not they scored 
high on what he called "personality factor 
16," which isolates winners. He found his 
winners. He put the seniors on defense, the 
sophomores on offense, and got to the Rose 
Bowl, quite to everyone's surprise. 
DISCUSSION 
STEVEN E. BELSLEY: But look what happened.' 
SWETS : Another surprise. 
One theme of our discussion was "inadequate 
data." We talked about sparse data in one-shot 
missions versus a lot of data in idealized settings. 
We talked about the difficulty of getting any data a t  
all in a certain box or cell of Tanner's payoff matrix, 
down in "coffin corner" where the pilot lands when, 
in fact, he should not have. Clearly, there is work to 
be done on the very high criterion, on the strict 
criterion, where false alarms are not tolerated, where 
it is very difficult to get any data to measure the 
false-alarm rate. The thrust of psychophysics in the 
last few years has been to get the false alarms up 
there where you can measure them. We run into 
problems for which that  is not a simple thing to do. 
The Navy in some instances claims to want false- 
alarm rates of lo-.'. Those rates are difficult to mea- 
sure; clearly, we need good theory to get from where 
we are to where we would like to be. 
Still another theme that  I detected had to do with 
"mathematical models: their usefulness." Senders 
spoke of the bed of Procrustes and told us how mod- 
* Ed. note :  1968 Rose Bowl, USC 14, Indiana 3. 
els frequently determine experiments. I thought 
Elkind put that  in a more favorable light when he 
remarked that  the light is rather bright under cer- 
tain model lamps, and we might do well to look 
where the light is bright. I think modern control 
theory was Elkind's example. 
JOHN W. SENDERS: Let us not carry that too far, 
though. 
SWETS: I think Edwards was the man who said, 
"Let us not carry that  too far," and commented that  
decision models, in particular, are not a panacea. 
They do not really resolve disagreement, but they do 
focus it. The models provide a structure in which i t  
becomes clear on which values or probabilities you 
are disagreeing. My aspirations may be too low, but 
I think that is something of an achievement. Think- 
ing of Edwards and thinking of mathematical models 
and what they can do (particularly decision models), 
we spent a fair amount of time talking about apply- 
ing models to complex real situations. Models seem 
to work fairly well under simple, idealized labora- 
tory conditions. They are very difficult to apply, as  
Ward was able to point out, in complex situations. 
There is a problem here with respect to a conference 
like this: what you must do first with a model is to 
apply it in the laboratory, to refine i t  enough so that  
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you can apply i t  in a real situation. That, of course, 
takes a lot of time. So if one desires tha t  the talk 
be about models tha t  have been applied in real situa- 
tions, the talk must necessarily be about very old 
models. That is  not much fun and, in fact, most of 
us are reluctant to talk about very old models. 
We next discussed a related topic. I think Birdsall 
got us going on this: Does one apply research ideas 
by setting up communication either on a man-to-man 
basis or on a 20-people-around-the-conference-table 
basis, or does one apply research ideas by a good 
deal of diligent work, like 100 men intervening be- 
tween one research idea and one real solution? He 
was a little concerned that  we have spent some time 
talking about "research" on the one hand and "real 
problems" on the other hand, but he did not hear 
much of "real solutions." 
I think we did, however, communicate to each 
other something about real problems. I am going to 
take Rathert's advice and go home and read Davies' 
book on handling the big jets. Someone may accept 
Miller's offer to take a special course in flight con- 
trolling, which he would be happy to make available 
to anybody here. Rathert has suggested that  his 
simulators are an excellent base for an experiment 
and might also be available to people here. Certainly 
Miller and Edwards gave many of us a much better 
feel than we had before for the flight controllers' 
task. I remember very well that dramatic tape re- 
playing their conversations. Birdsall's stricture sug- 
gests, by the way, that  the value of a conference 
like this will not be apparent a t  its conclusion; that, 
if there is any considerable value, by necessity i t  
will become apparent only a t  some later point. 
Yntema, in reinforcing Birdsall's point, noted that 
we  nus st "organize to bring ideas from the research 
stage into the advanced development stage." He 
emphasized that  i t  takes a big organization to do 
that. One man to one idea to one problem is not 
likely to work. I t  may be the wrong man for the 
problem or for the research idea. We must find a 
mechanism or an  organization that  will support 
many people working between research and advanced 
development. 
Some of us, following Belsley's lead over dinner 
last night, felt that  the low-visibility-landing prob- 
lem might be a reasonable focus for organizing to 
bring research ideas into contact with real problems. 
Is there some sense in choosing such a problem and 
trying to organize about i t  in order to get some 
research ideas into practice? Does anyone want to 
speak on that  point, either to the advisability of 
focusing on such a project or, hopefully, with some 
suggestions about a mechanism? 
DOUWE B. YNTEMA: Maybe we ought to ask 
whether that is the big problem? 
SWETS: Douwe is  looking a t  you, Belsley. He 
wants to check that  out. I s  the problem of landing- 
the problen~s surrounding landing, breakout, mini- 
mum rules, and so forth-the big problem? Is that  
the one to which some concerted effort might well be 
directed? 
BELSLEY: I t  is a problem that  everybody is 
worrying about, a t  least around here, in one way or 
another. It is  a problem I feel has not had research 
results, of the kind we have discussed, applied to it. 
Decisionmaking theory can be used in many ways 
and, a s  f a r  as  NASA is concerned, I say there are 
two places that  i t  can be done. One is Mission Con- 
trol Center, and---outside of trying to structure air 
traffic control problems, which we have not attempted, 
nor I think will attempt in the near future-the 
other problem is to  determine what is going on 
between the time the pilot gets on his landing ap- 
proach course and the time he touches down. The 
reason I think this is an important problem is that  
a t  the last Hunlan Factors Symposium, held in Palo 
Alto last May, we had invited as  one of our speakers 
Captain Beck, who is on the Air Line Pilots Associa- 
tion (ALPA) Flight Safety Committee. He, inci- 
dentally, flies the Atlantic route, but he had come to 
Ames before and talked to us about the breakout 
problem. He came to give us a talk scheduled for 
45 minutes. We had to drag him, screaming, from 
the podium after 1% hours. But his message was 
very straightforward. I t  was that  when a pilot 
breaks out of the present minimums, he does not 
know whether he has time to make a decision on 
whether he should land or not. If he finds out that  
his instruments have been slightly off and he had to 
make the correction, then he must be able to ascer- 
tain that  fact immediately and to do something about 
it. In the change from going on instruments to going 
on visual and coming back on instruments again, 
sufficient time has elapsed to compromise the entire 
landing situation. His plea was: I s  there a straight- 
forward way to assess the problem so that  a pilot in 
his position, representing ALPA and also flying, can 
make a rational determination of what some of these 
rules ought to be? This is a perfect example in 
which you should apply decision theory to establish- 
ing these rules. I t  is like the mission rules. They are 
establishing then1 and carrying them out, all in one 
organization. The aircraft-landing situation has 
placed the manufacturers, ALPA (which is  the union 
and has certain methods by which i t  can convince 
the others), and the airlines in a triumvirate that  
argues among itself. You need some data. It seems 
to me that  the most straightforward way of getting 
some reasonable data is to apply this kind of research 
to that problem. 
I am not saying i t  is the most important problem 
in the world. I say i t  is an important problem and 
nobody is  doing anything on it. It is going to get 
more important as time goes on. 
YNTEMA: That answers that question. The sec- 
ond question that  someone who had struggled with 
human factors work over many years asked is: HOW 
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many years do you have to solve this problem before in the decision-theory field to this particular problem, 
i t  becomes obsolete? that will not be the complete breakthrough in solving 
BELSLEY: I do not know how to answer that  the whole problem. It will be one important element, 
question, because I do not think it is going to become though. A number of others are completely outside 
obsolete. the field of decision problems. 
I do not think that  the situation is going to be JEROME I. ELKIND: What are some of the other 
such that  there will be an automatic system in this principal problems? 
country for a long period of time. If  you turn over 
the landing operation to an automatic system, then 
that  puts a cutoff on the thing. I cannot see ALPA 
doing this. 
YNTEMA: Suppose i t  takes 3 years from now to 
get results into the field. Is that  still useful? 
GEORGE A. RATHERT: Even if you go to an auto- 
matic system, you will still have the human monitor- 
ing problem. The man needs a set of criteria and a 
set of mission rules. 
BELSLEY: NO: vou will not. I t  is  either all one 
, " 
way or not. And you are not going to be able to 
monitor, get that  out of your mind. If you go auto- 
matic, the pilot does not do anything. There is a 
point a t  which he cannot do anything. You cannot 
expect him to do anything. 
RATHERT: Let the record show I disagree. 
BELSLEY: That is why they have not solved it. 
The British are  making landings on automatic and, 
if they t r y  to pull off and go around when they are 
almost a t  touchdown, they have had it. 
JOSEPH MARKOWITZ: That is caused by the dy- 
namics of the craft, not the speed of the decision- 
making. 
LLOYD A. JEFFRESS: I am thinking vaguely of 
something called GCA. 
BELSLEY: The GCA works, but does what the 
Mission Control Center does. I t  transfers control and 
command of the aircraft out of the cockpit onto the 
ground. So you must convince the ALPA that  that  is 
where they want their control, and then they will 
transfer it. But they have not done it yet, have they? 
They have had GCA since the end of World War 11, 
and when certain people use it, i t  works like a charm. 
You know that ;  everybody knows it. 
MELVIN SADOFF: Addressing myself to the first 
question-whether the specific category I1 problem 
is a real one and will be with us for several years- 
I do not think there is any question about that. I 
think, further, that  you can consider the category I1 
problem as  one of a spectrum of problems related to 
landing in reduced visibility, from category I1 down 
to category 111. There will be a spectrum of con- 
figurations starting with the current way of han- 
dling approaches-which is partly manual and partly 
automatic-to a completely automatic system. Per- 
haps for the SST, 8 or 10 years from now, we will 
have completely automated and reliable zero-zero 
landing capability. I want to point out that  the 
decision problem is a significant part of the overall 
problem, but i t  is not the only one. In  other words, 
if you aFe successful in applying the talent available 
SADOFF: According to Captain Beck of TWA, a 
change in display configuration may obviate the 
whole problem. For example, with a head-up display, 
there is no decisionmaking problem of the kind we 
have been talking about because the head-up display 
provides a symbolic "real-world" display to the crew. 
In this way, the decisionmaking problem associated 
with transition from panel instruments to the out- 
side world would probably be eliminated. There are 
many other aspects of the problem we could go into. 
We have been thinking (for example, in the category 
I1 problem) about subtle effects such a s  differences 
in the visual-performance characteristics of the two 
crewmembers, the captain and the copilot. I believe 
TWA handles category I1 problems by having the 
young copilot t ry  to establish visual contact. He is 
looking outside. When he establishes visual contact 
the older, and perhaps myopic, captain looks up from 
the panel to the outside and he may not see the 
runway. It may turn out to be important to establish 
visual-performance compatibility between the two 
crewmembers in allocating task functions. The point 
I wanted to make is that  the decision problem, 
though important, is not the whole story. 
YNTEMA: That bears heavily on the second ques- 
tion I was asking, which I think is a crucial one in 
launching into a human-factors effort. I s  i t  possible 
that  this whole problem will vanish with the head-up 
display, that  the problem of breakout and decision is  
going to be so modified? 
RATHERT: I think that there is an easy straight- 
forward answer. If you get the head-up display (let 
us postulate that  a genius in the display group 
comes up with a perfect working head-up display 
and puts i t  in the cockpit), what will you do with it? 
The minimums will drop from 200 feet to 100 feet, 
because the airlines will then have a broader cate- 
gory in which to complete their scheduled flights. 
The airlines, through economic pressure, will say, 
"Fine, we have a head-up display. I t  helps a lot. 
We will move down to 100 feet." And you will have 
exactly the same decision process. 
SADOFF: One of the potential problems with head- 
up displays is lack of registration. There might be 
the false-alarm kind of situation that Swets sum- 
marized and the decision would have to be made on 
how closely to register the head-up display to avoid 
"hypochondria" indications of system malfunction. 
For a category I1 Aight situation, experts in the field 
like Naish a t  Douglas have established acceptable 
out-of-tolerance registration of the head-up display 
with respect to the real world. Additional tests are 
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required to establish whether a decisionmaking prob- 
lem would exist with regard to the crew's ability to 
detect a real malfunction. 
RATHERT: May I also respectfully point out that  
i t  will be a long time before you are going to have a 
head-up display in a Taylor Cub. Those people are 
just as precious to us as the airline pilots. 
SWETS: Will YOU tell me what "category 11" is? 
SADOFF: "Category 11" is the jargon that defines 
a certain reduced-visibility condition defined by a 
series of numbers: the altitude a t  which you break 
out (150 feet), and the slant range (the runway 
visual slant range when you first establish contact 
with the runway lights, about 1250 feet). In other 
words, that is the visibility you have: 1250 feet 
slant range from the aircraft to the runway, and 150 
feet to see the ground if you look directly below. 
In  "category 111" there are several subcategories; 
but, in decreasing visibility, they run through a, b,  
and c. I do not know the specific numbers, but cate- 
gory IIIc is completely zero-zero. You may even 
need guidance to taxi back to the terminal. 
RATHERT: If you are cleared for a category I1 
landing, and as  you come down to 150 feet you can- 
not establish visual contact with the runway, then 
you cannot proceed with the landing. You must go 
around. In  other words, the categories are premade 
decisions that the conditions have to meet a certain 
minimum before a pilot can proceed with that type 
of landing. The total airplane system-and to a cer- 
tain extent each pilot, through our rather compli- 
cated licensing system-is cleared for category I1 
operation, or category I11 operation, and so on. The 
airports likewise. 
SWETS: Have we established that  the problem is 
real and will be here long enough for human-factors 
research to do something about it? 
WARD EDWARDS: I worry about the identification 
of that  particular problem as  the one to put con- 
certed effort into because i t  seems to me that, in the 
first place, i t  is, politically speaking, more than 
usually messy. In the second place, because i t  mixes 
what I see as  many different varieties of human- 
factors problems into the same pot, i t  may have 
advantages; but, if we are talking about decision 
processes, such a mixture may have some disadvan- 
tages. I s  there some reason why we are fixing on 
that  problem? 
SWETS: NO. 
YNTEMA: Belsley said several times that it was 
the problem. 
BELSLEY: NO. I said there were several kinds of 
problems. Let me make my position clear. I guess I 
have not. I am not necessarily saying that  this group 
should work on this specific problem, but I would 
like to see the fruits of the basic research on decision- 
making applied in some way to a real-life problem. 
Edwards is engaged in trying to determine some 
coefficients, or to sharpen the focus, on his condi- 
tional probabilities within a real-life situation. And, 
hopefully, when he gets these things, he will be able 
to apply i t  to a situation that  is even more complex 
than the one he has been working with. Maybe he  
will not, but this is the intent. I have been hoping 
that  since the airplanes are here to stay and are 
getting bigger and better and more complicated, that  
we can apply the fruits of decisionmaking research 
to these kinds of problems also. And for me to say 
that  this problem is the only one i t  should be applied 
to is not necessarily true, but I would like to see 
someone take a crack a t  it. This is the one, as  I see 
it-this breaking out and trying to decide whether 
thee shall go around with me or not a t  that  point 
in time-that is very crucial. And a lot of people 
are flying behind the pilot. I t  is going to make a big 
splash some day, and maybe you will be flying behind 
the pilot. You certainly are not going to be flying 
behind an astronaut. 
MARKOWITZ: About how many times a year is  
this decision made under category I1 conditions, the 
decision to go around? 
EDWARDS : Go-arounds are very infrequent. 
MARICOWITZ: I want to know how often that  
decision has to be made. 
BELSLEY: He wants to know how many landings 
they make under category I1 conditions, tha t  is all 
he is asking. They make a lot of them depending 
on the location. At London they are making them 
all the time. 
YNTE~VIA: HOW many a day, probably? 
BELSLEY: Well, you know what happens, what 
they do. Let me put i t  this way: For example, 
every 30 seconds they bring an airplane into Chicago 
O'Hare. The minute the weather gets sticky, the 
time required goes up to  a minute and a half, and 
then the controllers s tar t  to stack airplanes. As the 
ceiling gets lower, the stacking gets worse. These 
things are not just unique, they occur all the time. 
MARKOWITZ: On a bad day a t  O'Hare in 2 hours, 
you might say 100? 
BELSLEY: YOU could bring that many aboard, but 
not necessarily. 
YNTEMA: There are probably less than 1000 per 
day in the United States? 
BELSLEY: But i t  ties up airports. 
MARKOWITZ: The question is how much data 
could one expect to get in a real situation per unit 
time? 
BELSLEY: I do not know that  you are going to 
get i t  in a real situation. 
RATHERT: Assuming you could use the actual 
landing under category I1 conditions, you would 
have a t  least 1000 per day. I say this with some 
confidence because they have set out to record land- 
ings, and this sort of thing, and this is the kind of 
data production you get out of it. Noise measure- 
ments are another example. The approach must be 
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made in a different way because of tine noise prob- 
lems. They record these. 
SWETS: Let me clarify one thing. It was not in 
my mind nor Belsley's that  the people who happen 
to be in this room a t  this time without exception 
focus in concert on a particular problem. On the 
other hand, we came here expecting to be somewhat 
frustrated, and indeed are, with respect to applica- 
tions of research. The question is really what might 
a 'easonable step be to let us feel that we were vent- 
ing some of that  frustration. It is not enough to talk 
about how poorly we are doing, or about how well 
we are doing if you would rather take that  tack. A 
reasonable question is: What might we be doing? 
YNTEMA: Before going to tbat, could I make a 
remark? 
SWETS: We were about to leave that. 
YNTEMA: I would think that, generalizing from 
other fields, the way that  information crosses that  
boundary from research into advanced development 
is not very often by the push from the research man. 
One can always think of spectacular examples, but 
usually I think i t  is someone reaching from the other 
direction toward the research. I would suggest that 
i t  is someone who has been trained to think about 
where yo3 can make a big difference in a system, 
as opposed to putting in a lot of effort and making 
a small difference. If you push real hard, you might 
make a 1-dB difference. The way to look for the 
practicality of the applications, I would suggest, is 
more in some direction of the sort that Birdsall has 
symbolized, arranging that  the reach come from the 
other side. It is more a matter of people who know 
the problems reaching toward a class of research 
things than a research man saying, "Here is some- 
thing I can apply," because he will not think of 
something like the head-up display. He will not think 
plies only to a corner of the problem. The creativity 
of the fact that  his particular field of research ap- 
here, and it takes a lot of creativity to do this kind 
of thing, must come from the basis of knowledge of 
what the problem is. That  is, the developnlent man 
must be central, because usually this kind of practi- 
cal thing is done by reaching for research results in 
a number of fields. 
RATHERT: I am sure you will give us credit for 
pushing on both sides. We are pushing both sides 
equally hard. I think somebody used the word "frus- 
tration," too, which is exactly my state and the state 
of many people like me. Frustration a t  not being 
able to get these two together is so high that  I am 
willing to push you toward the middle and push the 
development man toward the middle equally. 
YNTEMA: I would suggest that you put your 
energy into pushing from the other side. No amount 
of urging research men to phrase their results in 
a form that will be accessible to people concerned 
about practical applications, or urging them to use 
their imagination and creativity to think of practical 
applications, is going to accomplish nearly as  much 
as  reaching from the other side. 
R. MARK PATTON: I feel compelled to take the 
position that more will be gained by pushing the re- 
searchers. Maybe this is because i t  is what we do 
more often, simply because we deal, with the re- 
searchers more than with the operational people. But 
we do not feel that  we have to make unreasonable 
demands-we simply feel tbat  we must keep the 
elbow in the back a little bit. When someone such as  
Edwards actually likes to have our elbow in his back, 
that  is ideal from our point of view. You have to 
remember that NASA is a mission-oriented agency, 
and is not in the business of doing sky-blue research 
for its own sake. Some people think that  I believe 
i n  supporting research with no thought of applica- 
tion, but this is simply not true. When anyone is 
supported by a mission-oriented agency, it seems 
to me that there is an obligation to consider that 
agency's needs. This means that  one's job is not 
really done until the results are in a useful form. 
I might add that I encourage people to t ry  for the 
application, without destroying the original format 
of their work, which I think is different from start- 
ing with the application, and tailoring the research 
to fit. I have no objection to the latter course, in fact 
a portion of our research is generated this way. 
But I feel that some of our best ideas may come 
from people who start in the laboratory, and attempt 
to apply their findings to some real-world problem. 
So I think that  a portion of our program should be 
developed on this basis. 
YNTEMA: Could I say that  I think i t  has been 
a great meeting. I think i t  has followed very much 
the pattern that  you were laying out. For someone 
not involved in this dialog, I find tha t  this has been 
a very impressive interchange. 
However, a tone seems to have crept in from time 
to time: "Would i t  not be nice if the people who are 
doing this research could have a brainstorm, a 
creative idea about how i t  could be used." What I 
am suggesting is  that  they just are not mentally 
equipped to do it. I t  is not that  they do not have 
the brains, but they do not have, and practically 
cannot have, the information on which that  creativity 
is based, except in a few odd cases, like someone 
who becomes a flight controller. Those cases would 
be rare. 
PATTON: I just cannot see it. You know, if com- 
pany A wants to hire a pilot to tell them about 
categories I1 and 111, pilots can be hired. If univer- 
sity B wants, in the future, to turn in on their grant 
proposals an amount of money for consultation by 
an airline captain, this can be done. I think the 
sources of information are there. I do not think you 
must necessarily become a pilot to know about air- 
planes. I think the essence of fruitful dialog is in 
bringing different categories of information together 
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into one body. No one person can have every capa- 
bility, so we must use a strategy to get what we need 
to solve a problem. 
I think some general remarks just by way of 
thanks for your attendance are in order. As Tanner 
said, some of you in particular were not bound to 
come to us because you are not our grantees or con- 
tractors. I guess even the grantees and contractors 
could have said that  they had the flu and not come. 
Anyway, we do thank you for attending. We thank 
you for your thoughts and ideas. My fear of a meet- 
ing such as this is not that we will have another one 
of a similar nature and make the same mistakes, 
but that i t  will not be exploited properly, because I 
think that  is the essence of the problem of meetings. 
For 3 days everyone thinlts great thoughts, has a 
great time, and then goes back to what he was doing 
in the first place. I am anxious to keep driving a t  
the result in the sense of-exploiting is a poor word 
-in the sense of using the things that we have de- 
veloped in the best way. 
SWETS: The final comment; I want to add my 
thanks to Patton's, to the speakers, and also to thank 
our hosts. Thanks very much for 3 good days. 
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